The U.S. Government Must Lay the Foundation for the Mass Production of Airpower Itself

Deterrence works when the would-be aggressor understands its opponent can prevent its war aims. If the U.S. is serious about deterring China in the Pacific, it needs the capability to mass produce large Unmanned Aerial Systems (UAS) and Small Unmanned Aerial Systems (sUAS), colloquially known as drones, at a greater scale than when it produced aircraft during World War II (WWII).

Today, drones offer a viable and economical means to manufacture at this scale once again. Building modern aircraft are too complex and expensive for start-ups to do successfully without large sums of capital and human expertise. Drones present a simpler and more accessible opportunity for a greater spectrum of ambitious entrepreneurs and businesses. Still, the conditions must be right for companies to take the risk and participate in the scale America needs. The U.S. Government can support favorable conditions through a coordinated plan that combines (1) government policy, and (2) economic levers for complementary effects, and (3) DOD-sponsored education.

Lessons from History 

In 1921, U.S. Army Air Corps Officer Billy Mitchell demonstrated how aircraft would disrupt the balance of military power by sinking the German Battleship Ostfriesland by air, proving that airpower was ready to usurp sea power as the preeminent strength of great powers. His acolytes carried his vision into reality by leading the largest air campaigns the world has ever witnessed during WWII.

In How the War was Won, Phillips P. O’Brien argues that air and sea power won WWII by immobilizing the Germans and Japanese. To match the need for air supremacy, President Roosevelt crafted a vision of winning WWII through “overall control of the air, to be gained by sheer numbers of aircraft” and he invested accordingly in related industry. In 1939 and 1940, the U.S. produced just over 2,000 and 6,000 aircraft, respectively; at the height of the war effort U.S. industry produced more than 96,000 in 1944. By war’s end, the U.S. built more aircraft than the entire Axis alliance, and more than all its Allies combined. We can do it again and, should we choose this path, there is work to be done.

Much like WWII, mass will play a critical role in defending against a Chinese invasion of Taiwan. The U.S. must begin the reinvestment in its industry now to support the capability to control the air through overwhelming numbers in addition to technological superiority.

Today, China has already built the capacity to mass produce airpower. Jiang Innovations (DJI) is the world’s largest global small drone manufacturer, producing more than 70% of the world’s supply and exceeding multiple billions of dollars in revenue in 2021. Despite DJI’s claim its drones are not for military use, thousands have been used to support ongoing wars abroad. DJI is the leading company inspiring public and commercial interest in drones propelling it as a viable commercial company.

The Department of Defense (DOD) and U.S. government can inspire a similar growth of U.S. drone manufacturing. The U.S. must reestablish the preeminence to mass produce air and sea power it once had when Ford Motor Company built one B-24 bomber an hour at Willow Run or when Henry Kaiser’s shipyards could build a Liberty Ship in several days.

Recommendation 1: Government Policy Support

First, the DOD needs to articulate how government policies that support the drone manufacturers is important to national security. These policies include proactively integrating drones into military operations where imaginable, establishing formal training programs, incentivizing public and private use of drones for commercial operations, and continued revision of FAA policies that encourage safe and secure drone operations while mitigating security risks.

Furthermore, the U.S. Government and DOD should consider drones as essential war reserve materiel (WRM) and place large orders of drones to be stockpiled for its own uses or that can be given to Allies or partners as part of security packages.  This is standard procedure for stockpiling munitions, like the Javelin missile, 155-millimeter artillery ammunition, or the 500 lb general purpose bombs, known as Mk-82s. Interestingly, sUAS built by DJI, that cost between $1k to $12k per drone, have been adapted by the Ukrainian army to destroy tanks; several assumptions aside, a similar outcome with a Javelin costs nearly $198k, requiring multiple (up to 50) 155mm artillery shells which cost at least $3,000 a piece.

The key deduction from Adam Tooze’s book, The Wages of Destruction, postulates that the outcome of WWII was largely determined by the overwhelming wealth and industrial capacity of the Allies compared to that of the Axis’. We cannot forget that most major wars between great powers have led to long attritional wars, and that the economic implications of the costs of weapons matter greatly for those types of wars.

Drones have the potential to deliver similar effects at a cheaper cost or at vastly greater scale for the same cost, but the U.S. cannot benefit from this advantage if it does not have the capability to mass produce drones. In contrast, China can. The key aspect of this initiative is that the DOD uses its buying power to place large orders which can kick start the economies of scale in the U.S. drone manufacturing sector thereby reducing costs of the process and increasing the commercial viability of companies.

While the DOD’s Replicator Initiative, with its focus to field autonomous systems, is a step in the right direction, the initiative’s vision to field thousands of autonomous systems is off by a few orders of magnitude. If the global security situation is as dire as many world leaders describe, what’s needed is the capacity to field millions, if not tens of millions, of UAS and sUAS in the U.S. military, or that can be given as part of security packages. A scale of this size is required based on the evidence from on-going wars abroad. To backfill high loss rates, Ukraine claims it could produce 2 million drones in 2024 with financial aid.

The U.S. could invest additional money into Replicator, build the domestic drone manufacturing capacity, and then use those drones to support Ukraine or other policy objectives.  A handful of U.S. drone manufacturers already exist, including Boeing, General Atomics, Lockheed Martin, and Northrup Grumman. However, what we need are a portfolio of drone companies that can build simpler and cheaper drones responsible for the less demanding tasks that burden our indispensable complex and expensive aircraft. These tasks, for example, may include close air support of ground forces that do not need—or is too risky for—the larger MQ-9 or manned fighter/bomber aircraft, but need air support, nonetheless.

The war in Ukraine and Gaza has demonstrated the critical need of this need capability within the DOD. Drones can assume complementary roles in ISR, precision strike, force protection, border security, tactical logistics or resupply, and more. Furthermore, UAS and sUAS platforms provide asymmetric means against traditional threats, but they also stand to complement traditional methods of military operations significantly.

Recommendation 2: Economic Support

Second, the U.S. government should consider drones as essential to national security and adopt policies that support the interest. Globalization of markets and free trade make it economically difficult for U.S. companies to compete against companies such as DJI in China, that include a myriad of factors that increase its competitiveness (many of which invalidate the idea of free trade). Drones serve as a dual-use technology with both commercial and military functions. The former incentivizes private industry to invest in the endeavor whereas the latter is the primary reason the U.S. government should take direct interest.

The potential uses of drones need not be limited to tools for war. To the contrary, drones can improve the well-being and welfare of humanity much like airplanes were nearly 100 years ago. At scale, drones could offer a cheaper alternative to provide surveillance of infrastructure and traffic, emergency response services, police reconnaissance and enforcement, logistics, investigate remote areas, monitor wildfires, deliver mail, and so on.

Economic levers to include tariffs on imported drones from China and subsidies for domestic manufacturers should be combined with government policy to increase the competitiveness and viability of U.S. companies until they are competitive without the need for support. Free trade loyalists may dislike these proposals, but security and prosperous economies go together. 

Recommendation 3: Put Advanced Education into Afterburner 

Finally, the DOD should dramatically expand its support and offerings for in-residence advanced educational programs to its members. While the DOD already places significant emphasis on providing an outstanding educational experience for its members, more people need to have the opportunity for an advanced education to build a widespread core of highly educated leaders and warfighters.

To educate a force that understands how to build airpower in addition to employing it, focus should be given to degrees concentrating on engineering, manufacturing, business, and economics. We must send our warfighters from various career specialties and Mission Design Series (e.g. AH-64, F-15, A-10, or F-35, etc.) to advanced educational opportunities, including but not limited to MBAs, MPPs, applied economics, computer science and mechanical, aeronautical, or industrial engineering programs. This will create a professionally diverse and educated force with expertise from real-world applications of airpower. Simultaneously, the opportunity should be open to officers, warrant officers, and enlisted so expertise and intellectual capital is shared across the spectrum of ranks within the services.

As services update their force structures, like the USAF’s restructuring of its fighter and bomber force, now is time to invest in the education of our warfighters. It is an opportune time as aircrew and teammates that support flying operations continue to fly less because of divestment of aircraft like the A-10, F-15, F-22, and F-16.  

Furthermore, the DOD should support those that decide to separate from the service and go to the private sector. Given U.S. law and regulations, this may be the preferable outcome to create leaders willing to join the private endeavor to rebuild America’s industrial capacity and produce airpower to preserve American interests and global stability. While a focus of national defense institutions is retaining talent, many of these individuals contain talents, ambitions, and connections that can advance their career goals—and support America’s interests—better outside of the services than as a uniformed member.

Building, training, and employing the world’s most effective combinations of airpower through the Joint Force is a team effort that requires whole-of-society participation. In this sense, the DOD must heavily invest in the intellectual development of its warfighters and should accept that some of the strong performers in each service may receive a world-class education or highly specialized military training that’s best used in the private sector to create or lead a company that contributes towards national security.

Conclusion

The U.S. must innovate before America’s capacity to produce airpower sinks to irrelevance like the Axis naval fleets sank from Allied airpower. China has a head start but the U.S. can do much to close the gap. Expanding the educational opportunities to DOD members, government policies that increase the use of drones, and economic levers can kickstart America’s own drone industry into one that can mass produce the airpower we need in large scale conflicts.

Disclaimer: The opinions and ideas of this piece are my own and should not be interpreted as to represent the position of the DOD or U.S. Air Force.

About the Author: Brent Peterson is a 2024 Air Force National Security Fellow at the Harvard Kennedy School, a graduate of the U.S. Air Force’s School of Advanced Air and Space Studies, U.S. Air Force’s Weapons School, a Joint All-Domain Strategist, with a BS in Aeronautical Engineering, a Master of Science in Operational Strategy, and a Master of Philosophy in Strategy. He was previously the deputy commander of the 335th Fighter Squadron and commander of the 336th Fighter Squadron.