Reports & Papers
from
Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory
Putin's Plans for Russia: How Realistic Are They?
Emil Pain
Galina Starovoitova Fellow on Human Rights and Conflict
Woordrow Wilson Center
May 29, 2001
When I read the invitation that you sent which contained a promise that the lecturer would touch on the questions of economics, foreign and domestic policies, I was simply terrified. I am not a specialist in any of these areas. To prevent any misunderstanding, I will tell you what it is that I intend to discuss with you. I will speak only on the things that are close to my narrow area of knowledge - that is the influence of Russia''s cultural and psychological climate on its economy and politics.
I also do not know in detail what Putin''s plan is. In Russia, there is a popular anecdote that says "We know that Putin prefers the Korean model of political and economic development, but we do not know which Korea he means: the North or the South." But the Russian president has outlined his overall policy approach many times: strengthening of the role of the state and government to achieve reforms in the economy. So the question is: "Can, in contemporary Russian conditions, authoritarianism in politics coexist with liberalism in the economy?"
What do I mean by the new cultural and psychological climate? First of all, it is the development of the ideology of national humiliation, which is associated with the transformation of basic societal values which are not a stimulant for development. One cannot say that the present government of Russia has already legitimized this ideology and made it official, but it exploits this ideology. It is precisely the "ideology of national humiliation" that brought Putin into power and supports his high ratings. Putin is seen as a strong personality, capable of restoring a form of respect to Russians or, as it is now fashionable to say, "raise Russia from its knees."
This ideology is used by political technicians serving the government to separate popular President Putin from the unpopular first president of Russia, Yeltsin. Putin''s popularity is built on being the opposite of Yeltsin. Within this "ideology of national humiliation," the previous ten years are now considered a failure.
Above all, the breakup of the Soviet Union and creation of new independent states is seen as national humiliation. It was an historical chance that allowed nationalities interested in development to free themselves from the pressure from the more traditional and conservative societies which are concentrated mainly in the southern periphery of the former Union. This is proven by the experience of the Baltic States, which seized this opportunity, and that of Russia, which did not. Now Russia is attracting the more conservative states.
Today, ideas of the restoration of the USSR, the revival of Russia''s status as a superpower and the strengthening of its defenses are the most attractive and are supported by more than 40% of respondents. At the same time, the goals of developing market enterprises and competition were mentioned by only 18%, and the development and strengthening of democratic institutions and freedom of speech by fewer than 12%.
The process of federalization of Russia and the growth of the national republics'' political self-reliance is seen as a defeat. But this process was the only possible answer to the growth of national self-consciousness of non-Russian peoples whose share of the population is growing. Federalization moderated and in some instances prevented the development of ethnic conflicts. But now:
- If inter-ethnic relations worsen, then the probability of the positive development of Russia is very small, as 59% of its territory is comprised of national republics.
- To the numerous national defeats, the majority of Russians add the economic reforms and privatization.
This can be seen in a number of myths that unfortunately have received wide support in Russia and even in America.
Myth number one: Russia was too fast in the conduct of economic reforms and used western economic models without taking into account Russian specifics. In reality, the greatest economic gains were made in precisely those sectors of the economy where privatization along western lines was fastest and most complete and done on Western money. This includes the food-processing industry (especially beer breweries) and telecommunications, where in the last ten years a total technological restructuring has taken place.
On the other hand, the worst indicators are in those spheres of the economy where privatization was not complete, where the government role remains large, and where the share of Western investors is low. These include the energy sector and military production. Here private ownership never developed and the separation between owners and managers never took place. In these sectors, the main actors are still the so-called "red directors" who, just like in Soviet times, steal the property of their firms which are partially owned by the state. The best example of this is Gazprom. Its management transferred the choice pieces (the most profitable gas fields) to a firm called Itera, which is organized as a family business by the children and other relatives of the leadership of Gazprom.
Myth number two: Russia moved too fast along the way to democratization, and political reforms were not accepted by the population. These kinds of statements could not be further from the truth. In my opinion, the problem of Russian reforms was that Yeltsin''s administration readily moved away from systematic democratic reforms and based their actions precisely on the claim that Russia "is not ready for democracy." Because of that, when the new constitution was enacted in 1993, power began to concentrate in the hands of the president and his apparatus, and the bureaucracy became increasingly out of control. As a result, the path was open for the increase in corruption and formation of oligarchic rule and "savage, criminal capitalism."
Two distinct periods of Yeltsin''s rule are apparent. His government began at the time of liberalism, and its main task was to reduce the role of the state in the life of Russian society. In the second period, his approach was based on the necessity of strengthening the role of the state.
In the first stage, the closeness of the foreign policy positions of Russia and the West were evident right up to the Russian leadership''s support of the American action against Saddam Hussein. In the second period, Russia demonstrated a separate position on the majority of serious international problems: Bosnia, Kosovo, Iraq, and Iran. And, the Russian military has recently returned to old Soviet habits of tweaking its Western rivals. If in the first period the brighter, famous people played a larger role in surrounding Yeltsin - Gaidar, Chubais, Kozyrev and others - then in the second period there were darker, less noted bureaucrats such as Borodin, Korzjakov, Yumashev and Voloshin.It was at this time, after 1996, when the former liberal goals were forgotten and the oligarchic or so-called "family" form of administration of Russia strengthened, that Vladimir Putin was born as an independent political actor. Putin received his first post as the rank of minister and became the head of the Federal Security Forces. Although Putin is seen in Russia as a repudiation of Yeltsin, he in reality is developing the political model that was formulated during the second anti-liberal period of Yeltsin rule.
Certainly the situation in Russia is different than that in the agrarian Moldova Republic when communists returned to power. In Russia, the return to the Soviet system is more camouflaged and Putin''s political model is more sophisticated; it contains even some liberal elements.
Now it has become clear that liberals in Putin''s team are more than likely just decorations. The main stream of his policy is the strengthening of the role of the bureaucracy and recreating the Soviet "vertical power." The system of checks and balances has significantly weakened. For example, the Soviet of the Federation, as a chamber representing regional leaders, ceased to exist. The State Duma is totally under presidential control, and the press is increasingly dependent on the state.The hope for a strong hand is only one of the symptoms of the revival of the patrimonial relationships and values which call for a dominant role for the state, which must care for its citizens. In May, the first anniversary celebration of Putin''s inauguration drew thousands of young people from all over Russia to Red Square. The events were reminiscent of those in Stalin''s times with the famous slogans of the youth: "Thank you Comrade Stalin for our happy childhood."
Another important symptom of patrimonial relationships is the organization of government service not on the institutional but the personal basis, as in traditional societies. The fact that many people in power today are from Putin''s home town has already given comics a reason to call the present government "Petersburg dzamaat." (Dzamaat is a name for regional clan groups in Dagestan that play a decisive role in all spheres of life).
One of the most dangerous consequences of the national humiliation ideology is the growth of an anti-Western mindset. Many Russians associate the majority of setbacks of the past decade with the West - the breakup of the Soviet Union, the economic collapse, and even the fact that the Russian army has been unable to defeat the Chechen rebels.
Two important consequences flow out of anti-Western feelings. First, concepts like democracy, liberalism and universal values, which are poorly assimilated in Russia, are associated with the West. Therefore, as the anti-Western mood grows, the above-mentioned values weaken. It is not a coincidence that one of the most popular TV personalities, Mihail Leontev, gained fame because of his militant anti-American position and constant proud pronouncements that he was never a democrat. Second, in all of the known instances of successful economic and political reforms, it was precisely Westernization that became a synonym for modernization. Even the Chinese economic miracle is nothing more than a direct transplantation of Western enterprises and technology. Russia is moving according to its traditional tango rhythm: "One step forward - two steps back."
What could be the result of such movement?
Let us discuss the possibility of the successful realization of Putin''s three political goals: economic reforms, fight against corruption and administrative reform.
First, economic reforms. The development of Russia along the path of liberal reforms, even in the economic sphere, seems to me unlikely. Nothing is pushing the present regime in that direction. The people are tired of reforms. They are more interested in punishing those who are responsible for the past reforms than in the initiation of new ones. The favorable developments in the oil and gas market and the income from weapons sales do not stimulate reforms. The influence of the so-called "red directors," the officer corps, generals and other carriers of the Soviet mentality are leading to similar consequences. And, redistribution of taxation in favor of the federal canter decreases the initiative of the regional leaders.
It is unlikely that Putin himself would push the most important economic reforms. The liberals on his team demand the dismantling of the monopoly in the gas industry, but if he agrees to it, then he would be unable to use Gazprom as an instrument of political pressure as he did in the case of NTV and as it is used in relations with the states of the CIS. Meanwhile, the political goals and above all the restoration of Russia as a superpower clearly dominate his system of values.
Second, the fight against corruption. Putin declared that fighting corruption was to be his main goal. However, it is unlikely that it will be realized. The growth in the number of officials, such as the creation of seven administrative regions, only increases the number of potential perpetrators of corruption. The attempt to fight corruption by constructing a vertical power structure is counterproductive; it simply leads to the creation of a hierarchy of corruption. Instead of paying bribes to one corrupt official, it is now necessary to pay all those people who hold positions at the different levels of the hierarchy. The latest example is in the Primorskiy Krai. The fisheries service accepted bribes from poachers. When police control was established over them, the police were soon taking bribes themselves. Nothing had changed when the Federal Security Service was ordered to oversee the police. The whole thing ended with the governor of Primorie, Nazdatenko, under whom all of this corruption took place, being appointed the fisheries minister.
To fight corruption, what is needed is an independent judiciary. But it is unlikely that this independence is needed by the present regime, which controls the courts and uses them to fight political opponents. An example of this is the case of Gusinsky or of Governor Rutskoi. Moreover, there must be stronger, independent press, but it has become more deferential.
Third, reform of the administrative system. Regional leaders view the creation of the seven administrative areas with a governor-general at the helm as a method of intimidation. But only a few publicly demonstrate their dislike. Examples include the President of the Chuvash Republic, Nikolai Fedorov, and the Governor of Sverdlov Oblast, Eduard Rosel. Others either keep their mouths shut or publicly support presidential appointees hoping to sabotage the implementation of their directives quietly.
With time, the leaders of the Russian regions have become more courageous in their doubts about the correctness of Putin''s reforms. Even careful and influential regional leaders such as Tatarstan President Shaimiev today publicly question the logic of creating seven administrative regions. Apparently at this point, regional leaders have come to the conclusion that the concept of administrative super-regions will not be long-lived. The idea is being resisted by forces on the ground who are more powerful than the regional leaders.
Federal ministers are suspicious of the president''s regional representatives'' attempts to control the flow of finances from the center to the regions and refuse to recognize their role in the coordination of activates of regional offices of their ministries. This kind of competition during Khrushev''s leadership led to the collapse of his favorite brainchild SOVNARHOZ, the prototype of the present day administrative region. SOVNARHOZ included three to four large, poorly governed oblasts, republics or krays. But the current administrative regions are even bigger (they include 12-13 regions). In addition, the party discipline that supported the command hierarchy in the Soviet times is gone. This alone condemns Putin''s administrative system to failure.
Certainly, the power of the regional leaders should be limited, but not from above - not at the risk of concentrating even more power in the Kremlin. Rather it should come from below, in the development of municipal self-government. Putin''s reforms would further weaken the already insignificant role of municipal authorities, because as a compensation for the loss of power on the federal level, the leaders of the regions will receive a free hand in their dealings with the municipalities.
The situation of the local governments is worsening as a result of Putin''s changes in the proportion of revenue directed to federal and regional budgets. Before, they were almost equal: 51% went to the center and 49% to the region. Today, the federal share has increased to 63% and the regions'' has dropped to 37%. But the municipalities were hit the hardest, as their share has been cut in half to only 17%. The Russian government is fooling itself into believing that regions thus controlled are easier to rule and more pliant. In reality, the opposite is true. The less money in the regional and municipal budgets and the less responsibility given to the leaders, the less that can be demanded of them. It should be expected that the residents of the provinces will increasingly direct their displeasure directly to the Kremlin. For the non-Russian peoples, this means a growth of anti-Russian sentiment because federal rule is perceived as Russian rule. All of the ills are seen as coming from it. Indeed, polls show that the majority of Russians believe that relations among the nationalities have been deteriorating since Yeltsin''s time.
It is clear that the Chechen War, more than anything else, has contributed to this sentiment. Since the beginning of the war, xenophobia has grown toward Chechens and others from the Caucasus. In reaction, the non-Russian nationalities'' solidarity with the Chechens has grown as well, including the solidarity of all non-Russian nationalists, Islamic solidarity, and solidarity of all offended nationalities. Second, the Chechen war has dragged on for more than a year. The monthly losses of Russian troops, according to official statistics, are now more than in the first campaign. Even in a pure military sense, there is little likelihood of a victory for Moscow. It is an especially utopian idea that there can be an economic victory in Chechnya.
In my opinion, not one of the goals declared by Putin has any chance of being successfully implemented. At the same time, a tendency which I am sure is not part of Putin''s plan may be strengthened. I am talking about the increase in Russian ethnic nationalism.
The combination of psychological factors that brought Putin to power and is connected with the complex of national humiliation is stimulating the development of ethno-nationalism. "Today everyone is against the Russians," say the nationalists, "- Chechens, Americans, Muslims, and Zionists." This so-called "defensive nationalism" is growing as Russians decline as a percentage of the total population, especially in the republics which comprise more than half the territory of Russia. In the next decade, Russians will become the national minorities in these regions. This fact more often than anything else is used in the propaganda material of radical Russian nationalists. It is represented as the genocide of the Russian people organized by the democrats as the agents of the West.
The Chechen war has a strong influence on the growth of Russian nationalism. The longer it lasts, the more the need increases to justify the setbacks as actions of the enemies of the Russian people. This is no longer just Chechen terrorists and international Muslim terrorists. Very recently a responsible official, General Zdanovich, publicly accused the CIA of supporting Chechen partisans. And Russian fascists go even further by declaring that the "Jewish capitalists" Berezovski, Gusinsky and others support the Chechen resistance. It is therefore not surprising that in April fascists in Moscow demonstrated with the slogans "Chechens into the grave, Jews to jail."
Of course the campaign against NTV and the oligarchs inflame anti-Semitism and the growth of Russian nationalism. The same is achieved by the growth in political activism of the Russian Orthodox Church. But the strengthening of the political influence of the army, militia and the secret services exerts the greatest influence on the growth of Russian nationalism. Even their ethnic make-up is far more uniformly Russian than the society as a whole - especially the officer corps and the generals. But most important is that these men have historically been the carriers of the Russian nationalistic mentality.
In my view, the most likely scenario of Russian development is stagnate authoritarianism where Russia, according to the type of its political regime, falls below the level of Gorbachev''s Glasnost and begins to resemble something in between the USSR under Brezhnev and present day Turkmenistan or Belarus. The economy is supported by the sale of raw materials, and political stability is achieved by the suppression of dissent. The glorification of the leader is almost unavoidable.
This policy of Sovietization could last six to eight years, and then it will give rise to a new democratic opposition. It may be comprised of young members of the intelligentsia and representatives of the business class who are concentrated in the major cites of Russia. In this instance we could expect the consolidation of Russia on the basis of civil society and a civil nation. On the other hand, the main carriers of dissatisfaction in Russia, as in the USSR, could be national movements of non-Russian peoples. These forces are growing as a result of demographic increases and in response to the nationalism of the majority. If the later occurs, then there is a real threat that Russia will suffer the fate of the USSR. I very much hope that this dark scenario will never come to pass.