Presentations
Verified Reductions in Nuclear Warhead and Material Stockpiles
as Part of START III
Matthew Bunn
Presentation to International Security Program
Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs
March 20, 1998
Outline:
- Context:
- How many warheads, how much fissile material?
- What was agreed at Helsinki?
- What progress has been made so far?
- Seven key policy questions to be answered
- Three key proposals will help answer the questions: 1 | 2 | 3
Seven Key Policy Questions:
- Verify how many weapons are dismantled, or how many remain?
- Limit only deployed strategic weapons, or reserves and tactical weapons as well?
- How many reserves and tactical weapons does the United States need to retain?
- Limit fissile material stockpiles as well as nuclear weapon stockpiles?
- How best to draw the balance between verification confidence and intrusiveness?
- What incentives would move Russian government to overcome past obstacles?
- Can START III numerical limits be agreed without verified warhead dismantlement?
Context: How Many Warheads Exist, in What Categories?
| U.S. (NRDC Estimate As of End 1996) | |
| Deployed Strategic: | 7,350 |
| Reserve Strategic: | 1,820 |
| Tactical (Deployed+Reserve): | 1,985 |
| Awaiting Dismantlement: | 2,542 |
| Total: | 13,697 |
| Russia (NRDC Estimate As of End 1996) | |
| Deployed Strategic: | 7,250 |
| Reserve Strategic: | 372 |
| Tactical (Deployed+Reserve): | 5,100 |
| Awaiting Dismantlement: | 12,278* |
| Total: | 25,000 |
* Many of these may not in fact be slated for dismantlement under current plans
Both the United States and Russia appear to be planning to retain total stockpiles of nuclear warheads several times the 2,500 START III figure.
At a START III level of 2,500, another 1,000 warheads would shift from the deployed strategic category to the "other" category; at a level of 1,000, a further 1,500 warheads would make that shift.
*Adapted from NRDC data, end 1996.
WARHEAD DISMANTLEMENT: A FACT AND TWO QUESTIONS
| FACT: | Under current plans, U.S. dismantlement of nuclear weapons will essentially come to a stop next year. All the rest will be saved as reserves for possible rearmament. |
| QUESTION 1: | What impact will this have on Russian dismantlement of nuclear weapons? |
| QUESTION 2: | Has anyone in the U.S. government asked themselves that question? |
Context: How Much Fissile Material Exists,
And How Much Is Needed to Support Reduced Weapon Stockpiles?
(Albright et. al. estimates in metric tons, end 1994)
| United States | Russia | |
|---|---|---|
| Total | ||
| Plutonium | 100 | 160 |
| HEU | 645 | 1050 |
| Outside of Warheads at Stockpile of 10,000 |
||
| Plutonium | 65 (65%) | 125 (78%) |
| HEU | 420 (65%) | 825 (78%) |
| Outside of Warheads at Stockpile of 2,000 |
||
| Plutonium | 90 (90%) | 150 (94%) |
| HEU | 600 (93%) | 1000 (95%) |
| Declared Excess To Date |
||
| Plutonium | 50 (50%) | 50 (31%) |
| HEU | 175 (27%) | 500 (48%) |
Context: Guidance from the Helsinki Summit Statement
"Basic components" of START III will include:
- "Measures relating to the transparency of strategic nuclear warhead inventories and the destruction of strategic nuclear warheads"
- "Any other jointly agreed technical and organizational measures, to promote the irreversibility of deep reductions including prevention of a rapid increase in the number of warheads."
"In the context of START III negotiations," experts "will explore, as separate issues":
- "possible measures relating to nuclear long-range sea-launched cruise missiles and tactical nuclear systems, to include appropriate confidence-building and transparency measures."
Recalling May 10, 1995 summit statement, "the sides will also consider":
- "issues related to transparency in nuclear materials."
Context: How Much Progress On Verified Stockpile Reductions So Far?
- 1994-1995: Agreement in principle on:
- Mutual reciprocal inspection of Pu and HEU from dismantled warheads
- Exchange of data on how many warheads, how much Pu and HEU
- Consideration of additional measures such as "spot checks"
- None of this implemented -- Russian secrecy concerns
- Negotiation of agreement enabling exchange of restricted data halted late 1995
- No creativity on U.S. side
- Only major transparency measures actually being implemented are for HEU deal
- Money from HEU purchase provided strong incentive
- Current discussions/negotiations/joint work on:
- Nunn-Lugar transparency at Mayak
- IAEA monitoring at Mayak and in U.S.
- Verification of Pu reactor conversion
- Lab-to-lab warhead dismantlement transparency technology development
Context: How Much Progress On Verified Stockpile Reductions So Far?
- Helsinki summit statement -- ambiguous call for transparency measures on stockpiles, measures related to dismantlement
- No negotiations since then -- U.S. position on no negotiations until START II ratification
- No official U.S. position yet on key policy questions to be addressed
- Internal DOE study on dismantlement verification options (5/97)
- Interagency review did not get started until late 1997
- Interagency review provided 6 options to NSC, 2/1998
- No specific option formally chosen yet
- No negotiations expected to begin for months
- Senior U.S. officials expect talks on warhead dismantlement to take "many years"
1. Verify how many weapons are dismantled, or how many remain?
- Verifying that a specified number of weapons is dismantled poses only modest technical problems -- BUT:
- Equal reductions produce unequal results (Russia has more warheads to start)
- Continued production could counterbalance dismantlement
- Verifying dismantlement of 1000 in context of over 10,000 has little value
- Verifying the total remaining is essential to providing the basis for deep reductions
- Verifying how many nuclear weapons remain is more desirable, but poses larger obstacles:
- Difficult to know how many warheads there were to begin with
- Substantial covert stockpiles difficult to rule out
- For any substantial confidence, need thorough-going transparency throughout the weapon and material life-cycle -- difficult to negotiate and implement
Proposal: Split the Difference
Verify Number Reduced, But Declare Total
1) Exchange declarations of warhead totals
2) Verified reductions to levels that would be equal if declarations are accurate
3) Work over time to negotiate measures to build confidence in accuracy of initial declarations, provide base for going to lower levels
Example:
U.S. declares 13,000 warheads, Russia declares 20,000
U.S. verifiably dismantles 8,000, Russia verifiably dismantles 15,000
5,000 remain on each side -- if declarations accurate
Baseline inspections, production records exchanges, "nuclear archaeology" help build confidence in accuracy of total over time
2. Limit only deployed strategic weapons, or reserves and tactical weapons as well?
- Helsinki refers only to destruction of strategic warheads as part of START III
- U.S. would like to address large Russian tactical stockpile as well (ca. 12,000?)
- Russia would like to address large U.S. strategic reserve stockpile (ca. 5,000?)
- Distinguishing between strategic and tactical warheads is difficult -- particularly since same warheads sometimes used for either purpose
Proposal: Quick Reciprocal Initiatives to Control the Unregulated Warheads
"Consolidate, Monitor, Disable, Dismantle"
- Warheads unregulated by arms control -- strategic reserve, tactical, awaiting dismantlement -- represent the vast majority of each side's total stockpile
- U.S. concerned about security of Russian "unregulated" warheads -- and reversal of arms reductions
- Russia concerned about reversal of arms reductions, given U.S. "upload" potential
- Clinton should announce that, if Russians will do the same, he will:
- Consolidate nearly all strategic reserve and most tactical warheads at small number of secure storage facilities
- Permit Russian monitoring of consolidated storage facilities
- Commit to rapidly disable and eventually verifiably dismantle these warheads
- Within 2-3 years, ~70% of each side's warhead stockpile could be at secure, monitored sites, permanently disabled, committed to dismantlement -- without any further reductions in deployed deterrent forces
- Addresses both U.S. theft concerns and Russian reversal concerns, could help ratification of START II
3. How many reserves and tactical weapons does the United States need to retain?
- Current U.S. policy: large reserves required to "hedge" against Russian reversal
- Essentially all warheads retired under START II to be held in reserve
- Large fissile material reserves also
- Sufficient reserves to rapidly rebuild Cold War arsenal
- U.S. warhead dismantlement scheduled to end next year -- rest are reserves
- U.S. cannot negotiate away large Russian unregulated stockpiles while keeping its own large unregulated stockpile
- Negotiating away Russian unregulated stockpile reduces need for U.S. hedge force -- IF adequate transparency and verification of totals is possible
- U.S. security would be adequately protected with a START III force and small number of tactical weapons -- even deeper reductions quite possible
4. Limit fissile material stockpiles as well as nuclear weapon stockpiles?
- Complicates discussion -- adds another complex element
- Verifying fissile material stockpiles extremely difficult
- BUT:
- Only chance for building confidence in total warhead figures is data exchanges and inspections throughout the warhead life-cycle -- including fissile material
- Only chance for irreversibility is to greatly reduce stockpiles of fissile material available to produce new weapons
- Ultimately, fissile material should be included -- but possibly not as integral part of initial limitations
- Comprehensive warhead and fissile material regime can be built step-by-step, with each step having some benefit and posing little risk
5. How best to draw the balance between verification confidence and intrusiveness?
- Each side would like complete information about the other without revealing any of its own; real solutions require balancing the concrete security benefits of data exchanges and inspections against the security costs
- Details of warhead designs highly sensitive -- even for exchange between U.S., Russia
- Both sides sensitive about access to dismantlement/assembly plants; options include:
- perimeter-portal monitoring
- "template" monitoring
- remote camera monitoring
- paper records checking
- "pit stuffing"
- Both sides sensitive about revealing information about warhead maintenance and production -- segregate dismantlement in separate area?
- Fissile material issues not related to warhead design generally less sensitive
- Comprehensive regime that would provide the basis for very deep reductions would require a complete revolution in traditional secrecy of nuclear complexes -- must be built step-by-step
Proposal: Cheap, Permanent Disablement and
Non-Intrusive Dismantlement Verification by "Pit-Stuffing"
- Each modern weapon contains a "pit" -- hollow sphere with a tiny tube into it
- If pit is stuffed with steel wire inserted through the tube, it cannot be compressed and the weapon cannot go off
- In most weapons, tube can be reached while weapon still assembled
- So: thousands of weapons could be permanently disabled with minutes per weapon
- Verification: inspectors observe insertion of wires into tubes -- with shrouds to conceal warhead design details. After warheads are dismantled, inspectors take gamma-ray image of one square inch of canister containing pit -- confirms presence of hollow sphere of plutonium stuffed with wire
- Confirms that the pits now being observed came from the warheads observed before (wire is essentially a tag inserted inside the weapon)
- Provides high-confidence dismantlement verification at low cost and intrusiveness -- minimal inspector-days, no access to dismantlement plants required
Pit-Stuffing
6. What incentives would move Russian government to overcome past obstacles?
- Overcoming barriers to openness will require senior Russian officials in several agencies (MINATOM, MOD, FSB, MFA) to do a lot of hard work, take major political risks
- They are unlikely to do this unless they perceive that it would result in major benefits for Russia or for their agencies
- U.S. government has made no effort to see question from these decision-makers' perspective, focus on incentives for them to act
- Incentives could include:
- Russian desire for START III; transparency currently linked
- Russian desire to address U.S. "hedge" stockpile, other perceived threats
- Financial assistance for dismantlement -- tied to verification of dismantlement
- Other financial benefits -- e.g., additional HEU purchases if HEU and Pu declared
- Movement on other issues important to specific agencies
- Incentive package will have to be handled carefully to avoid "selling secrets" backlash
- Incentives plus full reciprocity will be needed -- "pay per view" approach will not achieve all desired results
7. Can START III numerical limits be agreed without verified warhead dismantlement?
- Changing the START II numerical limits to the START III numbers is simple and could be accomplished quickly, if there is political will
- Limiting warheads and fissile material is more complex -- measures may take longer to develop
- If numerical limits are ready, but warhead and fissile material limits are not, there may be pressure to split the two, to avoid delaying numerical limits
- In principle, START III levels are still so high that limits on warheads and fissile materials are not essential for security
- BUT, Russian desire for START III may be best incentive available for Russian acceptance of warhead and fissile material transparency
- Proposals such as reciprocal "consolidate, monitor, dismantle" initiative and "pit-stuffing" could allow quick action on warhead controls, avoiding delay in agreements on START III numerical levels