Russia's Domestic Political Future and U.S. National Interests

99.15 Russia''s Domestic Political Future.pdf

Russia''s Domestic Political Future
and U.S. National Interests

CITATION AND REPRODUCTION

This document appears as Discussion Paper 99-15 of the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs. BCSIA Discussion Papers are works in progress. Comments are welcome and may be directed to the author in care of the Center.

This paper may be cited as: Graham Allison. "Russia''s Domestic Political Future and U.S. National Interests." BCSIA Discussion Paper 99-15, Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, August 1999.

The views expressed in this paper are those of the author and publication does not imply their endorsement by BCSIA and Harvard University. This paper may be reproduced for personal and classroom use. Any other reproduction is not permitted without written permission of the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Publications, 79 JFK Street, Cambridge, MA 02138, telephone (617) 495-4708 or telefax (617) 496-4403.

Memorandum

To: (New) President of the United States

From: Graham Allison
Date: August 15, 1999

Subject: Russia''s Domestic Political Future and U.S. National Interests
[Assignment: This memorandum responds to an assignment from a new President who takes office in late 1999. It assumes that he has requested a strategic reassessment of U.S. interests and policy towards Russia, with special attention to Russia''s domestic political developments. The hypothetical is highly improbable, but not impossible. In the case of death or incapacity of the President and the Vice President, for example, House Speaker Hastert would become President.]

I. OVERVIEW

When the topic of Russia arises today, the dominant image for most Americans is that of a mess; the dominant reaction, one of fatigue. Russia is a mess, and Americans who have sought to engage Russia have good reasons for fatigue. But jumping from these emotions to the judgment that events in Russia are too distant, or the Russian government too poor, or too weak, to matter is mistaken— profoundly mistaken. Developments inside Russia today have potentially greater consequences for Americans'' lives and liberties than events in any other country on the globe.

The central question about domestic political developments in Russia in the next four years can be simply stated: will Russia collapse? Will today''s failing Russian state become a certifiably failed state— a state like Tajikistan, or Colombia, or Somalia, in which the established government is unable to exercise its minimum functions? Analysts who know Russia best agree with long-time student of Russia and former director of CIA Bob Gates''s conclusion: Russia teeters on the edge of a black hole. (This judgment is shared by analysts who know Russia best, including the Council on Foreign and Defense Policy, the most influential group of Russian foreign policy and national security experts, whose February, 1999 report, "A Way Out of the Crisis," concluded that "if current trends continue for another year, Russia will collapse.")

The answer to this question matters more for Americans than any other issue in international affairs because of the spectre of "loose nukes." A failed Russian state would surely lose control of tens or hundreds of the 30,000 nuclear weapons it now possesses, and 70,000 additional nuclear weapons-equivalents. Try to imagine a world in which hundreds of nuclear weapons were stolen and sold in international bazaars to rogue states and terrorist groups. The U.S. would face a spectre of threats to U.S. troops abroad in Kosovo, Korea, and the Gulf, and to citizens at home, in Washington or Chicago— threats that would make policymakers nostalgic for the Cold War.

This paper is organized as brief answers to four key questions about Russian domestic political developments and U.S. national interests.

• Why does Russia matter? Why, among the 185 countries of the world, must Russia have a unique claim on the attention and energy of a responsible American President and his government?
  
  
  

• What could happen in Russia in the next year, or next four years? For which alternative Russian futures should American policymakers prepare?
  
  
  

• What U.S. policies and initiatives should be at the top of our agenda (as we attempt to protect U.S. interests in domestic Russian political developments)?
  

• What are U.S. stakes in Russia''s current decisive year of elections?
  

II. WHY DOES RUSSIA MATTER?

Why is Russia not like Indonesia, or Brazil, or Nigeria? In former Prime Minister Stepashin''s quip: why is it not a banana republic— without bananas? Just the day before his dismissal as Prime Minister, on August 9, Sergei Stepashin noted that the government should obey the Constitution or face the prospect that Russia become "the world''s largest banana republic, only without bananas." In a sentence: because history has left a superpower arsenal of nuclear weapons, biological weapons, chemical weapons, missiles, and know-how in the midst of a revolution that is deconstructing every sinew of the totalitarian Soviet state.

Why does Russia matter? Start with 7,000 active nuclear warheads: armed, mounted on missiles, capable of arriving at targets in the United States less than an hour after the decision to launch. Were a dozen or hundred of these weapons to be triggered— accidentally in a Y2K failure, by some unauthorized agent, as a consequence of misperception, or whatever— the United States would disappear from the map. Incredible, unimaginable, and a Cold War anachronism, yes— but a brute fact, hard to ignore. As surely as during the Cold War, this superpower arsenal creates for the U.S. a highest-priority, enduring interest in Russia: namely, that these weapons are not used against America or our allies.

Add 5,000 tactical nuclear weapons, many lacking any locking device to prevent their unauthorized use, some stored at bases where a colonel with the cooperation of two lieutenants could "privatize" a dozen warheads and take them to world markets to monetize their value. Finally, remember an additional 12,000 nuclear weapons in various storage facilities in Russia, many with no mechanical protection beyond that of guards whose salaries are frequently delayed for months.

One backpack nuclear weapon at Oklahoma City would have caused not just the Federal Office Building, but Oklahoma City itself, to disappear. One such nuclear device in the minivan that was used by terrorists to attack the World Trade Center would have caused lower Manhattan to disappear, including all of Wall Street up to Gramercy Park.

Beyond assembled weapons, there are approximately 70,000 nuclear weapons-equivalents in stockpiles of highly enriched uranium and plutonium, a softball-sized chunk of which, if it found its way to Iran or to one of bin Laden''s terrorist groups, would provide the critical ingredient from which a crude nuclear device could be assembled. Beyond all this, there are biological weapons, chemical weapons, thousands of ICBM''s, and, beyond physical items, know-how for producing additional missiles and other weapons without limit.

In sum: the overriding reason Russia must matter for Americans appears vividly as one considers the clear and present danger of "loose nukes": the theft of one or a dozen weapons, sale to a rogue state or terrorist group, and use of these weapons to attack American soldiers abroad or civilians at home. Nothing in the international arena poses so sure a threat to Americans'' survival and well-being for the next generation as the threat of theft of nuclear, biological, and other weapons from a collapsing Russia.

Policy implications:

• As the time and energy of the "high-priced help" of the Administration are allocated, direct them to focus first on what matters most to the U.S. Note, in contrast, the Clinton Administration''s practice, where a time-and-motion study of the Assistant for National Security Affairs and Secretaries of State and Defense and their subordinates would find higher priorities to have been: (1) the Balkans (Bosnia and Kosovo); (2) Haiti; (3) NATO enlargement to include three Eastern European states; (4) Somalia.
  

• As funds are allocated, invest in initiatives that have the highest return for U.S. interests (of which, more below).
  

III. ALTERNATIVE RUSSIAN FUTURES: WHAT COULD HAPPEN IN RUSSIA IN THE NEXT FOUR YEARS?

The central truth about Russia today is that Russia is a state convulsed by a continuing revolution. The current Russian revolution is transforming every dimension of life in Russia more radically than did the revolution of 1917 that brought the Bolshevik Communists to power. The closest analogue is the French Revolution in the 18th century. Under a banner of "liberty, equality, and fraternity," it freed subjects of a monarchy that had thrived for many centuries. Yet it also unleashed a succession of foreign adventures and border wars, a Thermidor in which the initial leaders of the Revolution lost their heads to the guillotine, and ended the century crowning Emperor Napoleon, who proceeded to assemble a vast Eurasian empire. The moral of this story: while the opening chapters of Russia''s current revolution have disappointed American romantics who imagined instant democracy, rapid marketization, and easy strategic partnership, events have been remarkably benign. But no one knows what Russia''s future holds. In Churchill''s fine phrase: "[Russia] is a riddle wrapped in a mystery inside an enigma."

The concept of revolution is essentially an analogy. Nonetheless, it provides a better frame of reference for considering what may happen in Russia than thinking of Russia as a normal, established state. As a reminder for myself, before going to Russia as I do every couple of months, I review my history books to consider what was happening in the same month, in the same year in 18th century France. Consider, for example, France in August 1799. On August 24, 1799, Napoleon snuck back into France from Egypt, where his military campaign to extend French control had bogged down— his naval support defeated by the British at the Battle of Alexandria, a British fleet commanded by Horatio Nelson. Four months after his secret return to France, in November, Napoleon engineered the coup of Brumaire, giving him total power in the French state and the base from which to pursue his dream of a great Eurasian empire, which ended in defeat in a great European war 15 years later.

When thinking about a state in revolution, it is essential to consider not the future, but alternative futures. These include discontinuous alternatives, and their consequences for the United States. Three generic alternatives map the most likely futures for the years immediately ahead: (1) reformist Russia; (2) a nationalist, authoritarian, reflexively adversarial Russia; and (3) a failed state.

1. A reformist Russia would continue muddling along as it has in the last several years, along the paths of political pluralization, marketization, and grumpy cooperation with the U.S. Muddling includes sharp up''s and down''s, as one has seen in the Yeltsin years. Yeltsin has accustomed us to the firing of one Prime Minister (five in the last 18 months) and the appointment of a new one that nonetheless continues the prior government''s main policy directions— as the State''s authority, and citizens'' confidence in their government, continues to crumble.

2. Reversion to a nationalist, authoritarian, reflexively adversarial, and possibly revanchist Russia. In its virulent form, this would be a Weimar successor with a Russian accent. Historical analysis suggests this option is more likely than it currently appears. The missing ingredient: a Hitler-style madman with dedicated supporters. The best candidate for such a role, General Lebed, now governor of Krasnoyarsk (one of Russia''s 89 regions), looked more formidable last year than he does today. Current Prime Minister Vladimir Putin, though perhaps lacking the zeal and charisma to be a nationalist dictator, has emerged as a strongman with broad popular appeal, largely due to his (so far) successful military campaign in Chechnya. Even as a weak and poor state, a "spoiler" Russia could nonetheless create nightmares for the U.S.: from unilateral vetoes of Security Council authorizations of multilateral actions to sales of high technology weaponry, and perhaps even nuclear know-how, to rogue states like Iran or Iraq, to sponsorship of terrorism.

3. A failed Russian state could result from the collapse of central authority into a collection of regional powers (mostly organized around strong governors), increasing chaos, and over time likely resumption of a civil war like the bloody conflict seen in Russia between 1918 and the mid-1920''s. China underwent such a process earlier this century when the dynasty was totally discredited. Disintegration and chaos would undoubtedly mean some bandit states, like Chechnya today, in which criminals would control weapons of mass destruction and likely be prepared to take actions as extreme as those seen by North Korea (which sells missiles to all buyers) or bin Laden or Yousef (who kill Americans with terrorist bombs).

Policy implications:

• In the first case, Russia remains a grudging partner (a "poor relative" as one Russian recently noted, poor being temporary, but a relative forever); in the second case, Russian plays a spoiler role; in the third, a criminalized, chaotic Russia becomes a "Home Depot" for WMD.
  

• The factors that will determine which of these paths Russia follows are overwhelmingly internal to Russia today. But the U.S. can exert influence at the margin. U.S. policy should therefore concentrate on factors that matter most for the U.S. These are: (1) control of nuclear and other dangerous materials, and thus a government competent enough to exercise such control (which Yeltsin''s government has so far just barely succeeded in being); and (2) reinforcing Russian reformist inclinations to create what they call a "civilized" state that is integrated with the West and thus continues down the difficult path of democratization, marketization, and substantial cooperation with the West.
  

IV. WHAT U.S. POLICY INITIATIVES SHOULD BE AT THE TOP OF OUR AGENDA?

In attempting to engage Russia, the Clinton Administration''s coordinates were marketization and democratization. In contrast, you should give highest priority to securing Russian nuclear weapons and weapons-usable nuclear material (and other weapons of mass destruction). For your Administration, this should be the North Star. While marketization and democratization are important, longer-term objectives for U.S. policy towards Russia, they are separate from, and less important in terms of American interests, than securing Russian WMD. Moreover, the danger of loose nukes looms large even in the best of Russia''s possible futures.

Policy implications:

• Sustain the basic mantra and support for Russians creating a "normal state"; for "partnership" with the U.S. and the West; for integration with Western institutions; for democratization and marketization of a civilized, great Russia. But recognize that these are long-term objectives, which the U.S. has only limited capacity to affect. Limited is not zero. Particularly because Russians are understandably confused by the extraordinary events of the past decade, U.S. clarity about ideals and objectives can help Russians orient themselves.
  

• Within the framework of "partnership," build on and expand two principal initiatives to increase the security of nuclear weapons, not only for the U.S. but for Russia.
  

1. The first began as a Congressional initiative, Nunn-Lugar (1991), that became Nunn-Lugar-Domenici (1995), and provides roughly $400 million per year to assist Russia in securing weapons of mass destruction. This assistance has supported the development of a deep, cooperative relationship between U.S. military professionals and their Russian counterparts, and the two defense establishments, which has reinforced Russian recognition that securing such weapons is essential for Russia, as well as for outsiders. Reinforce and expand these programs with an emphasis on specific, observable actions that enhance U.S. security. Note the contrast with the advice offered, for example, by Wall Street Journal editorial leaders: namely, to leave Russia alone over the next several years to develop itself. Such a Russia might as likely follow the path of Colombia or Somalia.

2. HEU Deal. The second initiative, negotiated by the Bush Administration, produced a contract between the U.S. and Russian governments for the purchase of 500 tons of highly enriched uranium from Russian military stockpiles. This HEU is diluted to fuel rods that are then sold to U.S. nuclear power plants. Conceived in the era of budget deficits, the HEU deal was constructed to be budget neutral. In the new world of budgetary surplus, the Administration has an opportunity to launch a major new international initiative to secure nuclear weapons material. Such an initiative should take advantage of all that the U.S. government has learned in dealing with Russia in buying and taking HEU over the past five years. It should focus on buying material from Russia and consolidating and securing the material that remains. Specifically, it would "buy and take" all the nuclear weapons-usable material Russia is prepared to sell (perhaps 80-90%) for approximately $10 billion, and condition that purchase on the concentration and securing of all remaining weapons and material to a standard that meets U.S. as well as Russian interests. (Supporting analysis for such an initiative is provided by the recent CSIS panel chaired by former Senator Sam Nunn. Note, in particular, that none of these funds would be delivered to the central Russian government; instead, they would be deposited in a Special Independent Fund, audited by an international auditor, and spent on specific, observable actions by agreement of U.S. and Russian authorities.)

V. WHAT ARE U.S. STAKES IN RUSSIA''S CURRENT DECISIVE YEAR OF ELECTIONS?

Russia has embarked on a decisive "year of elections." This promises to be the most important chapter in the Russian revolution since the Soviet Union collapsed in 1991. On the current schedule, Russian citizens will elect a new Duma (the Parliament) on December 19, and a new President in June, 2000. Barring extra-constitutional surprises, by this time next year, Russia will have a new President. If this occurs, Russians will experience the first peaceful, democratic transfer of power in that country''s thousand-year history.

Such a course will constitute a major step forward in the consolidation of Russia''s fledgling democracy. But even more important from the perspective of U.S. interests is the prospect that the new government could prove passably competent in performing its minimum, essential tasks. This is a threshold that the Yeltsin government has failed to meet, most vividly in recent years where a divided, corrupted, incompetent government currently collects less taxes annually than the city of New York and only intermittently pays military officers who control nuclear weapons.

Coping with Yeltsin''s last gasps requires more than dealing with a lame duck. As Bill Safire has noted, Yeltsin is "always dying but never dead." While Yeltsin continues to affirm his readiness to hold elections and transfer power, it is quite possible that when he wakes up to the facts, he will understand his (and his family''s) future may require a choice between jail and exile. This is a choice his daughter, his closest oligarchic supporters, and his Presidential hanger-ons deathly fear. It is not without historical precedent. Recall that as Julius Caesar approached the last month of his term as governor of Gaul, and return to the life of a private citizen, he recognized that the Roman Senate would almost surely charge him with capital offenses. To avoid that fate, he crossed the Rubicon, initiating Rome''s great civil war— a war that ultimately led to the destruction of the Republic. Thus Yeltsin will surely be tempted to take extreme initiatives (as he nearly did in 1996), for example, by announcing a "confederation" of Russia and Belarus and the extension of his term as President of the new confederation, or, alternatively, managing an external conflict.

U.S. influence in Russian elections is marginal in general, and is likely to be counterproductive if explicitly expressed as support for any candidate or party. But U.S. influence with Yeltsin in particular is considerable. While Clinton Administration policy has been too tightly tethered to Yeltsin, and too inclined to read U.S. policy through Yeltsin''s eyes, Clinton''s bonding with Yeltsin nonetheless has allowed him to deliver Yeltsin at decisive moments. These include preventing postponement of the elections in 1996 and enlisting Russia''s substantial assistance in isolating Milosevic and allowing the U.S.-led NATO campaign to achieve its initial objectives in Kosovo.

Policy implications:

• Reinforce Yeltsin''s image of himself as the "founding father of Russian democracy," and the "guardian of Russian democracy." Restrain Yeltsin and the "Family''s" instincts to violate the constitution and prevent a transfer of power. In the successor to the "Bill to Boris" phone conversations, make sure Yeltsin understands that both his place in history, and his material access to Western bank accounts and medical services (not to mention speaker fees), depend on his fulfillment of his promises.
  

• Engage Russia''s likely successors, including Putin, Luzhkov, Yavlinsky, and Primakov.