Will the Union be Reborn? The Future of the Post-Soviet Region

This monograph represents the second in a series of publications of the "Whither Russia?" project of the Strengthening Democratic Institutions Project, based at the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs (BCSIA) at Harvard University''s John F. Kennedy School of Government.

The general aim of the "Whither Russia?" project is to draw attention to and put content into the debate in Moscow about "what is Russia?" and what the country''s future geopolitical role should be. Ultimately, the hope is to encourage the most responsible strands of this debate. Specifically, as a result of the project we hope to help clarify: what the competing images of Russia are across the political spectrum; how these competing images are reflected in policy; how the debate is played out in specific arenas; how public perception of the debate differs from the views of the political elite; how views in the regions differ from those in the center; what impact the players have on the shape of the debate and on political outcomes; what the common threads are in the competing images of Russia; and, based on the conclusions drawn, what are Russia''s fundamental geopolitical and national interests.

The project will address a set of three broad questions:

1) Who are the Russians? Looking at competing ideas and components of the Russian nation, Russian nationalism, and Russian national identity.

2) What is the nature of the Russian state? Looking at competing images of the state, Russia''s status as a "Great Power," and Russia''s national interests.

3) What is Russia''s Mission? Looking at Russia''s relations with the outside world - specifically with the Newly Independent States, the coalition of the Commonwealth of Independent States, and the West - and its orientation toward action, including its stated foreign policy and general international conduct.

As part of the project we will be publishing important works by leading Russian policymakers and academics addressing these issues.

This piece is the latest in a series of important foreign policy statements by the Council on Foreign and Defense Policy, headed by Sergei Karaganov, the Deputy Director of the Russian Academy of Science''s Institute of Europe. The Council is one of the most influential non-governmental organizations in Russia. It was established in February 1992 to bring together leading opinionmakers - politicians, academics, prominent businessmen, government officials and journalists - for the purpose of providing the Russian government with recommendations on Russia''s national defense, security and foreign policy priorities. In 1992 and 1994, the Council published two major documents on Russian foreign Policy: "Strategy for Russian 1," and "Strategy for Russia 2." Both of which were published in Nezavisimaya Gazeta, on August 19, 1992 and on May 27, 1994 respectively. The Editor-in-Chief of Nezavisimaya Gazeta, Vitaly Tretyakov, is a member of the Council. This document, on one of the most contentious issues in current Russian foreign policy, the future of the post-Soviet space, was published as a separate monograph in Russian in Moscow in 1996 by Nezavisimaya Gazeta''s Publishing house.

The document begins with the observation that the disintegration of the USSR and the subsequent economic crisis has left Russia in the role of "donor" to the post-Soviet region but without any particular economic or political advantage. The authors then describe the general consequences of the Soviet collapse: a decline in Russian influence; instability in international relations and in regional affairs; the disaffection of minorities left stranded beyond their "national homelands;" border disputes; and the increased likelihood of local conflicts. They note that, in spite of the crisis of the post-Soviet space, there is a relatively broad consensus, both in the West and Russia, that the USSR must not be reconstituted in its former political and economic configuration. The Council members conclude that given the divergence in economic and political development in the post-Soviet space since 1991, it would now be difficult "to take the parts of a once unified system and "glue" them back into a whole," and Russian citizens would be reluctant "to pay for the reconstitution of the Union." "The restoration of the USSR as it looked before is pure utopian fantasy."

The members position, however, is that "although the restoration of the USSR is impossible, there is no reasonable alternative to the integration of a significant part of the post-Soviet region." They discuss a number of factors and tendencies that point to the political, economic reintegration of the region, and suggest that a new mechanism is thus required to regulate relations between the "new ''old'' neighbors." The Council on Foreign and Defense Policy predicts the reproduction of the kind of gradual integration experienced in Europe, with a so-called "integrational core" consisting of Russia and the republics both closest to and most dependent on it leading the way. For this to happen, however, the authors propose the formulation of a long-term, adaptable strategy that might eventually result in the construction of an authentic federal union of states, and the adoption of a policy of ''leadership rather than control, economic dominance rather than political responsibility."

In the concluding section of the document, the members of the Council on Foreign and Defense Policy provide the framework for a comprehensive policy for the region - involving access to markets, regional security arrangements, the status of the Russian language, the position of Russian nationals in the CIS, and the deepening of cultural ties. Within this framework, they offer an outline of Russian policy toward each of the states of the former USSR, and propose that an international conference of former Soviet states be convened to discuss their conclusions.

John Henriksen of Harvard University''s Literature Concentration has translated the original Russian version of the Council on Foreign and Defense Policy''s Statement for CSIA. Funding for the "Whither Russia?" project has been provided by The Carnegie Corporation of New York.

PRELIMINARY REMARKS

While the first version of this "Statement" was being prepared, there was firm and vociferous insistence by participants at the conference for CIS leaders in Moscow that the former USSR could not be reconstituted, and that this was not even an aim for Russia presently, even though it had been vaguely suspected of being the goal of the integrational processes of the CIS.

During the preparation of the second version, the State Duma passed a resolution that many considered (with some reason) to be a virtual denunciation of the Belovezhsky agreements. And as the third version was under preparation, the four-party agreement on the strengthening of integration among Belarus, Kazakstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Russia, as well as an even more historic and consequential agreement between Belarus and Russia, was signed.

It had thus become even clearer that the notions of a new rapprochement, integration, and even reintegration had become prominent themes in the political life of Russia, and of international relations within the territory of the former USSR. But at the same time dangers had also arisen: the threatening of the integrational processes with irresponsible declarations and actions, and the undermining of the positions of competing political forces and large social groups striving for union; the "jinxing" of integrational processes by making decisions which later, when the political climate had shifted, would not be carried out; and finally, the adoption of unfeasible or overly costly agreements that would undermine the integrational processes or weaken their social support base.

The task which the authors of this statement put before themselves was to lay out, with a maximum of objectivity and nonpartisanship, certain conceptual approaches to these themes which would stimulate discussion of them in Russia and the countries of the former USSR, and would contribute to a greater understanding by Russians of their own interests and their country''s options.

The authors of this statement take into account the document entitled "Russia''s Strategy Towards Members of the CIS," which was approved by the President of Russia. At the same time they have tried as much as they could to go beyond the boundaries of practical policy, and to avail themselves of the freedom afforded by the unofficial character of the document, which was signed by private personages, to broaden the scope of the discussion, and if possible to deepen it as well.

Ultimately, this theme has a direct bearing on Russia''s self-image, on the problem of national statehood, and by extension on the vitally important national interests of Russia connected with the resurgence and development of the country in the 21st century.

In other words, an answer to the question posed by the title of the "Statement" is impossible without an answer to another even more topical question: What is Russia (for its current and former citizens, i.e., those residing in post-Soviet countries)?

The "Statement" was prepared by a group from the Council coordinated by S. A. Karaganov and V. T. Tretyakov. Members of the group included A. G. Arbatov, A. A. Belkin, A. Ya. Degtyarev, Yu. V. Dubinin, K. F. Zatulin, P. S. Zolotarev, Iu. A. Kvitsinsky, E. M. Kozhokin, S. V. Kortunov, V. L. Manilov, M. V. Masarsky, V. N. Mironov, A. K. Pushkov, A. M. Salmin, V. M. Serov, A. V. Federov, I. M. Khakamada, S. M. Shakhrai, and I. Iu. Iurgens.

The first points of the report were discussed at the Assembly of CFDP on March 2-3, 1996, by members and guests of the Council, representatives of the administrative and legislative organs, and of business, academic, and media circles. Afterwards the material was reworked to take into account the results of the discussion, and the comments and amendments that were made. A second draft was discussed at a more broadly representative meeting of the working group on 26 April, and was sent out to be signed by Assembly members. Any document attempting to represent the opinions of a large group cannot claim the virtue of absolute consistency. In conformity with the Council on Foreign and Defense Policy (CFDP) tradition, the participants of the working group, the members and guests of the Council, and any state functionaries refrain from signing the Council''s documents, even if they agree with what they contain.

---

1. Context.

1.1. The question posed by the title of the "Statement" seems in many ways abstract and theoretical. But in fact it represents the core of all the contradictions (in opinion, evaluation, prognosis, policy, and strategy) that are connected with the idea of "Russia" wherever it exists in political consciousnesses. If we glance at the "natural habitat" of this idea of Russia, we see that the question "Will the (Soviet) Union be reborn soon?" is related to larger and more topical global questions. It is certainly of current interest in the Russian Federation itself and throughout the whole post-Soviet region, throughout Europe, throughout virtually all of Asia, the Near East, the United States and Canada, certain African countries (most notably the Arab ones), and Latin America. By the most conservative estimations, those interested in the Russian question represent two thirds of the earth''s population, and the most politically active portion of that population to boot.
1.2. A detailed analysis of the causes of the disintegration of the USSR would exceed the scope of this statement. Nonetheless, a brief survey of these causes is essential to understand which of them were temporary, and which continue to be valid today.
1.2.1. The most deeply-rooted reason for the fall of the USSR is the systemic crisis of the socialist economy, and the inability of the erstwhile heads of the government and the Communist Party to initiate decisive reforms. This crisis provoked a strengthening of separatist sentiment in the republics, as well as isolationist tendencies within Russia itself.
1.2.2. The schism within the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (which was the main structure of state administration in the former USSR) due to the virtual abandonment of it by the Communist Party of the Russian Federation, and the general degradation of the party.
1.2.3. The attempts by the national elites appearing during Soviet rule to secure a fuller control over the political and economic resources on their own territories, and to attain a higher status in general. The economic resources, incidentally, were for the most part seriously exaggerated; in most of the republics there was a widely current myth that Russia was "robbing" them, whereas in fact Russia was providing for them.
1.2.4. A similar mindset among the Russian elite, generated by the wish to get rid of Gorbachev and take all power into their own hands. For the communist segment of the elite, which supported almost universally the Belovezhsky agreement, Gorbachev was especially unacceptable.
1.2.5. The formation, during the Perestroika era, of rather powerful nationalist movements in several republics (notably in the Baltic States, but also in Ukraine, Kazakstan, Moldova, and Transcaucasia) struggling to separate their republics from the USSR.
1.2.6. The virtual "expulsion" from the USSR, as a result of the Belovezhsky agreement, of a number republics where the question of leaving the Union had not arisen. Part of the Russian leadership simply did not considered what the consequences of this action would be at the end of 1991 (which does not excuse them from blame).

1.2.7. The powerful stimuli for the disintegration processes coming from outside the USSR.

2. Consequences of the Disintegration of the USSR

2.1. Analyzing these consequences is decidedly complicated. There are few objective sources of information - whether economic, demographic, or sociological - and those that exist are incomplete. The debate over them is deeply emotional and politicized. Any attempt to bring a slight degree of objective analysis to it is immediately labeled "imperialism," "nationalism," "chauvinism," "a betrayal of national interests," and so on. The situation is made even more complex by the fact that the majority of the new autonomous states created on the territory of the former USSR are led by representatives of the political factions that pushed for the disintegration of the USSR, and consequently have an interest in justifying their actions.

Nevertheless, let us try to identify certain consequences of the disintegration of the USSR. They tend to be ambiguous, and not always obvious; they are often long-term and latent.

2.2 Economic Consequences

2.2.1. Economically, the disintegration of the USSR led to a breakdown of most of the traditional connections between economic subjects in the former republics, as well as to a sharp decrease in production. The destruction of these connections was also brought on by differences in the scale and scheduling of market reforms, in changes in price structures, and so on in the post-Soviet states. The economic and social cost of reforms in all states rose sharply.
The secession of the Central Asian republics alleviated one of the traditional risks of rapid modernization: rural overpopulation as a result of a postindustrial inability to make use of excess labor resources.

2.2.2. The disintegration of the USSR has significantly reduced the economic maneuverability of financial, industrial, natural, and other resources both in Russia and in other post-Soviet states as a result of the isolation of economies and of the general economic crisis.
In this regard, Russia has lost less than other countries because of its relative strength, the diversified nature of its economy, and - most importantly - the relative independence of its economic potential. The "liberation" of Russia from the republics, which as a rule were less prepared for entering market relations, perhaps smoothed its own entry into those relations (we give no evaluation of the strategy with which that entry was made).

2.2.3. In many of its relations, Russia profited from being gradually released from the necessity of subsidizing the former Soviet republics, as well as from changes in price structure.
Moreover, the accumulation by Ukraine and certain other republics of a sizable - and largely interest-free - debt after receiving Russian energy and other products shows that Russia continues in many respects to play the role of donor in the post-Soviet region, without deriving any special economic or political advantage from doing so.

2.2.4. Russia''s access to foreign markets for its energy resources has become less secure. Accessibility to seaports has declined.
2.2.5. The territory of the state has been reduced by a quarter, and its population by a half. The problem of an underdeveloped infrastructure, especially in areas of the country near the borders, has become acute. The potential difference in natural-resource and industrial production has increased; the first is estimated at 27 trillion dollars, exceeding by severalfold the U.S. potential, while the latter is 87% lower than the U.S. potential (based on 1995 data).

2.2.6. For several years now, access to the markets of neighboring countries has become difficult (in some cases lost irrevocably), which has cost Russia significantly in unreceived income, and which has also had a serious social cost in the inability to provide the domestic Russian market with relatively cheap consumer goods from the countries of the former USSR (for example, with certain foodstuffs like seasonal vegetables and fruits, and so on).

2.3. Political Consequences

2.3.1. In the political arena the disintegration of the USSR initiated a long-term process of altering the global and regional balance of power economically, politically, and militarily. The entire system of international relations has become less stable and less predictable. While the threat of a global nuclear war has receded, the likelihood of local wars and armed conflicts has sharply increased.
2.3.2. The potential and the influence of Russia, its ability to pursue its own interests, has sharply declined with respect to that of the former USSR. Retaining four of the five former territories of the USSR, Russia has slightly more than half the population of the former USSR, it oversees no more than half of the gross national product of 1990, and has kept only around 60 percent of its former defense industry.
2.3.3. The problem of minorities residing outside their national homelands has arisen. As a result of migrations over the last ten years, they now represent around 50 to 55 million people, including 20 to 25 million Russians. Defending their interests with traditional diplomatic methods over the long term has become virtually impossible, and other more complex strategies are needed.
2.3.4. Millions of human connections have been broken. Many Russians and citizens of CIS countries have developed a "divided nation" complex. If border conditions between states grow hostile, it could heighten the sense that populations have been divided, and could rise to a crisis level.
2.3.5. The disintegration of the USSR was not a completed act, but merely set into motion an extended process - lasting for several decades - in which new, independent states are to be built. This process will inevitably be characterized by a certain instability. Some states may prove themselves to be non-viable and will dissolve, creating new formations. The instability must be regulated, preferably by political means.
2.3.6. The problem of new borders has arisen, exacerbating relations between states created on the territory of the former USSR, where such a problem had never existed before. New states have had to face a number of border questions.
2.3.7. In the international arena, the disintegration of the USSR has brought about several positive changes. The outside world is less frightened of Russia than it was of the USSR. The possibility of hostility among neighboring countries has diminished.

3. Factors Impeding a Reconstitution of the Union

3.1. The legal measures liquidating the USSR were passed relatively smoothly - through referendums, bilateral treaties on the recognition of borders, and the induction of the new republics into the United Nations and other international organizations.
3.2. In the West a relatively broad consensus has emerged on the undesirability of a reconstituted USSR. Such a consensus must not be taken as the sign of a purely anti-Russian sentiment, since it has centuries-old geopolitical and psychological motivations behind it. No one as a rule wants their neighbors too strong, even if they are not enemies.

Today the countries of the West - the main opponents of a reborn USSR - are incomparably more stable than they were at the time of the Communist takeover of the Russian empire (1918-1922). After the disintegration of the USSR they have acquired a decisively new influence over world politics, as well as over events in the post-Soviet region through connections both bilateral and multilateral (i.e., through the EU, NATO, and so on) with the new autonomous states.
3.3. There is no historical precedent for the rebirth of the Union within the borders of the former USSR since, despite the efforts of the Bolsheviks to reconstitute the Russian empire, former parts of the empire like Poland and Finland remained independent.
3.4. There are obvious difficulties in bringing the countries of the former Soviet Central Asia into a new Union. The most serious opposition in this region to a recreation of the Union is offered by three mighty powers at the very least - the U.S., China, and Turkey - whose position Russia cannot afford to disregard.
3.5. The economic and political development of the former republics of the USSR diverge - at times quite significantly - in their pace and scale, as well as in their directions. Today it would be difficult to take the parts of a once unified system and "glue" them back into a whole.
3.6. In Russia itself, as a result of the continuing search for a national self-image, one can feel a certain lack of political will for resolving this problem; what is missing is a distinct political mechanism for performing the relatively simple task of overseeing relations with the new "old" neighbors - not to mention the lack of a clear understanding of its own national interests.
3.7. An essential impediment with respect to Russia is the presence of serious objective evidence supporting the theory of the Russian Federation''s or Russia''s economic donor status with regard to the former republics (especially the Central Asian and Caucasian ones) of the USSR, which encourages a sort of "economic egoism" within the new Russian leadership.
3.8. In the foreseeable future, the political, economic, and military potential of Russia seems objectively limited. Most of the country''s population and its leadership will direct their attention and efforts to the problems of survival and domestic improvements. In such a situation, even mass nostalgia for Russia''s lost superpower status will be accompanied by a rather profound reluctance in Russians to pay for the reconstitution of the Union.
3.9. The new Russian political and economic elites are oriented more toward economic than military-political dominance in the territories of the former USSR (the latter would be more troublesome and more expensive).
3.10. The reconstitution of the USSR is associated, in the minds of a certain segment of society, with the reinstatement of the communist nomenclature and the abolition of private property.
3.11. Today there exist powerful new centers of political and economic gravity for the new autonomous states that did not exist at the beginning of this century.
3.12. In an overwhelming majority of the new national states, the newly emergent elites will resist, whether for economic, political, or prestige-related reasons, any reduction of their national sovereignty. A process of self-identification is underway in the new post-Soviet states, including the so-called national states. In practically all of them there have been presidential and parliamentary elections, and constitutions have been adopted.

3.13. During the existence of the USSR, the former republics acquired almost all the formal and informal markers of autonomous statehood, virtually all of which they lack at the present time (with the exception of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania). Some of them in the Soviet period created their own economic base for a relatively independent existence.

4. Factors Facilitating a Reconstitution of the Union

These factors and tendencies are not so obvious, or so clearly manifested. Yet one should not underrate their deep and long-term influence.

4.1. Most importantly, every centrifugal factor has a factor opposing it (though not always equal in importance). Here are some examples.
4.1.1. The dissolution of the USSR occurred in clear opposition to the will of its people, which was unequivocally expressed in the referendum of April 1991.
4.1.2. The act of denouncing the Union Treaty in December 1991 is legally disputable, most notably because it was prepared without the knowledge of the parliaments of the Soviet republics (or the Union parliament), as well as without the knowledge of the population of the country. The leadership of the USSR was generally cut off from the decision-making process for this issue.
4.1.3. The present status of the new subjects of international relations (i.e., of the former Soviet republics) is weakened by the fact that it is deprived of legitimacy, of constitutional continuity. The USSR was declared dissolved without recourse to a single constitutional procedure whereby all the populations of the territory desiring autonomy could have the chance to decide their fates independently. From the legal point of view on nations'' rights of self-determination, it was precisely this right which was flouted and replaced by the rights of territories which were virtually all multiethnic states. Thus the conflicts in Transdniester, Ossetia, Abkhazia, and Tajikistan (as well as Yugoslavia) were directly caused by the division of the country.
4.1.4. The major industrially developed countries of Europe and Asia, as well as the U.S., are interested in ensuring that the Eurasian region be under the control of a state capable of maintaining stability in the post-Soviet area, and of cooperating with them in carrying out policies that affect Europe and Asia.
4.1.4.1. The gamble on "geopolitical pluralism," and the attempts by the U.S. and certain western European countries to place diplomatic wagers on antagonisms between Russia, Ukraine, Kazakstan, and other former republics in the name of the old principle of a "balance of power," seem distinctly unreliable. A multipolar balance of power has led in the past to world war. In an age of nuclear weaponry, a pluralist politics could be even more dangerous and suicidal.
4.1.5. The Bolshevik reconstitution of the Russian empire under the banner of the USSR is without parallel in recent history, but is perhaps not unprecedented in Russia as a case of "collecting" broken-away states.
The following factors must also be included among those that would contribute to a rebirth of the Union:

4.2. A realization by the peoples of the former republics of the USSR that a sharp decline in quality of life has been brought about not only by the initiation of reforms and the end of the Russian protectorate, but also by the shrinking of markets and the destruction of traditional economic systems. To the majority of republics of the former USSR, it is becoming more and more obvious that a genuinely independent economic development is impossible for them.
4.3. Among a significant segment of the Russian elite there still exist, even if they are gradually disappearing, features of an imperial mindset that are expressed in their political behavior. This mindset is nourished by the traditional idea of a "messianic destiny" for Russia, as well as by the equally traditional urge to bring happiness to populations living in greater poverty. The imperial mindset is weakening, but the psychological trauma of losing superpower status, or of seeing a nation divided, remains. It is merely being repressed, and it demands special attention.
4.4. The relatively advantageous economic situation of Russia due to economic reforms, stabilization, and the beginnings of economic growth can make it once again a center of gravity.
The stereotype according to which the Russian Federation is on one hand perceived as a republic that "robbed" or "devoured" its partners, and on the other hand as a territory that declined farther and faster than its neighbors - this stereotype is being replaced by the opposite image of Russia as a real source of cooperative partnership, and as a state with a true potential for economic reform and economic growth.
4.5. The existence of a Diaspora of Russians or of those identifying with Russian language and culture. In a number of areas this Diaspora is the source of first-rate technical and administrative experience, and it is quickly adapting to market conditions.
4.6. Elements of the former USSR infrastructure, including the Russian language itself, are being preserved. In the post-Soviet region there is a firmly rooted "geo-economic memory."
4.7. A weakening of the U.S. under the burden of its role as single global superpower can be noted (though it is not perceived and recognized as such by many).
4.8. The ethnic (and cultural-historical) unity of Russia, Belarus, and Ukraine may have significant consequences.
4.9. The growing military threats to security that have emerged after the breakup of the USSR may play a unifying role for several of the former republics of the USSR.
4.10. There is still evidence of the retention of certain Soviet traditions and habits (such as the so-called "common home syndrome"), even if they are slowly disappearing.
4.11. A push towards unification may be given by the threat of disintegration, or the real disintegration, of certain new states (Ukraine, Kazakstan, Georgia; a chain of disintegrations in the Central Asian states which would seem to be made almost inevitable by the withdrawal of Russian troops from Tajikistan), as well as by the problem of "unnatural borders" and "disputed territories" that could be resolved either by a long maintenance of the status quo, or by reunification.
4.12. Acts by the West could prove influential. One such act is the forced expansion of NATO alongside an isolation of Russia within Europe, which may put into motion the process of the Union''s reconstitution.
4.13. New local armed conflicts are possible. (For example, a large-scale conflict in Central Asia resulting from the fall of the regime in Dushanbe could push Kazakstan into a renewed intimacy with Moscow.)
4.14. The Chinese factor. It is particularly relevant to Kazakstan and Kyrgyzstan.
4.15. Many problems arising in the wake of the disintegration of the USSR are practically unresolvable as long as the post-Soviet region is in disarray, but would disappear or would be much more readily solved if the Union were reconstituted. For example, the problems in the Crimea, in Transdniester, in eastern Ukraine, the problem of the Black Sea fleet and so on would be removed. The problems of Chechnya for Russia, of Abkhazia for Georgia, of Nagorno-Karabakh for Armenia and Azerbaijan, and so on would much more easily solved if the Union were reconstituted. But perhaps the main consequence would the resolution of all border disputes.
4.16. The CIS has shown rather limited usefulness with regard to regulating activity in the post-Soviet region, and with regard to integration processes.
Behind the blueprint for the CIS as it is sketched out in the Belovezhsky agreements, there is actually a stereotype of a "real," "true," "proper" Soviet Union, of that which existed on paper ever since the Union Treaty of 1922 and the Constitution of 1924, but which was never realized in practice.
The attempt to go back to a legal fiction according to which ideologically unified republics, all enjoying equal rights, voluntarily united themselves into a single state has led to obvious failure. The disintegration of an ideologically unified Union has made it clear that the republics have few interests which they all actually share. This is evident from their unwillingness to interfere in any conflicts developing far away from their own borders. The point here is not only their economic problems, but the impossibility of persuading them of the necessity of sending armed forces into military action far from their zones of immediate interest. This is related to the general ineffectualness of the Community of Independent States. The half-thousand agreements that have been signed in connection with the CIS are mainly valid only on paper, and the ones that are effectual are as a rule mostly bilateral in nature.

4.17. In recent months, there has been a strengthening of the position of those influential power groups directed in one way or another at Russia in almost all the republics, or in any case in all the republics that share a border with Russia. The ruling elites that either came to power or consolidated their power in the wake of independence are being forced in greater and greater numbers to join ranks with them. What is at stake here is not just the potential separatism of certain regions, but also the more or less influential pro-communist (in the limited sense of the term) opposition, the pressure of directors of businesses that joined various Union consortiums, some of the new entrepreneurs, and the economic interests of the mass of the population, as well as, naturally, the Russian-speaking minorities.

5. Russia''s Interests

5.1. Russia (the Russian Federation) has not yet fully defined itself as a state, or found a true self-image. The speed of its social changes, and the high pitch of its political struggles have made it difficult to work out a consensus on Russia''s national interests, including those interests that pertain to relations with the former republics of the USSR. Yet it is clearly necessary to try to do so. CFDP is trying to contribute as much as possible to this process while keeping a nonpartisan position.
Russia''s interests in its relations with the countries of the former USSR can be divided into (1) vitally important interests, in defense of which the state should be prepared to use any means whatever, including military ones, (2) important interests, and (3) less important interests.

5.2. Vitally Important Interests

5.2.1. The safeguarding of freedom and increased well-being for Russians, and territorial integrity and independence for Russia.
5.2.2. The prevention of foreign powers gaining hegemony, especially military-political hegemony, within the territory of the former USSR.
5.2.3. The prevention of coalitions inimical to Russia forming anywhere in the world, including coalitions forming in response to any actions taken by Russia in the territory of the former USSR.
5.2.4. Unimpeded access to resources that have strategic importance, including transport arteries and the ports of the former USSR, under fair and just commercial conditions.
5.2.5. The prevention of local wars and large-scale armed conflicts in neighboring states.
5.2.6. The prevention of massive and violent violations of human rights and the rights of national minorities - notably those of Russian minorities in the states of the former USSR.

5.2.7. The safeguarding of an intimate political, economic, and military-political union with Belarus, Kazakstan, and Kyrgyzstan.

5.3. Important Interests

5.3.1. The safeguarding of access to the raw-material, labor, and commercial markets of the states of the former USSR, especially access to the oil of the Caspian Sea area, and the creation of any political, economic, and legal conditions necessary to do so.
5.3.2. The joint use of borders, territories, and a portion of the military resources of neighboring states for the prevention of military threats to Russia, and of its internal destabilization resulting from the arrival of criminals, drugs, weaponry, contraband materials, nuclear materials, and so on.
5.3.3. The use of political, economic, military, and other resources of the states of the former USSR to strengthen, if intimate union relations are created, the international political positions of Russia and of those states.
5.3.4. The prevention of those countries being used as geopolitical buffers or counterweights to Russia.
5.3.5. The safeguarding of basic civil and other rights for all national minorities, especially for ethnic Russians.
5.3.6. The prevention of a heightened "divided nation" feeling among the peoples of Russia and those of its neighboring states.** This is the opinion of K. F. Zatulin: "Acknowledging the fact of a divided nation of Russians, as well as of other peoples of the former USSR, is one of the most important and lasting arguments in favor of reunification. Thus it is advisable not to prevent a heightening of the feeling of a "divided nation" if real borders should be decreed, but rather to focus on and underscore the new divisions, if the borders become official, as grounds for returning to a unification of the peoples and a removal of borders at a more favorable time."
5.3.7. The preservation and strengthening of the status of the Russian language and Russian culture in the neighboring states.
5.3.8. The continuation of economic reforms in CIS states that are of key importance to Russia: Belarus, Kazakstan, and Ukraine.

5.3.9. The strengthening of the status of the Russian national currency within the territory of the former USSR.
5.3.10. The strengthening of Russia''s position as economic and technological leader within the CIS.
5.3.11. The strengthening of Russia''s position in the bilateral dialogue with those states.
5.3.12. The strengthening of cooperative partnership in the military-political field. At the same time, Russia is not interested in creating a hostile and costly defensive union that might be perceived as a threat to other neighboring states.
5.3.13. The preservation and development of a multilateral partnership within the CIS, with mechanisms for regulating activity in the transportation, law-enforcement, economic, financial, ecological, and other fields.

5.4. Less Important Interests

5.4.1. The safeguarding of the democratic development of neighboring states.
5.4.2. The strengthening of multilateral structures in the CIS.
5.4.3. The protection of the process of restoring some of the chains of production that were destroyed during the breakup of the USSR and the economic blockage of the borders.

5.4.4. Strengthening the mechanisms and procedures for coordinating the foreign policy activity of Russia and the other states of the former USSR.

6. Conclusions

If we were to sum up all the tendencies outlined above, taking into account the origin and developments of the Russian state, as well as concurrent trends in the development of its relations with other states, we could draw the following conclusions.

6.1. In the next five years it will become clear what the effects of all the integrational and disintegrational processes in the territory of the former USSR will be. There is sufficient evidence to predict the formation of an integrational core composed of Russia and several of the republics which are closest to it and most in need of its aid. Above all, the type of relations characteristic of present-day Europe will be reproduced to a certain extent in the region of the former USSR: the countries will be drawn together at various speeds, according to their various degrees of capacity and willingness for profound integration.

6.2. The restoration of the USSR as it looked before is pure utopian fantasy. A decision to this effect would represent the same sort of violence against people and against history as the decision to dissolve the USSR did (a decision accepted and/or supported in the early stages by virtually the entire Russian political elite, from the radical democrats to the communists).

A policy aimed primarily at the restoration of the USSR would inevitably compromise Russia''s well-being, and could not be carried out without great bloodshed. Thus the restoration of the USSR is not only a fantasy, it is an exceedingly reactionary fantasy. However lowered the national self-image of Russians may be, Russian society today is absolutely unwilling to purchase its lost geopolitical prestige at the price of its own well-being.

6.3. Disintegrational tendencies, especially in relations with certain countries, have not disappeared, but since 1995 integrational processes have begun to clearly prevail in relations with Belarus, Kazakstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Armenia. We may expect the strengthening of such tendencies in coming years with regard to Ukraine, Georgia, and Azerbaijan.
But in any case the new rapprochement and integration, despite all its historical inevitability for most of the former USSR, will be a long and difficult process. Any attempts to speed it up through coercive means are destined to fail and, in the final analysis, only to slow it down.
6.4. The pace of the new integration will depend most decisively on the success of economic reforms and political stabilization in Russia.
As before in the USSR, unifying tendencies are concentrated in Russia. Attempts at regional unification that bypass Moscow have been as yet largely unsuccessful.
6.5. No decisions can be made that would exclude this or that part of the former USSR from a new state formation. Although the restoration of the USSR is impossible, there is no reasonable alternative to the integration of a significant part of the post-Soviet region.
6.6. Hence the following conclusion: it is necessary to acknowledge and implement a long-term strategy, adaptable to any possible outcome, that would be aimed at alleviating the negative consequences of disintegration for Russians especially, that would be relatively cost-effective and stable, that would reduce the likelihood of conflict, and, finally and most importantly, that would conform to the main strategic goal of bringing about the economic, political, and spiritual rebirth and ascendancy of Russia.
6.7. It may be assumed that the scenario of a restored union at the beginning of the new century, in the form of a confederacy, is a likely one. It would be composed of the following:
Russia, Belarus, Kazakstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Armenia - very likely;
Ukraine, Uzbekistan, Georgia, Moldova - likely, but not overwhelmingly so.
Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan - even less likely.
Latvia - unlikely, but not impossible.
Estonia and Lithuania - almost impossible.** Disagreement with this view was expressed by A. G. Arbatov.
6.8. In the distant future there may be some discussion of creating federal relations with some of the first group of states, while they retain the basic marks of international sovereignty.
In the region of the former USSR there have arisen both the theoretical possibility of, and the objective conditions for, constructing an authentic federal union of states on the ruins of the dissolved USSR. All the former republics of the Union have acquired the formal and informal marks of statehood which the majority of them lacked earlier. Those marks of sovereignty in the potential federation partners represent the basis for a truly free future federal structure that may arise in ten to fifteen years.
Relations with the former Soviet republics that do not join the new federation would be possible on a bilateral basis, as well as through the CIS as a "round table" for those with a common cultural and historical heritage (on the order of the British Commonwealth of Nations).

6.9. The prognosis offered in point 6.7 may not fully conform to the interests of Russia. Russia is most interested in a rapprochement not only with countries like Belarus and Kazakstan, but also with Azerbaijan, and especially with Ukraine. But at the same time a speedy rapprochement with them in the next five years is highly unlikely. It will most probably be a matter for the first five years of the next century. But it is necessary to ensure the preconditions for such a rapprochement now.
6.10. Generally the establishment of Russia''s foreign relations in many different directions could, in the foreseeable future, create an asymmetrical system of obligations, and in any case the center of such a system would be Russia. Behind all the discussions about new models, whether the CIS, a Euro-Asian Union, some confederation or even federation, the objective fact remains that on the territory of the former Soviet Union a system of Russian leadership covering most of the geopolitical zone is gradually, silently, and indisputably being established, independently of the wishes of its participants, a multifaceted system operating in many different directions. And if that leadership is somewhat limited today, its limitations are first and foremost those of Russia itself.
The Council on Foreign and Defense Policy affirms the correctness of its conclusion (laid out in "Strategy for Russia, 2") with regard to Russian policy within the territory of the former USSR: this policy is being objectively based on, and should be aimed at, a principle of "leadership rather than control, economic dominance rather than political responsibility."

7. What Is To Be Done

7.1. We will repeat it once again: the main prerequisites for developing the sort of rapprochement and integration within the CIS framework that will be advantageous for Russia are the safeguarding of Russia''s own economic development, the continuation of democratic and market reforms, and the implementation of an active policy of economic growth. Only a powerful, dynamically developing Russia can become the sort of magnet capable of creating the field of attraction necessary for a new "unification of the lands" on a wholly voluntary basis.
7.2. The interests both of Russia and of the other CIS countries would be served by shifting the center of gravity of activity in the post-Soviet area from a higher level - that of creating superstructures, signing treaties and accords, and so on - to the lower level of supporting concrete projects for interaction in the cultural, social, and especially economic spheres: the exchange of debts for property, the formation of financial-industrial consortiums, the facilitation of financial transactions, the creation of joint banks, and so on.
7.3. It would be highly useful to create a Russian and international agency for development and integration that would concern itself with these issues on the private and state levels.

One of the components of such an international agency would be a Eurasian council of commercial banks designed to aid the formation in the CIS of a united economic and financial region, a common market for goods and services, and an investment partnership among commercial banks.

7.4. It is absolutely necessary to create a sizable network of unofficial and semiofficial contacts among the political, economic, and cultural elites of the various CIS countries. To this end, an urgent priority is the creation of a CIS Foundation endowed with an initial capital of state and private grants, as well as the creation of a CIS Institute (an Institute of the New Abroad).
7.5. At the same time, a decisive reform of the foreign policy and foreign trade apparatus of Russia is necessary. The following measures among others seem expedient.
7.5.1. Implement Decree 940, issued by the President of the Russian Federation on 14 September 1995, strengthening the coordinating functions of Russia''s Ministry of Foreign Affairs and its Cooperation Ministry with regard to the federal organs of administrative power.
A structural reorganization of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Russia and the Cooperation Ministry of Russia would be advisable.

The MFA should focus its efforts towards the development of relations with the CIS states by reorganizing itself into a single bloc composed of several departments, headed by the first deputy minister. It should strengthen the staff of this subdivisions with highly qualified specialists, and raise their material incentives for maintaining a close engagement with the project.

The Cooperation Ministry should create a system for guiding integration efforts entrusted with staffing the Russian ranks of the inter-state economic structures, as well as creating a system for supervising their activity and for concluding inter-state treaties and agreements. There should be a careful elaboration of a system for regulating the integration between Russia and Belarus, as well as between Russia, Belarus, Kazakstan, and Kyrgyzstan (in accordance with signed agreements).
7.5.2. Enhance the authority of foreign institutions, especially embassies, strengthening them both in their material and technical resources and in their staffing. Send authoritative Russian state functionaries and the most qualified diplomats to those countries as ambassadors. With the goal of increasing the authority of ambassadors, make an absolute requirement of their presence at meetings between the Russian government and the government of their appointed countries, even at high-level meetings.
7.6. The CIS administrative organs should also be reorganized. It is necessary to create a real and permanent basis for a working organ of Community with the authority to settle operational issues arising in the intervals between meetings of the Council of the Heads of State (CHS), to represent the Community in the interdepartmental arena, and to direct all efforts in preparing for CHS conferences and in hosting various CIS meetings.
It is necessary to reorganize the Executive Secretariat (ES) of the CIS, located in Minsk. The ES representation of countries can be guaranteed on the ambassadorial level through a quota system.
Depending on their interests and abilities, the states of the Community could use their own discretion in assigning specially authorized ambassadors to the ES, or in entrusting ES responsibilities to ambassadors holding more than one office in Minsk. The creation of a productive and competent ES would in many ways contribute to a raising of the organizational level of the CIS as a consistently operating regional organization, would ensure better preparations for CHS conferences, and would make possible the speedy and competent resolution of operational issues arising in the intervals between CHS meetings. Overall, smooth ES operations would facilitate interaction between the states of the Community, and would raise their interest in joint undertakings. For Russia these measures are especially important: they would guarantee the regular functioning of the Community during the period in which leadership is being transferred to other states.

7.7. In its relations with the region of the former USSR, Russia, while it is interested in preserving many CIS structures during the mid-term transitional period, can at the same time more effective realize its interests through bilateral relations.
7.8. It is necessary to prepare a set of scientifically based directives on Russian policy toward each of the CIS states and the states of the former USSR, and to implement a separate but coordinated policy toward each of them.
7.9. In the long term, Russia is interested in ensuring maximal access to the markets of CIS countries. Customs treaties and payment agreements are steps in this direction. Open markets contribute to the creation of jobs in all states, helping to alleviate the political and psychological consequences of the disintegration of the USSR.

7.10. Despite the support given in a number of CIS documents to the creation of a collective Community defense system, some doubts remain as to the expediency of such a system. One issue is the regulation of concrete matters of cooperation in a number of spheres (anti-aircraft defenses, border duty, the staffing of officer ranks, provisioning, and so on); another is the creation of a union that will prove very expensive for Russia and that moreover will be perceived as a threat to many neighbors, and so may not increase but diminish Russia''s defense capabilities. In any case one must not fall prey to understandable emotions and try to reproduce a lesser replica of the Warsaw Pact Organization, viewing it as an effective means of opposing the planned expansion of NATO.
Given the lack of a common enemy, the construction of a large-scale and effective collective CIS defense system does not seem objectively necessary in the foreseeable future. Moreover, pursuing a restoration of the old defensive area of the USSR would mean looking to the past rather than the future. If it proves impossible to carry out the plan laid out in the Collective Security Agreement of 1992, it is expedient for Russia to have several regional security systems with Moscow as their hub. Ally relations between Russia and these states could be formalized through bilateral security and defense treaties. In such a case, a general treaty uniting all the CIS countries would be unnecessary (all the more so if Ukraine was not yet a member), while the notion of collective security for the CIS would have a positive expression in its various joint efforts to support stability, avert conflicts, and work for peace.

Moreover, Russia needs to take into account the varying importance of the different CIS countries to its own national security. Some of those countries can be considered future allies, while others can only be seen as strategic partners.

It must be kept in mind that in present-day conditions, a military partnership with Belarus could be exploited by supporters of the soon-to-be-expanded NATO, an alliance with Armenia could threaten Russia''s interests in Azerbaijan, and an alliance with Kazakstan could lead to trouble with China. Thus the construction of formal ally relations should be carried out "from the bottom up," with the greatest possible degree of public exposure, and in the form of a dialogue with neighboring countries.

7.11. It is not in Russia''s best interests to waste its energy on extensive and challenging military and political obligations that require it to make military, economic, and other efforts to save an ally, or to defend that ally''s territorial integrity. The range of such obligations must be limited by Russia''s abilities and interests.

To the same extent it is also true that Russia is exceedingly uninterested in performing other parties'' mediation or peace-keeping functions within the territory of the former USSR. The vacuum in peace-keeping operations must be filled by Russian mediation or by multilateral missions under the aegis of the CIS. From this point of view there is great significance in the simple fact of the success of the first such operation in the area of the Georgian-Abkhazian conflict. Attempts to minimize the importance of that operation must be viewed as unfriendly to Russia.

7.12. Either Russia will make certain decisions, pertaining to the current widespread status of the Russian language in the post-Soviet area, that will ensure its continued hegemony in the region, or in the years to come this important factor will cease to play its essential (perhaps even decisive) role in the struggle of integrational and disintegrational processes in the post-Soviet region.

7.12.1. It is important to implement an effective policy supporting the Russian nationals still living in CIS countries, and raising the status of these groups within the economic and social life of the former republics of the USSR.

7.12.2. A strengthening of trust, a deepening of the cultural ties between Russia and the countries of the former USSR, and a heightening of Russia''s influence would in the relatively near future contribute to the creation within its own territory of cultural centers and schools teaching the languages and national cultures of the countries once belonging to the USSR
7.13. It is necessary for Russia to take decisive steps toward the goal of maintaining its informational, cultural, and linguistic presence in the post-Soviet region. In part, the issue of television broadcasting should be one of the central topics of inter-state negotiations. To support that cultural presence, one should pay special attention to the fact that Russian broadcasting is constantly under threat of being pushed into second-tier status in a number of republics, sometimes under the influence or with the participation of third parties.

7.14. In general, if the present-day trajectory of Russia''s development is followed further, and real economic and social growth is finally initiated, we may eventually expect a strengthening of its position relative to practically all the other CIS countries. Russia therefore should be very careful and discriminating in taking on demanding diplomatic obligations towards its neighbors and its CIS partners. It is highly likely that in the future Russia will be able to command even more advantageous conditions in such agreements.

7.15. As previously noted, the most important relations for Russia to consider are those with Ukraine, Belarus, Kazakstan, and Kyrgyzstan, as well as with Georgia and Armenia. Each one requires its own special approach, its own set of tactics.
7.15.1. With Belarus it will be possible in the coming year or two to step up efforts to formalize relations of at least a confederative type, notwithstanding all the problems this would entail in the economic and legal spheres. It will be necessary to work out with Belarus a mechanism for constant diplomatic, military-political, and military-industrial cooperation. Here the most important matter is the fact that the problem of the future development of Russian-Belarussian relations is no longer a bilateral one. From the geopolitical point of view, Belarus, dividing the Baltic states from Ukraine, is a "bridge" between Russia and the West. Any lost prospects for a political and especially a military-political rapprochement with Belarus would entail the serious probability of a weakening of Russia''s position within the CIS. Such a weakening would have a definite economic price as well.

7.15.2. For Russian policy within the CIS, relations with Ukraine are a top priority. Our relations should eventually become those of allies.
7.15.3. This does not mean, however, that all possible means should be devoted to supporting Ukraine''s economy or paying for its reforms. Russia at the present time simply could not afford to do so. It is both possible and necessary, however, to forge a political partnership. In this respect an important role should be played by regular, high-level, working meetings for the presidents, premiers, and parliament leaders of Russia and Ukraine. Also necessary are regular consultations, and the institutionalization of such consultations, on the most important issues in current international relations. The prospects for a strategic Russian-Ukrainian alliance also depend in large part on how our affairs with Belarus and Kazakstan work out. In the case of a Russian-Belarussian and a Russian-Kazak integration, Ukraine will be threatened at the very least with semi-isolation within the CIS. But if the economic cooperation of the three countries raises the quality of life of Belarussians and Kazaks, then it will be much more difficult for Ukrainian leaders to explain to their constituencies the advantages of Kiev''s isolationist policies.
7.15.4. Russia''s, Armenia''s, and Georgia''s interests - political, military, economic, historical, and spiritual - in the Caucasus region are largely similar. It is clear to the present leaders of these countries that without the help of Russia, it will be impossible to either preserve the territorial integrity of the countries of that region, or to affirm their status as influential states, or to solve their economic problems, since Russia provides them with their energy and most type of urgently needed raw materials and consumer goods.
7.15.5. But Georgia''s rapprochement with Armenia should not be an obstacle to maintaining and increasing Russian influence in Azerbaijan, which is of key importance with regard to long-term Russian economic interests. Russia has every opportunity for asserting its influence in the Caspian oil situation.
7.15.6. As the strongest power in the region, Russia should initiate a rapprochement with the Baltic countries, should make some gestures toward creating good-neighbor relations with them, to the extent to which the disputes with these countries over national minorities are successfully resolved, and to the extent to which they refrain from entering military-political blocs. At the same time Moscow, which is interested in the flourishing of the Baltic states and their rapprochement with Europe, should support their imminent entry into the European Union.
7.15.7. The basis for a new policy stance with regard to the area of the former USSR could be a union with the states that were of key importance from a historical, geopolitical perspective: Belarus, Kazakstan, and Ukraine. All new policy should on the one hand be oriented towards the effective functioning of bilateral and multilateral mechanisms of cooperation in the political, military, and economic spheres, and on the other hand should be directed towards ensuring long-term prospects for creating and strengthening social and economic structures and special interest groups that lobby for reasonable policies that do not threaten the interests of the citizens of their countries or of Russia.

7.15.8. The following issue connected with the safeguarding of Russia''s national security demand immediate resolution by the CIS: establishing an economic union linking the CIS countries, allowing for the creation of:
· an inter-state bank for financial transactions, as well as a Eurasian bank for economic cooperation (on a shareholder basis, with the participation of governments and central and commercial banks, with the goal of influencing the implementation of programs for restructuring national economies, developing industrial cooperation, encouraging transnational economic collaboration, and creating financial-industrial consortiums);

· a non-governmental commercial-industrial office;
· a single currency system;
· funds for financing joint special-purpose programs;
· a customs union;
· a mechanism for ensuring the free movement of workers and capital;
· a unified system of economic and civil legislation;
· treaties for the joint protection of external borders and for military cooperation;
· a means of safeguarding the unity of civil, legal, informational, and cultural space;
· guarantees of the mutual support of co-nationals;
· a legal basis for defending the interests of Russian citizens and Russian émigrés in CIS countries;
· a means of offering real aid to the Russia Diaspora in CIS countries;
· the restoration of a unified system of television and radio broadcasting for CIS countries (i.e., an information system in the Russian language);
· a collective security council for the CIS, and a network of systems ensuring collective security.

8. Conclusion
The subject discussed in this "Statement" is many-sided, and it demands to be commented on and evaluated not only by Russian experts, but by their colleagues in CIS countries as well. This may perhaps be a case in which the CFDP should take steps towards initiating an international conference (but limited to post-Soviet countries) to this end. Or, repudiating the facts of the "Statement," it may decide to collectively prepare a definitive report on which no energy or resources would be spared.

SIGNATORIES TO THE "STATEMENT":

CFDP Members

A. G. Arbatov,
Deputy chairman of the State Duma Defense Committee;

L. I. Bainberg,
President of the Association of Joint Enterprises and International Organizations, and President of the SOLEB international organization;

A. P. Vladislavev,
President of the Foundation for Realism in Politics;

A. I. Volsky,
President of the Russian Union of Industrialists and Entrepreneurs;

A. I. Dubrovin,
Senior Vice-President of AB-INKOMBANK;

A. V. Dolgolaptev,
Coordinator and Chairman of the Kompomash Corporation;

S. E. Egorov,
President of the Association of Russian Banks;

K. F. Zatulin,
Director of the Institute for the Study of Diaspora and Integration;

P. S. Zolotarev,
Head of the Information Analysis Center of the Russian Federation Armed Forces,
Major General;

V. O. Ispravnikov,
Vice-President of the Free Economic Society of Russia;

S. A. Karaganov,
Deputy director of the RAN Institute of Europe, member of the Presidential Council, Chair of CFDP;

E. A. Kiselev,
Vice-President of NTV Telecompany;

O. V. Kiselev,
Chair of the Mosekspo Council of Directors, member of the Presidential Council;

E. M. Kozhokin,
Director of the Russian Institute for Strategic Studies;

V. P. Kolbaev,
President of the Mezhekonomsberbank;

V. P. Lukin,
Chairman of the State Duma Committee on International Affairs;

M. V. Masarsky,
President of the Association of Business Directors;

N. V. Mikhailov,
Deputy secretary of the Russian Federation Security Council;

S. A. Mndoyants,
General Director of the Foundation for the Development of Parliamentarianism in Russia;

A. V. Mordovin,
Vice-chairman of CFDP, Major General of the Air Force (Reserve);

V. A. Nikonov,
President of the Politics Foundation;

A. K. Pushkov,
Director of Public Relations and Member of the Board of ORT;

V. A. Rubanov,
Head of the information analysis center of the Kompomash Corporation;

A. M. Salmin,
Chair of the Council of the Russian Social-Political Center;

V. I. Samoilov,
General director of Avtopromimport;

V. T. Tretyakov,
Editor in chief of Nezavisimaya Gazeta;

A. V. Fedorov,
Director of the Bureau of Special Information;

I. M. Khakamada,
Deputy of the State Duma;

V. A. Khorkin,
Chairman of the Revisionary Commission of CFDP;

A. V. Tsalko,
President of the "Fatherland" Association for the Social Support of Veterans,
Major General of the Air Force (Reserve);

A. I. Cherkasenko,
Chairman of the board of the National Agency for Financial Policy;

S. M. Shakhrai,
Deputy of the State Duma;

I. Iu. Iurgens,
First Deputy Chair of the Confederacy of Professional Unions;

Also:

V. P. Averchev,
Secretary of the State Duma Committee on International Affairs;

V. V. Zhurkin,
Director of the RAN Institute of Europe;

T. N. Zatyatina,
Member of the board of ITAR-TASS;

A. A. Zakharov,
First Deputy General Director of the Foundation for the Development of Parliamentarianism in Russia;

S. A. Zverev,
Vice-President of the KB MOST Bank;

V. V. Igrunov,
Deputy Chairman of the State Duma Committee on CIS Affairs and Domestic Relations;

B. I. Katorgin,
General director of Energomash;

S. N. Kondratov,
Political commentator for the newspaper Izvestiya;

A. A. Konovalov,
President of the Institute for Strategic Evaluation;

V. N. Mironov,
Director of the Institute of Politics,
President of the Moscow-Paris Bank;

S. K. Oznobishchev,
Director of the Institute for Strategic Evaluation;

Iu. M. Nesterov,
Deputy chairman of the Russian Federation State Duma Committee on information policy;

S. P. Polovnikov,
President of the Kompomash Corporation;

I. P. Rybkin,
Deputy of the State Duma;

V. N. Stepanov,
President of the Moscow Industrial Association;

S. A. Tsikalyuk,
Chairman of the Military Insurance Company.