Putin's First Year: How Good, How Bad? (Event Summary)

Putin''s First Year: How Good, How Bad?
Roundtable Discussion

Thursday, May 10, 12:15-2:00 pm, Coolidge Hall 215
Cosponsored by the Davis Center for Russian Studies and
the Strengthening Democratic Institutions Project (SDI)

Timothy Colton, Professor of Government and Director of the Davis Center for Russian Studies, Harvard University Vladimir Boxer, Fellow, Strengthening Democratic Institutions Project John Reppert, Executive Director (Research), Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Kennedy School of Government Sarah Mendelson, Assistant Professor of Political Science, Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts University

Summary by SDI Associate Misha Pryadilnikov
Four experts on Russian politics presented their views of Putin''s first year in office.

Timothy Colton began his remarks with a discussion of the 1999 parliamentary elections and 2000 presidential elections in Russia. He suggested two alternative views of the elections: they can be seen as part of a succession process or as truly democratic elections. Professor Colton claimed that although President Yeltsin named Vladimir Putin his "successor" in the fall of 1999, the formal transfer of power still included a competitive election in 2000. The parliamentary elections, he argued, were highly contested and the outcome was not pre-ordained.

Professor Colton noted that there is some evidence that a secret deal was struck according to which Putin accepted certain limitations, some of which may have prevented him from removing key figures from the presidential administration (at least while Yeltsin is alive).

Professor Colton reminded panelists and the audience that the central question to be addressed during the discussion is: what is the most important thing that Putin has done in his first year in office? Most importantly, he asserted, has been Putin''s talk about his deeply held beliefs and goals: 1) strengthening the Russian state and 2) catching up with the West "and the rest." Unlike Yeltsin, who thought of the West as a club to which Russia wanted to belong, Putin talks about achieving Western levels of productivity, growth, and modernization. Yeltsin saw Russia as being outside of the West; Putin sees Russia as being behind the West. Professor Colton concluded that the two goals— strengthening the state and catching up with the West— are not incompatible with one another, but noted that old Soviet-style methods would be detrimental to achievement of either of them.

Addressing the problems still facing President Putin, Professor Colton cited the Russia''s economy, territorial integrity, and international relations. The Russian economy has experienced significant growth in last two years, but there is still very little investment, and it is not clear what will happen to the economy once oil prices decline. The ongoing conflict in Chechnya proves that Russia''s territorial integrity is still under threat. The international environment is not very friendly to Russia, and here it is important to look not only at Russia''s actions, but also at what the U.S. has been doing.

Vladimir Boxer noted that the main concern of the Russian electorate since 1995 has been stability at any cost. Putin and his entourage played the stability card so well that we were able to predict even back in September that he would win the Presidential election. In a way, the parliamentary elections in December 1999 acted as a first round of the presidential election, because a clear frontrunner appeared then. Only from that point of view were the March 2000 presidential elections a mere formality.

Some have argued that during the election campaign Putin failed to advocate liberal reform, instead concentrating on ''strengthening the state.'' Well, Boxer stated, had Putin made liberal reforms a major message, as Acting Prime Minister Yegor Gaidar did in the 1993 election, why should we expect him to have gotten any more votes than Gaidar did then? However, Putin has adjusted himself to the economic liberal paradigm.

Putin''s main task has been to fight the Russian elite. Even those who supported his candidacy as Yeltsin''s successor were naturally apprehensive about Putin''s calls to break up the power of oligarchs and regional leaders.

What happened in Russia during the late Yeltsin period was not just privatization of the state, as some have claimed, but first of all and foremost privatization of society (by the oligarchs). For some time, there was a burst of civic participation in the early 90s. Parties and movements were making noise, groups were trying to organize collective interests, and more importantly media became the major mediator between society and government. Then, the so-called oligarchs "privatized" society''s most important institutions— those that can influence and counterbalance government— especially the major media outlets, including two of the three main nationally broadcasting TV networks, ORT and NTV. Except for the Argumenty I Fakty weekly newspaper, there are really no major independent media left in Russia, according to Boxer, if independent means free from both oligarchic and state control.

Aside from media, the oligarchs some "independent" trade unions, associations of journalists, parties, electoral blocs, and "independent" Duma Deputies. There is some evidence that coal-miners'' strikes in 1998, during liberal reformer Sergei Kirienko''s term as Prime Minister were called for by the major financial groups upset about the government''s policy.

President Putin has achieved some success in fighting the oligarchs and the regional bosses. The drive to centralize tax collection enabled the government to collect more revenue, thus enabling it to start substantial payments on foreign and domestic debt. Workers are finally getting paychecks on time. Pensions have been raised. The basic functions of the state are being restored. In the end of the day, according to contemporary democracy theory, a stable, functioning state is necessary (but not sufficient) for real democracy.

In sum, according to Yegor Gaidar, Putin has been able to: 1) improve tax collection 2) institute new custom tariffs 3) push through federal reform and 4) set the course for the military reform.

It might be argued that there is a dangerous tendency of reducing the freedom of the press and democracy; however this needs to be understood in the context of the transitional environment. Considering attitudes, values, heritage, and social psychology of the majority of Russian voters, why should we expect an uninterrupted ascendance to stable democracy in this post-Communist country? Shifts between unstable democracy and a limited form of authoritarianism will continue to happen at least until the young generation becomes dominant in political life. Only after this the transition to stable democracy begins. Boxer noted that he predicted these shifts (in print) back in 1993. Based on an understanding that limited authoritarianism is almost inevitable, some analysts and policymakers conclude that they should support this trend. However, Boxer noted that this is a mistake. It is one thing to understand this inevitability as an analyst, but another to support it as a policy maker. If every policymaker were to support the trend to limited authoritarianism, society would get unlimited authoritarianism. Democratic-minded political policymakers should act as if they believe they can achieve the fullest democracy in the shortest amount of time.

John Reppert began with the question "What has Putin not done?" He provocatively noted that Putin, unlike his predecessor, has not fallen down, appeared intoxicated, cancelled important meetings or embarrassed his country at any significant international occasion.

At the same time, the strength of the "power ministries" has increased significantly since Putin was elected, and surprisingly without an increase in resources. The president has given the FSB (the domestic successor to the KGB) a sense of having a much "longer leash." Many people now occupying government posts feel most comfortable in a military uniform. Unhappy with former Defense Minister Igor Sergeev''s dispute with his Chief of the General Staff, Anatoly Kvashnin, Putin decided to fire Sergeev; it seems that Kvashnin may soon follow.

Under Putin, the winners are the security forces, the liberals and Putin''s family. The losers include the oligarchs, media and the political parties.

In terms of foreign relations, Putin has tended to deal directly with China, India and Europe downplaying the bilateral relationship that Yeltsin cultivated with the United States.

It is likely that Putin will continue the tendency of his own power centralization and it is also likely that he will continue to pursue an ambitious foreign policy agenda, finding reasonable allies with whom he can make deals. In that endeavor, Putin has a great opportunity to isolate the influence of the United States, given the global backlash against perceived U.S. unilateralism.

Sarah Mendelson concentrated her remarks on the plight of civil society under president Putin. She noted that the current Russian administration has promulgated a "securitization of information"--a system where almost any information is considered secret. Scholars and civic activists are concerned about the pressure put on them by the FSB. The security services have cracked down on environmental groups and foreign researchers doing scholarly work in Russia. Internet outlets have also been under pressure.

Professor Mendelson asserted that Putin''s foreign policy has not been pragmatic, but rather, chaotic and dysfunctional. What is happening essentially is a battle of networks. This the only way one could explain Putin''s interest in strengthening ties with a range of countries including Canada and Iran.

Natural gas monopoly Gazprom is becoming a major player in foreign policy. This major gas concern can turn lights on or off for half of Europe and it''s not clear whether Kremlin is really in control of the corporation.

Mendelson cited rumors that Putin may remain in power for up to 17 years, considering discussion of possible amendments to the Constitution mandating a seven-year term for the President. Finally, she concluded that Chechnya is a major problem for the Russian state, with no visible solution. Neither internally in Russia nor outside in the West does the Chechen war get the proper attention.

Questions and Comments:

Q: Is Russia an enemy of the United States?
A (Mendelson): Russia is neither considered an enemy nor it is considered a friend. It looks more like a competitor but generally speaking Putin''s administration is heading on a collision course with the United States.

Comment (Boxer): Many representatives of the Russian elite may think America is an enemy because they resent globalization as a process and the United States as a symbol of globalization.

Comment (Jerry Easter): Too much emphasis has been put on Putin''s drive to strengthen coercive institutions while his work towards improving democratic institutions has been largely ignored. Putin managed to limit the power of regional governors without undermining the electoral mechanism. Putin institutionalized party reform imposing clear cleavage lines helping people to choose among definite alternatives. Putin strengthened the constitution, rather than destroy it.

Q: (Mitchell Orenstein): If Samuel Huntington''s ''two turnover'' test is applied to Russia, will Russia come out as a democracy? There were elections but there was little competition. Was the torch simply passed on to the same guys?
A: (Colton): Perhaps Huntington''s model should not be applied so straightforwardly. We have to consider segmentation within the government. By the end of the second term, Yeltsin did not have anyone in the government with whom he started in 1991. It is not clear that you really need an election to show that there has been turnover of power.

Comment (Rory MacFarquhar): Putin''s behavior could be aptly explained in terms of pragmatic means with a goal to have a strong Russia. Putin wants a strong economy. He wants Russia to be recognized on the world stage so he''s working with many, often conflicting, groups. Putin is pragmatic about the press, not authoritarian as some think.
A: (Sarah Mendelson): If Putin is truly pragmatic about fighting corruption, then he must understand that he can''t find corruption without the help of the free press.