Press Release
Spring 2009
Vol. 33, No. 4
Table of Contents
DOES DEMOCRACY MATTER?
"How Smart and Tough Are Democracies? Reassessing Theories of Democratic Victory in War"
Alexander B. Downes
pp. 9-51
New evidence challenges the near-conventional argument that democracies are more likely than nondemocracies to win wars they start. A reanalysis of original data on war outcomes and an in-depth case study of the Johnson administration's decisions regarding Vietnam in 1965 demonstrate that democracies of all types are not significantly more likely to win wars. Furthermore, they are constrained by domestic politics and are often pressured into unwinnable wars.
"The Social Market Roots of Democratic Peace"
Michael Mousseau
pp. 41-77
Democracy does not cause peace among nations. An analysis of conflicts from 1961 to 2001 shows that the absence of war between democratic countries depends on domestic economic factors-such as a contract-intensive economy-rather than on democracy. Because China and Russia lack this type of economy, an economic divide will define great power politics in the coming decade. Democratic leaders of nations with contract-intensive economies would do better to support global economic opportunity than to promote democracy abroad.
"Bridge over Troubled Water? Envisioning a China-Taiwan Peace Agreement"
Phillip C. Saunders and Scott L. Kastner
pp. 87-114
The new Taiwan president and senior leaders in China have indicated a willingness to reach a cross-strait agreement. Such an agreement could reduce the possibility of a military confrontation in the Taiwan Strait. Although significant obstacles remain, if China negotiates a formal and generous agreement with Taiwan, a peace agreement-if reached-could endure.
IRAQ AND BEYOND
"Long Time Coming: Prospects for Democracy in Iraq"
Bruce E. Moon
pp. 115-148
The odds of Iraq achieving democracy in the next twenty-five years are nearly zero, at best about two in thirty, but probably worse. Since the end of the nineteenth century, thirty nations have had long-lasting autocracies as extreme as Iraq's. Of those, only seven are now democratic. Their average transition time was fifty years, and only two managed it in twenty-five years. Their collective political experience indicates a similarly pessimistic future for Iraq and comparable nations. Furthermore, Iraq lacks the structural conditions necessary for a successful democratic transition. Thus the sober question of whether Iraq can democratize should deter policymakers from considering regime change in Iran or North Korea.
"Power without Influence: The Bush Administration's Foreign Policy Failure in the Middle East"
Jeremy Pressman
pp. 149-179
The George W. Bush administration's efforts in the Middle East failed to advance U.S. national security. The Bush administration did not defeat terrorism, promote democracy in the region, or stop nonconventional proliferation. It was unsuccessful because it relied too heavily on military force, showed an unwillingness to learn and adapt, and did not resolve long-standing policy contradictions. Given the Bush administration's failure in the Middle East, scholars should examine why material power does not automatically translate into international influence.
CORRESPONDENCE
"What Makes Terrorists Tick"
Erica Chenoweth, Nicholas Miller, and Elizabeth McClellan
Hillel Frisch
Paul Staniland
Max Abrahms
"The Limits to Partition"
Michael C. Horowitz and Alex Weisiger
Carter Johnson
Index to Volume 33
Recommended citation