US, Russia as Partners

AMERICANS and Russians have grown accustomed to hearing two distinct narratives about the post-Cold War world. As the sole superpower, the United States is the "indispensable nation." Little can be accomplished without our input. According to Russian President Vladimir Putin, Russia is the indispensable nation, too. Indeed, former Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev recently said that ridding the world of nuclear weapons could be accomplished only through US-Russian partnership.

US-Russian efforts vis-a-vis Iran suggest otherwise. Iran may have halted its nuclear weapons program in 2003, but its enrichment activities continue. If the world community is serious about preventing Iran from acquiring a breakout nuclear weapons capability, it will have to seek other states' sustained involvement, starting with China and Saudi Arabia.

Iran's refusal to suspend its enrichment may stem from factors beyond the stated goal of building a civilian nuclear energy program. Iran needs not only to avoid losing face at home, but may also wish to signal a change in the world order - one in which former imperial powers cannot dictate its terms and multistate engagement is key. Getting Iran to stop enrichment will require a partner who would allow Tehran to address these concerns.

Initially, the United States thought ignoring Iran could convince it to stop enriching uranium. Stubbornly defiant, Tehran demonstrated that the former superpower's cold-shoulder punishment would not turn a naughty child into an obedient one. Notwithstanding the NIE's revelations, it does not look like the Bush administration will change this strategy.

Russia, in turn, hasn't fared any better. Despite Putin's landmark visit to Tehran in October 2007, it is not yet clear that he actually accomplished anything. Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad immediately denied that a "secret proposal" had been offered to Supreme Leader Khamenei, and the Iranians have refused to accept a Russian proposal to enrich uranium on Russian soil since December 2005.

Iran could also be suspicious of Russia's proposals. For one, old habits die hard: Russia's support for Iraq during the Iran-Iraq war is a potent memory that plays to Iranian fears of imperial domination. Both countries are frustrated by the delayed construction of the Bushehr reactor (ostensibly due to late payments on Iran's part) and disputes over Caspian Sea rights. Iran also distrusts Russia's intentions in the broader Middle East. Those who have argued that Russia will successfully negotiate with Iran on our behalf might well be thinking wishfully.

Enter China, which clearly represents a challenge to US supremacy and has continuously showed support for Iran's right to enrich uranium. China's trade with Iran has grown and is likely to reach $20 billion this year. China's dependence on Iran's energy resources ensures that China and Iran will remain partners for some time to come. If China were to help defuse the crisis by actively using its permanent seat on the UN Security Council, Iran's leaders would be satisfied that they were negotiating with a partner, rather than with "imperial" powers.

China has been reluctant to join the sanctions bandwagon on Iran, but it proved to be an essential player in resolving the nuclear showdown in North Korea. If the United States and Russia were to flatter China's sense of its role in the world, Beijing could once again be just as effective.

Saudi Arabia also provides Iran with another out. Although the Saudis have a history of enmity with their Shiite neighbor, in recent years relations between Riyadh and Tehran have warmed. For example, Ahmadinejad became the first Iranian president to attend a Gulf Cooperation Council summit. This good will could be used to Saudi Arabia's benefit by preventing a nuclear arms race in the Middle East.
The Saudi foreign minister outlined a recent council offer that was not much different from Russia's. Iran's acceptance would imply that the Middle East no longer needs its former colonial masters to come to the rescue.

In the end, the post-Cold War world isn't about an indispensable nation or two, no matter what leaders in Washington and Moscow think. While the promise of a security guarantee to Iran gives the US a card that only it can play, the influence of nontraditional powers should not be automatically discounted. To prevent an Iranian bomb, the US and Russia need to be more imaginative and less self-centered. Encouraging China and Saudi Arabia to take the initiative and offer their own solutions could hold some promise.

Melanie Getreuer and Susan Sypko are researchers at the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Kennedy School of Government, Harvard.