Putin's Path: Reflections on Spring 2000 in Russia (Event Summary)

Putin''s Path: Reflections on Spring 2000 in Russia
May 31, 2000

Summary by Emily Van Buskirk, Research Assistant, SDI

"Russia is still Russia." Peter Rutland''s main conclusion upon returning from a semester of teaching in St. Petersburg is either optimistic or pessimistic, depending on how one understands it. Optimistic, in that Russia retains her unique cultural character. Pessimistic, in that assumptions of convergence such as the theory embraced by Joel Hellman and Stephen Fish that market reform and liberal democracy go hand-in-hand are not true for "exceptional" Russia. Understanding that "Russia is Russia" helps one decipher the so-called "Putin enigma." People wonder, Rutland said, "Is Putin a policeman or a reformer; a sinner or a saint?" The answer is that Putin is a policeman in Russia, a description that speaks to the unique nature of the Putin phenomenon.

Rutland argued that Russia thinks about its relationship to the global community in terms we associate with Peter the Great. Perhaps it is no coincidence, he observed, that Peter the Great is "everywhere" in the Russian consciousness, and ranks number one in opinion polls posing the question, "Who is the greatest hero?" The Soviet period, Rutland said, was only a temporary departure from the Petrine dilemma of how to integrate Russia into the global space: rejecting certain Western ideas and borrowing others, customizing them to fit Russia.

Rutland described Putin''s actions as "non-politics politics"; in other words, gosudartsvennost (statism, a focus on state-building). This was evidenced by Putin''s campaign for the presidency, which is better described as a non-campaign. During his campaign, Putin had complete coverage in the media as he exercised the symbols of power. However, these efforts were not in the context of competitive politics-not to win votes, Rutland stated.

Rutland also observed a revival of political ritual in Russia. He likened Russia''s "restoration politics" to those of 19th Century France, with its post-Napoleonic attempts to restore the Monarch. Putin is employing these symbols to help Russia put its recent past behind; invoking military bands, parades, and the Orthodox Church, for example. Putin''s inauguration was a showcase event in this regard, replete with 1812 period uniforms and his reception of a blessing afterwards in front of a cathedral. Putin uses these tsarist and religious symbols and rituals with the aim of establishing the authority of the presidency.

Meanwhile, the question of Russia''s identity remains ambiguous. In Rutland''s words, "Russia is a state, but is not a nation." Above all, Russia sees itself as a space that is threatened by other states. The Chechen War represents the Russian State standing up for itself, Rutland noted. To further refine his depiction of Russian society, Rutland noted that it was self-absorbed or "autistic." One piece of evidence is that international news gets less coverage now than it did in the Soviet period.

Finally, Rutland turned again to the economy. "Is it possible to have a market economy within the Russian State?" he asked. For starters, Rutland noted a complete absence of civil society and joked that Russian NGO activities entailed "laundering money the other way." Civil society was sidelined during the transition from the Soviet system; had it not been, there would have been much more conflict during this period. What happened, Rutland argued, was that the Soviet shadow economy, the idea that people must "make do" (cultivating their own garden plots, for example) became the post-Soviet "main stream" way of operating. This "shadow economy" does not constitute civil society in the Western sense of the term, because it has no "public face." Further, the social net for most citizens consists of the family, with the state picking up the rest. Where, Rutland asked, is the middle class?

Meanwhile, the Russian economy is functioning, but on petroleum. Producers of domestic energy, such as Chubais'' UES, suffer from having to charge low rates (about 1 cent per kwh when the price should be 4-5 cents). Chubais'' woe is that exporting energy is more profitable than domestic sales. Rutland explained that the energy crisis in February/March was brought on by the increase in industrial production (while the supply of energy remained fixed).

Discussion
Asked about the existence of a "middle class" of business professionals and entrepreneurs, Rutland described the existence of a partly criminalized "business elite" which was not, however, a middle class.

When asked to comment on the comparisons made in the Western press between Putin and Peter the Great, Putin and Deng Xiaoping, or Putin and Pinochet, Rutland said that comparisons are useful. However, he argued that more than anything else Putin is a "team player," and not an individual, transformatory leader of the sort implied by the comparisons with De Gaulle or Napoleon.

Asked about Putin''s foreign policy and his relations with the West, Rutland predicted toughness. "Putin will play a hardball game," he said.

When a question was posed about the sincerity and meaning of Putin''s statements about integrating Russia into the global economy, Rutland argued that Putin does want to encourage investment, but only the kind that will strengthen the Russian State. This kind of state-led integration, with protective barriers is reminiscent of Japan or South Korea, but not resonant with today''s models.