Russia's New Path

This monograph represents another in a series of publications of the "Whither Russia?" project of the Strengthening Democratic Institutions Project, based at the Belfer Center for Science and International Studies (CSIA) at Harvard University''s John F. Kennedy School of Government.

The goal of the "Whither Russia?" project is to illuminate for the international community the ongoing debate in Russia about the country''s identity, security, and interests. Our central question is: what will emerge as the dominant conception of Russian identity, Russian security, and Russian greatness? More specifically, we hope this project can help clarify: competing images of Russia across the political spectrum; how these competing images are reflected in policy; the shape of the debate in specific arenas; the views of the political elite and the public about the debate; differences between views in the regions and those at the center; common threads in the competing images of Russia; and, based on the conclusions drawn, Russia''s fundamental geopolitical and national interests.

As part of the project, we are publishing important works by leading Russian policymakers and academics addressing a set of three broad questions:

1) Who are the Russians? Authors are examining competing ideas and components of the Russian nation, Russian nationalism, and Russian national identity.

2) What is the nature of the Russian state? Monographs are analyzing competing images of the state, Russia''s status as a "Great Power," Russia''s national interests, and conceptions of Russia''s friends and enemies.3) What is Russia''s Mission? Looking at Russia''s relations with the outside world: specifically with the Newly Independent States, the coalition of the Commonwealth of Independent States, and the West, and its orientation toward action, including its stated foreign policy and general international conduct.

The author of this monograph, Aleksei Podberezkin, is a close advisor to Communist Party leader Gennadi Zyuganov, and is Deputy Chairman of the Committee for International Affairs of the State Duma. He is also Chairman of the Central Council of the All-Russia "Spiritual Heritage" movement, which currently has over 10,000 active members, and Co-Chairman of the National Patriotic Union of Russia. In June 1990, Podberezkin founded the RAU Corporation, a company that engages in research and educational work. Its regulations stipulate that all employees of the corporation must be patriots. Podberezkin graduated in 1979 from the Moscow State Institute of International Affairs. From 1985 to 1990, he was a senior researcher at the Institute of World Economy and International Affairs, and at the Diplomatic Academy under the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

The essay begins with general reflections by the author on the "Russian Idea," by which he means a conception about where the Russian nation is going and how it plans to get there. Podberezkin maintains that at present the Russian people suffer above all from a loss of national consciousness and values, which he attributes to the trauma of the reforms of the past decade. He believes that only after they regain a sense of national purposefulness can Russians solve the serious domestic and international problems they are facing. He wants to encourage by all possible means the process of self-understanding and self-consciousness that he believes is already proceeding in Russian society today.

In the next section on "Russia''s Domestic Challenges," Podberezkin first describes what he sees as the main features and policies of Russia''s current "oligarchic state capitalist system." He severely criticizes the Gorbachev and Yeltsin administrations for their allegedly harmful reform policies, which he identifies as the cause of Russia''s current economic, demographic, and other domestic problems. Podberezkin calls for a radical change in policies, especially a revival of state support for science and high technology, which he sees as the major source of countries'' economic well-being in the present age. Yet, he does not believe that Russia is in a revolutionary situation, and therefore favors the formation of a coalition government of all those who support a strong Russian state. He asserts that a coalition adhering to such a "state-patriotic" ideology could encompasses "state patriots" from a range of existing political parties because it synthesizes the basic ideas that exist today among Russia''s "reformers," "traditionalists," and "communists."

In the last section, on "Russia''s Foreign-Policy Challenges," Podberezkin argues that the international system has entered a new era in which a dominant process is the clash of world cultures. He maintains that the Slavic civilization is currently threatened with assimilation into the West. According to him, Russia will only be able to defend itself and its fellow Slavs against this threat if its people regain a sense of national consciousness. In a more traditional vein, Podberezkin acknowledges that Russia''s geopolitical and relative economic position within the world have sharply worsened in recent years. Exploiting their financial and other resources, the West is allegedly attempting to promote disunity within the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) and weaken Russia''s role in the former Soviet republics. To combat this threat, Podberezkin argues that Russia needs to strengthen the power of its state and its military. The latter requires the implementation of conceptually driven military reform and the allocation of increased spending. To free up resources to rebuild the military, he wants Russia for now to pursue a policy of "limited globalism" involving the use of primarily diplomatic means to advance Russia''s national interests outside the CIS. Within the Commonwealth, he favors a peaceful effort to reestablish a single powerful state. He also advocates the use of protectionist measures to make the Russian economy more self-sufficient, and calls for a more assertive approach to arms control (including START II).
Western readers will find much of interest in Podberezkin''s controversial but thoughtful observations. As an influential and thoughtful leader of the still-powerful Communist opposition, his ideas have played a major role in shaping the intellectual debate on Russian defense and foreign policy within at least the Russian Duma.

Dr. Richard Weitz, a Fellow in BCSIA''s International Security Program, composed this monograph by drawing on several of Mr. Podberezkin''s Russian language manuscripts on the same topic. Funding for the "Whither Russia?" project has been provided by The Carnegie Corporation of New York. The opinions expressed in this monograph are those of the author and do not represent the views of Harvard university, the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, the Strengthening Democratic Institutions project, Carnegie Corporation of New York, the translator, or the editor.

I. INTRODUCTION

It would appear that today, at the end of the 20th century, our country and society find themselves in the same kind of situation as they did at the end of the 19th century: before us stands the problem of deciding our very path of development. We must choose between either the traditional form (monarchy), the Western form (liberalism), or a third path (Social Democracy).

The path along which Russia will proceed will become known in the near future. The route will be chosen not by politicians, but by those publicly inclined individuals (many of which have yet to organize or become aware of their role), and their allies within the intelligentsia, who are actually making history in today''s Russia.

Russians must make their development choice in a context where the policies of the political authorities of post-Communist Russia are directed against the interests of the absolute majority of its citizens. No appeals to the population for its support or promises of a better life will change the situation. The income gap has exploded, homelessness is spreading, wages and pensions are not being paid, the state system of education (which had been the best in the world) has collapsed, and children are starving. The continuation of the government policies that have produced these disasters will inevitably lead to a social explosion.

Russians must also choose their direction of development against the background of a worsening international situation. The potential and influence of the largest Western states are increasing rapidly. The economies of China and Japan are growing even more rapidly. The United States, enjoying all the advantages of the international political and financial systems it created, is demonstrating the fantastic results of "the American way of life" and the "advantages of its social and political system."

Russia today faces a real threat. First, it could lose the remains of its dominant influence and control over the republics of the former USSR. Second, the central authorities in Moscow could lose control over the various regions of Russia, which would lead to the collapse of the Russian Federation itself. Third, Russia is threatened with a loss of its sovereignty and independence. The United States has already declared the Caucasus and the northern Caspian region as within its zone of interests, while our neighbors-from Poland to Japan-have claims against Russian territory.

Yet, the issue of Russia''s foreign policy remains at the periphery of the attention of the opposition and society. At best, they think only about NATO or about Belarus, not seeing foreign policy issues as an integrated whole. Most often they perceive foreign policy only as one of the aspects of their external reality, as something best left to the "ruling regime."

The problem with most contemporary Russian politicians is that they identify Russia''s national interests as being identical with those of the United States. We must not be afraid to say, "I am a Russian, my nation is Russia, and my state has national interests that may differ from yours." Patriotism is a natural biological defense mechanism of any individual who aims to defend the interests of his kin, tribe, people, nation, and state. The opposition ought not to fear such patriotism.

In my opinion, one can and must talk about a national world-view (which has diverse political-ideological nuances), about an attitude toward the world that has clear national (but not nationalistic) attributes and a cultural and spiritual basis. It is necessary to make this distinction in order to draw a clear border between the interests of our nation and the interests of others. We must not be afraid to stand up for our interests against, for example, the United States, Israel, or any international organization.Russians today are not ready to believe either politicians or scholars. For this they have good reason: in recent years they have confronted daily the deception and cynicism of the authorities, the opposition, and of so-called community activists, all of whom were exemplars of conformism, unscrupulousness, and opportunism. In such an environment, each person could count only on his or her own efforts. People had to adapt to the new realities with a single goal: to survive and help those closest survive.

But the truth is that an individual cannot solve his or her most important problems of survival by withdrawing into a separate sphere. An individual Russian-both in the past, and today-cannot concentrate only on his or her own problems, leaving aside the problems of the Motherland, the nation, or Russia''s spiritual and moral health. The individual can do very much if he himself wants to and she believes that it is within her power to change things significantly.

The Russian people are suffering above all from a loss of their national consciousness, their world view, and their guiding values. They have suffered a blow that has resulted in a "disruption in their heads." Until we overcome these ideological shocks, we cannot solve even one of our most acute economic, social, or demographic problems.

The rebirth of genuine values is inevitable. It has already begun-too slow, perhaps, but people are really beginning to recover after the severe hangover of reform. It is very important to exploit this trend and induce the most active part of the nation to independently search for a new truth. If this is not done soon, however, then the authorities will use the mass media and other channels to thrust their own system of values on the nation. I am convinced that it is imperative to encourage and stimulate by every means possible the processes of self-understanding and self-consciousness that are going on today in society. The Russian Idea needed by the nation will emerge from these processes, in a natural way (and not by presidential decree). The discussion of "the Russian Idea," i.e., about where we are going and what we need to do, is perhaps the only issue of the last decade that has been subject to a full-fledged discussion throughout Russia.

The strategic task of today is to create and instill in mass consciousness a new state-party ideology and a system of values for most of the Russian nation, regardless of party affiliation. The absence of such an ideology among the ruling elite-or, more precisely, its facile acceptance of theories made in Washington-has led to Russia''s present problems and will lead to a future catastrophe. We need an "intellectual breakthrough" before there can be a political triumph. Today there can be no single correct solution to the Idea-the time for final answers has not yet arrived. But it has finally become clear that for most of our citizens the old, orthodox ideology has died out, and the Western-liberal approach has not taken root in Russia-notwithstanding the strenuous efforts of its advocates.

II. RUSSIA''S DOMESTIC CHALLENGES

The Nature of the Crisis
In recent years five destructive trends have appeared in Russian society: (1) the growing indifference, distrust, and disappointment of the Russian populace towards politics; (2) a scramble to survive present difficulties by any means possible, with little attention paid toward the needs of the nation and the state as a whole; (3) the free hand of the government (which constitutes an oligarchic state capitalist system) resulting from such passivity and silent support; (4) the absence of a trusted political opposition to the government, which could lead to a social explosion that could be exploited by adventurers; and (5) growing support for those individuals (such as Moscow Mayor Yu. Luzhkov) who can attain practical results in politics and other areas.Yet, Russia does not find itself at present in a systemic crisis. The proletariat will not threaten revolution in the immediate future. In our country there exists a unique adaptation mechanism that lessens the growth of social tension and provides an effective counterweight to a new revolution. This mechanism is the "shadow" economy, which provides the present social system with its power of survival. If Russian citizens really lived on the income indicated by the State Committee on Statistics, a hunger riot would have long ago occurred in our country. The "shadow" economy (and its irregular income) comprises about one-fourth of the gross domestic product. Thanks to it, many voters are extremely satisfied with their material circumstances and are not preparing to storm the Kremlin just because the financial elites, and not they, actually elect the President.But one cannot exclude the possibility of a social explosion in the future. Great chaos arises whenever a state departs from its natural path of development. The development of the state is determined by the spirit of the nation, its culture and history. It is formed over the course of centuries in accordance with the requirements of contemporary international reality and science. A leadership that cannot understand its state''s national identification cannot proceed to define its national interests. The development of any nation and any state is predetermined by how wise its leaders are, how well they understand their country''s special features, and, most importantly, how well they exploit them in the interests of the nation and the state.Unfortunately, the Russian government has not understood this. In particular, it has failed to realize the intellectual and spiritual potential of the Russian nation. Some pseudo-Marxists, enamored by a dogmatic class-based approach to social analysis, also fail to appreciate these values. I am absolutely convinced that the spiritual and intellectual resources of the nation are essentially just as enormous and valuable as our raw material resources. The development of the unique potential of the Russian nation (including its science, its education, and its culture, valued throughout the world) will advance not only the interests of all civilizations, but is one of the most important conditions for their own development. Without the unique qualities that Russia contrbutes to the world, there could hardly be civilization at all. The leading countries of the world understand the contribution of intellectuals to their development. For example, the current success of the United States is explained by the fact that, unlike the USSR, it did not sleep through the scientific-technical revolution, but decisively placed its bets on it. At the end of the twentieth century, the might, influence, and level of security of any state in the world is determined by its relative capacity in information, communications, biotechnology, computers, and other scientific-intensive areas. A country that lags behind in the development of scientific-intensive technologies is doomed to be an outsider in today''s world, and its people are condemned to poverty. Science-intensive industries typically require less energy and other nonrenewable resources than other forms of production, are less threatening to the environment, and are associated with high national levels of education, culture, and military strength. Russia must again promote science and engineering as one of the highest priorities of state policy. In particular, it should provide concentrated assistance to those economic sectors that will most assist the development of the economy as a whole during the next decade. Stalin pursued such a policy when he concentrated the USSR''s resources on only two key areas after World War II: nuclear energy and rocket building. The success of his policies in these sectors not only guaranteed the USSR''s security, but provided a broad-based stimulus to the economy as a whole. Today, a concentrated effort to develop scientific-intensive industries would have the same effect.We have almost ten million "new Russians" in our country. They do not need science and literature-they live in another world. Rejecting values and ideology, they got rich at the end of the 1980s. Today they have no need for democracy, for even this sacred concept is for them an empty sound, a term they are ready to reject if it denies them their lifestyle and their high standards of living.At the base of many of the successes and failures of Russia lie the successes and failures of its political system. The misfortune of our liberal intelligentsia is that has been constantly fighting with the Russian political system, not understanding, or failing to acknowledge to itself, that its own success and well-being depend in the end on the strength of the state and its institutions. Both in 1917 and in 1991 the intelligentsia suddenly discovered that, even though what it had criticized in the state had disappeared, the majority of its members were worse off than they had been under the previous system. So far the intelligentsia has not understood that its current interests are best served by a strong Russian state.Unlike in many other states and nations, in Russia from the earliest times a merging of the state and the people [narod] has taken place. Therefore, the main component of the national idea for a long time now has been the idea of a strong state, for the sake of which one can and should sacrifice all: one''s health, life, intimates, and even more so governments, General Secretaries, political leaders, etc. Only the state can attain a country''s national interests. One can hardly talk seriously about other mechanisms-public, international, etc.-which at best can serve as supplements to the state. The state is the best instrument invented by humanity for ensuring the stable development of the nation, society, and the individual.
Since the second half of the 1980s a process has been gaining strength in our country, under the rubric of "the struggle with statism" and the "struggle with totalitarianism," that has resulted in the loss of such paramount functions by our state as the capacity to defend our territorial integrity and sovereignty, or to guarantee our national security and citizens'' basic rights. In effect, the value of having a strong centralized state has come under question. Institutional fixes will have little impact. No matter how much we strengthen the Presidency, we will not have a strong state. The absence of a national idea, a unifying ideology, calls into question the very viability of the state itself, and of its institutions. The enormous and urgent task of restoring the state''s functions and strengthening the state itself requires above all serious work in the realm of ideology, and its inculcation into mass consciousness. And here we will not manage without comprehending and overcoming the sorrowful experience of "perestroika," that is, the destruction of the state. Before then, there was an almost ideal system of state and bureaucratic management in the USSR, in which decisions and control over their implementation took place on a professional, competent, and responsible basis. Exploiting their media monopoly, M. Gorbachev, A. Yakovlev, and the other leaders of perestroika, to put it simply, deliberately brought about the nation''s demoralization and the country''s self-destruction. That which hostile foreign forces were unable to do, the state consciously did from within. One can quite justifiably regard what the Gorbachev team did to our country as treachery-and they should be held personally accountable for their crime. Retribution is inevitable for those who wreck and betray the Fatherland.As a result of the destructive policies of the Gorbachev period, Russia has ended up with a political system today that consists of the following key elements:

1. The country is governed by individuals who had been part of the apparatus of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, at whose head stands the President-the "Pope."
2. The "Pope" relies on the administration, the money, and in the final account the power structure of the state in his struggle with the "left" (the People''s Patriotic Union of Russia, composed of the RF Communist Party and non-Communist parties accepting its leadership) and the "right" (the Liberal Democrats) opposition.
3. Balancing between the "right" and the "left," the "Pope" pursues his own goals:
· privatization, i.e., a redistribution of public property
· liberalization, i.e., establishing the dominance of market relations
4. The ideology of the "liberal reformers" is the cynical encouragement of enrichment, support for Western models of culture, and a weakening of the institutions of the state.
5. The end result has been the economic destruction of the socialist intelligentsia and the workers, and the creation of a class of proprietors and a financial oligarchy. Another consequence of this system has been the withdrawal of most of the people from political life.
The de-politization of the Russian people-and their helpless observance of how a great power was destroyed, its economy ruined, and its population destroyed-has occurred because of the fact that the single ideological pivot of the country, Communism, was "plucked out" of the nation''s consciousness, and in its place there remains an appalling emptiness of disbelief.

A Plan for Action
What is to be done? In principle, three main answers as to how to bring about changes are possible:

A) Through Elections

Experience shows that such a variant-an electoral victory by the opposition-is possible, but by no means guaranteed since the authorities can exploit the state''s administrative resources and in fact predetermine the results, making the elections purely decorative. (This is the "democratic-authoritarian model" of elections, in which the rulers determine in advance the results even though international standards of electoral conduct are not violated). In fact, Russian politics takes place on two levels: a public layer, which is the focus of media attention, and a hidden stratum, where the real decisions are made.Overcoming this obstacle requires that the opposition (the People''s Patriotic Union of Russia and the other left-wing groups) be in a position to counter the "parties of power" (the Democratic Party of Russia, Yabloko, and the members of the presidential and governmental apparatus) with their own electoral resources, including access to the media, organizational structures, finances, political skills, etc. It is clear that this will require enormous practical work. The electoral resource gap between the opposition and the party in power is enormous. In Moscow, for example, Lyzhkov''s team enjoys a resource advantage over the opposition by an order of magnitude of from 20-50 times. Another negative consideration is the fact that centuries of history show that, in Russia, leaders are chosen and replaced by the elite, and not public opinion or elections. The current financial-information oligarchy is trying by all means to preserve this practice.

B) Through Forceful Methods

Given the growth in social tensions, this variant is becoming more and more realistic. However, the departure from natural processes of evolution is always, and especially under present-day conditions, fraught with unpredictable consequences. Precisely for this reason the leaders of the opposition have declared a "quota on revolutions."

In general, I believe that radical protest measures would be unproductive under current circumstances. This is above all because our history (including the Soviet and post-Soviet periods) has repeatedly demonstrates that the authorities know how to manage such protests. This by no means signifies that I am against radical forms of protest in principle. On the contrary, where possible, one must fight in every way possible for one''s rights. Any accord or reconciliation with the existing regime and policies is out of the question. Social conflict under current conditions is inevitable. Each social group must stand up for its interests. But one must not exaggerate the "protest potential" of the masses. At present, despite their discontent and distrust, they remain passive and submissive toward the authorities.

Another problem is the absence of a capable political party armed with a modern political theory. Today''s liberal Communists, in sharp contrast to their Bolshevik predecessors, have nothing to say to the people. The ideological incapacity of the contemporary communist movement is explained by the fact that it has in fact been deprived of its ideological basis: Marxism. In Soviet times Marxist doctrine became dogmatic. This dogmatic form has become unable to explain contemporary life, which has hence been characterized by an ideological vacuum. While again calling the people to socialism, the Communists themselves do not know what kind it should be, even with respect to its most basic principles. Although they criticize capitalism, contemporary revolutionary socialists (and not just the Communists) are not able to understand its achievements and its current contradictions, or counter it with a real alternative. It is precisely this circumstance that is the main reason why the majority of the population, despite the catastrophic consequences of bourgeois reform, still votes for a continuation of capitalist policies, and not for a socialist alternative.

C) Through an Evolution of the Existing Political Structure

Opportunist politicians and "new Russians" seeking self-enrichment have been gaining strength in Russian politics. Their program (or, rather, their absence of one) represents a grave threat to Russia. To counter this threat, as well as those emerging from abroad and in a de-ideologized society, the opposition must initiate a dialogue with a part of the "parties of power."

In particular, the interests of the state and the nation require a compromise between supporters of a strong state and their opponents. Although a mere agreement on "the rules of the game" would be useful, it might also prove possible to create a genuine "third force" in which all the leaders of this group agree on some basic principles and values. The core of these would include a rejection of both the radicalism of the adventurers and the conformism of the elite.

The "state-patriotic" ideology that would lay at the basis of this coalition is an ideology of development and modernization. It is an integrative ideology that encompasses state patriots of various hues-from the Communists to the Liberals. It synthesizes the basic ideas that exist today among three leading political forces: the "reformers," the "traditionalists," and the "communists."

I emphasize that what we are dealing with here is not a repudiation of the political struggle, but attaining a new, more precise form. It must not be understood in the narrow sense as involving just a struggle for political power, but within a broader political-ideological context. It would involve a pragmatic compromise in our understanding of the threats to our nation and the measures needed to eliminate them, and not an agreement that would allow the President merely to shuffle the political deck and not change his policies.

It is understood that this agreement might only be temporary. But it is precisely now when we need to take steps to preserve society and the state-our highest values. For these goals we must put aside our preoccupation with ideological purity and even consider entering into a coalition government. Such an approach is comparable to that undertaken by the Communists in 1939, when they signed a non-aggression treaty with fascist Germany to ward off an imminent threat to the nation.

Only a strong state can overcome Russia''s current problems. A system of "checks and balances," which has worked quite successfully in the West, is not suitable in its classical form for Russia. It involves the various branches of government wasting energy and resources in combating each other, whereas in Russia today we need greater collaboration among these branches. In addition, such a system presumes a rough equivalence in power among the branches, which does not exist within the framework of the present Russian constitution. It grants the President so much power that the other institutions are incapable of seriously resisting him. Although one must acknowledge the need to strengthen the Russian legislature in particular, such a protracted task must be relegated to the future. In the meantime, we must try as best we can through mutual agreement to counterbalance executive power by means of instruments not provided for in the present constitution-such as a State Council headed by the President, and composed of approximately a dozen representatives from all the branches of the government, the country''s leading political forces, and Russia''s most important public and scientific organizations. Such a State Council would strengthen the capacity of the state machine, which has atrophied disastrously in recent years. It would have the supervisory powers to both ensure the rapid fulfillment of its decisions by the various branches of the Russian government and make any necessary mid-course corrections. The Council would also be responsible for selecting candidates for the highest positions in the country that were recommended to it by the President, the Prime Minister, and the parliament. In practice, the State Council would assume the functions of a national government or a government of national interests. The coalition''s main functions would be to formulate and put into practice a program aimed at preventing the total looting and destruction of the country. In particular, its program would include urgent measures aimed at limiting the use of unregistered and foreign money as a way of combating theft and embezzlement, strengthening the role of state institutions in the economy by returning to them some of the powers that they have surrendered to private financial institutions, and reducing the embarrassing internecine disputes over personalities and wealth that regularly occur within the government by including within it only like-minded supporters of a strong state.The principles guiding the new coalition would consist of the following:

1. The need for a democratic government with strengthened institutions and policy instruments that is committed to the rule of law, the improvement of citizens'' social conditions, and the defense of the rights of individuals, the society, and the nation;2. The need for a powerful economy that would make Russia a world leader in the fields of science and technology (the most important sectors in terms of guaranteeing a country''s national security), and in which the question of the degree of state ownership or the use of protectionist measures in any given sector would be determined by their effectiveness and not by ideological or personal preferences;3. The fundamental importance of the idea of social justice and the protection of the social rights of the citizens of Russia through an effective system of targeted economic, social, medical, and cultural support that would ensure the economic and spiritual survival of the nation during the current transition period; and4. A recognition of the importance of cultural, scientific, educational, and spiritual life for the preservation and development of the nation (and Russia''s economic and military potential), by treating them as budgetary and legislative and by limiting foreign influences in these areas (the recently enacted law on religious organizations serves as a good example of appropriate state policy-the West''s aggressive opposition to it reflects a crafty understanding that to subordinate a nation it is necessary to deprive it of national values).
Evaluating the effectiveness of an economic policy only on the basis of financial considerations is too narrow an approach. The supreme goal of any policy is the creation of conditions necessary for the stable development of society and its various institutions. The criteria for evaluating any policy should be whether it improves the functioning of the state and the social system and, in the final analysis, leads to an improvement in the economic, social, and other conditions affecting the lives of a state''s citizens. In this regard, it is not essentially important under what social system progressive changes occur. One can simultaneously approve of the reforms of Peter I, Franklin Roosevelt, and contemporary China because they all meet the above criteria.

Unfortunately, the so-called "reforms" of recent Russian governments have only led to regressive changes. Russia''s GDP has fallen by 50%, and half of the population has been pushed under the poverty line. Two percent of the population possesses over sixty percent of the national savings. Russia''s trade balance now resembles that of an underdeveloped colony, its indebtedness to foreign sources of capital continues to grow, and the country is suffering from capital flight. The state''s finances are in shambles: the government is running huge deficits but is still unable to pay state employees. Bureaucrats at all levels of government dispose of state property as if it were their own, stealing more than at anytime in the history of Russia or that of any other civilized country. Everything is for sale, even that which one cannot buy in the most liberal of market economies: positions, national awards, social status, citizenship, etc. The government has failed disastrously according to one of the most important indicators of national security: a nation''s ability to reproduce itself. As a result of these "reforms," since 1987 Russia has fallen into a deep demographic crisis: the birth rate, the average caloric intake, and the life expectancy of Russia''s citizens have fallen sharply, while only their death rate has increased. Furthermore, whereas during the Soviet period the USSR had reached the level of the United States in terms of scientific and technological potential, and according to a number of indicators even surpassed it, by 1992, according to experts, the United States was spending 176 times more than Russia on science. Russia also lagged behind the Czech Republic, Norway, Finland, and Austria according to this criteria. Since the end of 1991, the number of Russians employed as scientists has fallen three-fold.

Russia desperately needs real economic reforms. The state must spend more on science. It needs a new tax code that will ensure social justice and stimulate economic growth. Russia must stop slavishly following the instructions of the IMF, the World Bank, and the United States. Such a policy leads one to question the very need for an independent Russian government-why not just disband the Cabinet and set up a small apparatus under Washington''s control?

III. RUSSIA''S FOREIGN-POLICY CHALLENGES

The Challenge
Russia is currently threatened not only with military defeat, but with the loss of its national sovereignty, territorial integrity, and, worst of all, its ability to preserve the specific traits of its national culture and its capacity to conduct an independent domestic policy.A proper national security policy involves the defense of (1) the individual, his or her rights and freedoms; (2) social and national groups, their status and role; (3) society, its material and spiritual values; and (4) the state, its territorial integrity, sovereignty, and constitutional structure. All these levels are interrelated, and the priorities of any policy will vary depending on changing circumstances. The content of a national security policy will involve the economy, politics, culture, technology, information, ecology, the military, medicine, and other areas, but as an integrated whole it should both promote the flourishing of the country and nation, and defend its interests against any domestic or foreign threat.In order to develop a foreign and defense policy for contemporary Russia, it is necessary above all to take into account the new international realities that have taken shape after the destruction of the USSR and the international socialist system. It must be a new foreign and defense policy, for the conditions under which it will be carried out are qualitatively different from those which persisted even in the 1980s. The most important difference is the emergence of a process involving a clash of world cultures, which is calling into question the existence of the whole Slavic civilization.Such a conflict in a hidden form has existed in Europe for centuries-since the time of Charles the Great and Kievan Russia. In essence, the history of the following millennium of Europe was a history of Europe''s expansion to the east, which was repeatedly stopped by Slavic blood. Without falling into "patriotic" hysterics, one is forced to state that the most terrible threat to the Slavic world in its history has now arisen: the menace of political, cultural, and spiritual assimilation into an alien civilization, that of the West. The issue is by no means that of the interaction of the cultures of two branches of European civilization, but about the annihilation of one of them: the eastern Slavic civilization. The defense of one''s national interests, especially the capacity to preserve the distinctive features of one''s nation, is the defining mark of sovereignty. Russia''s ability to withstand this threat depends on how quickly a revitalization of its national consciousness occurs.Today, as a result of the changes that have occurred in the world during the last decade, the USA and the countries of Western Europe have been able to attain practically the ideal international conditions for their development. As a consequence, their economies are healthier than ever. They have used their new-found strength to aim for complete political and financial control over the planet. Washington''s aspirations for world hegemony are unambiguous. And for at least the next decade Europe and Japan, despite their various tactical differences with the United States, will operate within the guidelines laid down by American policy. The recent financial crisis in Asia, which allowed the Western countries to weaken their potential competitors, shows that they are prepared to make large-scale financial and political changes in the world to attain their goal.In contrast, Russia''s geopolitical position has sharply worsened, as has its economic and military potential with respect to the West. In Europe, Russia has returned to the borders that it possessed in the middle of the 17th century, and in the Caucasus and Central Asia, to its frontiers at the beginning of the 19th century. Its population numbers only 150 million-several times less than that of the rest of Europe. In terms of the size of its GNP, Russia has fallen to fifth or sixth place in Europe alone. Its military potential and strategic position has considerably weakened. Furthermore, Russia does not have real allies in Europe, and for the time being cannot count on the active support of any of its CIS partners.In order to consolidate their victory in the Cold War, the United States and its allies will continue to oppose any forms of integration within the CIS, and will aim to weaken the position and influence of Russia within the Commonwealth. During the next few years the future orientation of the CIS states, whether they will incline toward Russia or toward other centers of power, will be determined. The Baltic countries have already defined their policy as integration into the European-Atlantic structures, and to all appearances we will not succeed in preventing this. The Western countries will also treat as a priority the rapid elimination of the military and technological potential that Russia inherited from the USSR. They will try to promote Russia''s isolation in the world by means of circulating myths about how Russia is run by a "criminal elite" and is a "state controlled by the mafia," and about "the export to pariah states of Russia''s weapons of mass destruction and missile technology." One cannot even exclude steps aimed at promoting Russia''s disintegration and, in response to exaggerated rumors about "the theft by terrorists and the mafia of nuclear materials from Russia''s nuclear complex," the placing under direct "international" control Russia''s nuclear facilities.We can also anticipate new Western efforts by one means or another to gain control over Russia''s natural and energy resources. Russia is rapidly turning into an economic reservation on whose territory one can with impunity and very profitably do as one likes. At present, only a few enterprises operating in the Russian Federation are capable of carrying out the mass production of complex weapons or military technology. The production of ammunition, surface-to-air missiles, and anti-aircraft systems has completely ceased within the country. Even now, at a time when international economic conditions are fairly favorable, we are only able to purchase renewable items from abroad (agricultural goods, services such as transport and insurance, etc.) in exchange for the sale of nonrenewable resources (oil, gas, aluminum, etc.).Russia nevertheless retains the attributes of an independent state because they assist in such plunder: the ideal conditions for such a policy can be achieved only through the help of a "national" elite subservient to alien interests. Yet, Russia cannot exist only as a source of nonrenewable resources for the world economy, which more and more is based on the dollar. We have a poorly thought out economic policy that neglects the interests of our domestic producers. If Russia continues to develop this way, it will have no future, not even a colonial one.

The Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS)
A geopolitical vacuum has arisen within the CIS. The creation of this organization prevented a repetition of the Yugoslav scenario on the territory of the former USSR, but the Commonwealth has not made any progress toward creating a new system of security and cooperation. Moreover, the passage of time is inevitably leading to the CIS''s collapse. Its disappointed members have been looking for other mechanisms of mutual cooperation, primarily through the use of smaller alliances. These problems are explained by the fact that so far there has been no dominating ideology of reintegration within the Commonwealth, and Russia''s political leaders are doing little to retain our influence in the CIS region. The West is conducting a well-thought out policy to limit Russia''s influence in the Caucasus, Ukraine, and Central Asia. For example, the unconcealed interest of the United States and Turkey in the Caucasus region, where these governments are openly strengthening their influence as a counterweight to Russia, places under threat our southern regions, which are vulnerable to destabilizing forces from without. In combination with the efforts of the West to prevent the political and military integration of the CIS states, and with the support of the anti-Russian policies of the governments of Ukraine, Georgia, and Azerbaijan, an anti-Russian axis consisting of NATO (Turkey)-Ukraine-Georgia-Azerbaijan is beginning to form in the region.The situation around Chechnya is extremely explosive. The Russian government is unable to defend neighboring peoples from the incursions of armed gangs emanating from the republic. The military formations in the northern Caucasus are undermanned, lack modern weaponry and adequate supplies, and suffer from various social problems.Russia''s position in Central Asia is also under threat. The exclusion of Russia from Central Asia would result in a loss of access to the vital goods, raw materials, and services that are located to Russia''s south. It would result in Russia''s displacement to the periphery of the world economy.Russia''s influence in the Caucasus, in Central Asia, and in the other former republics of the Soviet Union is under threat because Russia''s unqualified embrace of "wild capitalism" does not offer these governments an attractive model of development. The other CIS states are looking for other development models, and aim to escape their current problems without Russia-or, more precisely, without the present Russian leadership.

Russia''s Response

It must be noted that this is not the first time that Russia has found itself in such unfavorable international military-political circumstances: enfeebled, without allies, having lost its authority and former might. A comparison evidently suggests itself with the "time of troubles" of the beginning of the 17th century, and with the second half of the 19th century, when Russia was pushed back to where it had been a century earlier after its defeat in the Crimean War. Both then and now such defeats were the consequence primarily of internal factors, and not strictly speaking the military failures themselves. And as before we can best find a way out from the present unfavorable political-military environment by focusing our energies on internal reconstruction.We could place our hopes in the formation of a "united Europe," from the Atlantic to Vladivostok, but it is high time that we honestly acknowledge to ourselves that no one in Europe (aside from perhaps the partisans of Gorbachev) wants this or is acting to attain it. If we merely wait for its arrival, we at best will find ourselves gradually isolated from "civilized" Europe by NATO''s new cordon sanitaire.

Our strategy must proceed from a recognition of the fact that the civilization of the eastern Slavs is under threat. We can stop the expansion of the West only by means of a defense of the basic values that are the targets of Western aggression: our spirituality, culture, education, and the other core attributes that permit a nation to call itself a nation. For this a strong Russian state is needed (along with a strengthening of Russia''s economy, culture, education, and spiritual vitality). It is precisely a strong Russian state that has more than once in Europe''s history stopped the West and its horde of hirelings: from the crusaders-bandits to the fascist monsters.Russia will need to pursue a policy of isolationism, at least for a while. Our priority is to gather together our resources and restore order within the country. Our foreign policy can be considered effective to the extent that it minimizes the resources we must spend on the pursuit of external goals. Such a policy has been conducted by different countries at various times, including the USA, Japan, and, more recently, China.This policy would of course by no means signify a discontinuation of all Russia''s international activities (including, for example, its involvement in international organizations). Exactly the opposite: an active diplomacy should be carried out, but with the use of minimal resources. Russia would be able to take part in-as it is already doing-the formation of a multipolar world, in the creation of a system of stable relations among the world''s centers of power (one of which is Russia), and in the prevention of conflicts that could drag us into situations that conflict with Russia''s interests. Such a strategy presumes a continuation of a multidirectional diplomacy. It is sometimes called a policy of "limited globalism." With respect to Russia''s policy toward the "Near Abroad," it is clear that anyone who considers such very important questions as how best to defend the Russians in the other former Soviet republics, or what should be our policy towards the other member countries of the CIS, inevitably reaches the conclusion that a most important task of the next few years will be for us to peacefully reestablish a great state within the borders of the USSR that existed before 1991. This would allow us to unify the shorn nation and the artificially wrecked ties and markets, and provide a powerful intellectual spurt for the nation in the future. Russia must urgently begin the process of creating an eastern Slavic coalition-perhaps even a confederation-of states that will in any case remain the "social outcasts of Europe." Such a process must begin gradually, concentrating attention on the following basic developments:

· ideological preparation, manifesting itself in the propagation of the idea of pan-Slavism;
· restoration of shattered ties with the former members of the Warsaw Treaty Organization (WTO) and the Council of Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA);
· reintegration of the CIS;
· prevention of premature hostility on the part of the NATO member countries.
The first task requires Russia to show ideological initiative to the peoples of the former Soviet republics. In essence, it should consist of a promotional campaign in which Russia''s leaders would use the mass media to declare that they are not indifferent to the fate of these republics-a statement that has long been expected by most of the peoples of these "sovereign states." The overwhelming majority of the population of the CIS, including Russia, wholeheartedly supports maximum integration. And if we appeal to them, they will influence their leaders. Media outlets, primarily television, must also be used to show the true, egotistical interests of those who are opposing integration. Russian leaders must stop being lazy and disorganized, and must start treating the issue of relations with the CIS as a priority. It is also essential to show, even if only through declarations, that Russia has by no means forgotten about the ethnic Russians in these states, or about their centuries-long history of living within a single state. One must make clear to the national (and nationalistic) elites of these countries that Russia can very quickly pull the rug out from under them if it desires to do so.

The last goal, reducing the obvious anxiety and unease of the West, will require a combination of political and informational measures. We must not and can not hide our intentions, but they must be presented in a realistic and not distorted fashion-as a natural desire of the Slav peoples for close cultural and political ties, and as a natural bilateral process, the hindering of which would signify a hindering of our peoples'' natural feelings.It must be stressed that this plan does not conflict with the idea of a united Europe or the integration processes occurring there. It organically complements these processes with a Slavic component, making it more harmonious. This point is important, for our actions could easily be interpreted-and of course will be interpreted-as "Russian hegemonism," a "restoration of the WTO," and so forth. We must also acknowledge that in recent decades we have observed an opposite trend: the historically, ethnically, and culturally close eastern Slavic nations have been rapidly fleeing from one another, and have been losing their community of interests and their historical memory. There are several reasons for this, but two are most important: the short-sighted policies of recent Soviet and Russian leaders (their failure to prevent the collapse of the WTO and the CMEA, their betrayal of the leaders of these countries, their unilateral orientation towards the USA and Western Europe to the detriment of the interests of their allies) and the single-minded policy of the United States and the other NATO members, which made as a top priority "the disintegration and collapse of the Soviet bloc," seeing in it the most important condition for the break-up first of the USSR, and then Russia.It will take a while for an ideology of reintegration to become dominant within the CIS. In the interim, we must pursue a pragmatic policy of small steps that promotes concrete progress on specific issues that meet the direct needs of our citizens. The degree of integration will also depend on a subjective factor: the appearance within the CIS of leaders who proclaim as their policy the recreation of a single government. Furthermore, the idea of unification should become a leading element of the electoral program of the patriotic forces in Russia. Any Russian politician who would be able to occupy a central place in the relations between Russia and the other former Soviet republics would greatly increase his or her electoral prospects.With respect to Russia''s economic security, it is essential to clearly state that for national security reasons Russia needs a self-sufficient national economy. It is above all important that the country be able to feed itself and develop its own military potential without depending on foreigners'' goodwill. This by no means rules out being integrated into the international economy. On the contrary, Russia must fully contribute to the development of an international division of labor and the scientific-technological revolution. But while it would on various levels collaborate with the economically developed states, Russia''s economy must be both under national control and self-sufficient. In particular, we must introduce a system of quotas and customs duties on agricultural imports in order to protect domestic producers, provide state support for the public and cooperative enterprises in this area, and declare a state monopoly on foreign trade for several types of foodstuffs (grain, sugar, vegetable oil, and others.)Having entered into the world financial markets, we have received some benefits, but also experienced some costs. The most important of the latter is our dependence on the institutions that were created by the United States for its own benefit at Bretton Woods. The United States still controls these institutions, including the IMF and the World Bank. The crisis in East Asia shows that this system has entered into a new stage of development, and now is acquiring the function of controlling the activities of states and world financial flows. For example, IMF assistance programs typically require that a country sharply devalue its currency, liberalize its domestic market to make it more accessible to foreign investors, and privatize state property. These polices benefits the United States and other wealthy countries which, through the instrument of the IMF, are providing the financial assistance.

Military Policy

One cannot speak about a reliable system of state national security without discussing its military dimension. Those who assert that military considerations have lost their role in world politics are mistaken. This conviction, which was at the heart of Gorbachev''s foreign policy, laid the basis for the collapse of the USSR and its military capacity. The Americans correctly appreciate the importance of military power, as evinced by their overwhelming victory over Iraq and their policy of NATO expansion. A country should weaken its defense efforts only in response to a long-term improvement in the international climate; otherwise, it must remain vigilant.Russia must acquire a high-capacity armed forces by means of military reform, taking into account the economic resources available to the state. Unfortunately, this elementary truth has been disputed since the time of perestroika by "democratic" society. The thesis that "Russia is not threatened from without" has become very popular among the present leadership of our country. But it reflects at best a frivolous optimism which public officials, who are responsible for security of the country, have no right to hold.The Russian Federation Ministry of Defense declared that there will be no military threat to our security in the next ten years. This, in view of the West''s actions, is a myopic position. It is true that in the near term the possibility of nuclear or large-scale conventional aggression against Russia on the part of the West or China is practically zero in view of Russia''s possession of nuclear forces, which for the tine being are still capable of inflicting a crippling retaliatory blow. Such a state of affairs will continue as long as these strategic nuclear forces are capable of inflicting unacceptable damage on any aggressor.At the same time, local wars are possible. The risk of Russia''s being dragged into them will decline only in so far as the situation on the territory of the former USSR becomes more stable. In addition, it is already clear to all that the Russia-NATO Charter has turned out to be a fiction, and the issue of NATO''s further expansion eastward, perhaps even to include the Baltic states, remains on the agenda. The West''s assimilation of the military infrastructure of the countries of Eastern Europe will create conditions under which U.S. airforce in Europe will acquire vis-à-vis Russia a strategic weapons capability, whereby (considering the collapse of the Russian Federation''s air defense system) it will become possible for these states to employ against us a scenario analogous to the military actions the West used against Iraq in 1991 and against the Bosnian Serbs in 1995. The military activities of the USA and NATO are increasing even within the borders of the former USSR. Military exercises based on anti-Russian scenarios are being conducted in the Baltic region, in Ukraine, and in Central Asia. Appeals are being made for the use of NATO troops for the solution of the conflicts in Nargorno-Karabakh and Abkhazia.The Russian government presently lacks a well-considered, scientifically based conception of military reform. This is leading to the final collapse of the defense system of our country, and is opening the way for Russia''s geopolitical opponents to carry out a policy of military blackmail and aggression.As in other democratic countries, the Russian government should present to the legislature a Concept of Russian National Security, which would include a military doctrine, a concept and plan of military reform, and a plan for the development of the Russian armed forces that would reflect the nature of existing and potential military threats to Russia and the status of international arms control agreements. Without the parliament''s approval of these fundamental documents, its consideration and ratification of international agreements dealing with military issues would be premature.Of course, it is necessary in this regard to take into account the economic resources of the state, but not at the expense of its defense capacity. The 2.7-3.5% share of the gross domestic product that is being allocated by the government for national defense in 1998 is insufficient. For instance, in the 1920s, when the reform of the Red Army was being carried out, this share amounted to 6-7% of the GDP, while the situation in the country was not easier, and its resources even less, than today. The government must also take steps to preserve Russia''s defense industries and military R&D programs.Increasing the combat potential of the armed forces and strengthening the combat capacity of the country is connected directly neither with the number of service personnel nor with the level of financing. For instance, having set itself the task of increasing its military capacity, the United States both reduced the number of its service personnel and its expenditures on the military. The high effectiveness of the U.S. armed forces permits the United States to secure the formation of a favorable international environment and the fulfillment of the global obligations laid out in its national security strategy.Strategic nuclear weapons are not only the most powerful but also the least expensive component of the armed forces of Russia. They are intended for the deterrence both of nuclear threats and of the threat of large-scale conventional aggression against Russia from either the West or the East. They ought to receive about one-tenth of the Russian military budget. In this regard, Russia must also observe with concern the United States'' policy of developing a strategic anti-ballistic missile system, which continues notwithstanding the recent Russian-American agreement in this area. A most important task is for Russia to develop and produce strategic nuclear missiles equipped with means to overcome such a system.The availability of strategic nuclear forces, which provide for the deterrence of nuclear and large-scale conventional aggression, will not at all guarantee our non-involvement in local military conflicts "below the nuclear threshold." For this we will need military intelligence, which for now is still maintaining its effectiveness, and conventional forces, which today are in a very deplorable state. In the next few years Russia will have neither the forces nor the resources to conduct even a single high-intensity local conflict. It will therefore need to rely in the first instance on its diplomats, its intelligence services, and on the pro-Russian forces in any local conflict, employing elements of the Russian armed forces only in an emergency and in the most limited possible fashion.The forms of possible aggression against Russia include the spreading of instability, terrorism, sabotage, and criminal banditry. On the high end of the scale, one cannot completely exclude the possibility of limited military conflicts with non-CIS countries on the territory of the former USSR, something Western military planners have not ruled out. As the situations in and around Chechnya, northern Ossetia, Abkhazia, and Tadjikistan demonstrate, Russia''s involvement in low-intensity conflicts and peacekeeping operations is an ever-present reality. These engagements can of course escalate into high intensity conflicts without much warning.It is understood that Russia today does not have obligations in the world comparable to that of the former USSR. Nor does it have the financial or technical resources to conduct an expansive global policy. But like it or not, if we intend to fulfill our national obligations, then we are obliged to have, even on a limited scale, the possibility of defending our national interests. In practice, this means that we must possess the means to neutralize the USA''s armed forces if they act against Russia''s interests. This primarily requires Russia to better take advantage of the latest achievements of the scientific technological revolution in the defense field. With respect to arms control, we must avoid a repeat of the Gorbachev years, when negotiations on the limitation and reduction of arms frequently began to be considered as valuable in themselves, even in cases when they brought harm to the security of our country. Under the "new political thinking" then governing Russian foreign and defense policy, unilateral concessions on concrete issues in return for the receipt of so-called "political gains" were in principle acceptable because they allegedly achieved in the final analysis a "balance of interests" among the negotiating parties.Of course, arms control negotiations are only one of many means of strengthening a country''s security. Russia''s involvement in most currently operating or recently signed arms control treaties results from its being the legal successor of the former USSR. The collapse of the Soviet Union and the resulting disruption in our production of weapons, the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact and the consequent loss of our former allies, and other political realities have created a qualitatively new background for the fulfillment and even the very existence of these treaties. Another important consideration is that today Russia has very limited financial resources that it can allot to arms control. These circumstances impel us to be guided by stricter standards in our approach toward the entire process of drafting and implementing arms control treaties.The limitation and reduction of weapons can not and must not be a goal in itself, an instrument of political games and maneuvers, or a final concession in political or financial bargaining. The only acceptable criteria is whether an agreement reduces the risk of military conflict for Russia. Russia''s participation in an arms control treaty or agreement must clearly and unambiguously assist the country to obtain a respite from involvement in unnecessary conflicts or destructive arms races. In this connection, Russia must not rule out insisting on the revision or amendment of those treaty obligations that do not meet its interests in today''s very different reality. Under present-day conditions, Russia is not in a position to make any more concessions.The START II Treaty would be a good area to apply this new approach. Under the present treaty, the American side would receive real unilateral advantages, while Russia in fact would have to carry out unilateral nuclear disarmament. The treaty would limit the United States and Russia to 3000-3500 nuclear warheads by 2007, and require the elimination of all Russian MIRVed-ICBMs, which comprise 50% of the total warheads on our ICBMs. At the same time, under the treaty only 50 U.S. MIRVed ICBMs, which comprise 19% of the total number of American warheads, are subject to elimination. This will require Russia to abandon its traditional approach to strategic nuclear forces and adopt the American pattern of relying more on its sea-based nuclear systems. Such a restructuring of our strategic nuclear forces would be extremely difficult given Russia''s economic crisis. Instead, Russia should instead continue to adhere to the limitations in the still operating START I Treaty, and extend the life of its existing land-based MIRVed-ICBM force.

IV. CONCLUDING REMARKS

The government continues to lack a clear development strategy for the country. It has no unifying idea, no conception of our national security. It has failed to answer such fundamental questions as: Where is Russia going, and why? What threats (actual and potential) do we confront, and what do we need to do about them? We need a critical analysis of our past, a realistic appraisal of our present, and a scientifically based prognosis of our future.The time has finally arrived when it is necessary to take a step. Any path consists of a certain number of steps. The Chinese count 10,000, but it is most important to take the first one, then the second, the third, etc. We must not delay. The main thing now is to free ourselves from our chains and overcome our spiritual malaise.
In the final analysis, all our domestic and foreign policies should be governed by one goal: the restoration of the state, and transformation of it into a world intellectual and spiritual leader that will serve as the nucleus of a future empire of the east Slavic peoples. This process will not only revive Russia, but will be a powerful stimulus to the development of all humanity.Our most important task is to tell the nation that it has not only a great future, but a great present. In principle we have everything we need for this-except faith and a will to act.

Provides insight on the "Russian Idea," by which is meant a conception about where the Russian natoin is going and how it plans to get there. Details "Russian Domestic Challenges" and its currenctly "oligarchic state capitalist system." Argues that "Russia''s Foreign-Policy Challenges" have entered a new era in which a dominant porcess is the clash of world cultures.

Edited and Translated by Richard Weitz