Policy Briefs
from
Caspian Studies Program
Peace Pending in Nagorno-Karabagh:
Recommendations for the International Community
Blanka Hancilova
Blanka Hancilova is a Ph.D. candidate at Charles University in Prague. She is currently a Fulbright Fellow at the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, researching the Nagorno-Karabagh conflict.
* * *
In the opening months of 2001, the Nagorno-Karabagh peace talks gained significant momentum, culminating with the Key West summit (April 3-7), at which the leaders of Azerbaijan and Armenia met for intensive negotiations under the auspices of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). As Co-Chairs of the OSCE Minsk Group, the United States, Russia, and France were mediators at the talks. Over a million people have lost their homes (800,000 Azerbaijanis; 300,000 Armenians), and tens of thousands have died as a result of the Nagorno-Karabagh conflict, which has waged between Azerbaijan and Armenia since 1988. A ceasefire has held since 1994.
At this stage, there is reasonable hope for a peaceful settlement in the coming months, possibly by the end of July. However, any peace deal will entail painful compromises by both Armenia and Azerbaijan, which will be extremely contentious in both states. A peaceful settlement of the Nagorno-Karabagh conflict could, given the right conditions, stabilize the region, enable the reconstruction of war-damaged areas, and spur the economic and political development of the whole South Caucasus, by allowing both Azerbaijan and Armenia to focus fully on these processes. It would strengthen them and therefore limit their vulnerability to foreign, most importantly Russian, dictates.
In addition to bringing economic revival and other positive changes, an agreement over Nagorno-Karabagh could serve as an incentive for other breakaway regions, such as South Ossetia, Abkhazia and Transdniestria, to consider serious compromises in exchange for an end to war and the economic assistance packages that could follow.
In order for the Nagorno-Karabagh settlement to have a reasonable chance of success, it is necessary that immediate concrete results be realized, illustrating the benefits of the peace arrangement to the public. One potential concrete action would entail resettlement of Azerbaijani internally displaced persons (IDPs) in some or all of the occupied districts (raiony) that are outside of the disputed territory of Nagorno-Karabagh, but today under Armenian occupation. Resettlement and the overall reconstruction and development of Nagorno-Karabagh and the adjacent occupied territories will require immediate and substantial international assistance. An absence or delay of this assistance could seriously hamper the peace settlement.
However, little indication has emerged that international organizations and European states and organizations have produced plans or allocated funds for these peace settlement projects. This brief will focus on recommendations for the role of the international community in the creation of a successful peace settlement between Azerbaijan and Armenia, should an agreement between the sides be concluded.
Auspicious Conditions
Conditions have emerged which are conducive to a settlement between Azerbaijan and Armenia in the Nagorno-Karabagh conflict:
The leaders of Armenia and Azerbaijan no longer consider the status quo viable for the future and consider final settlement of the conflict possible and preferred.
The United States and Russia have demonstrated a high level of commitment, and are involved in the negotiation process at the presidential level.
Russia seems willing to work together with United States and other OSCE members towards a peaceful settlement.
The newfound cooperation between Russia and the U.S. on this issue has encouraged the perception by the leaders of Azerbaijan and Armenia that a historic opportunity awaits. The opposing sides sense that they have no option other than to negotiate, and that they cannot easily play Moscow and Washington off each other. Thus a critical sense of
"ripeness" has emerged in the minds of the opposing sides, both among decision-makers and the general public. Unfortunately, it nevertheless seems that the presidents are very much ahead of their constituencies. On the downside, failure of the negotiations to produce a settlement would probably not result in a continuation of the current status quo; rather, it is likely to generate an overwhelming negative momentum. The presidents would be exposed to increased domestic pressure to seek a military solution to the situation, which could lead to a renewal of armed hostilities between Armenia and Azerbaijan. In fact, Azerbaijani and Armenian leaders have mentioned the use of "means other than negotiation" as a possible option if the negotiations do not lead to a settlement.[1]
Recommendations
The international community must bear in mind that the signature of a settlement between the presidents of Armenia and Azerbaijan is only the first step towards establishing a lasting peace in the region. The agreement must then be implemented on the ground. Rehabilitation and development programming should be immediate, efficient and designed in such a way as to not discredit the peace process. The international community must adequately recognize its responsibility in the peace process and act accordingly in order to prevent the renewal of war.
The OSCE should carefully decide what information from the negotiations should be shared with international organizations in order to allow for a timely planning of their involvement. It should realize that the lack of effective post-settlement humanitarian, reconstruction and rehabilitation support might undermine the peace.
Since the OSCE is likely to be the leading agency in the post-conflict period, it should make a particular effort to be well prepared for the challenges of another mission. In the past, the OSCE has repeatedly suffered from understaffing, and in some cases (Bosnia, Kosovo) the quality of deployed personnel was not on par with the high demands of the job. The OSCE should therefore encourage member states to identify (well in advance) their citizens who are qualified and willing to serve on a field mission and to hire appropriate experts on the open market.
Similarly, the UN needs to decide which of its agencies will take the lead role. Once designated, this agency should develop a clear contingency plan that will allow for a timely response. It is especially important that the agency or agencies identify a sufficient number of motivated and well-qualified workers for the mission.
As part of international settlement efforts, the involved sides should strive for sustained cooperation and coordination. In this framework:
International organizations should coordinate future rehabilitation programs. There is a need to decide on the lead agency or agencies for rehabilitation and development projects and to secure joint preliminary planning with clearly delimited responsibilities.
The U.S. and France should try to ensure the continued participation of Russia. The U.S. should use the positive dynamics of cooperation with Russia to make the decisive breakthrough. The current cooperative position of Russia should be appraised, while at the same time contingency planning should be carried out in case Russia''s policies in the region change. In order to help President Aliyev promote a peace settlement in Azerbaijan, the U.S. Congress should cancel Section 907 (a) of the Freedom Support Act.[2] In the interim, the Executive should waive or reinterpret the limitations to the extent that is legally possible.
Recommended actions on the ground
The international community should be ready to address the following issues on the ground: return of internally displaced persons (IDPs), minefields, and infrastructure.
It can be assumed that the withdrawal of the Armenian forces from occupied territories will take place within a relatively short period (weeks) after the conclusion of peace. This withdrawal is likely to be followed (again, within weeks) by the return of the first Azerbaijani IDPs to their places of origin. The international community should be ready to provide effective assistance to these returning people.
Two issues are of utmost importance to facilitate and make safe this return.
1. Minefields: Parts of the occupied territories are mined, but many of the minefields are not properly documented. The international community should assist Azerbaijan in the speedy marking of the minefields, followed by de-mining. Countries with expertise in this field should be sought out and encouraged to contribute to this humanitarian effort.
2. Infrastructure (roads): It will be necessary to repair and rebuild at least the land communication links between Azerbaijan and what are today the occupied territories so that the return of IDPs and economic revival can proceed.
As the cases of Kosovo, East Timor and others have shown, due to the inefficiency and slowness of deployment, UN and OSCE missions (partly due to financing issues; partly to a personnel system that delays contracts and therefore deployments; and partly due to poor organization on the ground) often miss the window of opportunity that exists in the short time after agreements are reached. By the time of deployment, not only has the reality on the ground changed, but also the momentum created by the agreement in terms of the political will of the parties has slowed, stopped or even reversed.
Moreover, the UN and the OSCE need to improve the caliber of specialists who occupy operational posts, perhaps by recruiting some experts from outside their organizations'' framework. To date, appointments of leading personnel have often been plagued by inter-state politics, where candidates have been chosen by citizenship before any other quality.
An effort should be made not to repeat this situation in Nagorno-Karabagh. After a decade of intensive peace operations, a cadre of candidates could be identified to staff what could be the highest quality mission to date, tailored to meet the real needs of the situation on the ground, as required by the parties and guaranteed by interested states.
Burden-sharing in reconstruction and rehabilitation
International agencies await a clear signal from the OSCE that a settlement is likely to materialize before they launch needs assessment missions, and thus have not conducted formal estimates. The World Bank should take the lead and provide direct access to funding for Azerbaijan and Armenia, as well as mobilize additional financial resources and seek to attract private investors.
Unfortunately, at this point the World Bank has not conducted any comprehensive or partial needs assessment. Many of the international humanitarian and reconstruction agencies do not have a comprehensive enough idea of the financial and other implications of the reconstruction of the occupied territories and Nagorno-Karabagh. Under the coordinated leadership of the OSCE, the international agencies should start working out the responsibility sharing strategies in financing and implementation of the rehabilitation and development programs. Ms. Hancilova would like to thank Jarat Chopra (Peace Maintenance International) and Jaba Devdariani (United Nations Association Georgia) for their contributions to this policy brief.
ENDNOTES
1. For Azerbaijani proclamations see: Azerbaijani Foreign Minister Vilayat Quliev, interviewed by RFE/RL''s Baku bureau on 17 April. http://www.rferl.org/caucasus-report/2001/04/15-200401.html. For Armenian reactions see: BBC Monitoring, May 2, 2001 referring to report by Vahan Vardanyan entitled "Parliament has a united position", in Armenian newspaper Ayots Ashkhar on April 27, 2001.
2. Section 907 prohibits U.S. assistance (with the exception of assistance for nonproliferation and disarmament programs) to the government of Azerbaijan under the Freedom for Russia and Emerging Eurasian Democracies and Open Markets Support Act of 1992 (also known as the Freedom Support Act) "until the President determines, and so reports to the Congress, that the Government of Azerbaijan is taking demonstrable steps to cease all blockades and other offensive uses of force against Armenia and Nagorno-Karabakh." Later modifications in the legislation have enabled granting of humanitarian/NGO assistance.