RUSSIAN ELECTION WATCH
July 7, 1995, No. 5
To help identify significant developments affecting Russian Elections, the Strengthening Democratic Institutions Project offers a simplified summary including individual''s estimates of the likelihood of Russian elections and their results. The estimated probabilities are an indication of judgements of the individuals named.
I. The Probability of Duma Elections in December 1995
A. Individuals Likelihood Change From Last Week
Graham Allison (6/17): 80% +5%
SDI Project
John Lloyd (5/17): 70%
SDI Project Fellow
Financial Times
Sergei Grigoriev (7/7): 65% -5%
SDI Project Fellow
Former Spokesman for Gorbachev
Matthew Lantz (7/7) 80% -5%
SDI Project
B. Recent Events in Favor of Parliamentary Elections:
SECOND NO-CONFIDENCE MOTION IN GOVERNMENT FAILS: (See next section for description of first no-confidence vote) In response to the likelihood that the Duma would not vote for confidence in the government, Yeltsin dismissed three "Power Ministers" associated with the Chechen War. Gone are Victor Yerin, Minister for the Interior, Sergei Stepashin, Head of the FSB - the KGB successor organization, and Nikolai Yegorov, Deputy PM for Nationalities. The most disliked minister, Defense Minister Pavel Grachev, submitted his resignation, but Yeltsin refused it. Furthermore, at Yegor Gaidar''s suggestion, the vote was altered from a confidence motion, to that of no-confidence in the government, thus allowing abstentions to help keep the government in power. Both events allowed the Duma a face-saving measure to back down. Finally, fear of early elections and loss of parliamentary privileges also swayed some votes.
In the second vote, only 193 deputies voted for no-confidence in the government (226 needed). Voting against the government again were members of Yabloko, the Communists, and the Democratic Party of Russia. The Agrarian Party mostly abstained. The failure of this motion helped strengthen the hand of PM Victor Chernomyrdin and ensured elections would not be moved up to October. (various sources).
YELTSIN SIGNS DUMA ELECTION LAW: According to Radio Rossii, Yeltsin signed the Duma election law, despite the fact it contained many of the clauses that had caused him to veto it in May. (omri 6/22/95)
C. Recent Events in Opposition to Parliamentary Elections:
DUMA PASSES FIRST NO-CONFIDENCE VOTE IN GOVERNMENT, 240-71 WITH 20 ABSTENTIONS. The vote was introduced by the Democratic Party of Russia, and had the support of the Communist Party of the Russian Federation, The Agrarian Party, Yabloko, the New Regional Party, and the Liberal Democratic Party. Abstaining or voting on behalf of the government were Russia''s Choice, Women of Russia, PRES, and Stability.
According to the Russian Constitution, the first vote is not binding, but if a second no confidence vote passes in three months, the President must sack the government or disband the parliament. Yeltsin has called for a second vote and has threatened to disband the parliament if it passes. He says he will call early elections. PM Chernomyrdin, also does not want the threat of a second vote hanging over the government''s head for three months, he has called for the second vote, but also seeks a compromise by seeking to remove some of the power ministers involved in the Chechen war. No binding votes to remove the ministers of defense, interior, a deputy PM and the head of intelligence failed in the Duma on the same day, because Zhirinovsky''s LDPR did not support the measures.
The final vote of confidence will occur on July 1st. A positive 226 votes of confidence will be needed by the government to pass. Only 70 votes existed in the first attempt. (omri)
YELTSIN IMPEACHMENT ATTEMPTED BY COMMUNISTS: According to Article 109 of the Russian constitution, "The President cannot disband the parliament once a motion of impeachment has been passed by 2/3 of the majority of the Duma." To get the motion discussed, the CP-RF attempted to gain 226 signatures. Their effort failed at only 172 signatures. The Agrarian party and Democratic Russia joined the Communists. (omri)
II. Probability of Presidential Elections in June
A. Individual Likelihood Change From Last Week
Graham Allison 55% +15%
John Lloyd 55%
Sergei Grigoriev 60%
Matthew Lantz 55% +5%
III. If Duma Elections are Held in December, What are the Likely Outcomes?
A. Individuals
Graham Allison John Lloyd
Sergei Grigoriev Matthew Lantz
CP-RF 20% CP-RF 22%
Cherno 15% Agparty 15%
Yabloko 15% Cherno 12%
Com/Nat. Coalition Yabloko 12%
(RKO, DPR) 13% Lebed Party 9%
Agparty 12% LDPR 8%
Rybkin 8% RChoice 6%
Women of R 7% Women of R 6%
LDPR 5% Rybkin 5%
RChoice 5% Nationalists 5%
B. New Evidence:
Communists, Agrarians, LDPR, Yabloko, Democratic Party of Russia, New Regional Policy support first no-confidence vote in government. Russia''s Choice, Women of Russia, Stability, PRES abstain or vote with government. In second vote many Agrarians abstain. (omri, 6/22/95)
WHO WOULD EARLY ELECTIONS HURT MOST? Gleb Cherkasov investigates this question. All serious parties have started preparations for a December campaign, but none are ready. Some argue Chernomyrdin''s Russian is Our Home would be hurt greatly: a party must be registered 6 months prior to the elections. ROH would fail, but it is expected that it could get around this. Second, early elections would not give ROH time to clean up the Chechnya mess and print