Provisions for Succession in the Caspian Region

Provisions for Succession in the Caspian Region

by Martha Brill Olcott

Martha Brill Olcott is a Senior Associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.

Summary

Each of the countries of the Caspian region has at least one difficult transfer of leadership to survive in coming years, and there is little reason for confidence that most of these countries will achieve this in a seamless and bloodless way. The countries fall into three groups in terms of preparedness for the succession of power. In Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan the incumbent leaders seem to be grooming heirs, and hoping to develop political dynasties. In Armenia, Georgia, and Kyrgyzstan the institutional framework for a democratic transition is more or less in place, but there is a distinct possibility that the democratic procedure could break down. In Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan the current leadership seems to be making no preparations for succession. In those countries, the chances of open conflict between rival elite are high, with disturbing implications for the stability of the region as a whole.

* * * Provisions for Succession

The problem of succession is one of the most critical issues facing the Caspian states. While each state has a formal policy of succession, (several of these are contained in Appendix One) the real question is whether these provisions will be followed, or whether the countries'' leaders will try and circumvent the legal provisions to advance the case of an heir apparent. Until each of these states has had at least two orderly transitions, it will be too early to conclude that the procedures provided in the national constitutions are working.

In the first few years of independence there was a lot of upheaval in several of the Caspian states. (For the purposes of this presentation I am including all eight Caucasian and Central Asian states as Caspian states.) Presidents were forcibly ousted in Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Tajikistan. For the last five years, the situation has been far more stable. Armenia is the only state in the region in which there was a transfer of authority.

Leaders in other states have faced reelection, but generally these electoral processes have
not been democratic. Moreover, most believe that if these men want to stay in power as long as they live, they will succeed in doing so.

Eventually, though, each of the current incumbents will have to pass from the political scene, through death, retirement, or ouster. One of the major risks is that as these men begin to physically falter, their enemies will try to disrupt the political process.There are three different models of succession developing in the region. Some leaders seem to be grooming heirs, and hoping to develop political dynasties. In a second group of states the attention is on the development of a political process that should produce a democratic succession. Finally, there is a third group of states in which little attention has been given to succession, either by the designation of an heir apparent or through institutional development. Obviously, the first and third groups of states are most vulnerable.

The Incipient Dynasties
AzerbaijanPresident Heydar Aliyev''s behavior provides the clearest case of intent to create a political dynasty. He has strongly promoted the career of his son Ilham, who is first vice president of SOCAR, the Azerbaijan State Oil Company, and who chairs the Yeni Azerbaijan (Young Azerbaijan) Party. In recent years Aliyev Senior has become increasingly concerned with insuring the centrality of his role in creating and confirming Azerbaijani statehood. He has also tried to limit the arenas of political participation by increasing pressure on opposition parties and politicians as well as on the media.It is unclear whether or not this strategy will succeed. Much depends upon the longevity and physical endurance of the incumbent president. Azerbaijan has one of the most mature political elite of any Caspian state, and they are not going to quietly accede to Aliyev''s plans, which would effectively exclude them from power for another generation.As the "grand old man" of Azerbaijani politics, President Aliyev has vast reserves of authority to draw on. This includes at least grudging respect from some individuals in the political opposition, especially in the Azerbaijan Popular Front, many of whom worked closely with Aliyev during Ayaz Mutalibov''s presidency. (Such as Ibragim Ibragimli and Ali Kerimov, first deputy heads of the Azerbaijan Popular Front (APF)). Although these people opposed Aliyev''s seizure of power from Abulfez Elchibey in 1993, Ibragim Ibragimli stated that by transferring Abulfez Elchibey''s presidential authorities to Heydar Aliyev, Head of the Supreme Council, the parliament (Milli Mejlis) legalized a coup d''etat carried out by Surat Husein on June 4, 1993. Ali Kerimov noted that a belief that Heydar Aliyev would resolve all of the country''s problems should he come to power, was created prior to the coup d''etat and that determined the public''s indifference to such a change of power. (Popular Front party warns of ''social explosion''," FBIS-SOV-94-123, Baku TURAN in English, 25 June 19 94). they were somewhat appeased when Aliyev proved to be very independent of Moscow. There are other critics, such as former parliamentary speaker Rasul Guliyev, who come from closer to Aliyev''s own ranks.
Aliyev is a very special person in Azerbaijan, the only Azerbaijani to reach the Soviet Politburo, and so capable a politician that he was able to turn this achievement and his subsequent exclusion by Gorbachev into the foundation of his reemergence as a nationalist. His special place in history has caused most in the opposition to be reluctant to use radical or violent measures against him. There have been two coup attempts against Aliyev, in both of which Azerbaijanis claimed Russian involvement Surat Hussein, then prime minister and former army colonel, was allegedly behind an October 1994 rebellion against Aliyev in Ganja, Azerbaijan''s second largest city. (AFP, 5 October 1994, as in FBIS Daily Report, SOV-94-194, 12 November 1995). In March 1995 then deputy interior minister Rovshan Javadov, with the alleged complicity of Surat Hussein, led a police revolt in Baku and in two towns near the border with Armenia. Former president Ayaz Mutalibov (who lives in exile in Russia) was also said to be tied to the March 1995 attempt. Paris AFP, March 15, 1995, in FBIS Daily Report, SOV-95-051, 18 November 1995; Turan, 20 March 1995, in FBIS Daily Report, SOV-95-054, 18 November 1995.
The patience of these critics is unlikely to withstand the transfer of authority by the current president to a handpicked successor. While Azerbaijan is not a democracy, it is also not an authoritarian state, and the existence of a number of quasi-democratic institutions, most prominently a tradition of independent press and nascent (albeit partially formed) parties, will make it very difficult to dictate a political solution to the people.Kazakhstan
There is a similar situation in Kazakhstan, which can also be considered to be a quasi-authoritarian state. In Kazakhstan, as in Azerbaijan, there is strong presidential rule, and a parliament whose members have largely been hand-picked although formally chosen through a competitive election. President Nursultan Nazarbayev would also like to establish a political dynasty. He has introduced his daughter and son-in-laws into the country''s political life. His daughter heads the country''s major independent television channel, and his son-in-law has headed the local tax police. However, there is little reason to assume that he will be able to transfer political authority to his children. Like virtually all of the region''s presidents, Nazarbayev is likely to remain in office for the rest of his life. The country''s constitution has been rewritten, and then modified, to suit the incumbent president. This was done most recently in October 1998, when the election was moved from December 2000 to January 1999, the term of office extended from five to seven years, and the age limit and two-term restriction were dropped. Party development is even more nascent in Kazakhstan than in Azerbaijan, and the development of an independent press and mass media is also less advanced.There are some other important differences. Nazarbayev has not created a strong cult of personality, preferring a more traditional "eastern" dictatorial style. The Kazakh opposition is not as developed, and there is no real history or tradition of effective opposition in Kazakhstan to mirror that of Azerbaijan. At the same time the country is much more complex; its territory is vast and its economy diverse. Local elites may well grow more powerful, and economic elites certainly will. While the president has been able to monopolize control over the oil and gas industries, he and his family have not penetrated metallurgy and other heavy industries to the same extent. Powerful oligarchies or cartels that are only partially dependent upon presidential favor control the country''s financial institutions. These interests must be accommodated, either through behind-the-scenes negotiations, or preferably from our point of view, through free and fair elections.

States Favoring Institutional Development

Armenia
In three of the countries of the Caspian region the problem of succession has or is likely to be resolved through election. As already noted, there has already been a democratic or quasi-democratic succession in Armenia. President Levon Ter-Petrossian was forced to resign his office on 3 February 1998 due to election irregularities and was replaced by Robert Kocharian, After President Levon Ter-Petrossian resigned 3 February, the presidential powers were to be taken over by Parliamentary Chairman Babken Ararktsyan, but Ararktsyan himself resigned on 4 February. In accordance with the constitution, Robert Kocharian, then Armenia''s prime minister, became acting president for the next 40 days. who first served as acting president, and then was confirmed in the post by election. The first round of presidential elections was held on 16 March 1998. The two top candidates, Robert Kocharian and Karen Demirchian, competed in the second round that was held on 30 March 1998. Kocharian received 59.49 percent of the vote and became president for a term of five years. It would be disingenuous to view this as a simple victory for democracy. The Armenian political elite was more disturbed by Ter-Petrossian''s policies than by his election abuses, but nonetheless the criteria for his removal sets an important precedent, and may well help shape the future of Armenian politics. Removing a president for election irregularities puts all other politicians on notice that they too should behave with restraint.
Georgia
In both Kyrgyzstan and Georgia there is some reason for optimism that presidential succession will be achieved through elections, although in both cases there is no assurance that this will be the case. President Eduard Shevardnadze of Georgia seems to be genuinely committed to the idea that Georgia should become a democratic country. The Georgian leader has undergone a slow but steady political transformation. While Shevardnadze is not without blemishes - and there are always rumors that certain political "clans" have benefited more from his rule than have others - nonetheless there can be little doubt that he supports the cause of democratic transition in Georgia.That being said, it is important to remember that Georgia is still a highly unstable society, and the decision to democratize the country may not enhance its stability. The authority of the government in Tbilisi is not recognized in the breakaway republic of Abkhazia, and the future status of southern Ossetia is not permanently resolved. Moreover, any future government will also have to deal with the potential challenge to its authority from the Ajars in western Georgia, who have periodically made common cause with the followers of former president Zviad Gamsakhurdia. It seems likely that the Ajar leader, Aslan Abashidze, will seek to replace Shevardnadze and it is unclear whether he will be willing to accept the verdict of a democratic election if it goes against him. Aslan Abashidze has been chairman of the Ajara''s Supreme Council since 1991. In 1991-95 he was also a deputy speaker of the Georgian parliament. He is a founder of the Aghordzineba (Revival) party. President Shevardnadze is the only ruler in the region to encourage the development of a new generation of elites. Prominent among them is parliamentary speaker Zurab Zhvania. Once Shevardnadze is no longer a part of Georgia''s political scene, the existing rules of the game may well be challenged, especially if the much-anticipated income from the transit of oil does not materialize.Kyrgyzstan
Kyrgyzstan is another country in which power may be transferred democratically. However, while the country is the most democratic in the region, the enthusiasm of President Askar Akaev for advancing the cause of democratic government has waned as the country''s economy has faltered. Akaev won a competitive election for president in December 1995, but it is not clear whether he will be willing to accept serious competition in the presidential election scheduled for 2000. Akaev''s stiffest competition would come from Bishkek Mayor Feliks Kulov. Kulov earlier served as head of Kyrgyzstan''s committee for state security, head of Chu oblast, and vice-president of the country, before the latter post was abolished. There is reason to fear that President Akaev will seek to discredit Kulov, in much the same way that President Nazarbayev did with former prime minister Akezhan Kazhegeldin. Kazhegeldin was barred from running in the 1999 election because he had a criminal record, which he acquired through organizing an unsanctioned political meeting. Since then Kazhegeldin, who has left the country, has faced threat of arrest and extradition to Kazakhstan on charges of tax evasion. Kyrgyz tax authorities have also used the alleged non-payment of taxes by critics of President Akaev and by economic rivals of his family to seize their property and in some cases even to send them to jail. This has had a traumatic effect on the development of a new and independent generation of economic and political elites. Given the growing concentration of wealth in the hands of a few families, most of which are either related to or close to the president, it is quite likely that power will be transferred through behind-the-scenes maneuvering rather than through the democratic institutions that President Akaev initially pledged to create.Kyrgyzstan is a small state that has translucent boundaries with more powerful neighbors. The country is bounded by China, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, and Tajikistan. The latter boundary is currently the most problematic, as armed Uzbek opposition figures formerly based in Tajikistan have crossed into Kyrgyzstan and are holed up in its mountains. In general, Kyrgyzstan cannot really isolate itself from developments in either Kazakhstan or Uzbekistan. Since about a third of the population in southern Kyrgyzstan are ethnic Uzbeks, the potential instability in the latter country is a much greater risk.

An Institutional Void
Uzbekistan

In many ways there is even less preparation for succession in Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan, both of which are societies in which effectively there is one-man-rule. In the long run there is a strong chance that Uzbekistan will prove the most unstable state in the region. President Islam Karimov has sacrificed economic and political reforms in favor of advancing the goal of maintaining stability in the country. The end result may prove to be exactly the opposite of what he has desired.The country has proceeded quite slowly with economic reform, in large part so that the government could hold prices steady as long as possible, as well as maintain their comprehensive social welfare net. Uzbekistan''s Ferghana Valley (which spreads into Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan) is one of the most densely-populated areas in the world In the Andijan region of Uzbekistan the population density is more than 450 people per square kilometer; in the Ferghana district 338; in Namangan 215. Anara Tabyshalieva, The Challenge of Regional Cooperation in Central Asia: Preventing Ethnic Conflict in the Ferghana Valley (Washington: USIP, 1999), p. 20. and the center of Central Asia''s religious revival. Many of President Karimov''s policies have been designed to restrict the ability of elite groups (both secular and religious) in this region from accruing sufficient economic or political influence to challenge his rule. The end result, though, is that there are key groups in society ready to mobilize popular discontent against the president, should it begin to ferment on a widespread basis.
The economic situation in the country is deteriorating steadily, and as Karimov shows signs of failing physically, the opposition could begin to mobilize itself quite quickly. At least one opposition group already demonstrated its capacity for violence and destruction, with a series of explosions of 16 February 1999 in Tashkent. This led to a major crackdown in Uzbekistan, where tens of thousands of people are rumored to have been rounded up. For now Uzbekistan''s security apparatus seems up to the challenge, but whether it will prove capable of defusing future threats remains to be seen. The security forces seem likely to face a major challenge at the time of President Karimov''s departure from the scene, when there seems certain to be a major contestation of authority by the political groups in the country that have been excluded from power for so long.Karimov''s fears about challenges to his authority have ensured that there are no clear rivals to his rule, and no obvious successors. However, these efforts to curb opposition have not eliminated the basic competition between regions or between the economic and political elites that dominate them. The power of regional elites has been reduced in recent years but it has not been eliminated, and at the time of Karimov''s departure, Samarkand, Ferghana, and Tashkent are each likely to produce their own major contender for power.Turkmenistan
The situation in Turkmenistan is even more difficult to predict. President Saparmurad Niyazov seems to have consolidated even more personal authority than has his Uzbek colleague, but the situation in Turkmenistan is even more opaque. While the country''s capital city of Ashgabat regularly abounds with rumors of the Turkmen president''s imminent demise, there is little consensus on who will emerge at the top after an inevitable struggle for power. There is also little agreement on how the contestation for authority is likely to be decided, and what tools of control the leading figures will use to advance their respective causes, as virtually all the levers of power now appear to be under the direct control of "Turkmenbashi" ("the Father of all Turkmens"). It seems unlikely that Niyazov would be succeeded by his son: a figure who has been tied to some privatization scandals, but who does not play an active role in the country''s public life. In fact, there has been so little attention to the potential crisis over succession that one wonders whether Turkmenbashi is a permanent fixture on the Turkmen scene, much like his gold-plated statute that stands atop Ashgabat''s new Arch of Neutrality, which faces toward the sun in perpetual rotation. But whatever Niyazov''s feelings are about his own mortality, interested observers in Tehran and Moscow will watch the situation quite closely, and could well intervene to advance their own interests.

Assessing the Risks that Lie Ahead
Each of the principal countries in the region faces a major crisis of succession sometime in the not too distant future. In Azerbaijan and Georgia, that crisis is likely to come quite soon. In Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, the presidents are both in their fifties and seem quite fit, so the crisis may be further off. The situations in Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan are harder to predict, and a prolonged contestation for power in Uzbekistan, in particular, could turn out to have serious consequences for the entire Central Asian region.For a dispassionate observer of the Caspian region it is becoming apparent that the "good years" of independence may well lie in the past rather than in the future. Regardless, it is certainly clear that good times are not "just over the horizon." Each of these countries has at least one difficult transfer of authority to survive, and there is little reason for confidence that most of these countries will achieve this in a seamless and bloodless way.

APPENDIX: Rules of Succession According to the Countries'' Constitutions

Constitution of the Republic of Armenia (adopted May 1995)

CHAPTER 3

Article 53

In the event of the resignation of the President of the Republic, his or her passing, incapacity to perform his or her functions, or removal from office in accordance to Article 57 of the Constitution, special presidential elections shall be held on the fortieth day following the vacancy of the office.

Article 57

The President may be removed from office for state treason or other high crimes. In order to request a determination on questions pertaining to the removal of the President of the Republic from office, the National Assembly must appeal to the Constitutional Court by a resolution adopted by the majority of the deputies.

A decision to remove the President of the Republic from office must be reached by the National Assembly by a minimum two thirds majority vote of the total number of deputies, based on the determination of the Constitutional Court.

Article 58

The acceptance of the resignation of the President of the Republic shall be determined by the National Assembly by a majority vote of the total number of deputies.

Article 59

In the event of the serious illness of the President of the Republic or of insurmountable obstacles affecting the performance of his or her duties, upon the recommendation of the Government and a determination by the Constitutional Court, the National Assembly shall adopt a resolution on the incapacity of the President of the Republic to exercise his or her duties with a minimum two thirds majority vote of the total number of deputies.

Article 60

In the event that the office of the President of the Republic remains vacant and until a newly elected President assumes office the presidential duties shall devolve onto the President of the National Assembly, and if that is not possible, onto the Prime Minister. During this period it is prohibited to dissolve the National Assembly, call a referendum, and appoint or remove the Prime Minister and the Prosecutor General.

Constitution of the Republic of Azerbaijan (adopted November 1995)

Article 104. Inability of President of the Azerbaijan Republic to Permanent Execute his Authority.

The President shall be considered to have lost his power before the appointed time when he retires, loses ability to implement for his obligations for health reasons, or is removed from once [sic in English version] in cases and in the order specified by the present Constitution.

When the President of the Azerbaijan Republic retires, his request on retirement shall be submitted to the Constitutional Court of the Azerbaijan Republic. The Constitutional Court of the Azerbaijan Republic having ascertained that the President has personally sent in his resignation shall take a decision on approving the Azerbaijan Republic President''s resignation. From that moment on the President shall be considered to have resigned from his position in connection with his retirement.

Upon the representation of information concerning the President''s complete loss of ability for health reasons to execute his power, the Milli Mejlis shall address the Constitutional Court of the Azerbaijan Republic for elucidating the fact. The Constitutional Court of the Azerbaijan Republic shall take a decision on this issue by a majority of 6 votes. If the Constitutional Court does not confirm this fact, then the issue shall be considered settled.

Article 105. Execution of Obligations of the Azerbaijan Republic President upon His Retirement.

When the President retires from the position before the appointed time new presidential elections shall be held within three months. In this case the Chairperson of the Milli Mejlis of the Azerbaijan Republic shall perform duties of the President of the Azerbaijan Republic.

If, during this term acting President of the Azerbaijan Republic chairman of the Milli Mejlis of the Azerbaijan Republic resigns or completely loses for health reasons the ability to implement his power, then the obligations of the President of the Azerbaijan Republic shall be fulfilled by the Prime-Minister of the Azerbaijan Republic.

When there is no possibility for the Prime-Minister of the Azerbaijan Republic to exercise power of the President of the Azerbaijan Republic for reasons pointed out in the second half of the present Article the Milli Mejlis of the Azerbaijan Republic shall pass a Resolution on the executing authority of the President of the Azerbaijan Republic by another official.

Article 107. Removal from Position of President of the Azerbaijan Republic.

When a grave crime has been committed by the President of the Azerbaijan Republic, the issue concerning the removal of the President of the Azerbaijan Republic from his position can be put forward before the Milli Mejlis of the Azerbaijan Republic on the initiative of the Constitutional Court of the Azerbaijan Republic on the basis of the conclusion drawn by the Supreme Court of the Azerbaijan Republic within 30 days.

The President of the Azerbaijan Republic can be removed from office on the basis of the Resolution passed by the majority of 95 votes of the Deputies. This Resolution shall be signed by the Constitutions Court of the Azerbaijan Republic. If within one week the Constitutional Court of the Azerbaijan Republic does not come out in favor of signing this Resolution, the Resolution shall not come into effect.

The Resolution on the removal of the President from office shall be passed within 2 months since the day of the Constitutional Court addressing the Milli Mejlis of the Azerbaijan Republic. If within this term the mentioned Resolution is not passed the accusation shall be turned down.

Constitution of the Republic of Georgia (adopted on 25 August 1995)

Chapter Four

Article 75

2. Parliament has the right to relieve the President of his duties according to the procedures of Article 63 of the Constitution and according to procedures determined by organic law, for violation of the Constitution , or high treason or other capital crimes:
a. For violation of the Constitution if this is confirmed by the Constitutional Court;
b. For high treason or other capital crimes if confirmed by the decision of the Supreme Court.

Article 76

1. In cases where the President is unable to perform his duties or in the case of pre-term expiration, the powers of the President are delegated to the Chairman of Parliament. Within this period the duties of the Chairman of Parliament are performed by one of his substitutes.

2. A person holding the position of President in these cases cannot use the rights set forth in Article 73 clauses "c" [removes ministers;], "i" [issues decrees and orders, on the basis of the Constitution and the law;], and the rights envisaged in Article 74 clause one [1. By the request of not less than 200,000 electors or on his own initiative, the President fixes a referendum within 30 days following receipt of such a request on the issues determined by the Constitution and law].

3. Elections for the President are held within 45 days after the expiration of the President''s duties and its holding is the responsibility of the Parliament.

Constitution of the Republic of Kazakhstan (adopted on 30 August 1995)

Section III. The President

Article 47

1. The President of the Republic of Kazakhstan may be prematurely released from office in the case of constitutional incapacity to perform his duties due to illness. In this case the Parliament shall form a commission consisting of equal numbers of deputies from each Chamber and specialists of the respective areas of medicine. The decision of premature release based on the conclusion of the commission and that of the Constitutional Council confirming observance of the established constitutional procedures shall be adopted at a joint sitting of the Parliament''s Chambers by the majority of no less than three-fourths from the total number of deputies of each Chamber.

2. The President of the Republic shall bear responsibility for the actions performed while exercising his duties and only in the case of high treason may be discharged from office by Parliament. The decision to bring an accusation and conduct its investigation may be adopted by the majority of the deputies of the Mazhilis at the initiative of no less than one-third of the total number of its deputies. Investigation of the accusation shall be organized by the Senate and by the majority of votes of the total number of the deputies of the Senate. Its results are transferred for consideration at a joint session of the Parliament''s Chambers by the majority of no less than three-fourths of the total number of the deputies of each Chamber, provided the Supreme Court concludes the validity of the accusation and conclusion by the Constitutional Council that the established constitutional procedures were observed. The failure to arrive at a final decision within two months from the moment of the accusation shall result in the recognition that the accusation against the President of the Republic is rejected. Rejection of the accusation of the President of the Republic in perpetration of high treason at any stage shall result in premature termination of the powers of the deputies of the Mazhilis who initiated the consideration of this issue.

3. The issue of discharge of the President of the Republic from office may not be initiated in the period when the President is considering premature termination of the powers of the Parliament of the Republic.

Article 48

In case of premature release or discharge of the President of the Republic of Kazakhstan from office as well as in case of his death the exercise of the duties of the President of the Republic shall be temporarily transmitted to the Chairperson of the Senate of the Parliament. If the Chairperson of the Senate is unable to assume the duties of the President, they shall pass to the Prime Minister of the Republic. In this case extraordinary elections of the President of Kazakhstan shall be held within two months after the premature termination of the powers of the President of the Republic.

Constitution of the Republic of Kyrgyzstan (adopted on 5 May 1993)

Chapter Three - PRESIDENT

Article 50

1. The term of office of the President may be terminated as a result of: resignation by his own petition, made by him to a joint meeting of the houses of the Jogorku Kenesh; his dismissal from office in the procedure provided by this Constitution; or inability to perform his authority due to illness or as a result of his death.

2. If the President of the Kyrgyz Republic is unable to carry out his duties because of illness, both houses of the Jogorku Kenesh shall take the decision on early dismissal of the President of the Kyrgyz Republic from the office on the basis of the conclusion of a State Medical Commission created thereby and with a vote of no less than two-thirds of the total number of deputies of each of the houses.

Article 51

1. The President of the Kyrgyz Republic may be dismissed from office by the Assembly of People''s Representatives only on the basis of a charge made by the Legislative Assembly of state treason or commission of another grievous crime supported by a ruling of the Constitutional Court of the Kyrgyz Republic.

2. A decision by the Legislative Assembly to bring a charge against the President of the Kyrgyz Republic and dismissing him from office must be made by a vote of two-thirds of the total number of deputies of the Legislative Assembly, and in the presence of a ruling by a special commission formed by the Legislative Assembly.

3. A negative ruling by the Constitutional Court of the Kyrgyz Republic on a charge made by the Legislative Assembly shall entail the dissolution of the Legislative Assembly.

4. A resolution of the Assembly of People''s Representatives on dismissal of the President of the Kyrgyz Republic from office must be adopted by a majority vote of no less than two-thirds of the total number of deputies of that house, no later than two months after the laying of the charge against the President by the Legislative Assembly. If a decision is not reached by the Assembly within this period, the charge shall be considered to be refuted.

Article 52

1. If the President of the Kyrgyz Republic is unable to carry out his duties for reasons stated in Article 50 of this Constitution, the Prime Minister shall carry out his duties thenceforward until the election of the new President of the Kyrgyz Republic. Election of a new President of the Kyrgyz Republic must in this case be conducted within three months of the termination of the term of office of the President of the Kyrgyz Republic.

2. The Prime Minister, while executing the duties of the President of the Kyrgyz Republic, shall not have the right to dissolve the Legislative Assembly or the Assembly of People''s Representatives, to call a referendum, to terminate the authority of the Government, or to make proposals for introducing amendments and supplements to the Constitution of the Kyrgyz Republic.

Constitution of the Russian Federation (adopted on 12 December 1993)

Chapter 4:

PRESIDENT OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION

Article 92

2) The President of the Russian Federation ceases the exercise of his powers early in the event of his resignation, persistent inability to exercise his powers for health reasons, or removal from office. Furthermore, the election of the President of the Russian Federation must take place no later than three months after the early cessation of the exercise of power.

3) In all instances where the President of the Russian Federation is unable to perform his duties, they are temporarily carried out by the Chairman of the Government of the Russian Federation. The acting President of the Russian Federation does not have the right to dissolve the State Duma, schedule a referendum, or submit proposals on amendments to and the revision of provisions of the Constitution of the Russian Federation.

Article 93

1) The President of the Russian Federation can be removed from office by the Federation Council only on the basis of a charge of treason or commission of some other grave crime, filed by the State Duma and confirmed by a ruling of the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation that the actions of the President of the Russian Federation contain the elements of crime and a ruling by the Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation that the established procedure for filing the charge has been observed.

2) The decision by the State Duma on filing the charge and the decision by the Federation Council on removing the President from office must be adopted. By a vote of two-thirds of the total number of members of each chamber on the initiative of at least one-third of the deputies of the State Duma and provided there is a ruling by a special commission formed by the State Duma.

3) The decision by the Federation Council on removing the President of the Russian Federation from office must be adopted not later than three months following the filing of the charge against the President by the State Duma. If the decision by the Federation Council is not adopted within this period of time, the charge against the President is deemed rejected.

Constitution of the Republic of Tajikistan (adopted on 6 November 1994)

Chapter Four: The President

Article 71

In the circumstances of the president''s death, resignation, removal from office, or inability to perform his duties, the duties of the president will be the responsibility of the chairman of the Supreme Assembly until new presidential elections. In this circumstance, the duties of the Supreme Assembly chairman will be the responsibility of his first deputy. Presidential elections will be held within three months in the aforementioned circumstances. Issues related to inability of the president to perform his duties will be resolved by the majority of people''s deputies at the session of the Supreme Assembly, except cases that are stipulated in Article 72.

Article 72

… In the circumstances of breaking his oath and committing a crime, the president can be removed from his office by the Supreme Assembly, taking into account conclusions of the Constitutional Court and the special commission of the Supreme Assembly with the support of at least two-thirds of the people''s deputies. Issues related to the breaking of the presidential oath and commission of a crime should be put forward by at least one-third of people''s deputies. In such circumstances the duties of the chairman of the Supreme Assembly''s special session are laid upon the chairman of the Supreme Court. The people''s deputies take an oath that they will act with a clear conscience and within the framework of the law and justice during the discussion of this issue. The investigation continues after the president is removed from his office; he is accused and his criminal case is sent to court.

Constitution of the Republic of Turkmenistan (adopted on 18 May 1992)

Article 60

The President has the right of immunity. The President may be prematurely relieved of office if incapable of meeting her or his obligations because of sickness. The People''s Council, on the basis of the conclusion of an independent medical commission formed under its auspices, decides to prematurely relieve the President of office when not less than two-thirds of the established members of the People''s Council so vote. If the President violates the Constitution or laws, the People''s Council may express its lack of confidence in the President and put forward to a popular vote the question of her or his removal. A question of lack of confidence is put forward for consideration when not less than one-third of the established members of the People''s Council so desire. A decision of lack of confidence in the President is made when not less than two-thirds of the established members of the People''s Council so vote.

Article 61

If the President, for some reason, is not capable of meeting her or his obligations, until the election of a new President, her or his powers are transferred to the Chair of Parliament. In such a situation, a presidential election should be conducted no later than two months from the day of transfer of powers to the Chair of Parliament. A person meeting the obligations of the President may not be a candidate in the presidential election.

Constitution of the Republic of Uzbekistan (adopted on 8 December 1992)

CHAPTER XIX: THE PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF UZBEKISTAN
Article 96

If, for reasons of health that are confirmed by the findings of a State Medical Commission formed by Parliament, the President of the Republic of Uzbekistan is not able to meet her or his obligations, within ten days, at an emergency session of Parliament, from among the deputies, there is an election for an individual to, for up to three months, be Acting President of the Republic of Uzbekistan. In this case, within three months, a general election for the President of the Republic of Uzbekistan must be held.