Possible Frameworks for Verification of a WMD/DVs Free Zone in the Middle East - The Nuclear Dimension

Recognizing the 1995 NPT Resolution calling for a WMD/DVs Free Zone in the Middle East, it is worth noting that no such zone exists worldwide yet. Nuclear Weapon Free Zones are in effect, providing examples for issues of verification and organizational setup. Making the Middle East zone successful and sustainable will require, among others, solutions to verification issues that consider feasible and effective setups for institutional frameworks.

Therefore, this policy brief addresses these issues by developing three possible verification frameworks for an NWFZ in the Middle East, in the broader context of a WMD/DVs Free Zone: verification carried out by the International Atomic Energy Agency; joint verfication by the IAEA and a regional control mechanism; and seperate verification by both institutions. This policy brief argues that, on balance, a Middle East NWFZ would be better off relying on IAEA verification and safeguards at the beginning. Over the medium- to longer- term, given the political will, financial, and human resources, the regional states could invest in a regional authority to build up their own capacity and thereby contribute to strengthening mutual confidence and trust.

This policy brief builds on the contributions of the participants of several ACADEMIC PEACE ORCHESTRA workshops held from 2012 to 2013 generously founded by the Foreign Ministry of Norway. The views represented in this policy brief are solely those of the authors in their private capacity and do not necessarily represent the views of entities the authors are associated with.

The full text of the policy brief may be downloaded below.