Quick Take
“Assad must Go.” So said President Obama in a joint press conference with Israeli Prime Minister Bibi Netanyahu more than 11 years ago on March 20, 2013.
In the real world, Obama “went”—and Assad remained. Indeed, he continued ruling Syria for as long as Obama served as President. Over these years Obama’s decree became a popular meme among Syria watchers, reportedly including Assad. Check out the Assad must Go meme generator.
So what? First, note who has not gone. Bibi has demonstrated remarkable political survival skills—whatever the tragic consequences for Israel. Second, successful statecraft requires more than declarations. Third, in national politics, getting power, keeping power, and exercising power is not for the faint of heart—as Americans have just seen in the most remarkable political comeback in America’s 248 year history.
What happened in Syria may not stay in Syria. Political instability risks were already high in the Middle East. Bashar al-Assad’s fall raises the threats several more notches. Four factors are at play:
1. Pre-existing dissatisfaction. Every Arab republic has experienced popular demonstrations in recent years. These came in two waves, in 2011 and 2019. Iran also witnessed mass protests, most recently in 2022.
2. Lagging economies. In many countries, incomes per capita have fallen over the past decade. Egypt has had two currency crises. Lebanon hasn’t recovered from its financial crisis, which began five years ago. Iraq is heavily reliant on oil with a population that’s growing faster than the economy. Tunisia has been in a decade-long slump, spanning democratic and authoritarian rule. Iran has taken a hit from US sanctions. Jordan’s average income returned to its 2013 level only in 2023.
3. Fury over war. The conflicts in Gaza and Lebanon are fueling anger in Arab streets. Taking a guide from history, the consequences of the 1948 war only became fully apparent four years later, when a military coup in Egypt cited the defeat in Palestine in the first paragraph of its first communique. The lesson — just because things appear quiet and stable today doesn’t mean there’s no combustible mix simmering.
4. Spillover effects. Regime-change episodes often cluster. Arab popular protests happened in two batches — in 2011 and 2019. Egypt’s 1952 military coup inspired a series of similarly styled movements across the region in subsequent years. The latest dramatic turn of events in Syria could spread elsewhere.
The Assad regime fell on December, 2024, after 54 years of rule and after 13 years after the Arab Spring revolts of 2011, that started in largely student led demonstrations in Deraa, Syria. Syrian president Bashar Al Assad opted ultimately to confront the protesters with force rather than entering into a political dialogue. He labelled the protesters “terrorists,” which eventually became a self-fulfilling prophecy.
I met with Bashar al Assad in 2003 and noted his early vision in a meeting we had in 2000 to institute reforms in Syria, and commented that very little progress had been achieved. He responded that “the people have to be ready for reforms and they are not. Therefore, I have decided to institute administrative reforms.”
It was evident that he was not serious about the reform agenda and focused on the consolidation of power at all costs. With growing opposition to the regime in subsequent years, the situation in Syria devolved, whereby Assad controlled only 2/3rds of Syria with Islamist and secular rebel groups continued to confront the regime.
The consequences of October 7th and Israel’s war in Gaza and Lebanon impacted the situation in Syria with the serious diminution of the Russian, Iranian and Hezbollah’s roles in Syria. The opposition movement led by the Islamist party Harakat Tahrir al Sham seized the opportunity to move against the regime which resulted rapidly in the departure of Bashar al Assad.
Going forward, the key question is will the new rulers of Syria respect the pluralistic nature of Syrian society or will they enforce sharia law and suppress minorities? Are their initial policy statements for inclusion a tactical or strategic commitment? What will a political transition look like? Will it be broad based? Or will internal or external spoilers undermine a political transition?
A key goal should be the security, independence and territorial integrity of Syria. Otherwise, the risk of “statelets” defined on ethnic and religious grounds could emerge, with increased migration flows, as a destabilizing force in the heartland of the Arab world.
After over five decades of ruthless rule and thirteen years of civil war, the Assad regime in Syria collapsed in less than two weeks. The Syrian civil war has claimed around 600,000 lives and displaced 14 million Syrians. It is no surprise, then, that Assad’s fall has been celebrated by millions of Syrians worldwide. The collapse of the Baath regime in Syria has also been welcomed by certain international actors who expect to benefit from the repercussions.
Turkey, a key patron of Islamist opposition groups since the onset of the civil war, now views this as an opportunity to expand and consolidate its presence in Syria. This includes assisting with the country’s reconstruction, sending back some of the 4 million Syrian refugees it has been hosting to bolster domestic support, and clearing northern Syria of Kurdish-led forces. For Israel, the fall of the regime means the loss of land routes for Iran to supply Hezbollah, as well as a weakened Iran in the broader region.
In addition to Iran, Russia also appears to be a net loser from the regime’s fall, now fighting the war in Ukraine with a weakened global presence. Yet, much of what follows will depend on the kind of Syria that emerges from the rubble of the civil war. The Syrian opposition is fragmented, and they are not the only military and political forces on the ground. Kurdish forces control territory in northeastern Syria, while Alawite forces hold the coastal regions of western Syria.
It remains to be seen whether the Syrian opposition forces, led by the al-Qaeda affiliate Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), will commit to pluralist governance or foster further infighting, which could lead to more civil war, instability, and refugee flows. Much will also depend on how the U.S. approaches post-Assad Syria, particularly regarding its ongoing support for Kurdish forces. If the U.S. were to completely withdraw, as President-elect Trump has recently stated, Turkey would gain significant leverage over the Kurds.
There is also the possibility that Iran’s waning influence in the region might lead to an escalation of its conflict with Israel, especially if Iran focuses more on developing its nuclear program. All these possibilities suggest that it may be too soon to draw definitive conclusions about what this watershed moment means for the safety and security of the Syrian people, as well as the interests of external actors in the broader region.
Iran’s involvement in Syria dates to late 2011 and early 2012 when the late Quds Force Commander, Qasem Soleimani, and Hezbollah’s late Secretary General, Hassan Nasrallah, convinced Iran’s Supreme Leader to commit to military intervention. Their argument was existential: Assad’s fall would not merely mean losing an ally but could unravel the entire “axis of resistance” that they had constructed over decades. The investment was staggering. Iran poured an estimated 30-50 billion USD into Syria, deeply embedding itself within key military structures and creating pro-regime militias like the National Defense Forces. The strategy appeared successful as IRGC forces, Iranian-backed militias, and Hezbollah - complemented by Russian air support after 2015 - proved crucial in helping Assad regain lost territory.
However, by 2024, the situation had reversed. Iran’s command and control structure in Syria began unraveling due to persistent Israeli strikes, compounded by Israel's degradation of Hezbollah’s leadership. When rebels launched their offensive, Iran found itself unable to mount an effective defense. Unlike in 2016, when Iranian ground forces had worked alongside Russian air power to secure Aleppo, neither patron showed the will or capability to intervene. Instead, they orchestrated their own withdrawals - Russia to its coastal strongholds in Latakia and Tartus, Iran eastward to Iraq - leaving Assad to face the consequences of his brutality alone.
The irony is profound: neither Soleimani nor Nasrallah lived to witness their vision collapse. Their intervention, intended to cement the “axis of resistance”, instead became a testament to its deterioration. Yet Tehran’s calculations may extend beyond immediate defeat. Given Iran’s proven ability to exploit regional chaos, Syria’s transition could present new opportunities for influence. While Iran cannot hope to restore its former level of control, the emerging power vacuum and tensions between various factions - particularly Kurdish-Turkish animosity - might create openings for a different kind of Iranian influence in Syria’s uncertain future.
A slogan from the Syrian government’s crackdown on protesters in 2011 was “Assad, or we burn the country.” The conventional wisdom before last week was that many secular Syrians and religious minorities supported the Assad regime – despite its brutality – because they feared the alternative, rule by the Sunni Arab majority in the guise of Islamism. Yet, few Syrians were willing to fight for the regime when the rebels launched their offensive on November 27 and quickly took Aleppo and Hama with little resistance. Assad’s Iranian and Russian backers could do little once this became clear. At dawn on December 8, checkpoints around Damascus were littered with Syrian military uniforms as soldiers deserted and changed into civilian clothing.
The Assad family’s kleptocratic rule, international sanctions, and civil war hollowed out the state. Syria had become a de facto narco-state, financially dependent on the production and trafficking of captagon, a synthetic amphetamine-type stimulant popular in the Gulf. A sufficient number of Syrians no longer saw this political order as one worth defending, and many ended their silent acquiescence when they saw regime support dissipate. And perhaps that hollowing-out of the center made a change in regime less threatening to those Syrians who previously feared life after the Assads.
Ahmad al-Shar‘a – the rebel leader of the Committee for the Liberation of the Levant (HTS) and former affiliate of al-Qaeda – has said all the right things to signal pragmatism and reassure his fellow Syrians and neighboring states that he and his fighters are no longer transnational salafi jihadists. He pledged to protect religious minorities and sacred sites, most critically the Sayyida Zeinab Shi‘i shrine. HTS quickly reestablished administrative services in cities that it captured, and al-Shar‘a called for the protection of public institutions. But Damascus’s new rulers – whoever they turn out to be – will be unlikely to be able to exert the central state’s authority throughout Syria for the foreseeable future. Rebuilding the state will take decades, and Syria will be competing with Gaza, Ukraine, and other crises for international attention and resources. Syria’s minorities – even the Alawites in their mountain redoubts – know they will have bargaining power with the central state. Insurgency is an option. The weakening of the Syrian state made defection from the regime more palatable, and it is also likely to make pragmatism and accommodation necessary for Syria’s next rulers, regardless of their ideological proclivities.
The end of the Assad regime – after 50 years of rule – will have massive reverberations throughout the Middle East. The rapidity of the collapse is a testament to how significantly Assad’s supporters and protectors – Iran, Hezbollah, and Russia – have been weakened. The loss of Assad is a tremendous blow for Iran at a time when the country is already reeling from the dramatic degradation of Hezbollah, Hamas, and many of its own conventional capabilities. While no tears should be shed for the end of this brutal Syrian regime, it is far from clear that the region will benefit as much from Assad’s demise as his opponents in Syria and around the world hope.
Several significant considerations will occupy the Biden Administration in its final days and prove to be immediate challenges for the incoming Trump Administration. The potential resurgence of ISIS should top any list. As noted by UK MI5 chief Ken McCallum this past October, ISIS was already reconstituting and posing a threat to the U.K. The U.S. Central Command conducted several direct strikes on ISIS in Syria the same month, and ISIS attacks in Syria and Iraq have steadily been on the rise. Now, with the collapse of Syrian regime forces, ISIS will find itself with much freer rein in the vast desert swathe of Syria between the urban centers in the west and the Kurdish-controlled areas east of the Euphrates.
The United States and others will also need to take steps to bolster their friends and allies in the region well beyond Israel. Iran, on the back foot, could decide to consolidate influence in Iraq through its proxy militias. Jordan is perhaps even more vulnerable, with a strengthening ISIS on its border and an uncertain future for the U.S. troop contingent in Syria, which has served as a buffer. Although many governments in the region – Turkey, Lebanon, Iraq, and Jordan – may hope Syrian refugees within their borders will return home, the flows could go in the opposite direction. The destabilization of Iraq and Jordan will strain the entire region, with Jordan's future being particularly consequential for Israel.
At another time, the United States and its allies might have become involved in brokering a Syrian government and helping it craft and lead a transitional period – as they did with varying degrees of success and failure in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Libya. Syria will be different. Neither the outgoing Biden Administration nor the incoming Trump Administration will have any proclivity to play this role in Syria. Whether any other outsiders will be welcome or interested in doing so is unclear but unlikely. Countries from across the region and beyond will seek to influence factions and outcomes behind the scenes – not a recipe for good governance or peace.
In a [social media post] this weekend, President-elect Trump made clear that, in his view, the United States should have nothing to do with Syria and events unfolding there. Such a hands-off approach, however appealing, will be both difficult and unwise. For instance, however much a new President Trump may want to withdraw the 900 American troops currently in Syria, he should put those plans on hold and focus on preventing the resurgence of ISIS. Moreover, the United States will need to invest heavily in helping partners like Jordan and Iraq – as well as Israel – withstand the pressures emanating from Syria.
The collapse of the Assad regime presents new opportunities for the region but also significant risks. The incoming Trump Administration will need to rethink its approach to Syria if it is to advance U.S. security, political, and economic interests in the Middle East.
The fall of Assad’s government, Iran’s oldest and only state ally since 1979, could render the region unrecognizable to Tehran. Their partnership, forged in the early 1980s through shared animosity toward Iraq’s Saddam Hussein and Israel, deepened as they collaborated in Lebanon. This alliance helped Tehran lay the groundwork for Hezbollah, the cornerstone of Iran’s “axis of resistance,” a network of non-state allies across the region.
Syria later became central to Iran’s “forward defense” doctrine, which involves working with the axis to counter threats far from its borders. During the battle against ISIS, Iranian officials frequently argued that if Iranian forces did not fight in Damascus, they would eventually have to fight in Tehran, a justification for their steadfast support of Assad during his brutal campaign against opposition forces.
Assad’s sudden downfall, however, could provoke cognitive disarray within the Islamic Republic as it struggles to recalibrate its understanding of regional dynamics. Within Iran’s elite circles, a period of soul-searching is already underway. Iranian leaders once pledged, “We will back Assad to the end,” boasting that Iran, unlike the United States, does not abandon its allies. Now, the question looms: What went wrong? A range of explanations and justifications have emerged, including Assad’s growing reluctance to collaborate with the axis, his gradual shift toward pro-U.S. Arab states, and his loss of support among both the populace and his inner circle.
Iranian officials claim they were willing to support Assad until the end, but he viewed the collapse as inevitable, as his army was unwilling to resist the opposition’s advances. Anecdotal reports suggest that neither Syrian officials nor ordinary citizens were comfortable with the sustained presence of Iranian and pro-Iran forces in their country. Many viewed these elements as liabilities, particularly as they became frequent targets of Israeli strikes that also posed risks to Syrians.
Looking ahead, Assad’s fall may prove more consequential for Iran than the setbacks suffered by Hamas and Hezbollah since October 7. While these non-state allies may potentially recover, given their deep-rooted support bases, Iran’s loss of Syria severs a vital link to the Arab world—one critical for transferring weapons to Hezbollah.
In the coming months and years, it will become clear whether Syria was the linchpin of Iran’s axis of resistance, whose collapse could lead to its unraveling, or merely a scaffold used to build the axis, which may now sustain itself independently.
Former president Bashar al Assad had ceased to be a significant independent force in the Middle East, and few will mourn his ouster. The important issue is not that he is gone, but rather who or what will end up governing Syria in the future. The forces that toppled Assad are far from united, and the outside powers who have been meddling in Syria for the past decade have conflicting interests. As the United States should have learned in Iraq, toppling an unpopular regime is the easy part. The hard part is reconstituting a legitimate, effective, and tolerably benign order.