From the Outhouse to the Jailhouse

The capture of the number two figure in North Caucasus terrorism networks represents a major success in Russia's counterterrorism campaign and may signal a tactical shift from 'whack in the outhouse' to 'capture and prosecute'.

Such a shift would reduce numbers of avengers joining the networks, but Russia will remain unable to win the campaign as long as the root causes of insurgency and terrorism in the North Caucasus are not eliminated or minimized.

Federal Security Service (FSB) Director Alexander Bortnikov told Russian President Dmitry Medvedev on 9 June that his subordinates had captured ‘Magas,' the leader of the Ingushetia-based branch of the North Caucasus terrorism networks.

The arrest of Magas, which comes three months after the deaths of Said Buryatsky, who was one of the chief ideologists of these networks, and Anzor Astemirov, the leader of Kabardino-Balkaria's militant Salafites, represents a major tactical victory for those running Russia's counterterrorism operation in the North Caucasus.

In fact, I cannot think of any well-known warlord left at large, with the exception of Doku Umarov, the Chechen warlord who is generally recognized as the leader of the North Caucasus-based networks.

Under Magas' watch, the Ingush networks have gained such strength that at one point they appeared even more robust than groups operating in Chechnya under Umarov's command. Magas has become so powerful that Umarov appointed him the "commander of the Caucasian front."

Magas and Chechen terrorist leader Shamil Basayev are believed to have jointly organized a raid on Ingushetia's largest town, Nazran, in June 2004, killing over 90 people, including dozens of law enforcement and military servicemen.

Basayev and Magas are also believed to have organized the hostage-taking raid on the Beslan school in September 2004, in which mostly natives of Ingushetia participated.

Magas is also believed to have led the organization of scores of suicide bombing attacks, including the bombing of Ingushetia's Nazran district police headquarters, which killed at least 21, and an attack on the Ingush president. It was also the Ingushetia-based networks that organized the bombing of a train en route from Moscow to St Petersburg in November 2009, killing 27 and injuring 90 others.

There are conflicting reports about the real name and origins of Magas. Some reports identify him as Ali Taziyev, while others say his name is Magomed Yevloyev. But almost all sources agree he is a former Ingush police officer.

While still an active-duty officer he was kidnapped by rebels in the late 1990s and subsequently decided to join their ranks. Such switching of allegiance, both explicit and covert, has occurred time and again in North Caucasian law enforcement agencies, but authorities to date have failed to put an end to this dangerous phenomena, which has multiplied terrorists' capabilities.

The arrest of Magas - whom FSB commandos had reportedly staked out in an ambush for weeks - could signal a shift in the treatment of suspected terrorist and insurgency leaders in Russia.

Previously, Russian forces would kill terrorist leaders rather than capture them, perhaps, in line with Russian leader Vladimir Putin's call to "whack (the terrorists) in the outhouse."

However, before we can say this is beginning of a new trend, we should first see whether more terrorist leaders are captured alive and whether Magas lives to stand trial and serve out his sentence, if convicted. Several terrorist and insurgency leaders captured alive in previous operations died in prison soon afterwards, including Chechen warlords Salman Raduyev, Turpal-Ali Atgeriev and Lechi Borodaty.

A shift from ‘seek and destroy' to ‘arrest and prosecute' would represent a positive change, especially in light of  a recent report by UN special investigator Philip Alston, in which he warns that targeted killings may be prosecuted as ‘war crimes.'

Images of their leader Magas standing chained and destined for life in prison broadcast on Russian television will have a certain demoralizing impact on the more hesitant members of the networks in the North Caucasus.

Much more importantly, such a shift would help to reduce the number of avengers who join insurgency and terrorism networks and will improve the image of Russian authorities in the eyes of the population of volatile republics of the North Caucasus. Quite a few suicide bombers were widows or relatives of suspected terrorists and insurgents killed by troops and police in the North Caucasus.

As said above, the capture of Magas is a major success for Russia's counterterrorism campaign; but so was the capture of Raduyev, the killing of Aslan Maskhadov and Shamil Basayev and scores of other less well-known leaders.

Yet, as I wrote in a recent op-ed for ISN Security Watch, neutralization of terrorist leaders does not end security threats from the North Caucasus. It seems that every time Russian authorities kill or arrest a leader, a new one emerges to take his place, proving that the hydra of terrorism will not vanish until the root causes and contributing factors behind the proliferation of terrorism and insurgency are addressed.

These include abuses of the population, lack of opportunities for upward social mobility for the youth, poverty, corruption, lack of quality education and the failure of traditional Islam to counter the proliferation of militant Salafiya.