The Winds of Diplomacy

The November presidential election looms as a moment when the United States may seriously review its approach to many issues in the Middle East without any clear indication today as to which policy direction will prevail. Between now and then, however, the Bush administration seems increasingly pressed to decide what to do about Iran's growing nuclear technological capabilities, especially its uranium enrichment facilities.

The striking aspects of US foreign policy in the Middle East these days, compared to a decade or two ago, are the sheer scale and complexity of American involvement throughout the region -- which is almost exactly mirrored by Iran's web of military, ideological and economic ties with many partners around the same region.

This makes it much more difficult for the United States (or Israel) to strike militarily against Iran's nuclear facilities in the near future. Yet it is hard to see tough guys like George W. Bush and Dick Cheney simply slip out of office and retire to their respective ranches in January while Iran's 3000+ cascaded centrifuges are furiously spinning away and producing the enriched uranium that is vital for a nuclear industry -- whether that industry produces electricity, bombs or anything else of value.

The US dilemma in Iran is compounded by two other factors. First, it is likely that in 2009 the United States will start gradually withdrawing its troops from Iraq, and, second, the six principal diplomatic mediations now taking place in the Middle East (involving Lebanon, Syria, Hamas, Hizbullah, Egypt, Turkey, Qatar, Israel, and Saudi Arabia, in various combinations) are all occurring without major or direct American involvement.

So is the United States a rising or a receding power in the Middle East? What should the Bush administration do in its last six months in office, especially vis-à-vis Iran? These questions recur in many conversations in Washington among both those who are knowledgeable and ignorant about the realities of the Middle East. My sense is that most basic US foreign policy goals in the Middle East are not being achieved, as Washington finds itself bogged down in an ideological stalemate with a combination of antagonistic indigenous forces led by Iran, Syria, Hizbullah and Hamas.

A stalemate is not a defeat that requires retreat; it is a balance of power between two sides that are roughly evenly matched. This may change, and the big question is whether change might occur due to military action, or diplomatic initiatives.

A report in the New Yorker magazine this week says that the Bush administration continues to fuel and fund anti-regime operations in Iran, with the approval of senior congressional leaders. At the same time, an Israeli military exercise last week has been widely interpreted as a signal that Israel cannot forever watch Iran develop its nuclear capabilities without trying to knock out those facilities.

Diplomatic activity by Israel on four fronts -- Syria, Hizbullah, Hamas and the Palestinian National Authority -- may simply be a trick to give the impression of diplomacy triumphing over militarism, some analysts believe. These skeptics expect Israel or the United States to attack Iran soon.

I suspect that this is unlikely, because Iran has already achieved that which it says it seeks: full mastery of the nuclear fuel cycle, including uranium enrichment. Since this is the season for guessing and predicting in the Middle East, given the paucity of hard facts or credible knowledge of the main players' intentions, I would expect the US and Israel to finally accept the reality that a military strike, no matter how punitive, would only temporarily set back Iran's nuclear capability -- because the technological knowledge is already in Iran's hands and cannot be destroyed with bombs.

Furthermore, the destabilizing consequences for the Middle East, and for global energy and economics, are so massive that it is difficult imagining this scenario unfolding. The alternative is diplomatic negotiations that would meet the legitimate and reasonable needs of the key parties, namely Iran, the United States, Israel, Europe and the Arab neighbors. Iran could continue to develop its existing nuclear industry, but with stringent international inspections and safeguards under the rules of existing treaties and conventions that prevent the development of nuclear weapons.

The political enmity among Iran, Israel and the United States could be dealt with through serious political engagement, starting with a negotiated resolution of the Arab-Israeli crisis. The framework for an Arab-Israeli peace settlement is available. It only requires more seriousness and fairness from Israel and the United States. Israel's three most serious enemies in the neighborhood -- Syria, Hizbullah and Hamas -- are in fact negotiating with it already.

For the United States or Israel to attack Iran now would seem foolhardiness of the greatest magnitude -- something these two countries have proven themselves capable of doing over and over again. The rational cost-benefit analysis today, however, seems to favor a diplomatic solution.