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Relations with Russia were greatly damaged after the NATO-led bombings of Serbia and Kosovo. Russian politicians of all stripes voiced opposition to NATO''s actions and many Russian analysts and policymakers have expressed pessimism about the Balkans and Russia''s future relationship with NATO.
As part of the Belfer Center''s mission to build bridges of communication and engage in joint action with Russia to overcome a half-century of confrontation, BCSIA Director Graham T. Allison helped lead a trilateral U.S.-German-Russian meeting in Berlin on July 6Ã7, sponsored by Deutsche Gesellschaft fur Auswartige Politik.
This session was part of an ongoing series of trilateral meetings which began in 1997 when the partners developed and wrote The New Agenda which included an action plan for engaging Russia.
The meeting provided an important and timely opportunity for U.S. analysts to engage German and Russian colleagues on Kosovo, security relations, and cooperative denuclearization. To assure maximum candor, all comments were made on a not-for-attribution basis. One exception was a public presentation by German State Secretary of Foreign Affairs Wolfgang Ischinger.
At the meeting, there was a clear expression by the Russians of a sense of betrayal by the West on a personal level, a national level, and in terms of the NATO-Russian Founding Act. As one Russian noted, Kosovo devalued the political-military relationship as dramatically as last August''s default and devaluation did the Russian currency and commitment to orthodox economic reform.
One special benefit of the trilateral meeting was the opportunity for the Russian participants to hear from leading Europeans about Europe''s role in the NATO campaign. German State Secretary Ischinger candidly answered Russian questions about NATO''s motivation in the Balkans and Germany''s willingness to participate.
The Russian participants expressed frustration about the economic constraints on any Russian military development and what they saw as a more aggressive NATO and a U.S. committed to some form of national missile defense.
One high-level Russian described the evolution of Russia''s relations with the U.S. over the past eight years as having moved through four phases: Willing Partner, Unhappy Partner, Rebellious Partner, and now Compulsory Partner (only, as he noted, because they have no other viable choice.) As a compulsory partner, Russia could oscillate between cooperation with the West (judged essential for strengthening Russia), and assertions of independence as Russia endeavors to be a counterweight to U.S. hegemony.
The August 1998 events in Moscow and the crisis over Kosovo emphasize the urgency of building a solid relationship on the basis of fundamental shared national interests. These discussions are essential elements in building a "normal" relationship in international affairs.