When Terrorists Go Mainstream

Note

"When Terrorists Go Mainstream" was reprinted in The International Herald Tribune on January 28, 2006.

PERHAPS THE biggest surprise about this week's election results, in which the terrorist group Hamas won a majority of seats in the Palestinian parliament, is that it was a surprise to us at all. There are two main reasons why.

First, many in this country have fallen victim to the notion that if today's rogue states are bad neighbors, democratization will make them good neighbors. A central pillar of the current Bush administration's foreign policy is that dictators make bad neighbors. In other words, we can expect authoritarian governments to start wars and support terrorism more readily than democratic governments.

When the current US administration first took office, the security concern of the day was "rogue states," a euphemism for Afghanistan, North Korea, Iraq, and Iran. After Sept. 11, the threat of rogue states morphed into the terrorist threat, along with the conviction that because these states were led by dictators, they would be more susceptible to terrorism and they would eventually have "to be dealt with."

But apt as the characterization of these states might have been, and as troubling as they were to their respective neighbors, the corollary does not follow. It is not the case that democratic states necessarily make good neighbors on account of their form of government alone.

Japan is a democracy, but China does not rest easy on that account, even though Japan has no formal military to speak of, and even though pacifism is a part of its constitution. Democracies, even traditional allies, often don't see eye to eye; and historically they are as likely to start wars as dictatorships.

Second, most Americans buy into the romantic notion that "there are no bad people, only bad leaders." By extension, giving power to the people must result in "good" policy. The trouble is, what is "good" depends on where you sit. If you live among the minority of states that are rich and getting richer, then war and violence are a bad idea: There is little to gain and everything to lose. If, however, you live among the majority of states that are poor and getting poorer, then war and violence seem a good idea: There is everything to gain and nothing to lose. Thus, as in Woodrow Wilson's day, exporting democracy is as useful for gaining domestic political support as it is destructive as foreign policy.

Logic notwithstanding, we have a real-world example of what happens when the people of a poor Islamic state are offered democracy. In the early 1990s, Algeria's government held democratic elections to head off widespread dissent and riots. The Islamic Salvation Front — the first legal Islamic political party in North Africa — worked hard to win. When the Algerian people were given a choice (twice), they chose the theocracy (twice), and the government of Algeria was toppled by a military coup that repudiated the election results and imposed martial law.

What can we learn from this?

First, the United States and its allies have the power to bring their own foreign policies in line with their professed democratic values. It may be difficult, but the United States must stop supporting military dictatorships simply because they are "allies in the war against terror." The United States must also support Israel by pressuring it to concede to a genuine Palestinian state, while at the same time guaranteeing Israel's security.

Second, the more democratic Palestinians and Iraqis become, the less likely they are to support US strategic and economic interests. Israel is a strategic interest for the United States; but it is unlikely that given a choice, most people in the Middle East would accept Israel's right to exist. In other words, ideal election outcomes may not result in ideal foreign policy outcomes, from a US perspective.

Countering the popular appeal of groups such as Hamas requires controlling habitat, not population. Killing terrorists can't stop the violence until and unless you destroy the habitat that produces them. That in turn demands serious effort at providing basic needs, such as food, shelter, clean water, education, and healthcare.

Hamas has historically done much better at providing for the basic needs of Palestinian Arabs than the Palestinian Authority (Fatah). That's why Hamas won, and that's why, when seeking to export democracy, the United States and its allies must remain careful of what they wish for.

Monica Duffy Toft is an associate professor at the Kennedy School of Government and assistant director of the John M. Olin Institute of Strategic Studies at Harvard University.