Article
A key theory in international security studies holds that war becomes more likely when offensive military strategies are easier and that peace is more likely when the advantage shifts to the defense.
Proponents of the "offense-defense theory" argue that actual or perceived offensive advantages have caused many wars. They cite World War I as a prominent example, arguing that European political and military leaders plunged into war believing that they would secure rapid victory by attacking.
Critics of the theory argue that it is impossible to distinguish between offensive and defensive weapons and that the outbreak of war does not coincide with actual or perceived offensive advantages.
BCSIA''s International Security Program (ISP) gathered both sides in September to discuss retrospectives and future directions of offense-defense theory. The conference was co-sponsored by Georgetown University''s Center for Peace and Security Studies.
Participants included prominent scholars in the field of security studies (many of them former BCSIA fellows), including Stephen Van Evera and Barry Posen of MIT, Columbia University''s Richard Betts, George Quester of the University of Maryland, Charles Glaser of the University of Chicago, and Robert Powell of the University of California at Berkeley. BCSIA participants included Kirkpatrick Professor of International Affairs Stephen Walt, ISP Director Steven Miller, and International Security Editor Sean Lynn-Jones.
A highlight of the conference was a vigorous debate between Professors Van Evera and Betts in which Van Evera defended his recent book, Causes of War: Power and the Roots of Conflict, which is one of the most important expositions of offense-defense theory.
Papers presented at the conference will be included in a book to be published as part of the BCSIA Studies in International Security series.