The Tragic Failure of Arab Moderates

BEIRUT -- It is worthwhile viewing George W. Bush's presidency from a different perspective than America's performance abroad, for example by reviewing the efforts and fate of those around the world who partnered with Washington. A rich and often moving account of one such perspective has recently been made available by former Jordanian Foreign Minister and Ambassador Marwan Muasher.

His recently published book, The Arab Center: The promise of moderation, (Yale University Press, 2008) provides a rare peek into several core determinants of the condition of Arab societies and the wider Middle East. These include the personal sentiments of Arab senior public figures, complex diplomatic interactions among Arab, Israeli and American government officials, and attempts to change the Arab world from within.

This book is worth reading for both the valor and the failures it describes, and for outlining the vulnerable state of Arab moderation in a region in which extremism is the hallmark of Arabs, Israelis, Iranians and Americans alike. Muasher's personal political memoir of the period from 2001-2006 covers episodes in which he was personally involved. It has the credibility, factual specificity and reflective, often self-critical, analysis that official government statements and authorized histories usually lack.

The story he recounts of the fate of Arab moderation and the Arab Center -- the core being Jordan, Egypt and Saudi Arabia -- is as instructive as it is sad. It is instructive because it reveals a valiant, persistent and impressive attempt by some Arabs to engage the United State and Israel in serious peacemaking, or to launch an Arab-defined political reform process.

Jordan's experience teaches useful lessons. It affirms the importance of being able to speak to all parties, even the ones you disagree with. It highlights the value of taking initiatives, and not waiting for others to define your fate for you. It confirms the importance of collective Arab action and coordination. And it surprisingly reveals how the United States, even in the Bush years of attack dog morality, is open to dialogue and compromise, including in some cases on issues related to its ties to Israel. 

The tale is ultimately sad, though, because the Arab Center to date has failed in the two core goals that Muasher describes in much detail: to engage the United States and Israel in making peace, and to undertake Arab political, economic and social reforms. Moments of hope and some impressive breakthroughs -- such as the 2002 Arab Summit peace plan, the agreement on the Roadmap, or the 2004 Arab Summit reform document -- were all quickly followed by disappointment, and renewed conflict.

Muasher's personal response to being an Arab ambassador in Israel is the most moving part of the book; his account of the diplomatic negotiations related to Arab-Israeli peace-making is the most informative, incisive and useful; and his brief assessment of why Arab reform efforts failed is potentially the most important in the long run.

He notes with the sort of honesty that is uncommon among Arab officials that Arab moderates were squeezed between George Bush and Osama Bin Laden, both of whom in their own way wanted to change Arab governance systems. If the Arabs did not change themselves, someone far away would make the changes for them. 

Reform is needed, he acknowledges, because the absence of gradual political modernization has saddled the Arab world with corruption, an absence of secular and national political parties, and intimidation and depoliticization of the Arab street that has become dominated by Islamists.

His list of why the Arab world has not reformed is refreshing. It includes issues like education reform, oil, Arab-Israeli wars, lack of democratic parties, blind allegiance, and the absence of checks-and-balances.

A few important factors are not addressed in this book, such as the central role of Arab security agencies and the general militarization of Arab society and governance, and how the post-2001 prevailing Arab official alliance with the United States in the "global war on terror" retarded key thrusts for change in the region. Issues of state and leadership legitimacy are also left for others to deal with.

Despite these understandable omissions, Muasher's book is worth reading for helping us understand more profoundly why the Arab Center failed. Today, we enjoy neither peace nor democratic reforms in the Arab world. The Center's failure weighs heavily on every Arab family, and extremism fills many of the spaces left in its wake.

The center will rise and try again, I have no doubt, because the vast majority of Arabs are centrists and moderates at heart. When the next serious attempt is made, political actors in the Arab region and abroad should heed Muasher's call for peace and reform to move forward together, with the sort of credibility and support that were missing in recent years. This story is not over.

Rami G. Khouri is Editor-at-large of The Daily Star, and Director of the Issam Fares Institute for Public Policy and International Affairs at the American University of Beirut, in Beirut, Lebanon.