PDP Hosts Workshop on Iran Plan B Design

Washington, DC – On May 22, 2006, PDP Co-Directors Ashton B. Carter and William J. Perry hosted an off-the-record workshop at the Willard Hotel, focused on designing a coherent “Plan B” strategy for dealing with Iran’s nuclear weapons program. Plan B refers to three alternatives to Plan A (the current diplomatic effort to halt Iranian nuclear enrichment) that the U.S. might pursue to halt – or live with – an Iranian nuclear weapons program. One alternative uses coercion to obtain the outcome that Plan A now seeks: a non-nuclear Iran. Coercion is the political, economic, and military pressure that the U.S. and other nations can bring to bear on Iran to discourage or prevent it from developing nuclear weapons. A second version of Plan B consists of making a strategic adjustment to an Iranian nuclear weapons program that we have failed to stop. Strategic adjustment requires the U.S. to develop a long-term strategy to respond to Iranian possession of nuclear weapons. A growing number of influential observers have proposed a third version of Plan B: a new diplomacy in which the U.S. talks directly to Iran.

Workshop participants engaged in lively debate on all three Plan B alternatives. Overall, participants were divided on how much pressure the US should apply on Iran in all three scenarios. A common thread on which they based their arguments was their assessment of the nature and character of the Iranian regime. As such, many agreed that US strategy should vary based on the Iranian regime’s nature and character. A benign regime requires a benign response; a malignant regime requires an aggressive response. Participants also came to a consensus over their belief that the transition from Plan A to B was critical. They agreed that Plans A and B were mutually reinforcing and that the US and its allies needed to pursue Plan A in a manner such that they better position themselves for Plan B. They also agreed that each of the three Plan B alternatives affected the success of Plan A. Workshop participants then engaged in debate over the coercive Plan B alternative, with many of them expressing concern over the end game of any coercive option. Many participants also agreed that, in the short term, sanctions would rally the Iranian people against the US and its allies – but in the intermediate and long-term, decrease support for the current Iranian regime. Participants then discussed the possibility of US-Iran direct talks. Most participants agreed that while talks were unlikely to succeed in halting Iranian nuclear enrichment, they would be useful in setting up the other two Plan B alternatives by demonstrating that the US was committed to exhausting all diplomatic options and opening a direct channel of communication with the Iranians so that the US could communicate the potential consequences to Iran of its nuclear weapons development. Workshop participants ended the session after discussing the third alternative of strategic adjustment to Iran’s nuclear program. Many participants concluded that a nuclear Iran would most likely overwhelm US efforts for democratic reform in the Middle East, and the peace process in Israel and Palestine. Many argued that the US would have to increase its deployment of troops to the region and work strenuously to prevent further regional proliferation. Most participants also concurred that the cost of inaction was a price that many continue to underestimate when faced with the contemplation of the very vivid and tangible horrors of military action. Before a nuclear Iran becomes reality, most participants agreed that the US must be very clear with Iran that developing nuclear weapons will cost Iran more in the long term than not developing them. Finally, most participants also indicated uneasiness over Israel’s future behavior in light of a nuclear Iran.

The workshop attracted some 30 experts, including Robert Blackwill, former Ambassador to India, former Deputy National Security Advisor for Strategic Planning and current President of Barbour Griffith and Rogers International; Sam Nunn, former Senator and Co-Chairman and CEO of the Nuclear Threat Initiative; General John Shalikashvili, former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff; John Wolf, former Assistant Secretary of State for Nonproliferation; and Dr. David A. Kay, former IAEA/UNSCOM Chief Nuclear Weapons Inspector – as well as a number of other leading, experienced American thinkers and strategists on national security, Middle Eastern affairs, and nuclear weapons. All of the participants have been working actively on either Plan A, Plan B, or both.

Photos by Gretchen M. Bartlett, PDP Associate Director