Thoughts While Flying to New York on September 11, 2009

NEW YORK -- I marked the eighth anniversary Friday of the 9/11 terror attack in the United States by flying from Beirut to New York -- apt symbols of their wider American and Arab societies that in so many sectors are locked in an ongoing confrontation that includes the use of violence by both sides. This day of remembrance occurred at a time when the United States was refocusing seriously on waging the hitherto inconclusive “global war on terror” in Afghanistan.

This is a moment, therefore, to consider whether the “global war on terror” since late 2001 has achieved its aims, made the United States and the world safer, and reduced the number and capabilities of terror organizations around the world. The war in Afghanistan that is now escalating in many ways closes the circle on two parallel and deeply linked aspects of both global terror and the “global war on terror” that the United States would do well to appreciate more profoundly at this moment of remembering.

The first is the reality that foreign troops that invade another country -- even with cause -- will always elicit strong local resistance, often a fight to the death. Afghanistan has taught this lesson several times to invaders and the world. Al-Qaeda’s “global jihad” crystallized and spread from Afghanistan in the late 1980s and early 1990s in order to drive the Soviet Union out of Afghanistan. When a foreign army attacks a distant land, the home side almost always wins in the end.

The Al-Qaeda group that Osama Bin Laden forged in Afghanistan actually ignited from embers that were first felt in his home country of Saudi Arabia, again in response to the presence of a foreign army, in that case the US armed forces’ lengthy stay there to fight and contain Saddam Hussein and his Baath Party leadership after Iraq invaded Kuwait in 1990.

The second phenomenon that we should consider thoroughly on this eighth anniversary of the 9/11 attack is the structural nature and various linkages of the Al-Qaeda-like movements that continue to develop. We need to ask this question every time we remember 9/11 or civilians killed by Western armies seeking to avenge 9/11: Has the “global war on terror” contained or stimulated the development of terror organizations dedicated to fighting the West and what they consider to be apostate Islamic regimes? Is the global threat from such jihad-inspired terrorism greater or smaller than it was in 2001?

The answers are inconclusive, but lean towards the negative, i.e., attacks against Western targets have stabilized or declined, but the numbers of individuals and groups plotting such attacks or carrying them out in the world seem to be increasing (though many of them are identified and stopped by law enforcement measures before they are carried out). If the United States plans to send more troops to Afghanistan in an attempt to “win” the war there, thinking through the consequences would seem like a useful thing to do.

Defeating terror is a legitimate and compelling goal. Sending your armies half way around the world to do so seems to stimulate not only nationalist resistance, it also instigates sharper motivations, more lethal capabilities, and more effective linkages among jihadist terrorists around the world. Today as compared to eight years ago -- according to the best analyses I have seen from European and Arab experts working for international organizations in Geneva, who must remain anonymous due to the neutral status of their organizations -- the world of Al-Qaeda and its associates has expanded into three distinct but related tiers that form a single overall network.

Al-Qaeda’s core leadership in the northwest Pakistan mountains now provides global leadership and inspiration, more than operational management. Secondly, a series of Al-Qaeda “franchises,” as in North Africa, the Arabian Peninsula, or Iraq, carry out operations that are often locally initiated and funded. And a third tier of Islamist militant groups, like Al Shabab movement in Somalia, are inspired by Al-Qaeda but operate totally independently for local goals. Finally, we may be seeing a fourth tier developing, in the form of small groups of individuals in Europe or North America who are radicalized and decide to carry out attacks on their own, without any contacts with the other three tiers.

Afghanistan has demonstrated important things in the last six months: An expanded foreign troop presence will trigger more attacks against the troops. Nationalist appeals to fight the foreign invaders fall on fertile ears and attract Taliban recruits all across Afghanistan. And bomb-making and missile-launching technical skills from Iraq and other places are being absorbed by the Taliban and other groups fighting the Western armies. More US troops and an expanded war in Afghanistan would probably achieve these things again, while also perhaps revitalizing the operational activities of the core Al-Qaeda leaders.