The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Regime Challenged

Presentation by Olli Heinonen at the Pacific Basin Nuclear Conference, March 20, 2012, in Busan, South Korea, in advance of the 2012 Nuclear Security Summit in Seoul on March 26-27, 2012.

In this presentation, I will concentrate on four topics of importance that challenge both currently and in the future the nuclear non-proliferation regime: the impact of a nuclear renaissance, challenges posed by recent and future proliferation cases, nuclear disarmament, and the role of the IAEA.

During the last two decades, there have been successes but also disappointments in fighting against nuclear proliferation. On the positive side, we witnessed the dismantlement of nuclear weapons programs in South Africa, Iraq, and Libya. The NPT was indefinitely extended and continues to be the global framework against the spread of nuclear proliferation. On the downside, the withdrawal of North Korea from the NPT and its subsequent nuclear tests charted a dangerous and negative course. The international community has also not been able to curb Iran’s uranium enrichment and suspected military nature of its nuclear program. We see Iran marching slowly but steadily towards amassing nuclear weapons’ capability. Syria stands in flagrant violation in its safeguards undertakings. The IAEA has not been able to receive clarifications requested from Myanmar on its nuclear activities. FMCT negotiations in Geneva are stuck. However, on the positive side, the establishment a weapons of mass destruction free zone in the Middle East warrants a cautious optimism.

Some of these challenges and obstacles may sound impossible to overcome. To this end I would like to cite Louis D. Brandeis who said: “Most of the things worth of doing in the world had been declared impossible before they were done.” So it is time to talk the talk, and walk the walk to make it happen.

Nuclear Renaissance

Let me start by assessing the impact of a nuclear renaissance on non-proliferation efforts. There are currently about 435 nuclear power reactors in the world. According to IAEA estimates[1], 60 countries are considering using nuclear power by 2030 25 of them are countries which do not currently have any nuclear plants. The conservative estimate on the total number of power reactors expected to come online by 2030 is 90[2]. The higher projections are as high as 350 power reactors by 2030. This will have a significant impact to the IAEA program as a whole covering nuclear safety, security, and safeguards.

While the Fukushima nuclear crisis reversed the course of nuclear energy in some countries such as Japan, Germany, and Italy, many other countries, including our host, the Republic of Korea, continue to rely on nuclear energy to power their economies and industry. Nuclear energy continues to remain a part of their energy security mix, and expanded nuclear energy growth can be expected to continue, accompanied by more stringent scrutiny given to the “3-Ss”.

So what needs to be done to ensure that nuclear energy is used in a safe, secure and proper manner? There are various ways to mitigate proliferation risks associated with the expansion of nuclear energy, particularly with regard to enrichment and spent-fuel handling, such as providing assurances on fuel supply and developing fuel take back options[3]. The experiences at Fukushima do support the case for a permanent solution to centralized, long-term storage or disposal of spent fuel.

The idea of multinational enrichment centres is an important step, but one that needs to overcome certain hurdles. As things currently stand, there is no shortage of uranium enrichment services. The establishment of multinational enrichment centres (MNC) to politically unstable regions will not be an attraction to technology holders and investors. Technology holders may worry about risks associated with “hijacking” their technologies. We should also keep in our minds that A. Q. Khan got access to knowhow while serving in a multinational enterprise, URENCO. In other words, while MNCs and new enrichment technologies such as SILEX[4] should be pursued, emphasis should be made in parallel to ensure that there are adequate and commercially attractive enrichment services available to minimize the need to build unnecessary enrichment plants. That said, despite whatever incentives offered, a (hopefully) small number of states could still choose to build their own domestic enrichment capabilities. Individual and targeted approaches will be needed to address these cases.

A Changing Nuclear Proliferation Landscape

There is also the issue of adjusting non-proliferation efforts to a different and shifting external environment. Proliferation risks are being exacerbated by globalization. We have witnessed the emergence of covert nuclear trade networks whose activities span the globe. Such networks conceal their clandestine shipments within legitimate trade, often taking advantage of weaknesses of the export control systems.

We need to acknowledge that the knowhow on sensitive technologies is spreading. A. Q. Khan network and other players not only distributed equipment, but provided detailed information about centrifuge design, manufacturing, testing and operation. The genie is also out of the bottle on information related to: laser uranium enrichment, uranium conversion, reprocessing, and plutonium production reactors. The IAEA’s investigations into the A. Q. Khan network revealed that much of the sensitive information on centrifuge enrichment and nuclear weapons related information was stored and distributed in electronic form. The actions of the network have shown a new proliferation pathway: cyber. At this stage, the international community is ill equipped to combat this phenomena.

Another emerging threat is that of nuclear terrorism. As a remnant from the Cold War, small tactical nuclear weapons – a terrorist’s dream – remain deployed in numerous states. NATO and Russia should urgently proceed with the reduction and elimination of this risk which remain an unfinished business.

Many of the tools needed to deal with above challenges fall beyond the purview of the global verification regime. However, what the IAEA can do is to ensure that it develops an adapted safeguards approach that can join the dots in terms of the data it has and an analysis-focused approach to understanding data and information. To do this, more information and advanced information analysis is required. A universal implementation of Additional Protocols and access to new information sources, such as those maintained by the Nuclear Suppliers Group, would facilitate the process. New information analysis methodologies and tools are vital cornerstones for an information driven safeguards. It is of importance that the tools will be developed to assess proliferation risks, which are essential to ensure that the IAEA resources are used in a focussed and effective way.

At the same time, let me put down a qualifier here. Information analysis should clearly not replace inspections; but it is an important supplement in directing and focussing to infield work. To continue to provide effective safeguards, the IAEA needs to tap into modern communication technologies, take advantage of up-to-date instruments, and use remote monitoring to the maximum extent possible. In other words, to do more with less, and in a smarter and most effective possible way.

Reinforcement

Closely linked to the issue of safeguards is the question of compliance, and I would like to say a few words here. The Iraq nuclear file was on the table for a dozen years. We have been working with the North Korean case since the summer of 1992. Along the way we have witnessed the withdrawal of North Korea from the NPT. Nine years have passed since the Agency first raised questions regarding the nuclear programme of Iran. Four years has passed from the bombing of a nuclear reactor in Dair Alzour, and the international community still waits for answers from Syria about serious questions raised. It would therefore appear that current measures to ensure compliance and to allow speedier resolution of issues needs to be reviewed. This will directly impact upon the integrity of the international proliferation regime, and the authority of the IAEA as well as the United Nations Security Council, in ensuring a safe and secure nuclear world order.

In September 2007, an installation under construction at Al Kibar/Dair Alzour in Syria was destroyed in an air attack. Subsequently the IAEA was provided information which pointed in the direction that the building under construction could have been a gas-cooled graphite moderated reactor. When IAEA visited the site in summer 2008, Syrian authorities did not permit the IAEA to fully investigate the characteristics of the destroyed building nor did the IAEA gain access to other sites which were considered to be functionally related to the destroyed building. The samples taken by the IAEA from Al Kibar indicated the presence of man-made uranium, a type of uranium later found in samples taken at the Damascus research reactor. Whether the uranium particles at these two sites originate from the same sources or not still remains to be investigated, but it is alarming that Syria had conducted uranium conversion activities without meeting its safeguards reporting obligations.

The findings of the IAEA indicate that there has been and likely still is nuclear material, facilities and activities in Syria which should have been declared to the IAEA under the comprehensive safeguards agreement. The IAEA has not yet used all the rights from its verification repertoire, including a special inspection that enforces its rights to access at locations and facilities to do its job.

Meanwhile, faced with deteriorating evidence and information at Dair Alzour, as time drags on and stonewalling continues, the authority of the IAEA is eroding in step. This is detrimental to the non-proliferation regime and sets precedents for future proliferators. Whether the UN Security Council can do something to this end remains to be seen.

Let me now turn to Iran.

Since 2003 the IAEA has issued more than 30 reports on the implementation of the safeguards agreement in Iran and half a dozen United Nations Security Council resolutions have been passed. But the latest IAEA report continues to state that “the Agency is unable to provide credible assurance about the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities in Iran, and therefore to conclude that all nuclear material in Iran is in peaceful activities[5].”

On the contrary, Iran is increasing its enrichment related activities. Iran has continued with the operation of FEP and PFEP at Natanz, and the construction of a new enrichment plant at Fordow. Iran has started the enrichment of uranium up to 20% U-235 at PFEP, and more recently it has tripled the production, and moved a bulk of the production to the Fordow Fuel Enrichment Plant. This, together with already existing stocks of 3.5 % and 20 % enriched uranium will put Iran in a position to produce at the end of 2012, 120-150 kgs of high enriched uranium[6].

Iran has also continued with the construction of its IR-40 reactor and heavy water production activities. The Agency has not been permitted to take samples of the heavy water which is stored at UCF, and has not been provided with access to the Heavy Water Production Plant.

In engaging North Korea, several key hurdles have been faced. First, North Korea shows a poor proliferation record. It was the suspected supply source of UF6 to Libya via the A.Q. Khan network. There is also mounting evidence that North Korea was involved in the construction of a secret nuclear reactor at Dair Alzour in Syria in 2007. It is plausible that North Korean personnel assisted Syria in building the reactor. There are also allegations of North Korean assistance provided to Myanmar’s emerging nuclear activities, which makes the point of proliferation of North Korean human expertise and know-how an added concern.

On March 22, 2011, North Korea’s official news agency, KCNA, portrayed Libya’s decision to give up its nuclear weapons as a mistake that opened the country to NATO intervention following its domestic Arab Spring uprising. Such conclusions drawn by North Korea make an already difficult case to engage North Korea to give up its nuclear weapon deterrence that much harder. At the same time, the alternative of disengagement will in all likelihood bring about greater problems. A positive development is the agreement reached on February 29, 2012 between the US and the DPRK on the moratorium on nuclear testing, missile testing and uranium enrichment in Nyonbyon. However, the agreement is facing its first hurdles due to the announcement of North Korea on the launch of a satellite in April 2012.

When we are looking at these three proliferation cases, there are a number of lessons – positive and negative – learnt. First, facts reported by the IAEA are essential for the international community in assessing the compliance and risks of possible clandestine activities. Second, the IAEA verification scheme is biting when it fully exercises its verification rights, and when it is provided with the requisite cooperation.. Third, when countries face questions raised by the IAEA, those that chose to turn the course and / or cooperated to remove concerns and ambiguities resolved their nuclear dossiers in a satisfactory manner. Fourth, when the course of confrontation is adopted, as is currently the case with Iran, the situation becomes more complicated and more difficult to resolve.

Disarmament

Carrying out safeguards’ monitoring in states that possess nuclear weapons does not immediately serve the purpose of preventing a state from acquiring nuclear weapons. As a result, some analysts have long argued that safeguards monitoring in states with nuclear weapons is a waste of the IAEA’s time and resources. Others see it as part of the NPT bargain and equal distribution of verification burden.

But safeguards and other forms of monitoring in states with nuclear weapons serve a variety of other purposes in the near as well as longer term. The effective monitoring of fissile material and its facilities will be an essential element of a verifiable Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT). It will also serve as a key building block to eventual global nuclear disarmament. There are at the same time, costs and other constraints that limit the kind of steps that needs to be overcome.

Several states with nuclear weapons have recently built or are planning to build new enrichment and reprocessing plants. It is important that these facilities are gradually placed under safeguards. This has several-fold benefits – to reduce the purported discrimination in the safeguards system for nuclear and non-nuclear weapons states; to lay the foundations for a verifiable FMCT; and as a tangible early step toward a broader verification regime that will be needed for nuclear disarmament.

Revitalizing the IAEA

Many of you would be familiar with the IAEA issued report by a Commission of Eminent Persons published in the “20/20. Vision for the Future” 2030[7]. The Commission was established to reflect upon the nature and scope of the Agency’s programme up to 2020 and beyond. Its report encapsulates the challenges and opportunities facing the Agency in the medium term. Many recommendations concerning all aspects of the Agency’s work are proposed in the Report, some of them bold and far reaching. What is clear is that new thinking is required to provide the Agency safeguards system with resources, both financial and technical, so that it will be fit for tomorrow’s environment.

The report also warns that without the appropriate control measures, nuclear material and technology could be misused to build nuclear weapons. The international community is also increasingly concerned about the access of non-state actors to nuclear technology and materials. These, in turn, could lead to a major failure to the non-proliferation control regime – of which the security, social, and economic consequences would be enormous. In other words, we need to have a nuclear order, and the IAEA with member states support, play the key role.

So, when we look at the future of the safeguards verification regime, we do so in the context of an expansion of nuclear energy accompanied by the development of new reactors and fuel cycle technologies. We will need to map out new verification technologies and approaches to keep abreast of this changing environment. How can we do this? Technology foresight can help us provide a vision to deal with future challenges posed to the safeguards community. Technology foresight in safeguards can also feed into the review / formulation of new safeguards policies and strategies. In turn, this can help guide the development of necessary infrastructures required for better safeguards. The IAEA safeguards inspectorate is and must remain the eyes, brains, and arms of the non-proliferation community.

In order to do its job effectively, it needs up-to-date instruments that include a viable information and communications system. It requires adequate financial resources to carry out its tasks.

[1] Statements by Mr. Yukiya Amano, Director General, IAEA, on 12 September 2012 and 17 November 2012 in the IAEA Board of Governors.[2] IAEA Nuclear Technology Review 2012, 17 February 2012.[3] Olli Heinonen, A multinational fuel consortium: Obstacles, options, and ways forward, The Bulletin of Atomic Scientists,67(4),37-42,2011.[4] Global Laser Enrichment Submits Licence Application to Build and Operate First Commercial Uranium Enrichment Facility Using SILEX Laser Technology, Press Release, 1 July 2009, Silex Systems Limited.[5] Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement and relevant provisions of Security Council resolutions in the Islamic Republic of Iran, IAEA, 24 May 2011, GOV/2011/29.[6] Olli Heinonen, Blog, Iran ramping up uranium enrichment, Belfer Center Power and Policy, 20 July 2011.[7] Report of the Commission of Eminent Persons on the Future of the Agency, IAEA, 23 May 2008, GOV/2008/22-GC(52)/INF/4.