Star Wars and the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty: Is the United States Provoking a New Arms Race?

Remarks delivered to the International Press Institute World Congress, Boston, MA.

Star Wars and the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty:

Is the United States Provoking a New Arms Race?
Remarks delivered on May 3, 2000 at the International Press Institute World Congress
By Professor Graham T. AllisonDirector, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs
Kennedy School of Government
Harvard University

Distinguished ladies and gentlemen:

It is a great honor for me to be invited to speak to this remarkable gathering of leaders of the free press around the world, publishers, editors, and distinguished journalists. When I received a call asking me to pinch hit at the last minute for Governor George W. Bush, I could not resist rearranging my schedule to say yes. How often is a Democrat invited to be a stand-in for a Republican presidential candidate?

As I explained to the organizers, I certainly cannot speak on behalf of Governor Bush. I am in fact a supporter of Vice President Gore. But I will attempt to provide a non-partisan, objective assessment of the assigned topic, though you will find that my personal views are closer to the Vice President than to the Governor.

In his foreign policy address that opened your 50th anniversary convention today, Vice President Gore included a brief discussion of missile defense and the ABM treaty. I was fortunate to be your guest at that session, and to hear the comments of delegates after. I found that many of you, especially our international colleagues, feel that they''ve somehow fallen into a time warp. As one delegate observed, this appears to be a rerun of an old movie from the 1980s. As a famous American philosopher, the baseball manager Yogi Berra remarked, this seems like déjà vu all over again.

The bewildering swirl of acronyms, advocacy, and political arguments that surround this new debate about missile defense, the ABM treaty, and a renewed arms race will force this issue onto your front pages. You and your associates will be challenged to try to make sense of all this for your readers. This debate has been thrust onto the agenda by American politics. Last year President Bill Clinton announced that he would make a decision this summer about deployment of a National Missile Defense system. The Republican majority in Congress is determined to use missile defense as a stick to beat Clinton and the Democratic candidate for president, Vice President Gore. Next month when President Clinton and the new Russian President, Vladimir Putin, meet in Moscow, President Clinton will attempt to persuade Putin to accept modest amendments of the ABM treaty to allow the US to announce deployment of a National Missile Defense system and begin pouring concrete in Alaska.

If all this seems surreal, that is not surprising. As normal folks listen to the "acronymphomania" (1) of defense programs— ABM, MMD, TMD, BMDO; to Russian, Chinese, and European leaders'' claims that this will "ignite a new arms race;" to advocates'' assertions that this will "protect the US against the most urgent threats to American security in the first quarter of the new century;" to opponents'' contention that such an action will "shatter the cornerstone of stability in the post-Cold War world"--they can reasonably be confused.

Indeed, you can be excused for feeling that we have all been somehow dragged back to the future.

Ø Why are Americans proposing to do this now? Because North Korea has a missile that, according to CIA estimates, could deliver at least chemical and biological agents to the Western United States. North Korea could test a more capable missile that, if it worked, could deliver a first-generation nuclear warhead to the US "at any time"--but certainly within the next 15 years.

Ø How much will this cost? The latest GAO report estimates $60 billion.
Ø Will this ignite a new arms race with Russia? Probably not. How much is Russia''s defense budget today? Less than $5 billion. Indeed, the entire budget of the Russian federal government is only $27 billion. But there are a variety of things Russia could do— keeping its missiles ready for quick launch on any hint of warning, maintaining older missiles and putting more warheads on newer ones, keeping a huge weapons complex and huge stockpiles of bomb material— that would be much to the detriment of US and international security.
Ø What will this $60 billion buy? 100 anti-ballistic missile launchers in Alaska plus an upgrade of US radars and early warning systems that on the most optimistic technological assumption will be able to shoot down ten unsophisticated missiles from North Korea.
Ø "Come on," some say, "you Americans must have something more in mind." Yes, the Clinton administration envisages a second phase of deployment that would include an additional 100 launchers in North Dakota that would be better able to protect all 50 US States against potential future threats from missiles in Iran or Iraq. And Republican advocates of missile defense propose further deployments of sea and from space-based elements to provide a more robust missile defense capability.
Ø But don''t all the world leaders— Russian, Chinese, Indian, and European alike— oppose the US action? Yes, though for somewhat different, frequently contradictory reasons. Chinese leaders believe this anti-missile system could degrade their capability to attack the US. Russian military leaders know their nuclear forces can overwhelm the proposed deployment, but worry about what the US will learn and do in the future. Europeans are concerned that if the US has some protection and they don''t, they''ll either be forced to buy similar systems or be decoupled from American security concerns. Most of the world sees this as a peculiar American drama reminiscent of the recent Elian soap opera.
Nonetheless, the fact is that this is happening. National Missile Defense will be at the top of the agenda in US-Russian relations over the next month. You will need to explain to your readers what it is and why it matters. Like prior great debates about strategic matters, this one will surely generate more heat than light.

But, if presented wisely, it also offers you an opportunity to remind your readers around the world about a deeper, central truth about the age in which we live. That truth is that the nuclear sword of Damocles that hung over the survival of the US, the Soviet Union and Russia, and the world, has not disappeared. Rather, it has morphed. Fortunately, today we do not have Cuban Missile Crises that force citizens to experience existentially the fear of nuclear danger. But unfortunately, that leads too many of your readers to imagine that these weapons have somehow disappeared. The emerging debate about missile defense, the ABM treaty, and a new arms race will provide an opportunity for you to help your readers understand this hard reality— but only if you seize it.

To assist you in this effort, let me take 8 minutes to provide answers to 8 key questions:

· What is this issue? Just the facts.

· What are the key arguments of the true believers?

· What are the key arguments of the ideological opponents?

· What are the key analytic issues or questions?

· What are the political realities?

· What does George W. Bush propose (and would he have argued were he giving this speech here today)?

· What does Vice President Gore propose?

· What, in my view, does this all have to do with the real issues of nuclear danger?
All in 8 minutes, so bear with me if I summarize.

1. What is this all about? Recall the basic benchmarks:

· 1983: President Reagan''s Star Wars speech initiated a research program to "render nuclear weapons impotent and obsolete." $70 billion later, this research program has not succeeded. Since Reagan, objectives have been scaled back from a space-based shield against a massive attack, to a partial shield against a few dozen warheads from a rogue state using the old technologies of ground-based rockets and radars.

· 1991: In the Desert Storm war between a US-led coalition and Saddam Hussein, US and allied forces came under threat of Iraqi missiles with chemical warheads, heightening US military interest in theater missile defenses.

· 1994: A Newt Gingrich-led Republican Contract for America called for immediate deployment of a National Missile Defense system.

· 1999: Pressure from the Republican majority in Congress to move to deployment was blunted by Clinton''s pledge to deploy as soon as technically feasible and to announce a decision about deployment by the summer of 2000.

· 2000: At the June 5-6 summit Clinton will seek to win Putin''s agreement to modest modifications in the ABM treaty to allow the US deployment of a limited ABM system.

2. What are the key arguments of the true believers?
· The threat: North Korea, Iran, Iraq, and others are seeking to develop long-range missiles. The latest CIA estimate finds that "during the next 15 years the United States most likely will face ICBM threats from Russia, China, and North Korea, probably from Iran, and possibly from Iraq." Imagine a conflict between North and South Korea, or a replay of Saddam''s attack on Kuwait. If the dictator could threaten to fire a nuclear missile at Washington or Los Angeles or Boston, could he effectively blackmail an American president?

· Technological optimism. If the American president commits the nation to a bold objective and challenges the scientific community to solve the problem, it will do it. As William Safire, one of the most eloquent advocates of this position has argued: "Many who insist that it will never work were doubtful our technology could ever put a man on the moon."

· The ABM treaty is a Cold War relic. Allowing Russia or any other state to veto actions necessary to protect American security is simply unacceptable.

· Yes, the Russians, the Chinese, and many others, including our allies, object. But America''s priority must be America''s security first. Others will have to accept that.
3. What are the key arguments of the ideological opponents?
· The threat is not as grave as claimed and is not the largest threat on the horizon. The North Korean missile program that is the putative reason for the current urgency has in fact been frozen by recent agreements between North Korea and the US and South Korea.

· Technologically, the ballistic missile defense system doesn''t work and can''t work. "Hitting a bullet with a bullet" may be theoretically possible, but the tests have so far failed. Technologically, countermeasures are much more effective than improvements in defensive capabilities. Any state capable enough to create an ICBM can also create decoys that will defeat the missile defense technology currently available.

· Even if the system worked, it would be wrong because of its impact on Russia and the arms control regime. It would either: (a) initiate an arms race; or (b) push Russia into a more dangerous posture; or (c) upset Russia''s karma.

· Some extreme ideological opponents forward an additional argument that such a system, if it worked, or if it were believed to work, would be dangerous because the US superpower would face no countervailing threat and thus be tempted to even greater arrogance and adventure, like the adventurism that led to Vietnam.
4. What are the key analytic issues or questions?
· Is the technology ready? Most experts believe that advances in technological capabilities to identify launches and missiles and intercept them will at some point make feasible a ballistic missile defense system that has some degree of effectiveness, if only in complicating the calculations for a potential attacker. Nonetheless, all recognize that building an effective missile defense is technologically very ambitious. Experts believe that the decision to deploy any such system should be driven by technological developments and tests, not a political schedule. Thus the overwhelming consensus is that any decision about deployment is "premature."
The head of BMDO (the Defense Department''s organization developing the program) has complained publicly about a calendar driven by politics rather than his testing schedule. An independent panel of former military and defense experts appointed by the Defense Department, headed by former Air Force Chief of Staff Larry Welch concluded that the ambitious schedule was a "rush to failure." Only 3 of 19 scheduled tests of the current architecture have been performed, and the system failed the most recent test. Prior anti-missile systems have been put through much longer and more rigorous testing (for example the Patriot theater missile defense was tested 114 times before it was selected).
· Where do long range missiles from North Korea, Iran, or a terrorist rank? In the hierarchy of threats to American national security, the CIA assessment concludes that ballistic missiles are not the most likely means by which weapons of mass destruction will be delivered against the US: "US territory is probably more likely to be attacked with weapons of mass destruction from non-missile delivery means than by missiles."(2) Opponents of National Missile Defense liken deployment of the current system to installing bars on the second story window to keep burglars out of a house when the front door and windows are wide open. As Senator Carl Levin pointed out recently: "1,400 people were arrested crossing the Arizona border a couple of months ago in one night. How many people were not arrested that one night? How many are not caught and what is their capability to put together non-missile means of delivery of a chemical weapon or a biological weapon?" (3)

· Where does ballistic missile defense rank in the hierarchy of American defense programs to reduce threats to American national security? Weapons delivered by missiles have one striking disadvantage. Missiles leave an unambiguous return address. Any state that attacked the US with weapons of mass destruction can be sure that it would be destroyed by an overwhelming retaliatory response. In contrast, US capabilities to detect, defend against, and deter threats of weapons delivered surreptitiously, for example, in a ship that arrives in an American harbor or a truck that drives across the American border, are much weaker.

· Consider alternative expenditures of $60 billion in enhancing US security. The Joint Chiefs of Staff would spend those funds on current programs. Alternatively, $60 billion could fund an ambitious program beyond most people''s imagination to secure nuclear materials in Russia, prevent theft and smuggling, stabilize nuclear custodians, and reduce stockpiles of excess weapons along lines suggested by a recent BCSIA report by arms-control expert Matthew Bunn, "The Next Wave." (4)

· What will be the net effect of US deployment of missile defenses on US security? The fact that the leaders of most governments oppose such a decision is relevant, but not decisive in itself. The critical question is what these governments are likely to do in response to US deployment and what the net effect of the combination of actions will thus be on American security. China will likely devote more resources to its missile development program, accelerating its current program, and perhaps MIRVing. That will undoubtedly impact India and Pakistan. The Russian government has threatened to abrogate all current arms control limitations, including START II and the treaty that eliminated shorter-range missiles aimed at Europe. Whether it would carry out such a threat or not, these actions could disturb and distract Russia from current US-Russian cooperative threat reduction programs that address the much larger risks of "loose nukes." This is the threat that weapons or weapons-usable material from Russia''s vast arsenal are stolen by criminals, sold to rogue states or terrorist groups, and used against Americans at home or US forces abroad. Such consequences could overwhelm any gains from a US decision to deploy missile defenses that Russia strongly opposed. If current arms control regimes, not only US-Russian, but broader international agreements, unravel, the US will lose the transparency these regimes provide, and thus become more vulnerable to developments in Russia and other countries that would otherwise be prevented or visible.
5. What about "political realities?"
· Republican conservatives, supported by some members of the analytic national security community, have made vivid in American politics (at least within the Beltway) the threat posed by rogue states'' long-range missile programs. They have made actionable demands that the US deploy defenses. In part, this has been a flag for rallying conservatives to Reagan''s bold vision; in part, it has been a search for higher ground in the struggle with a centrist Democratic president who has made Democrats more defense-friendly; in part, this reflects deeper recognition that mutual assured destruction is, in fact, MAD. Moved by these impulses, Republican leaders in Congress have succeeded in making this issue live.

· In the fierce competition of American elective politics, political leaders attempt to armor themselves against all plausible lines of attack. A mix of motives, including growing recognition and reality of threats, progress in research and development programs that promise greater effectiveness in protecting against such threats, wide public support for defense and the US military, budget surpluses (after a decade of deficits), and political realities push this issue forward on President Clinton''s agenda.
6. What is Republican candidate George W. Bush''s position on missile defense? What would his speech have said if he were addressing you today? He has proposed to:
· Postpone decision on NMD deployment until the next President''s administration; (5)

· "Accelerate research on, and deployment of, both national and theater missile defenses, as soon as possible;"

· Withdraw from the ABM Treaty unilaterally (with due notice) if Russia does not agree to changes allowing "effective national and theater missile defenses." In his view, the ABM Treaty is an artifact of 1972. Bush said "I will have a solemn obligation to protect the American people and our allies, not to protect arms control agreements signed almost 30 years ago."

Governor Bush''s foreign policy advisor, Condoleeza Rice, argues that: "A single site is only a start and we need to be able to look at other near-term options that may be available, including sea-based ballistic missile defense."
· In a letter to President Clinton, Republican leaders of the US Senate assert that the Clinton Administration must not restrict the size and type of missile shield the US can build. Rather, they insist that it leave open the possibility to develop and deploy additional missile defense interceptors, lasers, or other interception devices based on aircraft.
7. What is Vice President Gore''s position on missile defense? He presented his case to you in Boston on Sunday.
· Gore accuses Bush of being irresponsible on NMD: "Governor Bush used his brief meeting with Russian Foreign Minister Ivanov to issue a warning that his intention would be to build and deploy a global ''Star Wars'' system that he believes could defend the US and all our allies against any missile launch from any source. In the 1990s most serious analysts took a look at the implausibility of this endeavor, the fantastical price that our taxpayers would be expected to pay, and the dangerously destabilizing consequences of traveling down that path— and rejected the notion."

· Gore''s proposal: "I favor— and we are negotiating with the Russians— changes in the ABM Treaty that would lead to a responsible and practical defense against a nuclear attack from a rogue state."
8. What does all this have to do with the larger issue of nuclear danger? --at least as I see it?

I address this question at some length in the final chapter of the new edition of my book Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis --which examines the specific case of the Cuban Missile Crisis but also draws larger lessons for nuclear relations today and in the future.

In general, I believe that national missile defense is a secondary item on the larger defense agenda. By far the largest threat to American lives and liberties today is the risk of "loose nukes" falling into the hands of terrorists or rogue states. Our resources would be much better spent securing Russia''s nuclear materials and reducing stockpiles of excess weapons. Both opponents and proponents of missile defense have made valid points— and both sides have also made exaggerated claims. It is our job as academics and analysts— and your job as reporters and editors— to sort out the fact from the fiction and provide reliable information to the public.

Thank you.

(1) Essence of Decision, 2nd Edition, 1998, p. 197.
(2) "Statement for the Record to the Senate Subcommittee on International Security, Proliferation, and Federal Services on The Ballistic Missile Threat to the United States," Robert D. Walpole, National Intelligence Officer for Strategic and Nuclear Programs, February 9, 2000.
(3) Carl Levin, in remarks to the Arms Control Association, Washington, DC, March 31, 2000.
(4) Matthew Bunn, The Next Wave: Urgently Needed New Steps to Control Warheads and Fissile Material, April 2000. <</span>http://ksgnotes1.harvard.edu/BCSIA/Library.nsf/pubs/Nextwave>
(5) James Hoagland, The Washington Post, December 21, 1999.