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Putin's Plans for Russia: How Realistic Are They? (Event Summary)

Putin''s Plans for Russia: How Realistic Are They?
Strengthening Democratic Institutions Project, Harvard University

May 29, 2001

Written by Jaba Devdariani and Blanka Hancilova

Implications of Putin''s policies remain vague. While analysts and politicians note alarming trends in politics, the economy and human rights, it is difficult to identify details and determine the feasibility of Putin''s long-term strategy. Dr. Emil Pain, the Galina Starovoitova Fellow on Human Rights and Conflict Resolution at the Kennan Institute/Woodrow Wilson Center and a former advisor to President Yeltsin, was invited to present his views on policies of the Putin administration.

Graham Allison, Director of the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs and Chair of the Caspian Studies Program, opened the meeting by welcoming Dr. Pain to the Kennedy School and emphasizing that Dr. Pain''s opinion on the topic at hand would be of high value to the audience present.

Dr. Emil Pain began by emphasizing the importance of Russia''s culture and psychological climate to Putin''s current policies. The Russian political climate is influenced by the ideology of national humiliation, which is based on several myths built around Russia''s recent history. First, this ideology interprets the collapse of the Soviet Union as a failure of Russia to maintain its superpower status. Second, it argues that the pace of privatization and the extent of democratic reforms were excessive and "not acceptable for Russian realities."

In actuality, Dr. Pain argued, the pace and results of privatization were satisfactory in the areas where western participation was highest, as in the telecommunications industry. In contrast, the industries that remained under the control of the "red directors"--former communist nomenklatura— such as the energy and gas sectors, have degenerated into corrupt oligarchies that influence state decision-making.

Two distinct phases of Yeltsin''s rule can be identified. The first, characterized by the state''s diminishing role, was dominated by liberal advisors and political figures like Egor Gaidar, Galina Starovoitova and Andrey Kozyrev. Although these young reformers argued for liberal policies, they never fully embraced democratic values. The second stage saw the rise of reactionary political figures like Aleksandr Voloshin and Evgeny Primakov. Their rise to power was marked by the strengthening role of the state hierarchy and the return to rhetoric of Russia''s special position in international affairs. It is during this stage, Dr. Pain argued, that Putin started to grow as an independent political figure. Therefore, Putin''s policies can be seen as a succession of the second phase of Yeltsin''s rule. His current rule can be considered patrimonial, where the core of the administration is composed of the president''s personal friends and cronies. Putin attempts to strengthen the "vertical of power" in order to strengthen the economy, but Dr. Pain pointed out that authoritarian politics are rarely compatible with liberal economic models.

Dr. Pain stated that the negative effects of Putin''s domestic policies are visible in a multiplicity of areas, including the national economy and regional governance. In the area of economics, the myth about the excessive pace of privatization has rebounded in a takeover of the crucial industries by the "red directors." The presidential administration is not interested in de-monopolizing energy giants like GAZPROM because Putin can use these organizations as policy tools, both domestic (as the NTV case showed) and international (by pressuring neighboring states on energy issues).

The policy toward regional governance aims to further consolidate the president''s executive powers by limiting the strength of the Parliament''s upper chamber. Dr. Pain argued that the policy eliminates local governors'' incentive to attract foreign investment to their regions. Further, Putin is not interested in curbing corruption in regional governance. Rather, he uses accusations of corrupt practices to persecute political enemies, and not to improve general management practices.

A notable trend in Russia is the growth of ethno-nationalism. In addition to the ideology of self-humiliation, Dr. Pain presented several other grounds for the growth of nationalist sentiment in Russia. One is sensitivity to the changing ethno-demographic composition of the country, especially the growth of the Muslim population. Another is the administration''s tactic of encouraging nationalist sentiment in order to argue the existence of ethnic conspiracies (Islamic, Jewish, etc.) against Russia and to hold them responsible for the country''s economic and political failures.

Nationalist sentiments are closely connected to the escalation of conflict in Chechnya, which actually improved Putin''s popularity. Dr. Pain argued that Russia cannot win the war in the near future and stated that public opinion may be reversing as casualties increase. Even according to official data, the Russian military''s losses are approximately 1.5 times greater than during the first Chechen war. The Chechen conflict affects overall democratic development in Russia. As the role of the military grows, the most controversial generals occupy the positions of the regional governors. There is no hope that these people will carry out liberal economic reforms. On the contrary, they will back the trends of imperialism and xenophobia.

Based on his meetings in the United Kingdom, Germany and the United States, Dr. Pain noted that international pressure on Russia to change its current policies would increase. In spite of negative trends, Dr. Pain argued that Russia''s controversial policies should not be used to demonize the country. He believes that a gradual reversal of public opinion and a conclusion to the apolitical stance of the country''s younger, more pragmatic generation give hope for the future.

Discussion
The question and answer session was dominated by questions on Chechnya. In response to Dr. Allison''s questions, Dr. Pain noted that Putin sooner or later will realize that a political solution to the Chechen problem must be sought. For economic, demographic and political reasons, Russia cannot sustain the military operation in Chechnya much longer. In addition, Dr. Pain referred to recent opinion polls, which show that 59% of Russians do not believe in the possibility of a decisive victory in Chechnya. 60% believe that the rebels could return to power. Under these circumstances, Russia should seek a common language with the moderate Chechen leaders, but not with the outright collaborators who have no respect within the Chechen community.

Brenda Shaffer inquired about effects of the new Russian policies on the South Caucasus. Although Dr. Pain noted that he is not an expert in this particular field, he replied that it is difficult for Russia to play a positive role in the Karabakh conflict. Russia provokes controversy with Georgia by introducing a visa regime and applying preferential policies to the breakaway regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. According to Dr. Pain, spread of the Chechen conflict to Georgian territory is possible and would be a disaster for Russia, leading to international isolation.

Dr. Pain believes the effect of humiliation ideology on Russia''s foreign policy will be minimal. Considering the Russian diaspora in post-Soviet countries, he recalls a personal encounter with Putin in 1994, when the future president actively argued against the integration of the Russian minority into the society of the Baltic States.

When asked to share his vision of appropriate policies that will change the current state of affairs in Russia, Dr. Pain stressed the importance of developing a comprehensive program that will educate Russians in the spirit of civil citizenship rather than ethnic identity.