Book Chapter

Russian Election Watch No. 2, June 2, 1995

RUSSIAN ELECTION WATCH
June 2, 1995, No.2

I. The Probability of Duma Elections in December 1995

A. Individuals Likelihood Change From Last Week

Graham Allison (5/17): 75%
SDI Project

John Lloyd (5/17): 70%
SDI Project Fellow
Financial Times

Alexei Ulyukaev (5/5): 90%
Russia''s Democratic Choice
Moscow Head

Matthew Lantz (5/22) 80%
SDI Project

B. Recent Events in Favor of Parliamentary Elections:

YELTSIN PUBLICLY DENIES SPECULATION THAT DECEMBER
ELECTIONS AND PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS MIGHT BE POSTPONED. States,
"Categorically, the elections to the Parliament will be held on time as well as the 1996
Presidential elections" (Financial Times 5/25/95) FT analysis of Yeltsin''s veto of Duma
election law: Will hold elections because Yeltsin is sensitive to his image in the West. (FT
5/24/95)

C. Recent Events in Opposition to Parliamentary Elections:

DUMA FAILS TO OVERRIDE YELTSIN VETO OF DUMA ELECTION LAW:
Needed 300 votes to override veto, obtained 243 in the first attempt and 237 in the second.
Originally the law passed with 302 votes, but some Duma members feared a direct
confrontation with the Presidential apparatus and changed their vote to avoid confrontation
with the President. (omri 5/25/95)

COMMISSION REJECTS MAIN YELTSIN AMENDMENTS TO DUMA
ELECTORAL LAW: A commission made up of members of the executive, the Duma, and
the Federation Council (upper house) rejected many of the amendments offered by
President Yeltsin to the Duma election law. The commission voted to keep the 225 list
representatives and 225 district representatives. (Yeltsin sought 150 list and 350 regional to
strengthen the regional representation.) However the commission recommended increasing
use of regional lists. It also kept the 25% minimum voter turnout for valid elections.
(Yeltsin sought 50%). Finally, it accepted Yeltsin''s suggestion that federal officials running
for office need not quit their jobs, but will not be able to use government benefits and perks
in their campaigns. (omri 5/26/95)

II. Probability of Presidential Elections in June

A. Individual Likelihood Change From Last Week

Graham Allison 40%
John Lloyd 55%
Alexei Ulyukaev 60%
Matthew Lantz 50%

B. Recent Events in Favor of Presidential Elections:

See above statement by Yeltsin reported in May 26 Financial Times.

C. Recent Events in Opposition to the Presidential Elections:

III. If Duma Elections are Held in December, What are the Likely Outcomes?

A. Individuals

Graham Allison John Lloyd

Alexei Ulyukaev Matthew Lantz
Cherno 20% CP-RF 23%
CP-RF 17% Cherno 15%
AgParty 11% AgParty 15%
LDPR 10% LDPR 11%
RChoice 9% Yabloko 9%
Yabloko 9% Lebed party 9%
Rybkin 9% Rybkin 6%
RChoice 6%
Missing 15% Nationalists 5%

B. New Evidence:

SHOULD YABLOKO AND RUSSIA''S CHOICE COOPERATE? The Carnegie
Endowment in Moscow held a conference in late May on the upcoming elections. Igor
Klyankin, director of Public Opinion, stated that Russia''s Choice and Yabloko had different
constituencies and should therefore not cooperate. Russia''s Choice appealed to the young
and rich with radical economic policies, while Yabloko appealed to a more moderate
reformer. Klyankin argued the reform forces should concentrate themselves around these
two poles. He saw Chernomyrdin''s Bloc gaining 10% of the vote and Rybkin getting 9%,
both drawing from undecided centrist voters, not the reform forces.
Opposing this view was Leonid Sedov, who claimed the formation of the centrist
blocs who would gain 13% and 12% would draw from the reformist constituencies and
therefore Yabloko and Russia''s Choice should unite. (Segodnya 5/19/95)

Michael McFaul''s "Eurasia Letter: Russian Politics After Chechnya," in the Summer
1995 edition of Foreign Policy predicts in the 1995 Parliamentary elections: Russia''s
Choice, despite difficulties will remain in Parliament and plan for their comeback next
century. Yavlinsky''s high popularity ratings will allow Yabloko to clear the 5% threshhold.
The Communists and Agraians are positioned to increase their share of parliamentary seats.
And finally, Zhirinovsky''s Liberal Democratic Party and Women of Russia will also be
represented. The centrist blocs'' fate will depend on how they coalesce over the next few
months and how many such blocs compete.

D. If June Presidential Elections. What Outcome?

A. Individuals

Graham Allison Matthew Lantz

Yeltsin 20% Yeltsin 25%
Rybkin 10% Cherno 25%
Cherno 10% Lebed 10%
Yavlinsky 10% Yavlinsky 10%
Lebed 10% Rybkin 8%
Other 40% Zhirinovsky 3%
Other 19%

B. New Evidence:

FEDERATION COUNCIL SPEAKER VLADIMIR SHUMEIKO ON A
PRESIDENTIAL RUN: Many people see me as the number one candidate after Yeltsin.
This does not show up in the polls, but "I don''t believe polls." I need 70,000 signatures in
16 regions. I can collect this while others cannot. (Moskovsky Komoslets 5/20/95)

McFAUL''S PRESIDENTIAL SCENARIOS: Writing in the summer 1995 edition of
Foreign Policy Carnegie Endowment Senior Advisor, Michael McFaul sees three potential
presidential scenarios: First, Yeltsin runs with the backing of Russia''s nationalist, law and
order vote. However, for this consitutiency, Lebed is the obvious candidate. Second,
Yeltsin cancels the elections that he cannot win. Uses a state of emergency. Third, Yeltsin
decides not to run again. Chernomyrdin is the heir apparent, but bureaucrats do not always
make good candidates. Therefore, the race could be wide open.

E. OBSHCHAYA GAZETA POLITICAL POLL FROM MAY 25, 1995

The poll was conducted among 1326 rural and urban Russian respondents. Participants
were asked to answer to questions:

If elections for the post of President were held today.
1. "Which of the listed politicians would you like to see elected to this post?"
2. "Which of the listed politicians would you not like, under any circumstances, to see
elected to the post of president of Russia?"

One could not give more than three answers to both questions. Answers are in percentages.

Question One (positive ratings):

1. G. Yavlinsky (leader Yabloko bloc) 12%
2. Svyatoslav Fedorov (Eye Surgeon, parliamentarian 10%
under Gorbachev)
3. Boris Fedorov (Leader Forward Russia bloc) 9%
(Former Finance Minister)
3. G. Zyuganov (Leader Communist Party Russian Fed) 9%
5. A. Rutskoi (Leader Derzhava Movement 8%
6. A. Lebed (General Russian 14th Army) 7%
6. V. Zhirinovsky (Leader Lib. Dem. Party) 7%
8. Y. Gaidar (Leader Russia''s Choice bloc) 5%
(Former Deputy PM)
9. B. Yeltsin (President) 4%
9. S. Shakhrai (Deputy PM, Leader PRES bloc) 4%
11. V. Chernomyrdin (Prime Minister) 3%
11. Y. Luzhkov (Mayor Moscow) 3%
13. M. Gorbachev (Former President USSR) 2%
13. P. Romanov (Duma Member, CP-RF) 2%
15. I. Rybkin (Speaker State Duma) 1%
15. V. Shumeiko (Speaker Federation Council) 1%
15. Y. Skokov (Leader Russian Communities Bloc) 1%
15. O. Soskovets (First Deputy PM, CIS) 1%

Question Two (negative ratings):

1. V. Zhirinovsky 39%
2. B. Yeltsin 35%
3. M. Gorbachev 26%
4. Y. Gaidar 16%
5. A. Rutskoi 12%
6. G. Zyuganov 9%
7. All of those listed 7%
8. G. Yavlinsky 2%
8. A. Lebed 2%
8. V. Chernomyrdin 2%
8. V. Shumeiko 2%
12. B. Fedorov 1%
12. Y. Luzhkov 1%
12. I. Rybkin 1%
12. S. Shakhrai 1%
12. P. Romanov 1%
12. O. Soskovets 1%
18. Sv. Fedorov 0%
18. Y. Skokov 0%

Question Three: Will you vote for Viktor Chernomyrdin''s electoral bloc?

Yes 10%
No 56%
Hard to say 34%

For more information on this publication: Please contact the Belfer Communications Office
For Academic Citation: SDI Staff. “Russian Election Watch No. 2, June 2, 1995.” .