Article
from
Newsday
The new Israeli government formed by Kadima leader Ehud Olmert this week represents a complete realignment of the Israeli political scene.
In the 1980s and through the early 1990s, the Israeli public was closely divided on issues related to the future of the West Bank and Gaza. This deadlock was manifest in electoral outcomes: Neither Labor nor Likud could separately form a stable governing coalition. As a result, they were often forced to cohabit within governments of "national unity" or to form governments resting on a very slight majority of Knesset members.
This deadlock is over. Public opinion polls before Israel's disengagement from Gaza last summer revealed broad support for Prime Minister Ariel Sharon's plan to begin ending Israeli occupation of the Palestinians. After the summer, polls showed a clear preference for continuing the process of dismantling outposts and settlements in the West Bank.
The March 28 elections reflected this political realignment. In the resulting new Israeli parliament, the ratio between members of parties that clearly support ending Israel's control of Gaza and the West Bank - whether by negotiations or unilaterally - and those opposed to such moves, is more than 2-1. An important dimension of this dramatic result was the almost complete demise of Likud, which declined from 39 seats in the outgoing Knesset to 12 seats after the March vote. The result is a new Israeli government resting on a majority of 67 out of 120 members. In support of further pullouts, those 67 will be backed by 14 additional members of the left-wing Meretz Party and the Arab parties.
Equally important, the new government enjoys a clear mandate to implement Olmert's plan to withdraw from all but three settlement blocks in the West Bank. Unlike Sharon, who kept his plans ambiguous, Olmert made his ambition to draw Israel's final boundaries crystal clear during the election campaign.
Despite this clear mandate, Israel's new government will face considerable difficulties in attempting to implement its designs. Even a conservative estimate of the number of Israeli settlers who would have to be uprooted in the framework of Olmert's plan shows that it is likely to be at least eight times larger than the number of settlers evacuated during last summer's disengagement. This would present a monumental challenge to Israel's governing institutions.
This problem is compounded by the results of the parallel political realignment on the Palestinian side: the creation of the new Hamas-led government. Like Sharon's disengagement, Olmert's plans are meant to be implemented unilaterally. But even in Gaza some aspects of Israel's pullout could not be carried out without coordination with the Palestinians. In one case, involving the Rafah crossing between the Gaza Strip and Egypt, an agreement required the personal intervention of U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice.
But in comparison to the West Bank, disengagement from Gaza was simple. Gaza is fully fenced, and Israel's withdrawal was complete. Thus, there was a finite quality to Israel's departure. This will not be the case in the West Bank even under the best of circumstances. The West Bank is not fully fenced, and Jewish and Arab lives intersect there along thousands of potential and actual points of friction. Pullout from the area without coordination with responsible authorities on the Palestinian side will be nearly impossible.
The electoral triumph of Hamas - a party that remains committed to Israel's destruction - makes such coordination very difficult. Moreover, further Israeli withdrawals are likely to be declared by Hamas a victory to its radical stance.
Under such circumstances, any help the United States would be able to provide Olmert will be essential. Without such help, the mandate he has gained at the polls will not be enough to allow an end to Israel's occupation of the West Bank.
Shai Feldman is the director of the Crown Center for Middle East Studies at Brandeis University.