Security and Conflict in Central Asia and the Caspian Region

Boris Shikhmuradov, the former foreign minister of Turkmenistan who has become one of the main leaders of the country's opposition movement, addressed an audience at the Kennedy School on May 3. When he left the government in November 2001 after years of government service, Shikhmuradov condemned the country's authoritarian President Saparmurat Niyazov and he has been effectively exiled from the country over the last six months.

Shikhmuradov identified eight major threats to security in Central Asia and the Caspian region— authoritarianism, instability in Afghanistan, boundary disputes, water disputes, Islamic extremism, chauvinistic nationalism, drug trafficking, and disagreements over the status of the Caspian Sea. His remarks focused on three of these threats— authoritarianism, instability in Afghanistan, and disputes over delineation of the Caspian Sea.

Authoritarianism. Shikhmuradov indicated that authoritarianism in Central Asia is epitomized by the abuses of President Niyazov's regime in Turkmenistan. In Shikhmuradov's estimation, Niyazov's cult of personality government is a "laughingstock," and the lack of democracy in Turkmenistan has brought about the extreme poverty that currently plagues the country. Niyazov's regime has many parallels with the Taliban, in as much as it has used repressive means to minimize any form of political opposition within the country.

Instability in Afghanistan

When Shikhmuradov spoke at the United Nations at different times during the 1990s, he urged the international community to address the civil war in Afghanistan. Shikhmuradov said that the world has ended up paying a high price for its lack of engagement in this troubled country until after the September 11 terrorist attacks and that the world ignores Afghanistan at its own peril.

Shikhmuradov indicated that he believes that the United States will need to make a sincere and sustained effort to assist the government of Hamid Karzai and the campaign to stabilize political conditions in Afghanistan— a campaign that will require at least ten years of active involvement, he believes. Shikhmuradov hopes that the "6+2" process— in which Afghanistan's six immediate neighbors, as well as Russia and the United States, have tried to address Afghanistan's problems— will eventually become an "8+1" process, where Afghanistan itself becomes a key member in discussions about its own political future. He also explained that a force of international peacemakers made up of soldiers from countries such as India and Turkey could make a significant contribution to the stabilization of Afghanistan.
Caspian Delineation Issues

In discussing the contentious question of how to divide the energy resources of the Caspian Sea, Shikhmuradov refuted Turkmenistani President Niyazov's recent assertion that "the Caspian smells of blood." The problem is not among the five countries of the Caspian, according to Shikhmuradov, but in "President Niyazov's sense of smell."

Shikhmuradov explained that President Niyazov had no intention of engaging in any genuine discussion on the Caspian delineation issue, and instead had orchestrated the summit in order to make himself appear more statesman-like within the context of domestic politics. According to Shikhmuradov, Russia, Kazakhstan, and Azerbaijan have essentially agreed on a system for dividing the northern section of the Caspian Sea. The main holdouts have been Iran and Turkmenistan, and the recent summit in Turkmenistan did not lead to any further progress on this impasse.

Iran has turned to its 1921 and 1940 treaties with the Soviet Union in an attempt to advance its claims to half of the Caspian seabed, as opposed to dividing the sea equally among the five states that border the Caspian. According to Shikhmuradov, Iran's claims to a larger sector of the Caspian Sea have some basis in international law and should be addressed seriously rather than dismissed out of hand. According to Shikhmuradov, it would make the most sense to split the sea according to the original "50/50" model along the old Iranian and Soviet boundaries, and then to split the old Soviet half equally among the four former Soviet states that border the Caspian.

Q & A

Michael Lelyveld of Radio Free Europe asked Shikhmuradov to elaborate on Turkmenistan's penchant for releasing dubious economic and production figures. According to Shikhmuradov, manipulation of statistics is one of President Niyazov's major crimes against Turkmenistan. Niyazov has claimed that Turkmenistan's annual per capita income is $3000, when according to Shikhmuradov it is actually closer to $100. The president has engaged in similar statistical sleights of hand when discussing his country's petroleum reserves. He has said that Turkmenistan has 35 billion barrels of oil and gas deposits, while Shikhmuradov asserts that the country has about 15 billion barrels of reserves. In fact, Niyazov has proven so unreliable and arbitrary in his relations with international oil companies that ExxonMobil has stopped doing business in the country. However, Shikhmuradov maintains that with a more democratic form of leadership in Turkmenistan, the country will be able to take its place among major energy producers— especially in the natural gas market.

Gerard Libaridian of the University of Michigan asked whether the government of Turkmenistan actually wants to promote instability in Afghanistan and whether or not it actively supports the drug trafficking that is taking place within its borders. Shikhmuradov answered that President Niyazov does not want Hamid Karzai's government in Afghanistan to succeed precisely because it could provide an example of what he most hopes to avoid in Turkmenistan: a stable Central Asian government that puts aside an authoritarian past, moves toward democratization, and integrates more fully into the international community. In this sense, Niyazov has a strong stake in perpetuating instability in Afghanistan. Shikhmuradov also explained that Niyazov has encouraged and has benefited personally from the drug trafficking occurring in Turkmenistan, but is careful to use the country's secret service to cover up any traces of his own involvement.
Franz Frei, an international development expert from Switzerland, inquired about Turkmenistan's foreign currency reserves and who might be loaning money to Turkmenistan in order to make up for any shortfall. According to Shikhmuradov, the country has $1.8 billion in hard currency, and $5.2 billion in foreign debt. Niyazov keeps a tight rein on how much money is in circulation in Turkmenistan, and controls the national currency reserves "like his own private checking account." He has leverage with certain international lenders because of his country's large energy reserves— no one would lend this kind of money to other neighboring Central Asian states like Kyrgyzstan, because there is no promise of a return from petrodollars in these other countries.

Melissa Carr of the Caspian Studies Program asked how the Caspian Sea summit had played domestically in Turkmenistan. Shikhmuradov responded that Niyazov's efforts to make himself appear like a statesman before the people of Turkmenistan had backfired and that after the summit "people in Turkmenistan are laughing at him." Carr also asked about what sort of minimal press freedoms there are in Turkmenistan. According to Shikhmuradov, it does not make sense to talk about "violations" of press freedoms or human rights in Turkmenistan because they simply have never existed in the country. He indicated that there is minimal reliable media information available in Turkmenistan— what is available comes from abroad, including Radio Free Europe and Shikhmuradov's own movement's web site, www.gundogar.com.

Summary by John Grennan, Caspian Studies Program