Reflections on Russia's Past, Present, and Future

This monograph represents the first of a series of publications of the "Whither Russia?" project of the Strengthening Democratic Institutions Project, based at the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs (BCSIA) at Harvard University''s John F. Kennedy School of Government.

The general aim of the "Whither Russia?" project is to draw attention to and put content into the debate in Moscow about "what is Russia?" and what the country''s future geopolitical role should be. Ultimately, the hope is to encourage the most responsible strands of this debate. Specifically, as a result of the project we hope to help clarify: what the competing images of Russia are across the political spectrum; how these competing images are reflected in policy; how the debate is played out in specific arenas; how public perception of the debate differs from the views of the political elite; how views in the regions differ from those in the center; what impact the players have on the shape of the debate and on political outcomes; what the common threads are in the competing images of Russia; and, based on the conclusions drawn, what are Russia''s fundamental geopolitical and national interests.

The project will address a set of three broad questions:

1) Who are the Russians? Looking at competing ideas and components of the Russian nation, Russian nationalism, and Russian national identity.

2) What is the nature of the Russian state? Looking at competing images of the state, Russia''s status as a "Great Power," and Russia''s national interests.

3) What is Russia''s Mission? Looking at Russia''s relations with the outside world - specifically with the Newly Independent States, the coalition of the Commonwealth of Independent States, and the West - and its orientation toward action, including its stated foreign policy and general international conduct.

As part of the project we will be publishing important works by leading Russian policymakers and academics addressing these issues.

The author of this first piece, Andrei A. Kokoshin, has worked for over a quarter of a century on international and defense questions. He holds a Ph.D. in History and is a Corresponding Member of the Russian Academy of Sciences. From 1972-92, he worked at the Institute of the USA and Canada of the USSR Academy of Sciences, eventually becoming Head of the Department of Military Political Studies and Deputy Director of the Institute. He has published twelve books and many more articles. Since April 1992 he has been First Deputy Minister of Defense of the Russian Federation, serving as the Ministry''s top civilian.

Dr. Kokoshin wrote this monograph as a scholarly contribution and not in his capacity as a member of the Russian government. The opinions presented here are purely his own and are not necessarily shared by any institutions of which he is a member.

In this important study, Andrei Kokoshin directly addresses the question of Russia''s national identity. In part I, he provides a comprehensive review of past Russian thought on "the Russian idea," which encompasses such issues as the meaning of Russia''s history and culture, Russian intellectual history, the Russian national character, and the distinctive features of the Russian nation. The essay discusses in detail the protracted debate between Russia''s Westernizers and Slavophiles, and highlights the need for Russians to develop a clear, unbiased view of their past in order to produce a durable national consensus regarding their future.

Part II looks at the complex international legacy inherited by Russia from its Soviet past. Although not without successes, the Soviet Union proved unable to sustain the burdens of maintaining its "three empires": the "socialist-oriented countries" of the Third World, the "socialist commonwealth" in Eastern Europe and Asia, and the vast multiethnic state of the former Soviet Union itself. Andrei Kokoshin hopes that by pursuing a policy based on the principles of equality and mutual benefit, Russia might serve as a sort of foundation on which other CIS states could unite on equal and mutually beneficial terms.

In part III, Dr. Kokoshin outlines the challenges and opportunities posed by Russia''s current international security environment. He expresses deep concern about the potentially disastrous consequences of NATO expansion, both for Russia and for the international community as a whole, and argues that Europeans and Americans have underestimated the OSCE''s potential contribution to European security. Kokoshin stresses the need for Russia to remain involved in the global economy. He sees great potential for Russia to develop close and mutually beneficial economic, political, and military ties with a number of countries in Europe and Asia. He concludes by offering his insights on optimal directions for future Russian military reform.

In 1996, this paper was published in Russian in Moscow. The Peace Research Institute Frankfurt (PRIF) also published an earlier version of the paper in English, as PRIF Report no. 43. Natalya Dolgopolova, Margaret Clarke, and Gerard Holden translated and edited the original Russian draft for PRIF. CSIA International Security Fellow Richard Weitz revised and edited the current draft. Funding for the "Whither Russia?" project has been provided by The Carnegie Corporation of New York.

I. RUSSIA IN SEARCH OF ITS PLACE IN CONTEMPORARY CIVILIZATION

The problem of Russia''s self-identification and self-perception as a nation, of its search for its rightful place in time and space, has been, and continues to be, one of the most crucial factors in shaping state and society in Russia. It has been a centuries-long process, full of twists and turns and great deviations from the path traditionally followed by other nations. At critical moments in history, the Russian search for identity has intensified. It has been particularly vigorous in the current historical phase (since the end of the 1980s), and not just among the intelligentsia and the political elites - old and new - that are pondering the fate of Russia, but across broad sections of the population. The question of Russia''s place in contemporary world society, of where its past history has led it, and what paths it should follow in the future, is being debated not only systematically in intellectual circles, but also spontaneously among the public. The debate is being conducted not only by those with the time and resources to do so, but also by people who have been impoverished by the new developments and yet, despite the burdens of recent years, continue to hope for a better future both for themselves and for their country. These issues also have recently become the subject of bitter political debate, and they figure in the platforms and programs of countless political parties and movements.

There is probably no other society in the world today where political movements, parties, and individual figures are raising such urgent and wide-ranging questions of fundamental significance for national life - questions about where the country belongs in terms of its civilization and culture, about its national traditions, traditional teachings and innovation, patriotism and the betrayal of national interests, natural borders, and the country''s role in the world. In Russian society, arguments about these problems are almost always highly emotional, and often the debate veers between the pertinent and the pointless. Opinions on either side often take the form of crude political slogans and buzzwords, but these nevertheless have a considerable impact on the public.

The current debate has certain objective causes deeply rooted in the whole complex of issues relating to Russia''s historical development, its geopolitical and geographical location, and other considerations. An additional factor, however, is that from the 1920s to the 1980s, the issue of Russian self-perception, like many other issues, was essentially banished from the sphere of public discussion, and reflection about it, though keen, was conducted in private, at the individual level. Answers to questions emerged, as it were, for each person alone, and did so, as a rule, on the basis of sparse historical and scientific knowledge and of purely personal feelings and experience. The official line about the appearance in the Soviet Union of a new collective entity, "the Soviet people," that had begun its history after the Great October Socialist Revolution and was gradually moving towards a Communist future may have suited many people, but it flew in the face of the complexities that characterized the lives of Russians and non-Russians, as well as belying the lack of clarity in regard to communist perspectives. Russia took great strides along the path of scientific-technological progress, making huge efforts and sacrifices; but it continued on the whole to have its own specific, multifaceted nature, which differed both from that of the United States, which it rivaled in many spheres and was on a par with in military technology, and from that of any other country.

Much of the Soviet political elite was distinguished by its poor knowledge of its country, of its history and distinctive features. This was true even for those spheres for which sufficiently reliable information was available (as in the 1970s and 1980s). Having developed in a situation where there were fixed ideological objectives, the elite was unable to move, of its own volition, beyond the comfortable notions that it had about the nature of the people and the country''s historical mission. Interestingly, the elite''s lack of understanding of the country was highlighted by as committed a Soviet leader as Yuri Andropov. Perceptive observers regarded his statement that "We do not really know the society in which we live" as revolutionary for the time. It was made as part of the speech which he gave, as General Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU, on the occasion of the 112th anniversary of Lenin''s birth. A. S. Chernyaev, "Agoniya neostalinisma" (The Death Throes of Neostalinism), Megapolis, 2, 1995, p. 37. Unfortunately, this line of thought was not developed, and the architects of Perestroika came to power laboring under this same dearth of knowledge about their country. This was one of the reasons why the results of the policies they proposed turned out to be so different from what they had intended.

In fairness, it must be said that the overwhelming majority of the ruling elite in Imperial Russia was just as ignorant about its country, especially in the years preceding the October Revolution. As a result, it neglected the notable achievements of talented native historians, economists, and sociologists, many of whom, such as Pitirim Sorokin and Vasily Leont''ev, were forced to emigrate after 1917 and went on to become sociologists and economists of world renown. Much of value that was achieved by Russian social scientists in the 1920s was subsequently banned or deliberately consigned to oblivion.

The absence of solid scientific knowledge, of a firm research-base, and of regular interchange between genuine scholars and political leaders, as well as the ignorance about social science displayed by leaders and much of their coterie, all played a part in ensuring that grave mistakes were made in what is called the "nationalities policy" of the Soviet Union, and subsequently also of the Russian Federation. Lenin''s thesis about "the right of nations to self-determination" was adopted as part of the general battery of arguments. At the same time, however, the notion was rejected that the Soviet Union comprised a multi-ethnic entity, based on Russian and other Slav groups, and that the nation and the Soviet Union, being a "subject" in international relations, was entitled to take the stage as a nation-state, no less than multi-ethnic countries such as China, India, Indonesia, and even the United States.

The collapse of the Soviet Union, the formation of new sovereign states on its territory, covert and overt hostility in national and ethnic relations, and finally, the formation of the Russian Federation as an independent and multi-ethnic subject of international relations in the fullest sense have revealed the vast deficiencies in our understanding of what sort of society, country, and nation we have been, are now, and will be in the future. This is what Sergei Zalygin, an exceptional writer and a man respected for his sincerity and unwavering integrity, currently has to say on this subject: "Russia, the Russians, have not learned to perceive themselves as a specific entity, as the fully fledged product of their own history. . . . All that nine out of ten philosophers have ever done is to try to work out the riddle of Russia" - to try to understand and define what it is, what its true spirit is. The questions to which they have sought an answer, Zalygin says, are "whether Russia belongs to Europe or to Asia, whether it is a cultured or an uncultured country, a liberator or an enslaver." S. P. Zalygin, "Dva provozvestnika" (The Two Soothsayers), Novyi Mir, 3, 1995, p. 172. We do not know our own country, our own national psychology very well: "It seems we have a better idea of the psychology of the German or the Frenchman than of our own - this is easier and clearer for us. We know that the Frenchman or the Englishman, when he wakes up in the morning, does not ponder what France is or what England is, what a Frenchman is or what an Englishman is. They were born knowing this, and they just live in the French or English way." Ibid., p. 177.

This "unriddling of the self" was put to one side during the Soviet period but has resurfaced with renewed vigor, creating a penchant among the public for any kind of literature that fuels reflection along these lines. This literature also has its specifically Russian character.

The huge decline in the knowledge and understanding of the country that took place in the Soviet Union stemmed directly from the rigid socio-political system established at the end of the 1920s and beginning of the 1930s. Given its nature, this system acted as a permanent brake on the development of the great majority of social-science-related disciplines, especially practical sociology and practical economics. The genuine attempts made to tackle these branches of knowledge during the "thaw" that took place under Khrushchev, and during subsequent periods, were actively suppressed by the all-powerful party dogmatists. At the end of the 1960s, for example, the sociological school of Yuri Levada was broken up. The work of the Institute of Applied Sociological Research at the Soviet Academy of Sciences, which was just beginning to take off, and of many other research centers, was virtually blocked. As a result, during the years of Soviet rule, we fell behind the Western countries not just in regard to the social sciences as a whole, but, most deplorably, in regard to knowledge about our own country.

The gap in social sciences between Russia and the developed countries of the West thus remains almost insurmountable. In addition, the years of Perestroika did not prove as beneficial to these disciplines as they could have been; the overwhelming majority of social scientists made a dash for journalism and politics, considering these more desirable spheres of activity than the laborious (and less lucrative) research work proper to the sociologist or economist. As a result, in considering such a crucial question as national self-identification, we have so far relied more on the work of philosophers and publicists than on the investigations of sociologists, historians, ethnologists, and ethnographers.

The changes that have taken place over the last decade have brought to light dozens of extremely interesting Russian writings that had been either banned or suppressed. They include works by Russian expatriate writers such as Nikolai Berdyaev, Nikolai Lossky, Ivan Il''in, and Georgy Fedotov, who spent decades working abroad after the October Revolution. The works of these authors are often complex, from the points of view both of language and of content, and require a well-prepared reader. Despite this, they have aroused enormous interest among the reading public, and they have a very modern ring to them. A whole range of political movements and groupings are trying to exploit these writings for their own purposes. The works, therefore, not only have obvious historical and philosophical significance; they are also a crucial indicator of current Russian thinking as regards identifying Russia''s place in the contemporary world.

As is well known, in both Russia and the Soviet Union those with mastery over language have traditionally played a crucial role in shaping public opinion and the public consciousness. Hence the great importance of poets and writers, not only in the cultural sphere, but also in social and political life. In the conditions of strict political and ideological censorship that prevailed in the Soviet Union, these individuals were more or less the only channels of expression for ideas with which society identified itself. In the period of Glasnost'' and Perestroika, the situation changed. Writers and poets virtually ceased playing this special role. But it is impossible to forget what they did. It is deeply rooted in the consciousness of the Russian people. The Soviet population, if not actually the "most voracious readers in the world," were nevertheless high on the list, and bought up works of literature, including historical ones, in huge quantities. The mythologies propagated in the Soviet public consciousness were shaped largely under the influence of literature.

The topic of Russian self-identification is a huge one. It could be, and one hopes will be, the subject of a whole range of special investigations. Bearing this in mind, we should like, nevertheless, to take a general look at some of the opinions, past and present, that have been expressed about Russia''s fate - opinions that are a source of both contention and fascination for today''s Russians.

1.1 The Russian Idea Revisited

Turning to past writings that have now come to light again after many years in obscurity, one often encounters something called "the Russian idea." This is a huge concept. It embraces the significance of Russian history and culture, the course of Russian thought, the Russian national character, the distinctive features of the Russian nation, religious self-awareness, all within the context of world development and as a driving force of national life. The Russian idea veered off in all sorts of directions, sometimes turning down a blind alley and almost disappearing from the social and political scene. Not infrequently, it was declared to be a product of egocentrism, of the idealization of, and absolutist attitude to, the intellectual and psychological characteristics of the Russian race, and it was perceived as being nationalistic, if not chauvinistic.

Some authors did indeed hold these kinds of attitudes, but they were never dominant. The Russian idea developed on a huge territory, populated by numerous peoples who had coexisted for centuries. Its proponents included representatives not only of the Russian people, but of peoples who had historical ties with Russia: the Greek Mikhail Trivolis (Maxim the Greek), the Croat Yury Krizhanich, the Belorussian Frantsisk Skorina, the Ukrainians Grigory Skovoroda and Feofan Prokopovich; the Moldovans Dmitry and Antioch Kantemir, the Armenian Mikael Nalbandyan, the Azerbaijani Mirza-Fatali Akhundov, the Georgians Il''ya Chavchavazde and Akaky Tsereteli, the Kazakh Chokan Valikhanov, the Jews Isaac Levitan and Mikhail Gershenzon, and many others. M.A. Maslin, "Veliko neznanie Rossii" (The Great Ignorance about Russia), in Russkaya ideya (Moscow: Respublika, 1992), p. 7.

The origins of the Russian idea, in a broad cultural and historical sense, may be traced back to the Sermon on Law and Grace, an outstanding piece of eleventh-century Russian writing by Ilarion, Metropolitan of Kiev. In recent years, this monument of ancient Russian culture has been identified, in Russia and abroad, as marking the start of Russian philosophical thought - including, of course, many religious traits. One of the main themes of the Sermon is the eulogization of Russia, which had recently been converted and become part of the family of Christian nations.

A landmark in the evolution of this idea is the appearance of the doctrine of "Moscow as the Third Rome." This idea was propounded by Filofei, an elder of the Elizarovsky Monastery at Pskov, in his letter to Vasily III, Prince of Moscow. Following the Council of Florence and the fall of Constantinople (the "Second Rome" or Tsargrad), Rus'' was the only strong Orthodox country left, the guardian of the Western Orthodox tradition. "All Christian Orthodox kingdoms have now come together in your kingdom. You are the only Christian monarch on earth," wrote Filofei. It was in this sense that Filofei regarded Rus'' as the "Third Rome": "two Romes have fallen, there is now a third, there will not be a fourth." Letter of the Elder Filofei, in Pamyatniki literatury Drevnei Rusi: Konets XIV-pervaya polovina XVI (Monuments of Ancient Russian Literature: Late 14th-Second Half of 16th Century) (Moscow: Khudozhestvennaya literatura, 1984), pp. 437, 441.

A major argument in support of this idea was furnished by the diplomatic links that the Moscow princes had with Byzantium, specifically through the marriage of Grand Prince Ivan III with the Byzantine Emperor''s niece, Sofia Paleologue. The "Third Rome" doctrine was an expression of the desire to provide collective religious and historical-cum-cultural protection not only for the Russian nation, but for the Orthodox world as a whole. Maslin, p. 7. Filofei called on the Prince to assume a special responsibility in this new situation. He reminded him of the fate of the second and third Romes, which he was convinced had perished because they had fallen away from the true faith. He insisted that the Russian monarchy would last forever if it remained faithful to true Orthodoxy.

This theory may appear to have a political side to it, if only because it mentions the state as well as religion. But Filofei''s idea of the state was highly theocratic. Later on, in the mid-sixteenth century, the idea of a strongly theocratic state reappeared with Patriarch Nikon, who became involved in a bitter dispute on this subject with Tsar Aleksei Mikhailovich, ending in Nikon''s utter defeat. Echoes of Filofei''s idea are to be found in the late eighteenth and the nineteenth centuries when, following the growth in Russia''s power and its successes in the struggle against the Muslim Ottoman Empire, the question arose of the fate of those people, closely linked to Russia through race and religion, who had settled in the Balkans.

The fullest and most systematic articulation of the Russian idea was produced at the end of the nineteenth century by the noted Russian philosopher Vladimir Solov''ev, a thoroughly non-chauvinistic and non-nationalistic individual. Solov''ev presented the idea in a primarily religious-cum-philosophical form. He adopted a very negative stance to positivism in both philosophy and methodology, attacking in particular such pillars of the positivist school as Auguste Comte. Solov''ev strongly emphasized the "limited nature" of positivism, and of "universal knowledge." He supposed that because it geared itself solely to "external relative phenomena," positivism would not be able to penetrate that which Solov''ev himself focused on as the main channel of knowledge for the individual and for society - namely, the maintenance of religion and philosophical metaphysics. V. S. Solov''ev, "Krizis zapadnoi filosofii. Protiv pozitivistov" (The Crisis of Western Philosophy: Against the Positivists), in Collected Works (Moscow: Mysl'', 1988), pp. 136-8.

Solov''ev defined the gist of the Russian idea as follows: Russia''s historical duty requires that the inseparable links that bind the ecumenical family of Christ be recognized, and that harmony be established between the church, the state, and society as "free and sovereign" entities. "Restoring this true image of the divine Trinity on earth - that is what the Russia idea consists in." Solov''ev, "Russkaya ideya" (The Russian Idea), in Russkaya ideya, p. 204. Solov''ev advanced the idea of Russian life being transformed through a strengthening of its religious aspect - which he understood broadly to mean moral perfection, greater public freedom, and faithful service in the cause of goodness and justice. In addition, he argued for the unification of all the branches of Orthodoxy, Catholicism, and Protestantism, and against identifying Christianity solely with the Orthodox faith. Hence his support for the idea of unification between Russia and Europe on the basis of Christianity. The Russian idea, according to Solov''ev, had nothing exceptional about it; it was simply a new facet of the Christian idea. In order to fulfill their national mission, Russians "need to act not against other nations, but with and for them."

The proponents of Russian cultural advancement at the beginning of the twentieth century - Vyacheslav Ivanov, Nikolai Berdyaev, and Vasily Rozanov - continued to develop the Russian idea as it had been understood by Solov''ev. But whether in its religious, monarchical, or liberal-democrat permutation, the idea failed to survive the experiences of world war, revolution, and civil war - as the leaders of the "White movement" were forced bitterly to concede. See e.g. A.I. Denikin, Ocherki risks smutty. Boor''s general Kornilova (An Essay on Russian Discord. The Struggle of General Kornilov) (Moscow: Nauka, 1991); Vospominaniya generala barona P.N. Vrangelya (Memoirs of General Baron P.N. Vrangel) pt. 1 (Moscow: Terra, 1992); Beloe delo. Don i dobrovol''cheskaya armiya (White Cause. The Don and the Volunteer Army) (Moscow: Golos, 1992).

The rise of the idea of socialism, beginning after the October Revolution, and the qualitatively new international slant it brought, did much to oust the Russian idea, but it did not completely eradicate it. Indeed, in the present situation, where guiding values of the past few decades have been lost, where we are seeing both a spiritual crisis and a revival of religious activity (especially its external forms), and where there is increased interest in the distinctive features of the Russian nation, Russian culture, and Russian history, Russians are increasingly turning to the rich traditions of the Russian idea. Will they find in them something to match the current mood, to satisfy present needs, something that can act as a guiding star? What political trends in the Russian social organism will this ultimately produce? So far, we have not found any clear answers to these questions.

1.2 Westernizers versus Slavophiles

The question of Russia''s position in the East-West configuration has always occupied an important place in the Russian mind, and continues to do so. One of the most important and most widely known disputes in Russian history was fought over the issue of towards which civilization Russia should orient itself. This was the dispute between the Slavophiles and the Westernizers. It took a particularly impassioned form in the nineteenth century, but its roots go back to an even earlier age. Echoes of it are distinctly audible today.

According to the noted Russian historian Vasily Klyuchevsky (1841-1911), forerunners of the Westernizers appeared as early as the seventeenth century, during the upheavals associated with the "Time of Troubles," which ended with the expulsion of the Poles and other foreigners from Moscow and the accession of the Romanov dynasty in 1613. In particular, Klyuchevsky mentions Prince Khovorstin, writing at the beginning of the seventeenth century, as the "great grandfather" of the Westernizers.

Klunchevsky, who could not in any sense be considered a pro-Slavophile, gives an extremely critical assessment of the Westernizers. At the time of Prince Khvorostin, he says, the "blurred outline" of the Westernizer began to emerge in Russian cultural and political life. "This type," he says,

was destined to be with us from that date, appearing in various forms at various junctures, each time with more distinct intellectual and moral features. In the second half of the seventeenth century, he appeared in the guise of the Latinist, an adherent of the Polish-Latin school. In the second half of the eighteenth century, as a Voltairean, a shadowy and impatient admirer of Western European political institutions. In the thirties and forties of the following century, he was a Westernizer proper, an enthusiastic and erudite admirer of Western European thought and science, especially in the shape of the philosophies of Schelling and Hegel. His final incarnation was as the contemporary intellectual, a cautious, sometimes even timid, and therefore prevaricating adherent of all kinds of trends in Western European thought and life. V. O. Klyuchevsky, Sochineniya v devyati tomakh (Collected Works in Nine Volumes), vol. vii (Moscow: Mysl'', 1989), pp. 163-4.
Klyuchevsky goes even further in his criticism of the Westernizers. He considers that they do not live, and do not want to live, in the real world of Russia, with all the habits and customs it has acquired. In Klunchevsky''s words, the Westernizer "looks upon the habits and customs of his native land as a personal inconvenience, as a fortuitous muddle in the midst of which he has to make pause on his way to some better world in which he has no relatives and no acquaintances but in which his mind and his heart have long since taken up residence." Ibid., p.164.

Sadly, this observation is applicable to many Russian "Westernizers" in recent periods of Russian history - including our own. These are people who, albeit from the very noblest motives, want to transplant everything they find alluring in the West - everyday life, culture, technology, and the way individuals and social institutions interact - onto Russian soil as quickly and as unreflectingly as possible.

From today''s standpoint, one of the most interesting representatives of nineteenth century Russian historical and philosophical thought was Pyotr Chaadaev. He was regarded by many as the most ardent pro-Westerner of his day, and he was accused (sometimes justifiably) of being nihilistic towards his own country. It is easy to sympathize with the view of the contemporary Russian historian Professor M.A. Maslin, when he says that in one of his "Philosophical Letters," Chaadaev laid such grave accusations against Russia that he virtually set it beyond the bounds of history. Maslin, p. 11.

"We live in the East of Europe," wrote Chaadaev in his Apologia of a Madman, "that is true. Nonetheless, we have never belonged to the East. The East has its own history, which has nothing in common with our own." P. Ya. Chaadaev, Stat''y i pis''ma (Essays and Letters) (Moscow: Sovremennik, 1987), pp. 140-1. Chaadaev advocated Russian entry into Western civilization and rejected the idea that Russia belonged to the East. He regarded the efforts of the Slavophiles as leading nowhere; they were, he said, calling Russia back to the wilderness. In his quest to identify Russia''s place in the civilization of his day and of the future, Chaadaev put forward an interesting thesis which perhaps deserves, but has not yet received, closer examination, namely that all the available evidence indicated that Russians were a Northern people. "We simply are a Northern people by virtue of our ideas as well as our climate, far removed from the fragrant valleys of Kashmir and the sacred banks of the Ganges." Ibid., p. 141.

Despite all his critical, skeptical, and sometimes outright nihilistic view of Russian history, Chaadaev, in the authoritative view of the Russian religious philosopher Nikolai Berdyaev, was actually a consistent champion of the Russian messianic idea. He developed an original view of the philosophy of Russian history, and this was subsequently taken up by very different schools of thought. What many people found most attractive was Chaadaev''s main thesis that the Russian people had huge hidden and unrealized potential, and that Russia''s socio-economic backwardness might one day prove a historical advantage for the country. The revolutionary democrats made use of Chaadaev''s ideological legacy to argue that it was possible for Russia to skip a stage in historical development, and that it could take a non-capitalist route to socialism. As is well known, this idea was later taken up by the radical faction of the Russian Social Democrats (the Bolsheviks), under the leadership of Lenin.

Views similar to Chaadaev''s about the place of Russia in the East-West configuration were expressed by the well-known Russian democrat and opponent of autocracy, Alexander Herzen: "We are a part of the world between America and Europe, and that is sufficient for us." A. I. Herzen, "Prolegomena," in Russkaya ideya, p. 121. Nowadays, at a time when the Eurasian notion of Russia is gaining popularity among the intelligentsia and among a large section of the nascent political elite in Russia, Part of this phenomenon is the sharp rise in popularity of the contemporary historian Lev N. Gumilyov, author of a series of highly original works on ethnogenesis and the history of the Asian peoples and Russia. several Russian intellectuals, recalling this remark of Herzen''s, have claimed he was more or less the first Russian "Eurasian." To regard Herzen as a Eurasian in the modern sense of the term would probably be an exaggeration. In identifying Russia''s place as being between Europe and America, he was an undoubted pro-European, although he did not shut his eyes to the negative aspects and vices of the European civilization of his day. Having spent many years as an émigré, he knew European civilization much better than many Russian Westernizers who had only visited it from time to time.

One cannot ignore the fact that Herzen repeatedly warned against "iconoclasm" and the kind of leveling that was the catchword of revolutionary insurgents in Europe and Russia alike. He sharply criticized the attempt to romanticize revolutionary violence and also the rejection of the culture of past ages and of values built up over centuries. This kind of outlook has proved extremely topical in recent times, including our own. It is an aspect of Herzen''s work that was generally suppressed in Russia during the Soviet period, despite the very lofty position which Herzen occupied in the pantheon of forerunners of the 1917 Revolution.

In his reflections on the place of Russia in the world, the great Russian chemist and polymath Dmitry Mendeleev stressed the fact that the country belonged both to Europe and to Asia, which prompted some Russian scholars to include him among the Eurasians of history. He wrote: "Russia, lying as it does partly in Europe, partly in Asia, and bordering on territories of crucial importance to both parts of the world, has been destined by history precisely to find some way of reconciling, binding, and merging them." D. I. Mendeleev, "K poznaniyu Rossii," (Towards an Understanding of Russia), in Rossiiskii voennyi sbornik, ed. A.E. Savinkin, Issue No. 7: K poznaniyu Rossii, (Towards an Understanding of Russia) (Moscow: GAVS, 1994), p. 220. Mendeleev notes in particular the multi-ethnic character Russia has gradually acquired through history, which is a direct con-sequence of its special geographical position:

A not inconsiderable number of peoples of different origins, indeed of very different races, have come together in Russia. The resulting group therefore inevitably reflects the medial position which Russia occupies between Western Europe and Asia, right in the path of the huge migrations which determined the whole fate of Europe and the Mediterranean region, which brought about the fall of ancient Rome and of Greece, and the appearance of the Slav branch of the Indo-Europeans on the vast European plain. Ibid., pp. 222-3.

If we are talking about the ideas of the Slavophiles, then it is impossible not to mention one of the most important Russian poets of the nineteenth century, F. I. Tyutchev. It was he who wrote the words, so well known in Russia: "Russia cannot be understood with the mind, it cannot be measured with any of the usual yardsticks; Russia has its own special nature; all one can do with Russia is believe in it." These words have sometimes evoked admiration, sometimes derision, implying it is high time the Russian was understood with the mind.

As a political thinker, Tyutchev developed under the direct influence of such pillars of Slavophilism as I. Kireevsky and A. Khomyakov. While highlighting, as they did, the decisive role played by religion in shaping the spiritual outlook of the Russian people, and while extolling the originality of Russian culture, Tyutchev also tried to show that Russia was not an opponent of the Christian West, but its "legitimate sister."

Tyutchev emerged as one of the most important Romantic proponents of the notion of Russia as a pan-Slavic state with its capital in Byzantium (Constantinople). He wrote that at some point in the future, the Tsar of Russia would have to prostrate himself before the altar in a spiritually revived Byzantium, beneath the ancient dome of Saint Sophia, and rise up again "as Tsar of the Slavs." Tyutchev saw the creation of this kind of pan-Slavic state as being inextricably bound up with the resolution of one of the most important questions of internal and external Russian policy: the question of Poland. In his view, the "desired order" would only be established in the "vast Slavonic realm" when "Russia and Poland were reconciled." But this reconciliation would not take place in Petersburg, nor in Moscow, nor in Kiev, but in Tsargrad. F. I. Tyutchev, Polnoe sobranie sochinenii (Complete Collected Works) (St. Petersburg: A. F. Marx, 1914), p. 191.

Interestingly, Tyutchev, an enthusiastic champion of pan-Slavism, never directed that pan-Slavism against, for example, Germany, and never put forward anti-German ideas. On the contrary, because he had many links with Germany (through family and through long periods spent there), he was an active proponent of German unification and of Russo-German friendship. There is considerable evidence to suggest that Tyutchev''s positive attitude towards German unification reflected the ideas of the illustrious Russian diplomat Prince Gorchakov, of whom he was a close friend. Gorchakov generally looked to Russia''s material interests and made no small contribution to the realization of German unification-for example, by adopting a position favorable to Bismarck at the time of the Franco-Russian crisis in l870. This emerges most clearly in his well-known essay "Russia and Germany," written in 1844. F. I. Tyutchev, "Rossiya i Germaniya" (Russia and Germany), in Russkaya ideya, pp. 91-103.

What Tyutchev said about Russia''s pan-Slavic role was, of course, a flight of poetic fantasy, but one that was not by any means without foundation. At that time, and especially in later periods, many political groups and movements among almost all the Slavic nations and all the Slavic countries looked to Russia with great hope. In many cases this hope was rewarded, from the Russian side, by the provision of important, if not decisive, aid in the struggle of Slav and Orthodox peoples for liberation, and in their attempts to create their own states. This occurred even with those Slav nations whose lifestyle and degree of social development was more advanced than that of Russia. These included the Czechs, among whom pro-Russian sentiment was extremely strong even in the First World War, when they went over to the Russian side in whole regiments because they did not want to fight for the Austro-Hungarian empire.

Despite all their weaknesses, the efforts of the Slavophiles did bear fruit. It was in great part due to them that Russian culture underwent a renaissance at the start of the twentieth century, on the basis of a new synthesis of Russian and European traditions. At the present time, this period in the history of Russian culture is evoking lively interest among Russians. It was a blossoming that encompassed all kinds of creativity. Russian ballet, art, music, poetry, Russian literature in general, won universal recognition and did much to stimulate world culture. To a great extent, these achievements were the result of a revival of deep-rooted traditions going back to ancient Rus''. Added to this, there was the appearance of new pillars of national spiritual heritage, in the persons of Dostoevsky, Solov''ev, and Tolstoy. Maslin, p. 16.

Dostoevsky''s enormous influence on the spiritual and cultural life of Russia is well known. Today, many people are again turning their attention to his views on Russia in their search for answers to the age-old questions about the country''s fate. This trend is reinforced by the fact that his own writings, and works about him, are now becoming known for the first time, having been suppressed under the Soviet regime. Dostoevsky was a prolific and passionate portrayer of the Russian character, and his philosophical and literary legacy is vast. For the purposes of this essay, we shall touch only on his attitude to the ideological tussle between the Westernizers and the Slavophiles. The renowned Russian philosopher Nikolai Lossky, one of the best writers on Dostoevsky and his world-view, considers that he was neither a one-sided Slavophile nor a one-sided Westernizer-cum-liberal.

Dostoevsky never agreed with those who, like Tyutchev, called for all Slav nations to be united under the aegis of Russia, and who saw this as being the chief mission of the Russian state. The Slav, said Dostoevsky, would prove to be "a source of future misfortunes for Russia." "Do good to them and pass on," he said. "We cannot dissolve into Slavism; we are above it. They will bring us discord and disintegration." F. M. Dostoevsky, "Russkoe reshenie voprosa" (The Russian Decision) in Rossiiskii voennyi sbornik, no. 7, p. 202. What Dostoevsky condemned in the Westernizers was their unremitting desire to alter everything in Russia at a stroke. "Even two centuries ago, they were wanting to speed ahead and have everything reckoned up, and instead they got bogged down - because, in spite of all our Westernizers'' triumphal cries, there is no doubt that we have got bogged down." Ibid., p. 157 We should remember, however, that Dostoevsky had his own particular attitude to the Westernizers, regarding them as radicals, revolutionaries, and socialists. The clearest literary expression of his negative stance toward them was given, as is well known, in his novel The Possessed. He considered that when the Westernizers and the Slavophiles engaged in their "fantastical quarrels" they "ceased to be Russians." Ibid., p. 203. To the question of what and who the Russian nation was to become, Dostoevsky gave the following answer, which some have found convincing, others not: "We must simply, very simply be Russians." Lossky quotes an entry in the writer''s diaries for the 1880s, in which Dostoevsky wrote that by alienating themselves from each other, and by being hostile to each other, both parties were perverting their activities, whereas if they united, and acted in harmony, they might be able to rescue Russia and rouse it to a new, healthy, and grand existence of a kind hitherto unknown. This appeal by Dostoevsky remains more than relevant today.

1.3 Saving Europe at Russia''s Expense

Russian patriotism is a historical sentiment that has developed over centuries. Its first crisis was described by Klyuchevsky in his account of the "Time of Troubles." He saw one of the causes of the Troubles as being the antiquated "patrimonial-cum-dynastic" view of the state. "Sixteenth-century Muscovites saw their sovereign not so much as a guardian of the national good, but more as a master of the territories belonging to the Muscovite state. And they saw themselves as having come there from elsewhere and as temporarily occupying the territory, as if by political chance." Klyuchevsky, Sochineniya v devyati tomakh. The Troubles were overcome, and the state was revived, when people ceased to regard the latter as a private domain of the Tsar, and when the realization that it belonged to the people took firm root.

As contemporary Russian writers comment, the Russia that was reforged in the fires of the Communist Revolution bore very little resemblance to the Romanov state that had disintegrated after lasting 300 years. Many traits, not only of an Orthodox but also of a general historical and cultural nature became not merely alien, but actually deeply inimical to it.

Among the many ideas put forward during the Soviet period was that of Soviet patriotism. At that time, the patriotic idea was regarded as concerned exclusively with service to the cause of socialism and communism, and with loyalty to Soviet ideas. What was now preached was not service to the nation, but service to Soviet power. A. Panarin, "Tsivilizatsionnyi protsess v Rossii" (The Process of Civilization in Russia), Znamya, 7 (1992), p. 206. No active thought was given to the traditional national values of Russia until the time of the Great Patriotic War (1941-5), when the survival not only of Soviet power, but of the nation as such, in its historical, ethnic, and cultural totality, was at issue. This was also the reason for the regime''s interest in the Russian Orthodox church, in the idea of Slav unity, and in mass propaganda recalling the Russian heroes who had figured in Russian history from the thirteenth century onwards - individuals such as Aleksandr Nevsky, Dmitry Donskoi, Koz''ma Minin and Dmitry Pozharsky, Aleksandr Surovov, Mikhail Kutuzov, Fedor Ushakov, and Pavel Nakhimov.

After many frustrations and failures in Russia''s development, many people in the country turned - and are currently turning - their attention to the fact that the country has done much more for the rest of the world than for itself. Pushkin noted this even in his day: "Russia was entrusted with a lofty mission: its vast plains absorbed the force of the Mongols and halted their advance at the very edge of Europe; the barbarians did not dare to leave an enslaved Russia at their rear, and they returned to their Eastern steppelands. The emergent Enlightenment was rescued by a ravaged and expiring Russia. . . ." Quoted in Russkaya ideya, pp. 6-7. This view has become deeply rooted in the Russian consciousness ever since Pushkin''s day. Many Russian scholars have concluded that the price that Russia paid for defending European civilization from the onslaught of that powerful war-machine was not simply that it was left lagging behind Europe, but that it was actually cut off from it for a long period of time.

One proponent of the notion of a historical divergence in the paths taken by Western Europe and Russia is the contemporary Russian scholar Nikolai Kosolapov, regarded as one of the most unequivocal Westernizers of the present day. His point of view is shared by many Russian historians and political scientists, and is therefore worth examining in detail.

According to Kosolapov, the Tatar-Mongol invasion was the first important juncture at which the historical paths of Eastern and Western Europe parted from one another in the period after the twelfth century. And it is natural that in the 800 years that have passed since then, the paths of Western Europe, the part of the continent most protected from foreign invasion during that period, and of Russia, which "invited" them on account of its geographical and geopolitical position - should have diverged widely. N. A. Kosolapov, "Rossiya: v chem vse-taki sut'' istoricheskego vybora" (Russia: The Essence of its Historical Choice), Mirovaya ekonomika i mezhdunarodnye otnosheniya, n. 10 (1994), p. 15. Divergences and differences had existed prior to this. But, according to Kosolapov, it was only after the Tatar-Mongol invasion that many of the fundamental traits of Russian and Western European society and of their social-territorial systems acquired essentially distinct characters, and these became more and more marked with the passage of time. These new divergences had long-lasting effects not so much in terms of the invasion, but in terms of the socio-historical macro-processes which they made possible - indeed, which they rendered unavoidable in the relevant parts of the European continent.

Invasions are common in the history of Russia and of Europe, but, continues Kosolapov, that of the Mongols occupies a special place among them. It lasted for two and a half centuries - in other words, through eight or nine generations. It occurred at a time when social, organizational, political, and intellectual structures in both parts of the European continent were quite well developed by the standards of the time, having long since emerged from barbarity. And it led to the two parts of Europe being more or less isolated from one another for many generations, creating in each of them different preconditions for later development.

As Kosolapov shows, the Russian social/territorial system experienced a devastating shock, from which it took several centuries to recover simply in physical terms. It was a shock whose memory has persisted to the present day, and one which destroyed Russia for the whole of those two and a half centuries, when a particularly rapid build-up of material and intellectual assets occurred in the rest of Europe. It was a shock which, apart from anything else, encouraged the isolation of Russia from Europe, resulting in its cultural and emotional distancing from it, and the impairment of links which, in any case, were not particularly well developed. After the start of the Mongol invasion, Europe, which even before this had regarded the old Russian lands as a barbarian domain, now completely excluded them from the list of "civilized" countries ("civilized" according to the European standards of the day - all the more so since Catholicism had failed to establish itself there, as in most Slav countries). Historically speaking, the Tatar-Mongol invasion - its scope, the inevitability of having to stand up to it and of having to work to throw off the centuries-long yoke which it imposed - was one of the major factors, so Kosolapov believes, in shaping the unique centralized Russian state.

However, this point of view has its opponents, most notably the historian Lev Gumilyev and his followers. Gumilyev advances the idea that union between Russia and Western Europe, where at that time, the Papacy had triumphed over the Hohenstaubens, would have been unnecessary for Russia. In addition, he holds the rather outlandish view that there was never any Tatar-Mongol yoke, only a natural symbiosis between Orthodox Russians and pagan Mongols.

The idea that Russia "extracted chestnuts from the fire" on behalf of others is seen by many scholars as being borne out by the country''s subsequent history, notably the defeat of Napoleon''s Grand Army in 1812-14. The collapse of the Napoleonic empire as a result of the great commander''s strategic defeat in Russia meant that the pluralism of the countries and peoples of Europe was preserved, and this was one of the major factors in the rise of contemporary European civilization (including that of North America). Russia itself gained relatively little, in terms of its internal development, from this notable victory. Most importantly, serfdom, already a pressing problem, was not abolished, despite the peasants'' having played an enormous part in defeating the foreign aggressor.

There is no question that the Soviet Union made a decisive contribution to the defeat of National Socialism, which was threatening the existence of contemporary civilization and, before its attack on the Soviet Union, had managed to enslave practically the whole of Europe. Germany itself was liberated by the defeat of National Socialism: after the Second World War, it went on to produce notable achievements in culture, science, and technology. As far as the Soviet Union was concerned, this notable victory did not produce the benefits Russians had expected in terms of domestic social and political development.

In its gigantic social experiment, and its attempt to create a society based on supreme social justice - first with socialism, then with communism - Russia (the Soviet Union) also made an incontestable contribution to the development of civilization. The whole Soviet experiment, including its the colossal costs and tragedies, had a tremendous influence on the development of socialist movements in countries that proved more civilized and more attuned to the real needs of people. Equally importantly, it demonstrated the perils of many of the excesses of the socialist way. Some believe that Roosevelt''s "New Deal" was conceived under the influence of what was going on in the Soviet Union at that time. And it was the successful implementation of the New Deal that largely determined the fate of Euro-Atlantic civilization up to the present day.

There are indications that the attempt by broad sections of Russian society to come to grips with Russia''s experience of paying too high a price in international confrontations, of receiving very little or nothing at all in return for its efforts, may prompt Russian society to adopt a judicious form of national egoism and to come to some understanding of its own national interests - vital ingredients in a more sophisticated appreciation of concepts such as patriotism.

The question of Russia''s place in contemporary civilization is closely linked to whether the country is regarded as having used up the energy it would need to perform further feats, or whether it is still capable, after such huge sacrifices, losses, and disappointments, of demonstrating the kind of strength it needs to take its eminent place in the world. It is this question which Gumilyev attempts to answer in a series of fascinating writings that have now become available to millions of readers. He repeatedly puts forward the idea that the people of ancient Rus'' and the Russians are two successive super-ethnic entities. The Russians are to the people of ancient Rus'' what the French are to the Gauls, or what Renaissance Italians were to Italians of the time of Caligula. Gumilyev comes to a simple conclusion: compared to Western Europe, the Russians are not an old (and backward) ethnic group, but a young one to which the future belongs. See e.g. L. N. Gumilyev, Drevnyaya Rus'' i Velikaya Step'' (Ancient Rus'' and the Great Steppe) (Moscow: Mysl'', 1989).

1.4. Alienated by Capitalist Development

Even at the time when capitalism was undergoing rapid development, at the end of the nineteenth and beginning of the twentieth century, not many Russian thinkers reflecting on the fate of their country linked that fate with the need for industrial and economic development in Russia. This is all the more surprising in that the Crimean war (1853-55) had shown the country''s marked technological backwardness in comparison with such states as France and Britain (particularly in the military field, and specifically in the development of the naval fleet). Russia was to pay for this backwardness not only with considerable bloodshed in what was a comparatively small-scale war, but also with a humiliation that deeply affected the psychology of the imperial house, the ruling elite, and the whole of Russian society at that time. The defeat was a particularly bitter one because Tsar Nicholas I and the nobility devoted all their energies to the armed forces, and because the Russian Empire was above all a military one, with rich traditions of illustrious conquest. Russia''s glorious triumph over Napoleon''s armies (actually a multi-ethnic force with a French core), the many triumphs over the Ottoman empire, over Prussia, the defeat of Sweden in the Great Northern War, and the many other conquests stretching back over centuries were still very much alive in the nation''s memory.

Interestingly, the most active supporters of Russian industrialization included the early social democrat Marxists, who were convinced that this very process would lead to the formation of the class that would liberate Russia: the proletariat. In this respect they diverged markedly from their predecessors, the Narodniki (Populists), who, in the Marxists'' eyes, had become little short of reactionary.

Russian Marxism, emerging as it did in an as yet unindustrialized country where no proletariat had developed, was bound to be torn by moral contradictions. This fact, says Berdyaev, "weighed on the consciences of many Russian socialists." How was it possible to desire the development of capitalism, to welcome it, and at the same time to regard capitalism as evil and unjust, as something which every socialist was called upon actively to oppose? This difficult question posed a moral dilemma, but then moral questions played an extremely important role in the Russian revolutionary movement of that time. The development of capitalist industry in Russia, Berdyaev writes, presupposed among other things the destruction of the peasantry, their proletarianization - in other words, it meant plunging a great part of the population into destitution, particularly that section which had just freed itself from serfdom. See N. A. Berdyaev, Istochniki i smysl Russkogo kommunizma (The Sources and Meaning of Russian Communism) (Moscow: Nauka, 1990), pp. 84-5.

This moral dilemma was only resolved by Lenin and the Bolsheviks. At a particular juncture, Lenin began to assert that it was possible for socialism to be realized in Russia before a large working class had been formed. But he also believed that if the socialist revolution in Russia was to take root, it had to be followed by socialist revolutions in the more developed countries of Europe, especially Germany. Only after the well-known failures was the thesis propounded that it was possible to build socialism in a single country.

Thus, at a particular point, the traditions of revolutionary Marxism quietly merged with those of the old Russian revolutionaries, who refused to consider that there should be a capitalist phase in the development of Russia (this tradition was embodied in the works and activities of Chernyshevsky, Bakunin, Nechaev, Tkachev, and others). As a result, the Bolshevik Marxists proved to be more within the framework of Russian traditions than their Menshevik counterparts.

The ideologues of the non-Marxist trend counted on Russia''s industrialization as being the most important means of building up its national wealth, and on that national wealth as being, in its turn, the most important source of the country''s strength. Prominent among these ideologues was Dmitry Mendeleev. He wrote, "However bourgeois the need to build up wealth may seem . . . however much it diverges from the lofty idealism of the past and present age, it has to be admitted, without need of any special proof, that without the proper prior accumulation of wealth, everything implied in the term ''the people''s welfare'' cannot be realized." Without the accumulation of wealth, Mendeleev believed, it is not possible either "to reinforce order and truth" or to advance people''s education, or even simply to defend the country. D. I. Mendeleev, "K poznaniyu Rossii" (Towards an Understanding of Russia), in collection of the same name, 7th edn. (Moscow: GAVS, 1994), p. 209. As part of this process, Mendeleev underlined the state''s obligation to promote the country''s industrial development and to educate the people. Ibid., p. 232. As a means of boosting Russia''s industrial development, he suggested the creation of a powerful "Ministry for the Promotion of National Industry;" Ibid., p. 262. this idea of Mendeleev''s may have something in common with the increasingly popular call nowadays for the creation of a counterpart to the Japanese Ministry for International Trade and Industry. Similar ideas were advanced by the prominent Russian statesman Sergei Witte, a contemporary of Mendeleev''s. (In contrast, issues relating to Russia''s industrial development do not occupy pride of place in the reformist ideas of another well-known Russian statesman, Pyotr Stolypin, whose works have recently attracted the attention of Russian politicians of various persuasions.)

1.5 State versus Society: The Russian Enigma

Many Russian thinkers of the past and present have been exercised by the question of the colossal role of the state in Russia, particularly the state apparatus, and of the inflated role and size of state bureaucracy. As historical knowledge in this area increased, interesting parallels were drawn between the Russian Empire and the Soviet Union on the one hand, and Byzantium on the other. Scholars pointed in particular to the autarkic nature of the Byzantine state, which paralyzed development, and they suggested that, notwithstanding the difference in historical conditions, the Byzantine model had, in many respects, been adopted by Moscow.

Among those with the greatest repugnance for the inflated size and role of the state in Russia was Berdyaev. He wrote that Russia was the most bureaucratic state in the world. Everything in Russia was turned into an instrument of politics. The Russian nation had produced the most powerful state in the world, the greatest empire. Since the time of Ivan Kalita (i.e. the first decades of the fourteenth century), Russia had single-mindedly consolidated itself, assuming proportions beyond the imagination of every other nation in the world. The strength of a people whose gaze was thought, not without reason, to be fixed on the inner spiritual life, had been surrendered to a colossal state that turned everything into its own instrument. Interest in the creation, maintenance, and preservation of a huge state occupies a unique and overpowering place in Russian history. N. A. Berdyaev, "Dusha Rossii" (The Soul of Russia), in Russkaya ideya, p. 299.

The effect of the state''s exaggerated role, according to Berdyaev, was that the Russian nation had almost no strength left for its own creative life; all of it went into bolstering and defending the state. The social classes and the estates were poorly developed and did not play the same kind of role as they did in the history of the Western countries. The individual was oppressed by the state, which made impossible demands on him; and bureaucracy assumed monstrous proportions. The Russian state was like a sentry, a bodyguard. It was a product of the struggle against the Tatars and other foreign invaders, and of the Time of Troubles. It had then taken on an abstract life of its own, existing as it pleased, according to its own laws, unwilling to be subjected to the nation''s requirements. This peculiar feature of Russian history gave an air of joylessness and downtroddenness to Russian life, said Berdyaev. Ibid. Many Russian historians, including Klyuchevsky, and specialists in state law, have devoted their attention to the super-bureaucratization of the Russian state.

The views of Egor Gaidar, who designed the "shock therapy" prescribed for the Russian Federation''s economy in 1992, coincided in large part with Berdyaev''s analysis of the Russian state. When a powerful state engaged in territorial, social, and technological expansion, said Gaidar, this affected all the structures of society, hampering their development, or even completely destroying them. The "fertile soil of a highly structured society," where private property acted as a guarantor against arbitrary rule, had not developed in Russia. A cult of the state had grown up, which "crippled the consciousness" of society and produced a host of grave complexes in it. These complexes, said Gaidar, continued even today to prevent Russians from seeing themselves and the rest of the world rationally and with open eyes. E. T. Gaidar, Gosudarstvo i evolutsiya (State and Evolution) (Evrasiya: Moscow, 1995), p. 52.

The exaggerated role of the state and state security could not but evoke a negative attitude among large sections of the intelligentsia in pre-Revolutionary Russia. A significant if not overwhelming majority of this group, together with many of the leaders of the nascent bourgeoisie, regarded the state, and the dominant noble-cum-bureaucratic element within it, as the chief brake on the country''s development and progress. As a result, anarchist ideas had a great impact throughout society, particularly in student circles, and the works of such champions of anarchism as Bakunin and Prince Kropotkin were therefore immensely popular. These ideas were widely applied after 1917, and in the civil war that followed.

From today''s point of view, one of the most interesting features of developments at that time was the effort made by pre-Revolutionary Russian thinkers to find the optimum balance between society and state, to work out a positive and progressive role for the state machinery. In a characteristic comment, Solov''ev wrote of the need to find an optimum balance between not just the state and society, but the state, society, and religion. Solov''ev saw the purpose of Russia''s development as being to identify this optimum. In so far as the Russian state existed only as an "empire held together by its absolutism," it was, said Solov''ev, "no more than a threat of war." If it changed its character by beginning to serve ''the world-wide church and the cause of social organization,'' taking them under its wing, then it would bring peace and blessings to the family of nations." V.S. Solov''ev, "Russkaya ideya" (Russian Idea) in Russkaya ideya, p. 204.

Pyotr Struve, the well-known liberal Marxist (and the target of energetic attacks by radical social democrats) was well aware of the negative attitude of large sections of the Russian intelligentsia towards the state. He wrote that the intelligentsia had to become imbued with the kind of spirit of statehood that had to predominate among the educated class if there was to be a powerful and free state. P. B. Struve, "Problema russkogo mogushchestva" (The Problem of Russian Power), in Russkii Voenny Sbornik, no. 10: K poznaniyu Rossii, pp. 94-5. Struve also underlined the need to work out a practical policy for implementing the national idea, believing that without that idea, state power was impossible. He defined the national idea, as it prevailed in his day, as reconciliation between the authorities and the population, which was just then becoming aware of itself and its own powers, and was gradually evolving into a nation. The state and the nation must grow together into an organic whole. Ibid., p. 43. Struve believed that the most notable and instructive example of such a development in recent European history was Bismarck''s creation of the German empire, in which the state had fused with the emergent nation. Like Mendeleev, Struve emphasized the primacy of economic development in the formation of a new state, and it was true that at that time, the ruling elite in Russia did not pay sufficient attention to this aspect. Struve stressed that "to create a great Russia means above all creating a state power based on economic power." Ibid.

The importance of the state was also recognized by the leaders of the Bolshevik Party, though naturally they viewed it differently before 1917 and after, when they had come to power. The fullest account of Lenin''s views was set out in his famous work State and Revolution. During the Soviet period, especially after the abandonment of the "New Economic Policy" and the start of agricultural collectivization at the end of the 1920s, state pervasion of everyday life increased sharply, reaching proportions unprecedented in modern civilization. The party machines, the machinery of the only officially sanctioned party in the country, became essentially a part of the state. Economic life in the Soviet Union, as many Russian experts rightly argue, was not just subordinated to politics and ideology: it became an integral part of them.

In the present situation, the question of the state continues to be central to the course of reform in Russia. The stance adopted by Egor Gaidar and his associates, outlined above, is increasingly becoming a minority view, even among supporters of reform. A full treatment of the role of the state in Russia at its present stage of development is given in the book Economic Reform in Russia and its Cost, by the Russian economist Alexander Livshits (currently advisor to the President of the Russian Federation). The author''s basic thesis is that the state is not moving out of the economy and surrendering its huge powers to the market system, but is making important changes to the way it functions and is attempting to adjust to the demands of the modern market economy. Among the factors prompting it to do this are the negative effects of overregulation. According to Livshits, the reduction in state entrepreneurship is fully compensated for by production incentives of a fiscal, monetary, or other kind. It is not that the market is expanding and the state shrinking; it is just that a new balance is being established between them; and it is quite possible that there will be further adjustments in the future.

Livshits points to important traditional features of Russian development that cannot be ignored in the process of reform. Inherent in the Russian economy there have, historically, always been elements of paternalism; and people''s attitude to the state was never the same as in other countries - they always expected more of it than people did, say, in the United States or Britain. Whatever government comes to power in Russia, it will have to respect these expectations. A. Ya. Livshits, Ekonomicheskaya reforma v Rossii i ee tsena (Economic Reform in Russia and its Cost) (Moscow: Kul''tura, 1994), pp.145-51.

In many Asian countries which have achieved significant development in the post-war period, one notable feature has been the high coefficient of state expenditure. It has greatly exceeded, and continues to exceed, that which, in the nineteenth century, was regarded as a normal indicator for countries in the process of industrialization. High state expenditure was also typical in the majority of Western European countries that experienced the "economic miracle" of the 1950s and 1960s. A distinctive trait of the Russian model of the market economy, according to Livshits, will be the presence of a well-developed state sector. Privatization will relieve it of the burden of enterprises which, by their nature, have a different, non-state vocation. To bring this about, effective forms of management and, of course, specially targeted state programs are required. Nor should we jettison indicative planning, which has been successfully applied, and has proved its worth, in a whole series of fully market-oriented countries. All the workable features of our many years of national economic planning may prove useful here. Ibid., p. 150. Many specialists in Russia and elsewhere stress that without specially targeted programs, structural change will drag on for decades and, in all probability, will not proceed in the desired direction.

The main challenge for Russia in the foreseeable future, says Livshits, is to create a modern, competitive economy with a good base of technologically advanced industry whose infrastructure conforms to world standards. This challenge also raises the problem of the country''s reintegration. Some hard work lies ahead in terms of creating a functional system of state governance and political institutions that are consonant with the status of a great power. As part of this process, it is essential that, in the structures of power and government, we find an optimum balance between professional politicians, bureaucrats, and technocrats. Specifically, we need to work on the development of a national technocracy that is relatively depoliticized but is driven by the goal of assuring the prosperity and power of the country. While achieving success in the sphere of economic development, it is essential that we preserve our own distinctive Russian character in terms of civilization and culture.

Having accepted Livshits''s basic view, one should add that chief among the proposed programs should be those aimed at developing the infrastructure for transportation, communications and public utilities. Even in the most "market-oriented" Western countries, the state has always played a central, if not the central, role in the development and implementation of this infrastructure. In the case of Russia, with its vast expanses of land, transport and communications play a critical role, not only economically, but also in safeguarding its territorial integrity and in national defense. See A. A. Kokoshin (ed.), "Osnovy natsional''noi industrial''noi politiki Rossii" (The Bases of a Russian National Industrial Policy), Rossiya, no. 41, 7-13 October 1992.

In pursuing the course of reform, one also cannot ignore the fact that the great mass of Russian society does not favor the commercialization of child care, schools, hospitals, or higher education. By and large, it is the state that will have to assume responsibility for these services in Russia.

An extremely important issue as regards bolstering reform is the formation of a middle class in the Russian Federation and the other CIS countries. Perhaps the most important feature of the thoroughly justified criticism of the Gaidar government was that its policies were not directed at the creation of this crucial element in contemporary society. In addition, the liberalization of prices, the loss of savings, the severe cuts in the funding of research, the arts, etc., resulted in the de facto pauperization of large sections of the Russian population - precisely those sections which could have formed the basis of a middle class. Prominent among them were the engineers and technicians of the military-industrial complex, which for decades had had concentrated within it the best managers, the best-educated and best-qualified individuals, capable of critical, independent thought. Nor does the state do enough to promote small businesses. Without the development of the middle class and of small businesses, we may see the emergence in Russia of a "bureaucratized ''concrete jungle'' pseudo-capitalism characterized by huge barrack-like buildings." See Mirovaya ekonomika i mezhdunarodnye otnosheniya, no. 6 (1994), p. 53.

For the foreseeable future, there will continue to be a high level of social ferment in Russia. It must be said that market processes do encourage socio-economic, and even political, discontent. As a result, socialist and communist ideas persist; but in any case, such ideas have deep historical roots, particularly in Russia. There is therefore a danger of recurrent radical upheavals in society.

As is pointed out by the contemporary writer Aleksandr Panarin, the realities of privatization in Russia have bred in the masses an ideology of collective disenchantment rather than an ideology of individual success. This has led to a revival of the archetypal image of the "outcast holy nation," betrayed by those in power and by civilization itself, having failed to find its place in the "earthly city," where the show is run by swindlers and rogues. See Panarin, "Tsivilizatsionnyi protsess v Rossii," pp. 201-2. According to Panarin, the Russian population at present suffers from low self-esteem. It sees itself as a people that has been cheated and robbed by dishonest individuals at the top, as a people incapable of defending its interests in a constitutional, rational, and effective way, and as a people unable, because of this, to regard itself as part of world civilization. Hence, it presents itself as a global threat, because it is not individual people but the nation as a whole that is involved.

This warning does not seem over dramatic, considering all the events that have taken place in the country. Attention ought to be paid to it in Russia and elsewhere, particularly since a dismissive attitude towards deeply felt public sentiments could produce an outcome completely contrary to that intended by the reformers, namely, a new state "giantism" that is even more counterproductive than the former one in terms of the economic and social development of the country, and more of a threat to individual liberty.

The current problem with regard to Russian self-identification is how the country should define its role in the new geopolitical balance and the new civilizational configuration that has come about at the end of the twentieth century. Geographically and historically, Russia''s identity is that of a huge territory stretching between Western Europe and the Pacific, between the Arctic Ocean and the Great Steppe. In socio-cultural terms, it undoubtedly leans heavily towards Western Europe. Whatever the twists and turns of its history, it has, on the whole, remained more a part of Europe in cultural and civilizational terms. But it is a special, highly distinctive part, with its own specific civilizational and cultural features. As regards the simultaneous presence of Russia in Europe and Asia: all the most rapidly developing countries of the East - those which, together with the United States, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand, form a new center of economic, technological, and cultural development in the vast Asia Pacific region - will in fact in the long term, generally tend towards the European type of civilization. Despite all their distinctive features, countries such as Japan, China, South Korea, Malaysia, and Indonesia are all attempting to establish a market economy that has its roots in the European model of development. Russia, although a Pacific power, is not yet sufficiently involved in this process.

Russia needs a new geopolitical approach in order to define its policy towards the East. Panarin offers some interesting reflections on this issue, which may be summarized as follows. The East, including the former Soviet East, does not currently form an integral whole; some Eastern countries are modernizing and Westernizing, others are maintaining, or shifting over to, a position of fundamentalism. However, both groups are tending to oppose or distance themselves from Russia rather than move closer to it. Until 1917, Russia quite successfully fulfilled its mission as a mediator of civilization and enlightenment: the Westernization of adjoining countries and regions in the East proceeded by way of Russia. Now that the Cold War with the West is over, Russia is regarded by both sections of the divided East as a rather dubious ally: the fundamentalists do not trust it, on account of its defeat and "apostasy," and the reformist regimes do not trust it, on account of its backwardness and the continued uncertainty about its pro-Western course.

One can reasonably claim that some fundamental geopolitical processes result from the Westernization of Russia. Russia is moving over to the West, and its "Eastern question" will be decided in concert with it. But, says Panarin, not everything here is self-evident. The West came together on the basis of Atlanticism, without Russia and the attendant countries of Eastern Europe. Germany''s shift to an Atlanticist position after its defeat in 1945 completed the process of crystallization around this idea. Not so long ago, the program of Atlantic integration (Europe 92) seemed near completion. But Eastern Europe''s migration to the West has rendered the Atlantic question problematic once again: the European Union does not dare welcome into its fold countries of Central and Eastern Europe that do not fulfill the criteria it has laid down.

Germany''s role up to the Second World War was, says Panarin, a special one. It counted itself among the countries of Central Europe, the continental bastion against "Atlantic cosmopolitanism." Now, it is once again struggling with the question of its identity. The Central European paradigm may reach a position of parity with the Atlanticist paradigm if not only Hungary, the Czech Republic, and Slovakia, but also former Soviet republics, including Ukraine, seek alliance with Germany. For Russia, says Panarin, this means that, alongside the Atlantic model of Westernization, there is now a Central European model, represented by Germany and Switzerland, countries which are much more sensitive to distinctive national-cum-cultural features than is the Anglo-American world. Thus, the image of the West, which today seems so monolithic and unique, will once again assume a dual nature, throwing Russian Westernizers into confusion. Ibid., p. 208.

1.6. The Need for National Consensus

Today as never before, Russians needs a clear, unbiased view of their own past in order to produce a durable national consensus regarding their future. Without this kind of sober look at itself and its place in the world, Russia may once again fall into the hands of demagogues who will prevent it from achieving true greatness within the framework of contemporary civilization. Self-abasement (which afflicted many of the "helmsmen" of Perestroika) and self-glorification are equally dangerous.

The search for this kind of balanced view of Russia''s fate is directly related to the possibility of forming a durable political center, with centrism being acknowledged as the source not only of stability, but also of progress. Russia will long continue to be distinguished by a wide spectrum of political forces in which left-wing parties and movements will continue to play a not inconsiderable role, but in which pride of place must go to centrism. The formation of a durable political center will, in its turn, not be possible without the creation of a substantial middle class. One of the most important elements in the formation of a durable political system must be a reconciliation between the main opponents in the Russian Civil War of 1918-22, much in the spirit and style of what occurred in Spain in the 1970s.

The state will play an important role in Russia''s political and economic development, alongside the growth in the institutions and other components of civil society and the development of private property in various forms that do not conflict with the traditions and cultures of the Russian people. One essential element in the formation of a functional society is the restoration, within certain boundaries, of components such as the Church. The Orthodox Church played an enormous role in the emergence and development of a distinctive Russian civilization, and in preserving the country as a single entity. It was the power that made possible the unification of the country after the destruction of ancient Rus'' and after centuries of devastation. It made a great contribution to overcoming the "Time of Troubles" at the start of the seventeenth century, and in freeing the country from foreign rule. Of course, in the new Russia, it is hardly likely to play the role which many Russian ideologues of the late nineteenth and early twentieth century hoped it would. But its rebirth, and that of other congregations in Russia, is beyond question; and it is essentially a positive phenomenon, if only in cultural and historical terms. In Russian culture, there is necessarily a dense interweaving of Imperial and Soviet traditions.

While geographically remaining a Eurasian power, Russia looks above all to what may broadly be described as the European experience in developing a modern economy, society, and political system. Objectively, it no longer plays the role of a bridge between the East and West, as it did, for example, in the eighteenth and, especially, the nineteenth century. However, this objective reality has not yet penetrated the public consciousness. But this in no way diminishes the country''s role in the new, late twentieth-early twenty-first century geopolitical balance.

One of the major challenges facing Russia in the modern world is that of starting to think of itself as belonging to the most rapidly developing part of contemporary civilization, at the same time preserving its own special cultural and spiritual values, forged over centuries. The preservation of the fundamental features of Russian identity will directly and indirectly promote a healthy and fruitful pluralism within the framework of the general processes of civilization.

II. THE BURDEN OF "THREE EMPIRES" AND THE REVIVAL OF RUSSIA

The postwar period saw a great increase in Russia''s role and influence in the world, which simultaneously and naturally increased its commitments and its economic and financial burden. The USSR in fact had to control and support three "empires": 1) the Soviet Union proper - a giant multi-ethnic state occupying one sixth of the Earth''s land surface; 2) its allies within the socialist bloc, i.e., the "peoples democracies" or the socialist countries of Europe and Asia, and 3) the developing "socialist-oriented Third World countries." As postwar experience shows, that task proved to be too much for the country economically and politically, bringing numerous and ever deepening problems. The late 1980s and early 1990s saw a simultaneous collapse of all three "empires."

2.1 The Soviet Union in the Cold War System: An Ambiguous Heritage

The conclusion of the Second World War (or Great Patriotic War) brought a gigantic shift in the system of international relations, a shift more significant than that which had occurred after the First World War and the October Revolution in Russia. The countries of Eastern and Central Europe, Mongolia and half of Korea fell under the direct influence and control of the Soviet Union. China, the world''s most populous country, became an ideological, political and military ally. Russia had not experienced such a dramatic strengthening of its position in the world since the times of Peter I and Catherine the Great, not even since the defeat of Napoleon when Russian troops entered Paris in 1814. In the immediate postwar period the faith of the Soviet people in socialism had not yet been exhausted, and this was an important underpinning of the international position and internal development of the Soviet Union. Victory in the Great Patriotic War was achieved at an extraordinary cost: about twenty-seven million Soviet citizens died and many parts of the country were devastated.

At the same time the United States, which had suffered the least damage during World War II, emerged as a superpower. The United States, taking advantage of the defeat of Germany and Japan and the weakening of France, Britain, and other European states, set about creating its own "empire," which spread well beyond the boundaries determined by the Monroe Doctrine, the boundaries within which the United States had stayed until the First World War (with the exception of the Philippines). It is not for nothing that the French political scientist Raymond Aron described that country as an "imperial republic."

Nuclear weapons introduced a qualitatively new factor after World War II by dramatically changing the military-political situation. This new factor increased the destructiveness of warfare by several orders of magnitude almost overnight. The two opposing states, the United States and then the Soviet Union, acquired nuclear weapons almost simultaneously. This set a severe limit on the possibilities of using nuclear weapons, either as a means of warfare or as an instrument of political pressure. Possession of such powerful weapons prompted both powers to show restraint in their relations with each other and set the limits beyond which neither country could afford to move in their world rivalry. The situation that arose was described as mutual nuclear deterrence or nuclear stalemate. There are reasonable grounds to believe that this circumstance contributed greatly to preventing a Third World War between the two blocs headed by the United States and the USSR.

Nuclear weapons became not only, or largely, a military or military-political instrument, but also an important symbol of the status of a nation, of its place in the world hierarchy; significantly, the three other permanent members of the UN Security Council - Britain, France, and China - also eventually became members of the nuclear club.

Many military men were slow to appreciate the military and political consequences of the advent of nuclear weapons and their massive adoption by the armed forces of the opposing sides in the Cold War. Nuclear deterrence theory did not get its due share of attention in this country, and it was assimilated neither by the political elite nor by the military supreme command. This prevented them from deriving the maximum political benefits that the possession of nuclear weapons could have provided for the country''s security. At present, developing the theory and practice of deterrence is, if anything, more relevant to Russia than ever before, considering the country''s new geopolitical situation and the difficulty of maintaining the required level of combat readiness and equipment for the conventional forces.

The collapse of the colonial system in the 1960s offered further opportunities for the Soviet Union to expand its influence in the world. The Third World became an object of contention between Moscow and Washington. The Soviet leadership embarked on a path that differed markedly from that chosen by the architects of the Russian empire. The latter had been formed by the gradual addition of territories adjacent to parts of the existing Russian state. Accordingly, Russia''s sphere of influence mainly covered contiguous countries; notable exceptions were colonial acquisitions such as Russian Alaska and the Russian colony in California with its center in Fort Ross, both of which Russia had lost long before the October Revolution. For Russia, which did not have natural protection against foreign invasions, expanding the borders of the country was a traditional means of self-defense; as a result, some former enemies were included within Russia. The Muslim Kazan kingdom was added to Russia in the sixteenth century, and the Crimean Khanate and then much of Catholic Poland were annexed in the eighteenth century.

Russia pursued its policy of territorial aggrandizement in a way that did not always take into account the creation of a homogeneous cultural and ethnic state. The Russian historian Vassily Klyuchevsky, writing about the reign of Catherine the Great when the Russian Empire made its greatest territorial gains, stressed that these actions were often ill-considered and even chaotic. Russia of course did not act alone, but with the connivance or assistance of other European powers, notably Austria and Prussia. The main targets of this policy were the Ottoman Empire and Poland. The overriding goal was simple: to diminish the territory of a hostile neighboring order to round off Russia''s own borders. The policy with regard to the Ottoman Empire, after a certain point in history, was that of dividing it in two ways either by dividing it between the European powers or by restoring the states that had existed before they were conquered by the Turks. As a result, Klyuchevsky pointed out, non-existent states were recreated (Dacia), Slavic lands fell under Austrian domination, Greek Orthodox areas were added to Catholic Venice etc. V.O. Klyuchevsky, Sochineniya v devyati tomakh (Works in Nine Volumes), vol. V (Moscow: Mysl'', 1989), pp. 180-1. This created many clashpoints of future conflicts. One of these was the part of Catholic Poland annexed by the Russian empire after the victory over Napoleon (the Kingdom of Poland), which never became an organic part of Russia and was a constant bone of contention between Russia and a number of Western powers. However, as an analysis of treaties and agreements attests, many peoples and tribes joined Russia of their own free will, especially when, and this happened often, their existence was threatened.

One of the most outstanding personalities of the first half and middle of the nineteenth century, the poet Fyodor Tyutchev, defined the territorial ambitions of the Russian Empire as follows in his poem Russian Geography:

From the Nile to the Neva,
from the Elbe to China,
from the Ganges to the Danube. . .
This is the Russian Kingdom. F.I. Tyutchev, Polnoye sobraniye sochinenii (Complete works), (St. Petersburg: Izdaniye A.F. Marksa, 1914), p. 190.

These ideas of Tyutchev were in many ways consonant with the views of the ideologues of colonial empires of other countries, in particular Great Britain. The British used to say proudly that the sun never set on the British Empire. (By the mid-twentieth century this definition was being applied to some giant multinational corporations; imperial dreams never die, they simply acquire new forms.) The Russian Empire never grew to the size envisioned by Tyutchev, but it did become the largest state entity in human history in terms of territory and of the number and diversity of the peoples inhabiting it.

As regards Soviet efforts to create zones of influence, they encompassed regions and countries of which the most ardent advocates of expanded Russian influence before the 1917 Revolution had not dreamt. In the 1960s, the USSR embarked on a truly global struggle to assert its influence under the banner of supporting the nations newly liberated from colonialism to build the third "empire," the gigantic sphere of Soviet influence in the developing world. That struggle involved massive financial, economic and military assistance.

Not the interests of the domestic economy, but also the real foreign policy interests of Russia were sacrificed to the ideology of solidarity with the national liberation movements and the so-called progressive regimes. The huge debts of the Third World countries to the USSR and, after the break-up of the Soviet Union, to the Russian Federation, were and are the consequence of this profligate use of national resources. Many of these countries'' debts are for Soviet arms and military hardware. According to authoritative assessments, these debts are larger than the Soviet Union''s indebtedness to Western countries. Specialists note that Russia should join the London and Paris Clubs as a creditor rather than a debtor.

It has to be said that the mass of the Soviet people, although still strongly influenced by socialist ideas, were skeptical about all-out support for "national liberation" movements and countries with "revolutionary-democratic" regimes. They saw such support as an unjustified waste of resources that could be put to better use at home.

A distinguishing feature of the Soviet Union was that the economy of the "first country of victorious socialism" was inherently unsuited for active foreign trade and serious economic expansion. The country was, if one uses the main criteria, largely self-contained, and its economy was autarchic in character. It became more open to the world from the 1950s onwards, but this was largely a reflection of cooperation with the socialist and developing countries within the orbits of the "second" and "third" empires.

History attests that empires have never been formed without the use of organized military force. The Dutch and the British colonial empires relied mainly on their navies. The builders of these colonial empires were mostly motivated by the quest for superprofits to foster private enterprise, and it was private capital that forced the use of the armed might of the state for imperial conquest. In Tsarist Russia the scenario was different. The predominant interests were not economic, but those of security as interpreted by the country''s ruling class, the landed aristocracy headed by the Emperor. Things only began to change during the late nineteenth century when capitalism burgeoned in Russia, and a bourgeois stratum emerged which demanded that its government should act in a way that would increase national capital as had been done in Great Britain, France, Germany and the United States.

The threat and use of force were regarded in past centuries as legitimate methods of achieving political goals. The content of these political goals for many states was the specific, self-seeking economic interests of the ruling elite, which determined the balance between the resources spent on military power and the potential benefits derived from its maintenance and use. But these private interests affected much of society and especially the middle classes. National egoism, as distinct from nationalism, became a powerful factor in economic growth and the coming of age of modern industrialized countries. However, in the pre-Soviet period national egoism was not a salient feature of the Russian national character; and in the Soviet period, the feeling of healthy national egoism was deliberately suppressed on ideological grounds because it contradicted the ideology of proletarian internationalism. As a result the largely ideologically-motivated support of national liberation movements and socialist-oriented countries in the Third World became a major component of the foreign and military policy of the Soviet Union, especially during the late 1950s and early 1960s.

Turning to the present, one has to note that memories of the Soviet Union''s activities in many Third World countries are by no means all negative. Hundreds of thousands of people trained in the USSR, including military cadres, are still working in these countries and major industries built up with Soviet assistance are still running. Soviet weapons supplied to these countries over the years have generally served very well. Egypt, for example, stresses that it was Soviet arms that played the decisive role in the October 1973 war when Egypt regained control over the Suez Canal. Such facilities as the Aswan High Dam and the Helwan metallurgical complex are seen as pacemakers of the country''s industrialization. It seems that Russia as a legal successor to the USSR can, if it acts on a new and truly mutually beneficial and pragmatic basis, successfully develop its relations with these countries, thereby influencing the emergence of new regional and global alignments.

Also, Russian resources were used freely to develop peripheral areas within the Soviet Union. An outstanding example is Central Asia, which was a comparative newcomer to the Russian state and differed markedly from the central Russian Empire of the mid-nineteenth century not only in terms of economic development but also in ethnic, cultural and social respects. For example, Islam arrived much later in Tartaria and Bashkiria than in Central Asia, and these areas were not linked to the main world centers of Islam outside the Russian Empire as were the Central Asian Khanates of Bukhara, Khiva and Kokand.

Maintaining political control over Eastern Europe cost the USSR tremendous material outlays and constant strain, because upheavals occurred in different parts of that region that could potentially destroy the system and provoke a crisis of foreign and indeed domestic policy in the USSR. To preserve the system, the Soviet Union repeatedly had recourse to arms, which undermined the prestige of the USSR in the world as a whole. Meanwhile other models of security in relations between the USSR and its neighboring countries existed. Examples were Soviet relations with Austria and Finland, which attained neutrality after the Second World War, and after 1956 with Yugoslavia, which gained the status of a non-aligned country. These states were not within the Soviet orbit and were not perceived as a headache by the Soviet leadership in any way comparable to Poland, Hungary, the GDR and Czechoslovakia. With Austria and Finland, in particular, the USSR always enjoyed wide-ranging and in many ways mutually beneficial economic links, and no major threat to the interests of our country emanated from their territories throughout the postwar period.

Global confrontation with the United States and its NATO allies combined with an ideological, political, and later military confrontation between the USSR and the People''s Republic of China, which had emerged as the result of a rift between the Khrushchev and Mao Zedong leaderships. There is much evidence to show that the conflict was not inevitable. Nevertheless, it became an accomplished fact. The direct and indirect cost of the conflict to the Soviet Union was vast. After the military clashes on the island of Damansky, tens of divisions were deployed on the Soviet-Chinese border as a shield against a feared Chinese invasion. Later, a well-armed force was deployed in the Mongolian People''s Republic. Providing accommodation for Soviet Army units in these sparsely populated areas diverted huge resources from the economy and from the task of modernizing the armed forces. It also did not strengthen the international position of the Soviet Union.

Militarily, the Soviet Union had to confront practically single-handed not just the United States (globally), but also NATO in Europe; and China, Japan, and South Korea in Asia and the Far East. In the whole of its modern history Russia had not found itself in such a complex geopolitical situation since the period of political and diplomatic isolation of Tsar Nicholas I on the eve of the Crimean War of 1853-1856. The allies and friends of the USSR contributed very little to the technical and economic effort that went into that confrontation, and they consumed vast resources.

No state in the world, however powerful its control over society and however great its manpower and material resources, could endure such a strain. The existence of three empires diverted resources from the strengthening of the nucleus of the Russian state (the Soviet Union), notably the core Russian lands. The Russian countryside ran to seed. Rural families were broken up, something that did not occur in China even after the policy of the Great Leap Forward and the Cultural Revolution. When Deng Xiaoping launched reform in China, it was the existence of strong peasant families that made it possible to resolve the food problem and to ensure development in many other areas. Most of the Russian soldiers whose unique qualities often astonished the world came from rural Russia. Yet the high educational and cultural potential of the Soviet Union was not used to ensure economic development and high living standards. The process of the formation of a middle class, which is the prime guarantor of the stability of social, economic, and political development in any modern society and also ensures social mobility, was never completed.

Our country learnt to produce sophisticated technological systems which only a few highly developed countries of the world could emulate. But that tremendous achievement was not applied adequately to the tasks of promoting economic growth and meeting the welfare needs of Russian people. The potential was largely confined to the military sphere, and its use in the nuclear power industry was marred by the Chernobyl tragedy.

The everyday culture of our multi-ethnic country fell far short of modern world standards. And yet everyday culture is far more important for the self-identification of a country in the world community and for achieving genuine sovereignty than was thought in the USSR. France, for example, managed to uphold its identity and sovereignty against heavy economic, ideological, political and military-strategic odds not least because of its high level of national culture (which Charles de Gaulle and the Gaullists understood very well). It was largely due to high levels of everyday culture that Germany and Japan recovered on a new basis after World War II.

At the same time, the numerous cultural and social achievements of the Soviet Union should not be ignored. These were the achievements not only of ethnic Russians, but of practically all the ethnic groups within the USSR. There were world-class achievements in the cinema, ballet, classical music and sports. Russia scored major successes in the fundamental and applied sciences and in higher education. The USSR created a network of child care centers (kindergartens), general education and specialized secondary schools, many of which provided a very high level of instruction and inculcated culture, patriotism, and social discipline. They trained several generations of highly skilled engineers, technicians, and workers, especially in the defense industry. All this can and must be used to build a new Russia and to ensure her strength and influence in the world of today.

2.2 Relieving the Imperial Burden

The late 1980s and early 1990s brought major upheavals to Russia. Attempts to reform the economy and to carry out profound transformations, to "dismantle" the Cold War system of international relations within a short space of time, resulted in the collapse of all three "empires." Unfortunately, the political decision-makers of the time did not heed the arguments of some specialists that involvement in the affairs of the Third World should be phased out gradually while Soviet influence in Eastern Europe should be preserved and the break-up of the Soviet Union prevented. The result was a paradoxical situation: the USSR was withdrawing from Central and Eastern Europe while trying to maintain its presence in the Third World and committing huge resources to that goal.

The revolutionary changes in Central and South-Eastern Europe in 1989 were primarily the consequence of the profound internal crisis of the ruling regimes in those countries (although, of course, various external forces interfered politically in various ways). This is demonstrated by the recurrent social and political conflicts that erupted in the countries of those regions in the 1950s-1980s, when the ultimate argument of politics - military force - was used on a wide scale. The regimes that were installed with Soviet help became obstacles to economic, social and scientific-technological progress and a brake on the processes of world integration, despite the fact that these countries made important gains in the social sphere. For more detail see: V.K. Volkov, "Revolutsionnye preobrazovaniya v stranakh tsentral''noi i yugo-vostochnoi Evropy" (Revolutionary Transformations in Central and South-East Europe), Voprosy istorii, no. 6, 1990, pp. 21-3.

The Soviet Union''s loss of political control over the states of Central and South-East Europe was partly the result of deep historical processes of the formation of sovereign nation states. The states of the region that were members of the Soviet-led Warsaw Treaty Organization and the ethnic entities which formed Yugoslavia had at various stages of their history lost their sovereignty and even statehood. Prime examples are Bulgaria, which fell under Turkish rule in the late fourteenth century; Bohemia and Hungary, which were parts of the Hapsburg Empire after 1526; and Poland, which was partitioned between Prussia, Austria and Russia three times (1772, 1793, and 1795).

In the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, when the foundations of the present system of international relations were laid, these countries were to all intents and purposes excluded as subjects of that system. They gained new opportunities in their quest for nationhood after World War I which brought about a collapse of four empires: the German, Austro-Hungarian, Russian and Ottoman. But almost immediately they became a sphere of acute rivalry between more powerful states. France and Great Britain in particular made far from unsuccessful attempts to use these East European countries as a cordon sanitaire around Soviet Russia and to impose on them the status of quasi-subjects of international relations.

The political regimes in East European countries in the period between the two world wars were often dictatorial and authoritarian. However, democratic institutions and political pluralism were also developing along broadly West European lines. During the Second World War these countries lost their sovereignty to Hitler''s Germany (Poland, the Czech Republic, Yugoslavia) or became German satellites (Hungary, Romania, Bulgaria and Slovakia). After World War II they were liberated by the Soviet Army only to fall under the political control of the USSR (with the exception of Yugoslavia). As a result they failed to gain full sovereignty even though they had the superficial trappings of sovereignty. One would assume that even if the USSR had exerted a favorable impact on the economy and policy of the Central and South-East European countries, they would have sought sovereignty similar to that enjoyed by the small West European states, which would have brought them into conflict with the Soviet Union.

In their heart of hearts all sober-minded Soviet leaders mistrusted most of their Warsaw Pact allies, especially from the beginning of the 1970s. The Bulgarians were the most trusted, but they were not of key strategic importance; among the key Soviet allies, the National People''s Army of the GDR got the highest marks from Soviet generals. History is now playing a cruel joke on these countries once again. They are anxious to join NATO, where they will not be fully sovereign states. The question of the expansion of NATO to the east remains open, however.

2.3. The Prospects for Reintegration

Russia''s security will be determined to a great extent by the process of the reintegration of the former Soviet Union. The social, cultural, economic, geopolitical, and even historical prerequisites for the strengthening of this process already exist. Russian history bears witness to the fact that the changes in the geography of the state that occurred in the 1990s are not irreversible. If one looks at the space occupied by the Russian Empire in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, and by the Soviet Union in the twentieth century, one can envisage the emergence there of a new, viable, state-political entity.

The post-Soviet space has the potential for a new integration, but that potential cannot be realized automatically. The forging of allied relations among the CIS states would be an important step in that direction. Such relations must be based on the principles of equality and mutual benefit, and must rule out diktat and especially the use of force. Only by respecting these principles could Russia become a sort of foundation on which other states could unite on equal and mutually beneficial terms. The way the future state in the Russian Federation and the relations between its parts are shaped - and the way economic reform, the political system, and the middle class emerge - will also have far-reaching implications. One of the most difficult issues after the tragic events of recent years is that of Chechnya and its place in the Russian Federation.

Russia remains a nuclear superpower. The nuclear potential of Russia (strategic and tactical) is, in some respects, more important for Russia''s security now than in the past when we had large conventional forces. The Russian nuclear umbrella is important for the security of practically all the former republics of the Soviet Union, even though their present leaders may not be aware of it. Russia''s nuclear forces play a key role in the collective security of the CIS. The nuclear shield created by the efforts of scientists and industrialists ensures the peace that we need in order to carry out reform. At the same time one cannot pin all one''s hopes on nuclear deterrence alone. A balanced development is needed of all the other armed services and of diverse weapon systems, including high-precision long-range conventional weapons. The system of strategic nuclear force control maintains these forces in constant readiness and is called upon to rule out any unsanctioned use of such forces. Under international agreements, the Russian strategic nuclear forces are not at present targeted. But when necessary they can be quickly retargeted. M.P. Kolesnikov, Nezavisimaya Gazeta, October 5, 1994.

The reintegration process will, of course, be complex and will proceed at varying speeds in various areas. According to public opinion polls and the assessments of political scientists and sociologists, the greatest desire for reintegration with Russia is displayed by the populations in Belarus, Armenia, Eastern and Southern Ukraine. It will not necessarily dovetail with the contours of the former Soviet Union''s borders, and its various dimensions will wax and wane. A general environment favoring the reintegration trend has been fostered by the marked ebb of nationalist sentiments in most successor states of the Soviet Union, including Russia itself, after the disappointments of independent life. However, the picture is anything but simple. In most cases the reintegration trend coexists with continuing attempts to assert sovereignty and to build new state entities. There is a seesaw struggle between these two trends. The desire for reunification often seizes the broad masses, but this is not always true of the political elites. Local "proto-elites" are emerging which for reasons of prestige seek to consolidate their power by opposing reintegration processes. Russia''s own record on this score is not altogether blameless. See: Ob integratsionnykh protsessakh v postsovetskom prostranstve (On Integration Processes in the Post-Soviet Space) (Moscow: Peace Institute of the Russian Academy of Sciences, International Association of Peace Foundations, 1995), p. 4.

Some countries take a critical view of the possibility of a multipolar world and would welcome the recreation of a powerful center on the territory of the former USSR. Some states, however, take a very cool attitude to the processes of reintegration within the former USSR, and often undertake active political measures (generally disguised) to prevent such an eventuality. Many states are not exactly enthusiastic about the prospect of Russia''s reemergence as a superpower.

The trend of declining "nationalistic irrationalism" in the former republics contrasts with the manifestation of such irrationalism in some autonomous regions within Russia, creating the danger that the former trend could be reversed under the impact of the latter. There is a danger that in some potential subjects of a new integration, the "anti-empire effect" will again gather strength as soon as the inevitable difficulties have to be confronted by the new associations of states. The formation of unifying institutions may bring back the former habit of blaming all negative phenomena on the center. Russian public opinion will take some time to assimilate the need to support former allied republics in order to promote Russia''s own interests.

It is important to bear in mind that the trend toward integration that is gradually replacing the trend toward autarchy may manifest itself in different ways. Some new state entities are looking to the West. Some countries in the Caucasus and Central Asia are contemplating an orientation towards Turkey and Iran. There are prospects for a rapprochement of some Central Asian states with their neighbor China, which increasingly provides a model of economic development for them. The leaders of many new independent states apparently have not yet decided with whom they would like to integrate and how far they are prepared to go. They are still considering various combinations, including alliances among themselves. All this reflects the processes of diversification of foreign, economic and political ties of the new independent states formed as a result of the break-up of the USSR. Ibid., p. 5.

A successful Russian national industrial policy which could be joined by a number of former republics of the USSR could become a powerful factor in a new integration. It should focus on the development of facilities that ensure the production of competitive high-technology goods. The aviation and the aerospace industries of Russia, with their unique intellectual and technological potential, testing systems, and other assets. provide a prime example. An important part of national industrial policy must be the development of infrastructure, in particular transport, communications, data transmission systems, and satellite navigation. See A.A. Kokoshin (ed.) "Osnovy natsional''noi industrial''noi politiki Rossii" (The Bases of a Russia National Industrial Policy), Rossiya, no. 41, October 7-13, 1992. If such a policy is initiated by Russia, it would serve as an important stimulus for reintegration on the whole territory of the former Soviet Union.

2.4. The Russian Language as a Basis for Russian Identity

A special role in the creation of a new Russian statehood and in the search for a new stable place in the world is played by the Russian language. In the field of national security and the military-political sphere where linguistic nuances can mean the difference between life and death, particularly in crises situations, the clarity and transparency of language becomes ever more important.

The development of the Russian language as a major cultural factor is one of the most important means to preserve the integrity of the country and its territory. It is also important for the implementation of policies toward the other former Soviet republics. In this regard, Russian authorities can profitably imitate the policies of French governments, which since the time of Cardinal Richelieu have recognized the importance of developing a unified literary language for their country. Russian language development should become a primary concern of state policy, especially with respect to the training of military personnel. Pushkin, the creator of the contemporary literary language of our country, has done more than thousands of prominent government officials and military leaders to create a unified and globally influential Russian state.

While safeguarding and promoting the development of the Russian language, the government by no means should undermine the rights of all the ethnicities and nations of Russia to cultivate their own languages and dialects. It should not impose a policy of russification similar to that introduced by Emperor Alexander III.

III. ELEMENTS OF A RUSSIAN NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY

The concept of "national security" widely current in the practice and theory of contemporary international relations is only now becoming part of our political lexicon. This is not surprising if one considers that in the USSR the official doctrine was that the national element of security was subordinate to the social-class and international elements. The Soviet Union was seen as a multinational state cemented by a common ideology. The Stalinist conception of state socialism put the state above the individual and above the nation, regarding it as an end in itself. This is why the term "national security" was not part of the Soviet debate, the cornerstone of which was the concept of state security, interpreted primarily as the defense of socialism and its gains inside and outside the country.

The resulting narrowly ideological understanding of security deprived the state''s actions of flexibility, diminished the prospects of warding off complications in the international arena, hindered the correct evaluation of gains and losses in various military security efforts, and did little or nothing to ensure genuine security for the country.

In determining national security principles for a new Russia, at least two questions must be answered. The first concerns the magnitude of the cultural-civilizational task we set ourselves as a state. The answer to that question seems to be clear: our aim is to make Russia a strong state with a civilization that develops in a stable manner. The second question is far more complex, since it concerns the evaluation of the environment in which we will have to move toward that goal. What are the main characteristics of that environment?

3.1 Security After the Cold War

It is already clear that the new Russia will develop in a conflict-ridden world in which many problems do not lend themselves to civilized solutions, despite the constructive efforts of universally recognized international organizations. Large-scale armed conflicts in some regions of the world cannot be ruled out. The danger of the proliferation of nuclear weapons has increased. If nuclear proliferation cannot be prevented, the character of mutual nuclear deterrence may be substantially changed, which would alter the context not only of individual countries'' national security, but also of international security as a whole.

The disintegration of the Warsaw Pact and the break-up of the Soviet Union did not result in a more stable and homogeneous system of international relations, as many people in the West and in this country had hoped. The radical change of the international order that followed the end of the Cold War created large unstructured zones whose development is unpredictable; the evil which many thought to have been tamed - extreme nationalism, chauvinism and authoritarianism, even primitive vendettas - have come into the open again.

In Europe, the problem of borders seemed to have been resolved once and for all, especially after the very important Helsinki Conference of 1975 which cost all its participants immense political and diplomatic efforts and demanded of the USSR painful concessions in the field of ideology (the so-called "third basket"). But the dramatic shifts of the 1990s proved otherwise and graphically demonstrated that even in the nuclear era, an era of rapid scientific, technological, economic and cultural development, the states and peoples have no more solid guarantees of their geographical and geopolitical status than before.

The disappearance of the bipolar structure of international relations, even in the context of growing interdependence, has not automatically been followed by the emergence of a system without hierarchy. The comparative power of the state (especially its economic dimension) will, as in the past, play a very significant role in the new situation, although in present-day conditions of interdependence and democratization of international relations, small states are much better placed not only to uphold their sovereign rights but even to be leaders in certain spheres. The sheer weight of leading states in the European system (including the United States and Canada) establishes a certain substructure of relations between them. Constructive interaction within that substructure will go a long way to determine the stability of the system as a whole. But the difference between this substructure and what existed in past centuries and in the period between the two world wars lies in the strengthening of processes of political and economic integration in western Europe, processes which have acquired a supranational character and given rise to corresponding institutions.

The modern system of international relations in the Western world, although its strength is challenged from time to time, especially in the monetary field, still has certain reserves of strength thanks to the infrastructures which were forged over decades by developed capitalist states to prevent crisis situations and minimize damage. A number of associations of political parties and public organizations are actively engaged in transborder, transnational political processes, not to speak of transnational corporations which often have a big say on key international issues. However, that safety margin may not be sufficient in certain situations, which strengthens the argument of those in Russia and other countries who believe that ensuring world order requires a certain level of control by force, in particular by the states that already possess such force. Today, control by force is not confined to overt or covert use of military might but has many more dimensions and involves various non-military levers of influence and coercion. In addition, that control by force is exercised within the framework of a fairly well-developed international legal system of relations that is markedly different from what existed in the period between the Franco-Prussian war and the First World War or between the two world wars.

The phenomenon of interdependence (the growing role of transnational corporations and "strategic alliances" between them), although recognized by many scholars and political leaders, has not yet been adequately studied and is not fully understood by the population of the countries involved in that process. In the Soviet Union interdependence was either ignored or dismissed as a false "bourgeois" conception. Now that attitude has been supplanted by exaggerated hopes that this process will bring nothing but stability. However, increasing interdependence is only in part stabilizing; it also creates many new problems and makes new conflicts more likely. Furthermore, growing interdependence does not just lead to mutual cultural enrichment, but in many cases tends to create new economic and social tensions and conflicts. The complexity of advanced civilization makes it more vulnerable than in the past to the transborder consequences of internal racial or ethnic conflicts. It also becomes more vulnerable to the actions of terrorists.

In spite of the lessons of the past and the emergence of ever more sinister problems which are becoming global in character (environmental pollution, health hazards and the depletion of vital resources), the behavior of nation states is still in many ways determined by "national egoism." Mass awareness of these problems, even awareness among intellectuals, lags behind the real changes. The corporate interests of ruling political elites, various state institutions, social classes and other groups still play an important role and are often at odds with the interests of common and mutual security. Any realistic system of security, including Russia''s, must take into account national egoism and the interests of various groups. One should not forget that totalitarian governments that are outside democratic control may behave irrationally and in a way that conflicts with the new realities of international relations.

However, while recognizing the many components of power in the modern era and the increased role of its non-military instruments, one has to take into account the existence of areas of incipient conflict and the high probability of direct armed conflicts; it should suffice here to mention the recently-ended war in Bosnia.

Clearly, the coming decades have a good many challenges in store for us. The challenges that the international environment presents to Russia are easily discernible. Increasingly the challenge comes from Asia, which has a talent for quickly assimilating Western scientific and technological achievements and often improving on them. From the time in the sixteenth century when Russia began actively to expand eastwards, Asia was something like a "backyard" for Russia. Now the situation has changed radically, as many Asian countries are fast emerging as centers of economic power which many people here are inclined to regard as models that Russia could follow, despite all the differences between our countries. The Asian challenge, though serious in terms of longer cycles of historical development, is not yet perceived in Russia as a problem that requires immediate solution or should be a short-term specific concern of our national security policy. Western countries, including the United States and Canada, are regarded differently; the challenge they pose was and is highly relevant to us. There can hardly be any doubt on that score in or outside Russia, despite the fact that the Cold War period which saw such tough confrontation in every area, including the military and political, has come to an end.

3.2 The Fallacies of NATO Expansion

The West of course is no longer perceived as the enemy, especially militarily, but it has remained strong and united, partly due to NATO. Many Russians see this (with some reason) as a source of various problems for Russian sovereignty. NATO''s eastward expansion is perceived by many in Russia not only as a move that is profoundly unfair in the military and political sense, but also as a move aimed against Russia as a civilization.

There are many ambiguities in relations between Russia and the Western world, at least as these relations are perceived by Russians. In fact, the Russian mind is confronted with a basic uncertainty. On the one hand, if one takes a long-term view of US and Western interests, the Western world would like to see Russia as an economically developed partner, and even as an ally in the building of a new international community. This is what Russians hear in the official statements of Western leaders and from their own Western-oriented liberals. On the other hand, any sober-thinking person in Russia cannot help being aware of a new geopolitical situation in which Russia has few trump cards or levers of influence, and equally few allies. Besides, Russians are aware of the West''s "iron grip" (sometimes we describe it as the West''s respect for force). Finally, Russians can easily imagine how tempted the West could be to finish off its former enemy in the Cold War by dismembering its territory and destroying it as a great power. This argument is elaborated by A. Panarin in "Geopoliticheskii pessimism protiv tsivilizovannogo optimizma," (Geopolitical Pessimism Versus Civilised Optimism), Znamya, no. 6, 1994.

The approach of Western influence closer to the heart of Russia that would result from the eastward expansion of NATO by the admission of Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic, Slovakia and especially the Baltic countries strengthens the Western challenge and cannot but cause resentment in Russian society. This point merits closer examination. The idea of NATO expansion has its roots in the previous phase of world politics, in a situation in which it seemed to many that a power vacuum had appeared in Europe which needed to be filled quickly if stability was to be preserved. As pointed out by Vladimir Lukin, Chairman of the State Duma Committee for Foreign Affairs, the widely held idea that there is a power vacuum in the space between Germany and Russia has little support. It would have been correct if anyone really believed that the states filling that space are under threat of being absorbed either by Germany or by Russia. But if such a vacuum does not exist, Lukin argues, then there is still time to take careful stock of the situation. V. Lukin, "Nam neobkhodima pausa dlya aktivnogo dialoga" (We need a Pause for Active Dialogue), Segodnya, July 14, 1995.

NATO''s eastward expansion meets neither the interests of Russian security nor of international cooperation as a whole. The disappearance of the belt of virtually neutral countries in Central Europe, created as a result of the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact, would intensify the Russian feeling of vulnerability and could have unpredictable political consequences in view of the prevailing sentiments, especially if NATO''s expansion towards Russian borders strengthens militaristic attitudes in Europe, a possibility it would be unwise to dismiss. One also has to bear in mind the fact that feelings of mutual suspicion and hostility accumulated over the decades of the Cold War, no matter how hard we are trying to disown them and no matter how deeply suppressed they are in the consciousness of people on both sides of the Cold War front, are still there and any ill-considered Western or Russian moves in sensitive areas of international relations could easily revive these sentiments and bring them to the surface of international political life. Under such conditions the expansion of NATO may be a powerful catalyst of renewed hostility.

The expansion of NATO will overturn the low concentration of armed forces and armaments in Eastern Europe that resulted from the break-up of the Warsaw Pact. This zone, which does not at present divide Europe politically and economically, promotes military stability in Europe. It is not an analogue of the cordon sanitaire which the Entente countries tried to create around Soviet Russia in 1920s, but rather a group of countries which today ensures the unity of Europe in many ways. NATO''s advance to the east will change that situation for the worse. The presence of a number of independent states without significant armed force concentration, according to careful evaluations by Russian political-military experts, greatly diminishes the offensive capability of the sides in the event of an armed conflict. Furthermore, such expansion could deal a powerful (perhaps a mortal) blow to most areas of arms control. The geopolitical and conceptual basis of existing arms control agreements will fall apart. The military-political situation will become less predictable and new weapon systems may be developed. Russia''s security will certainly suffer and the country''s search for ways to ensure its national security will be made more difficult. In such a situation there will be no winners.

Certainly, a confrontation with NATO is not in Russia''s interests. On the contrary, Russia would benefit from expanded and deepened cooperation with all the NATO countries. But the plans aimed at expanding the alliance diminish such possibilities. There are grounds for regarding all talk about "compensating" Russia for NATO expansion as counterproductive. Russia also takes a very negative view of attempts to influence the traditionally neutral countries of Europe so that they should become members of the North Atlantic Alliance. The neutrality of these states made a major contribution to stability in Europe during the Cold War, and it has not lost its relevance today.

While the expansion of NATO may resolve one problem by addressing the feeling of some Central and East European leaders that the area has no "strategic master," the same expansion presents them with a set of new problems, including the possible loss of independence to the NATO establishment, the problems of adjustment to the alliance and possible opposition to that policy within their own countries. The overriding desire of the Central and East European countries is to join the community of the more developed states and to get full access to the European Union, but this will be costly and by no means easy. The requirements for entry into the European Union are very stringent, and competition is already tough in Western Europe. This has led some Western politicians to believe that it would be cheaper and more expedient to admit Central and East European countries to NATO than to the EU. But the Central and East European countries themselves must understand that accession to NATO does not automatically secure access to the European market. Over a period of centuries, including the period when nation states were appearing in Eastern Europe, those nations frequently lost their sovereignty. The resulting national psychological trauma has yet to be healed. Their sovereignty was limited in some ways within the Warsaw Pact. But something similar may happen to these countries if they join NATO, albeit in less crude forms, and it may be very humiliating for them. They will hardly have any real say on key trade, financial-economic and military-political issues in the foreseeable future.
Russia''s past policy toward the countries of Central and Eastern Europe could have been more effective. Not only were their wishes not taken fully into account during the Soviet period, but Russian policymakers paid insufficient attention to them during the crucial 1992-93 period. Our diplomacy has since become more active in this regard, but valuable time was wasted. The development of military-technical cooperation was weak, although these countries possess large numbers of our weapons. We also should have been more delicate in our approach to these countries'' security interests. We went over their heads to discuss NATO expansion with the Germans and with the Americans, and neglected to encourage their participation in these discussions.

Every state has the undisputed right to belong to any alliance. But the wishes of the Central and East European countries can be satisfied in many other ways. For example, mutual or even unilateral security guarantees and even guarantees of mutual defense could be developed. And there are other options on which we would do well to work together. The possibilities of the European Stability Pact signed in March 1995 have not been fully exploited.

Although the fiercely ideological relations of the postwar decades are receding into the past, this does not mean that international relations are free of ideology. Every state, party, and political organization is a proponent of a certain ideology, and they reproduce these ideologies in their day-to-day activities. If we consider the countries of Central and South-Eastern Europe, there is a good likelihood that nationalist ideologies will re-emerge with excesses and often unpredictable complications that characteristically accompany such developments. With NATO sprawling over the map of Europe, it is hard to speak of any real guarantee against events in Europe taking an unfavorable turn.

Indeed, many people inside NATO believe that the expansion of the alliance would be the beginning of its end. The new members will put an end to the homogeneity of the alliance and some NATO institutions will be weakened. It has even been suggested in that connection that Russia stands to gain from NATO''s eastward expansion. But such things simply do not happen in history. The start of NATO expansion towards the east may act as a catalyst for a kind of change in world politics that would increase the degree of entropy in the system of international relations and make it less resistant to various crises.

Those in the West who advocate the expansion of NATO pay little attention to other regions of the world. A number of Asian powers are clearly claiming an improved position in the world hierarchy of states, and they are increasingly unhappy about their present status. The outstanding British historian Arnold Toynbee wrote in his time that the East remembers well the insults inflicted on it by Europe and America. The political elites of Asian countries, even those that have made great economic advances largely by borrowing Western management methods and technologies, increasingly complain about the double standards the Western countries apply to them. They argue that while a number of Western countries are developing new military technologies, their own countries are denied access to new types of weapons and dual-use technologies. Such sentiments do more to determine the course of historical processes than rational economic considerations.

The role of military force outside Europe increases, despite the recent successful resolution of a number of regional conflicts especially in such explosive areas as the Middle East and South Asia which are directly relevant to Russia''s security interests. There is a continuing danger of an armed conflict on the Korean peninsula, close to Russian borders in the Far East. The threat of nuclear weapons and modern long-range delivery systems falling into the hands of parties to acute international conflicts still exists. It has been suggested that the nuclear non-proliferation regime is facing another crisis.

Despite the declining role of the military factor in Europe''s political life and the reduction of military budgets and armed forces, the military machines created after World War II are still formidable. Work continues on developing many new weapons systems. We have much to complain about in that respect in our relations with the United States and a number of its NATO allies. Huge efforts and much political and military thought will be required to switch the military machines of the European states to non-offensive defense. New negotiating mechanisms will have to be put in place, because the CFE Treaty was designed to correspond to the old system of blocs that no longer exists. Europe cannot do without at least de facto hierarchical structures, especially in the security field. These may not necessarily be institutionalized, but they must be effective.

The security policy pursued by Russia in Europe must proceed from the awareness that we have vital security interests both in Europe and in Asia. The more stable the balance of forces in Asia and in the Asia Pacific region, the stronger Russia''s position in Europe, and vice versa. Many countries need Russia as an active participant in forming new balances of power in the world.

3.3. The Foundations and Prerequisites for Russia''s Economic Security

In current conditions a broad and active participation in the international division of labor is becoming vital for every country, and Russia is no exception. The interests of economic security must be ensured by the maintenance of a level and a structure of national production that would make it possible to adjust it to the changing economic conditions in the world without a danger of long-term one-sided dependence on external resources for economic development. Obviously, there are no simple solutions to this task and the state must give profound consideration to the economic component of national security.

In contrast to the traditional approach to economic security that was characteristic of the USSR, which aimed at preserving the prevailing economic structure in the country, this approach emphasizes the ability of the structure to make good use of competitive advantages in the world market. This implies, among other things, the need to scrap unprofitable industries, a process that may involve adverse social consequences. In other words, this interpretation of Russia''s external interests and national security calls for a highly effective social policy that would minimize the negative consequences of the liquidation of unprofitable industries and take into account the interests of ordinary people.

External ties are becoming an important factor in the modernization of the economy and national development as a whole, and the criterion of economic security is increasingly competitiveness in the broad sense of the word. This applies not to individual items or groups of firms in high-technology sectors, but to the entire economic mechanism that must stimulate innovation in all sectors and constantly renew the competitive advantages of the national economy. This is by no means an easy task for Russia, but it needs to be addressed if we are to ensure our economic security and, ultimately, our national security.

It has long been argued by political scientists in many countries that the military and economic potential of a state in the modern world is increasingly determined not so much by the strength of its defense complex as by the general level of economic and technological development of its civilian industries. In key industries the spin-off from the latest technological achievements is increasingly directed from the civilian industries into the military, and not vice versa (this was noted in the late 1970s by Harold Brown, a prominent physicist and one-time U.S. Defense Secretary). As the experience of the United States and of our own country shows, inflated military production has a negative impact on production growth in general, impedes the development of infrastructure, and undermines competitiveness in the world market.

Russia''s difficult economic situation will for many years prevent us from using the economic components of strength and influence to an extent comparable to that of the developed capitalist countries. And it will directly affect the country''s defense capability. However, for all its failures and weaknesses Russia is not a "Third World country with rockets." It has a highly educated population and a rich scientific tradition that is more developed than that of the newly industrializing countries. Russia, despite the destructive phenomena of its recent and more remote past, has built up a culture which today is increasingly becoming a factor of economic growth. Our defense complex, especially the aerospace component, has a vast pool of intellectuals and skilled workers and a developed infrastructure, and may become one of the engines that will enable Russia to enter markets for science-intensive civilian products.

3.4. Multidirectional Interests and Priorities

The deep crisis of the form of socialism that developed in our country, the change of priorities in the development of society and the state and the new external environment require a major revision of foreign policy priorities. Our national interests in the world are diverse and still significant. In most general terms they could be described as follows: preventing wars and crisis situations where there is a danger of war, preventing the creation of hostile coalitions that do not allow Russia to ensure its sovereign security interests, and developing our economy. We are interested in just and non-discriminatory terms for the expansion of the participation of the Russian Federation and other CIS countries in world economic relations.

One of the most urgent tasks, if not the highest priority for Russian foreign policy, must be to gain a prominent place in the hierarchy of the most developed countries in the industrial, economic, cultural, social, and legal spheres. The foundation of all this must be a modern and effective economy which has a solid industrial base. We are talking of course of an industry that produces goods capable of competing on the world market. This goal is impossible to achieve without interaction with the industrial companies of various countries and with their private and governmental financial institutions. The problem is how to optimize such interaction in order to benefit from cooperation with foreign partners without having to relinquish our sovereignty. Russia must prioritize these forms of interaction in its relations both with those states that have already gained commanding positions in world politics and economics and with those countries which are seeking to upgrade their status.

Relations with the West European countries and with the European Union still remain highly important for Russia. They are prompted not only by pragmatic economic interests but also by the rich historical experience of contacts in centuries past. The traditional gravitation of Russia toward French and German culture, on the one hand, and the understanding of Russian culture in France and Germany, on the other, will determine the special character and political cooperation of Russia with these states. The situation regarding Italy is in many ways similar. It is very important for Russians that relations of partnership have been shaping up between France and Germany in recent years, and that these two leading states and cultures have by and large overcome the centuries-old antagonism that repeatedly led to devastating wars. There are also good prospects for Russia''s relations with a number of other West European states including Spain, whose economy is thriving, and Great Britain, which remains one of the key world financial centers.

If handled correctly, the relations between Russia and the countries of Central and Eastern Europe, the former members of the Warsaw Pact and COMECON, may well become more intensive. Besides, it is important for us in Europe to restore the traditional ties that were to some extent disrupted or distorted by blocs and ideologies. Cultural and civilizational closeness will often play a special role here.

The growing role of our traditional interests does not diminish the special importance of our relations with the United States, which remains the leading Western country. This fact was highlighted by the Persian Gulf crisis of 1990-1991. Russian-American relations will in many ways be determined by the fact that these two states still possess huge nuclear potentials and are linked by strategic nuclear weapons agreements and limitations on anti-missile defense. The same also applies to many other types of weapons and high technologies, including some rare technologies that have not been developed on such a wide scale in any other state. The same is true of much of civilian space technology and fundamental science as a whole. This need not prompt early specific conclusions regarding the character of the relations between the two states, if only because of their different status. Many people in Russia believe that the United States is seeking to establish itself as the world''s only superpower for the foreseeable future, is doing everything it can to prevent political reintegration within the framework of the former Soviet Union, and is working to secure the independence of Ukraine and making active use of the distinctly anti-Russian Ukrainian diaspora in the United States. At the same time analysts in Russia and abroad note that Russia will not remain in isolation if there is a cooling of its relations with the United States and other pro-American Western countries.

It has been argued that such powerful countries as China and India, a number of ASEAN countries and leading Latin American states are interested in promoting relations with Russia, even in the event of the cooling of its relations with the West. The same is true of some Middle East and African countries. Many of these states are by no means happy about the place they occupy in the global political and economic hierarchy; many of their leaders believe that the European countries led by the United States are too dominant and too anxious to preserve their dominant positions in the world. This is especially true in the financial sphere, in regard to control over fuel and energy resources (notably oil), and in the field of high technology.

In Asia, Russia''s attention will of course be focused on such giants as the ancient civilizations of China and India. A constructive triangular partnership among these three countries is in line with both the national security interests of these states and international relations in general. Both India and China have been increasingly interested in Russian technologies and achievements in the fields of applied and fundamental science. Their interest in promoting relations with us in these fields is much more active and wide-ranging than that of West European countries and the European Union.

Friendly, good neighborly relations with China are at least a major guarantee of security along the common border shared by Russia, Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, and Kyrgyzstan with that great country. Relations between Russia and China will most probably develop not only through the Moscow-Beijing channel, but also in a less centralized way through the Vladivostok-Shanghai and Khabarovsk-Kharbin channels. These relations will hardly be unclouded at the regional level, as recent years have already demonstrated. One immediate challenge is therefore to minimize the level of conflict or at least to keep it within manageable limits in order to prevent growing tensions at the state-to-state level. In general there are grounds for believing that the two countries do not want a recurrence of the hostility that reigned between them in the 1960s and 1970s. Russia''s national interests will not be served by growing social-economic and ethnic tensions in China, a perspective that is more and more often mentioned by analysts in Russia and other countries. A number of specialists have suggested that China may disintegrate at the end of the current cycle of its political development, with upheavals exceeding in scope those that attended the break-up of the Soviet Union.

Few states in Asia enjoy such a favorable image in Russian public opinion as India. The attraction that the country and its culture have always held for Russians is hard to explain, yet it is evident both at the official and at the popular level. One only needs to mention the popularity of Indian films, especially in the Russian provinces - which have nothing in common with India, either ethnically or culturally. As for the priorities of national security, India is seen in Russia as one of the few natural long-term geopolitical partners. These sentiments are shared by much of the Indian political elite. Russian-Indian relations, with memories of friendship between India and the Soviet Union, may play an exceptional role in shaping a new regional and global balance of forces that would determine the character of international relations and international security for decades ahead. Having achieved major economic successes, India is emerging as a major world market despite the continuing poverty of much of its 900 million population. The Indian market is already the object of fierce competitive struggle.

Relations between Russia and Vietnam, which have experienced a downturn in recent years, are being restored step by step. These relations are unlikely to reach the intensity of Soviet-Vietnamese relations in the 1960s-1970s (and indeed the two countries have no need of such relations in the new conditions), but the potential for growth is significant and past experience will be valuable. Russia''s relations with the ASEAN countries are developing well, as recently indicated by the sale of Russian MIG-29 fighters to Malaysia. Similar deals may be in the offing between the Russian Federation and other countries in the region. The relations between Russia and Indonesia, propelled by Indonesia''s burgeoning economic growth and its increasingly pronounced geopolitical interests, look promising.

Russia obviously will not renounce an active role corresponding to its real possibilities in the Middle East, including the Persian Gulf. Russia is being pushed in that direction by many Arab states and by Israel, whose relations with Russia in recent years have totally changed. These relations are in many ways determined by the fact that there are many former Soviet citizens now living in Israel, who maintain close ties with their relatives and friends in Russia and other countries of the former USSR, and indeed are trying to strengthen and multiply these ties. A number of Persian Gulf Arab countries welcome Russia''s growing role in the region if only because Russia, in its present condition, does not seek to and is unable to claim control over the region''s oil resources. If the countries in the region had any fears that the Soviet Union, by entering Afghanistan, was preparing to make a push towards the Persian Gulf, these fears have receded into the past. In the Persian Gulf, Russia faces an acute struggle for markets, although much of that struggle will take place "under the carpet," as the saying goes.

Russia at present will be unable to play a major role in such regions as Latin America and much of Africa or the Southern Pacific. But in the future, as the role of the countries in these regions grows, one cannot rule out attempts to establish political, diplomatic, economic and military-technical cooperation. As part of that scenario, Russian-Cuban relations may well develop on a new basis.

Finally, Russia has significant interests in the world oceans. In addition to the purely military aspects of our security connected with the world oceans, the oceans are important for us as a link between the eastern and western parts of our country; we have a large ocean-going fishing fleet which today plays a more important part in providing the country with food than ever before; our ocean-going vessels are important hard currency earners for the state; marine communications ensure interaction with a number of our allies.

3.5 Institutionalizing Security in Europe

The emerging multidimensional system of relations calls for corresponding agreements, quasi-alliances and alliances to ensure Russia''s security interests. Even in Europe, which has traversed a considerable distance, one cannot rely wholly on just one universal security structure. The experience of creating such systems in the past is far from comforting. The League of Nations, the Kellogg-Briand Pact, and other attempts to set up European security structures in the period between the two world wars were fruitless.

However, present-day conditions - the existence of well-tried standards of behavior in Europe, greater homogeneity of political and social structures, and growing interdependence - do provide more favorable conditions for creating a pan-European security structure than those that obtained in the period between the two world wars. But such a structure needs realistic goals and functions that do not exceed its historical capacity, and an efficient mechanism for implementation that does not exist at present. It also has to be remembered that the League of Nations did not include such states as Soviet Russia and Germany, nor the United States which had initially become involved in European politics with a vengeance when it entered World War I on the side of the Entente in 1917.

The general European level, with the participation of the United States and Canada as signatories to the 1975 Helsinki Act, occupies a special place in Russia''s actions to ensure its security interests. Considerable prospects exist not only in regard to traditional security problems (the military-political dimension), but also with respect to more acute regional problems such as the environment, the creation of a common communications system, or coordinated policies in the energy sphere. Until now, according to many experts, cooperation between states in Europe has been lagging behind the increasingly international character of these problems. To ensure all-European security interests, there will have to be extensive cooperation in the struggle against terrorism, the fight against various types of crimes including the narcotics trade, and in regard to the problem of large-scale migration. Europe is witnessing an increasing number of ethnic and racial conflicts as a result of the migration of large numbers of non-Europeans from Africa and Asia. Today these problems are as high on the list of security threats as the traditional threat of war.

Obviously, the construction of a security system on the European continent must proceed from the ideas and ideals of democracy, economic prosperity, peace, and social progress that are shared by all European states. A new Treaty on Security signed by all or most European states, the United States, and Canada could provide a legal framework for the military-political component of such a community. It has to be stressed that the emergence of such a system need not be considered an attempt to unite some countries and regions against others, for it presupposes greater transregional cooperation, partly in the interests of the security of other regions and states.

Such a security system could emerge under the aegis of the OSCE, through a phased process of transformation of the existing European and transatlantic cooperation structures into mutually complementary components of a single security system in the twenty-first century. It must be stressed again that while the role of international institutions is changing, the nation states and national institutions continue to function and the national interests of various states to clash. One must take a balanced view of these matters if an unnecessary aggravation of tensions is to be avoided. Neither international institutions nor the traditional system of the balance of power can ensure a stable security system by themselves. They must be complementary.

The implementation of the decisions of the Budapest summit of 1994 aimed at turning the OSCE into a fully-fledged and effective regional organization with an international legal status might be an important step in this direction. This is not to say that the new system of European security should be built up from scratch. The existing structures, particularly the European Union and the Council of Europe, may play an important role in that process.

The creation of a stable system of European security as the main component of an effective system ensuring Russia''s national security presupposes the active involvement and cooperation of Russia. This applies in particular to the prevention and settlement of conflicts, including, for instance, cooperation in the development and production of individual types of weapons and military hardware for peacemaking operations. But it is no less important in the sphere of arms control with a view to preventing the spread of weapons of mass destruction, missile technology and fissionable materials, including the creation of the necessary collective military potential for defense against those weapons and for extraordinary measures to stem their spread. It also entails the joint development of a regime of mutual military-technological security on the basis of transparency, confidence-building measures, equal and mutually beneficial cooperation in the field of military conversion and the development of a reasonable defense potential precluding military-technological surprises and new spirals of the arms race.

3.6 Strengthening the Russian Military

Military reform has been undertaken in Russia on several occasions. Usually closely associated with such names as Peter the Great and Prince Potemkin, these reforms were often implemented over long periods of time during which the original visions underwent considerable modification. Military reform was also planned for the late 1980s. This experience demonstrated that in order to carry out reform, it is essential to determine the basic foreign-policy, economic, and social parameters influencing the international and domestic political environment in which such reform is conceived. Unfortunately, these parameters changed several times between 1992-1996, due above all to Russia''s continual economic decline over this period. Frequent changes were made to the budget even after its approval. As a result, the first long-term program for arming the Russian military, which was ready for implementation by the end of 1993, was put on hold indefinitely.

Large-scale aggression against Russia and its allies over the next ten years is unlikely, in large part because nuclear weaponry and conventional forces remain powerful deterrents. The current lack of a direct military threat, however, does not preclude its possibility in the future. The possibility of an aggressive regime coming to power in some region of the world cannot be overlooked, and Russia may need to undertake timely strategic preventative measures to address the threat of large-scale aggression against Russia. A protracted period of worsening international military and political relations may yet arise, and it would be unwise to ignore the probability of force being used to influence Russia during international crises. In addition, there is a constant threat of localized armed conflicts, directly or indirectly affecting the country''s national interest, which might require intervention by Russian armed forces. The distribution of weapons of mass destruction could at any time force Russia, both unilaterally and jointly with other nations, to take additional special measures to ensure its security. But to exaggerate these risks would be as dangerous as to underestimate them - especially in the light of today''s scarce economic resources.

The primary impetus for war in the foreseeable future will be interracial, ethnic, and religious conflicts. All of these, as a rule, have underlying economic motives. The end of the Cold War and the move away from rigidly structured bipolar relations have unleashed many destructive forces which, while present in both international relations and certain nations for thousands of years, were held in check for several decades after World War II by the dominant ideological conflict between two competing systems.

The primary goal of Russia''s integrated nuclear deterrent forces is to ensure that no country is capable of launching a large-scale attack against Russia without the facing the threat of devestating nuclear retaliation. The aggressor must realize the unavoidability of revenge and the possibility of the elimination of the majority of its population. A successful deterrent force requires, apart from the means to launch a strike, an effective early missile-attack warning system, a space-monitoring system, and a reliable, indestructible command system for Russia''s nuclear forces and weapons. Yet, the nuclear deterrent alone cannot counter all the problems and threats to the national security of Russia and its allies, as proven by the conflicts of recent years. An important element in building and reforming Russia''s armed forces is the creation of conventional forces with multipurpose capability in priority areas, fully-equipped, well-trained, fit to fight, and conceived as a land-based force.

The major goal of Russia''s military reform program should be to create a fighting force capable of meeting the demands of the twenty-first century: a more compact but significantly more efficient force able to carry out all measures required to ensure military security. Russia''s military might, as never before, should be defined not in terms of numbers in the active and reserve armed forces, but in terms of fighting capabily, the level of equipment and arms, mobility, and the capacity for decisive and flexible deployment.

A primary role of the armed forces is deterring military aggression aimed at Russia. This is achieved by a convincing demonstration of the actual capability to deploy force, as well as a willingness to do so. As both a continental and naval power, Russia must have those forces vital to protecting its interests in a number of regions around the world, whether independently or jointly with its allies. This, of course, assumes separate action carefully attuned to the country''s national interests. It must be undertaken only when all possible non-military means for conflict resolution have been exhausted. One of the armed forces'' objectives is influence over the balance of power in various regions. Now, more than ever, it is vital to create such a balance, drawing the threat of aggression away from Russia''s borders and neutralizing pressure on Russia and its allies.

Another function of the armed forces is to provide a Russian military presence, whether permanent or temporary, in the CIS and other strategically important regions. This presence should be implemented according to mutual interest and international law, and serve to protect Russia''s and other nations'' territorial integrity and sovereignty. Russia''s naval fleet should play a particular role in maintaining a presence abroad. The armed forces must be prepared to go into action to maintain or establish peace in accordance with the country''s international obligations, either as a national force under a bilateral agreement or as part of a multinational force. They cannot stand by while others do battle with terrorism and other unlawful actions.

The choices for deploying armed force in conflicts and localized and large-scale warfare are largely governed by trends in the development of warfare techniques. A feature of the deployment of armed force in the period following World War II has been its carefully controlled, selective application. This requires that the Army and Navy be specially trained in terms of technical capability, tactical operations, and psyhology. Russia''s armed forces have not, in the whole, been trained to undertake such controlled, selective missions. There have been extraordinarily few analytical studies on local wars, even though it is precisely these wars which have been predominant for thousands of years. On the contrary, dire predictions that the next war will most certainly be a World War - global and, most likely, thermonuclear - are par for the course.

Lack of preparation for localized conflicts was one of the reasons behind the Soviet Union''s defeat in Afghanistan - clearly defined political rationales for each concrete operation were entirely lacking. These operations were to be limited in nature, but the troops were neither trained nor psychologically prepared for this type of conflict. The Afghan experience, though extremely painful, has nonetheless failed to find its place in domestic military science. A conversation with an Afghan War veteran will do more in the way of providing a real understanding of what went wrong than any of the handful of studies and official documents on the war.

The impact of the conflict in Chechnya is extremely important, as here our army undertook an even more difficult task than during the hushed-up Afghan war. In theory, this internal conflict should have been solved by the internal forces sent as domestic peacekeepers to maintain order, but this is not what happened. Often even those skills that helped many of our commanders in Afghanistan were of little use in Chechnya. Of course, it must be added that the army''s presence in Chechnya came at a difficult transitional moment - the military forces of the Soviet Union were becoming those of the Russian Federation, a process extremely difficult in both material and psychological terms.

The deployment of armed forces must be meticulously prepared - on a political, psychological, and propaganda level. Over the last few decades the influence of the mass media, particularly television, has grown in leaps and bounds - manifested, in part, by the Chechen conflict. Dangerous assignments undertaken by journalists in trouble spots translate into the almost instant globalization of armed conflict. More and more, the perception of military action as successful or unsuccessful depends on the media''s evaluation. Russian policymakers still neglect this development, and the media is still not given proper consideration during the planning stages of military achon. Press relations should become an important component of military policy.

An important focus for military reform is military and civil personnel. One of reform''s primary tasks is to create a new type of commanding officer: a leader with flexibility and capacity for independent decision-making, in addition to other professional, skills. The role of junior commanding officers in the general hierarchy of the armed forces must be given more importance: they should be better trained and allowed more authority. The rank of company sergeant major should be reestablished along new lines. It is precisely this office which should play a dominant role in the basic unit of the new Russian Army. In establishing the armed forces on a contract basis, the first step should be to create a professional corps of authoritative squad and platoon commanders.

The system of military education is uneven and needs to be reformed. Russia has excellent military academies with world-wide recognized scholars. These academies are very popular among our officers because, in addition to high-level specialized training, they offer a good general education. But there are many military schools where the situation is different. We should expand the network of cadet, Suvorov, and Nakhimov schools, which have extremely tough entrance requirements (they regularly accept only one of eight or ten applicants). The development of these schools, which help to identify energetic and bright adolescents, is important not only for the armed forces but also for society as a whole.

As one of the important elements for the Russian army of the future, options are being considered for a multifunctional combined division with several different sets of equipment for different types of military action. Such units would be deployed for a wide range of purposes, from full-scale combat to peacekeeping missions. They would be relatively few in number and could be reincorporated into regular divisions in wartime. Similar scenarios are being considered for the air force and air defense forces.

In terms of the Navy, which is primarily dependent on strategic naval-nuclear and other forces providing fighting capability, a major focus should be placed on founding a "northern strategic bastion" based in the Northern Fleet. At the same time, the navy must have conventional forces capable of selectively protecting Russia''s interests in various parts of the world''s oceans, flying the Russian flag, and bringing influence to bear on the resolubon of various conflicts and crises in keeping with Russia''s interests. The issue here is not one of setting unrealistic military and economic goals, such as becoming the world''s predominant naval power or being capable of conducting landings in places far from Russia''s shores, but rather ensuring that Russia''s navy plays an important role in those conflicts and crises that have a bearing on the country''s vital interests. Examples of regions requiring such a presence, usually temporary, are some parts of the Pacific and Indian Oceans, the Mediterranean, and the Persian Gulf.

It is unlikely that the financial and material resources available to the government over the next four to five years for national defense needs will be enough to build up the Russian armed forces and related forces to the level required for their full operational ability and development. The Russian military''s share of expenditures in Russian Gross Domestic Product dropped from 6.2 percent in 1991 to 3.4 percent in 1996 - and here one must take into account the continual shrinkage of GDP in the near future. These circumstances make construction and reform of the military forces extremely difficult. Among current national defense expenses, those involving upkeep are increasing, while those regarding purchasing new technology, military personnel training, developing infrastructure, and defense-related scientific research and testing are dropping. In the 1996 federal budget, this current tendency was halted. The percentage of the defense budget allocated to research and development, weaponry and equipment upgrades, fighting and operational training, etc., was set to be increased. This objective, clearly stated by Boris Yeltsin at the Defense Ministry Collegium on June 18, 1996, will provide the military and logistical basis for re-equipping the army and navy in the 1996-2002 period. Thus far the budget''s implementation leaves something to be desired.

In order for Russia to have a strong military, it must develop and implement a purposeful, long-term industrial policy. One of the foundations for such an industrial policy is the realization of the country''s national interests and national objectives. Russians must reaffirm their sense of pride in their country. A similar situation occurred in Japan after its defeat in World War II. Its people were determined to prove to the whole world that they could revive their civilian economy and establish Japanese culture and society among the leading countries in the world. Germany, France, Spain, Italy, and South Korea were also, despite national differences, able to attain a certain level of social consensus regarding their long-term national ideas which united personal and public interests. The peoples of Russia as well should develop a strong national egoism supplemented by healthy ambitions and a determination to prove that we can achieve the same living standards as in these Western countries, without relinquishing our national cultural identity and sovereignty.

3.7 Concluding Remarks

For any new security structure to function effectively, it must engage people who are profoundly aware of their duty to their country - not just diplomats and soldiers, but political and public leaders, members of the business community, and the leaders of the emerging political parties. A growing role will be played by Russian members of parliament, most of whom will have to achieve the same level of proficiency in international affairs as professional diplomats and their colleagues in many foreign countries. As for diplomats proper, it may be that the time is coming when they can develop their potential to the full. Reviving the largely lost art of diplomacy of Tsarist Russia is becoming an imperative of the new era. Our new diplomacy should also draw on the more valuable aspects of Soviet diplomacy.

Russia still has to travel down an arduous road on the way to gaining a new national self-consciousness and determining its place in an increasingly interdependent world. This requires us to take a sober and honest view of our own history, and to come to an understanding of our strengths and weaknesses. It also requires a careful appraisal of the opportunities we have to strengthen our positions at home and in the world, and a judicious choice of national and foreign policy priorities.