Europeans felt as if they were punched three times in a row last week. The first punch came before the Munich Security Conference started, with the release of the opening remarks by Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth at Ukraine Defense Contact Group.
In these remarks, Hegseth stated, among other positions, that “the United States does not believe that NATO membership for Ukraine is a realistic outcome of a negotiated settlement.” Given that at its Washington summit in 2024, NATO previously issued a declaration saying that Ukraine is on an “irreversible path to full Euro-Atlantic integration,” such a bald statement from the U.S. defense secretary came as a shock.
Second, the news about the phone call between President Donald Trump and Russian President Vladimir Putin broke just as many of the guests were arriving in Munich for the conference. There was once again widespread shock at how much Trump appeared to be willing to concede to Putin in advance.
Third and finally was the speech of Vice President JD Vance at the conference itself, which signaled that he did not consider Europeans to be partners in security matters and so touched on them only relatively briefly. He focused instead on accusing Europeans of being afraid of free speech, particularly (in the German case) that of far-right politicians. His willingness to meet with the AfD, the far-right German party, convinced many Europeans that Vance had no understanding of the risks posed by such a party in a country with Germany’s difficult history.
The cumulative effects of these three shocks is hard to overstate. Europeans have felt that previous cases of transatlantic discord could be managed because they arose against a background of shared values. As a result of MSC 2025, however, Europeans and particularly Germans are now questioning whether those values are still shared.
The 2025 Munich Security Conference will likely be remembered as one of the most memorable since the turn of the century, alongside the ones in 2003, when German Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer criticized the impending US invasion of Iraq, and in 2007, when Vladimir Putin openly accused the U.S.-led world order of fueling global instability and condemned NATO expansion.
This year’s gathering marked the second Trump administration’s debut on the international stage, signaling a historic shift in U.S. foreign policy. U.S. president Donald Trump’s approach, characterized by a more transactional and even adversarial stance toward Europe, has forced European policymakers to reconsider the future of transatlantic relations. U.S. Vice president JD Vance’s strong criticism of Europe’s political leadership sent shockwaves through the conference hall and the European continent. Behind closed doors, European officials spoke about the need to “de-risk” not only from China and Russia but also from the United States.
Debates in Munich were shaped by Trump’s decision to exclude Ukraine and European allies from negotiations about Ukraine’s future, a move that European leaders viewed as both humiliating and alarming. While the immediate concern is Ukraine’s security, the broader implication is the erosion of European agency in global affairs. The central question discussed at the MSC was whether Europe would use this moment to develop a more cohesive and autonomous security policy amidst political division, a stagnant economy and the rise of nationalist anti-establishment parties.
Beyond Europe, Trump’s Russia policy has reinforced the notion that the new U.S. administration acknowledges that the world is multipolar, where spheres of influence are openly discussed. This raises concerns in Kyiv, the Baltics, and beyond, as Moscow may feel emboldened to interfere in their domestic politics and security arrangements, or even reshape regional borders. Meanwhile, despite the geopolitical uncertainty caused by Trump, policymakers from Latin America, Africa, and Asia generally see this moment as an opportunity – especially in India and China, but also, to a lesser degree, in Indonesia and Brazil. Many countries are now exploring ways to diversify their partnerships, reducing reliance on the United States and seeking greater strategic autonomy.
The 2025 MSC made clear that the world is in a period of rapid geopolitical realignment, and the question is no longer whether multipolarity will define the future of global order, but how different regions will adapt to it.
Amid the whirlwind of breaking news at this year’s Munich Security Conference, a Belfer Center side event focused on one longer-term, vitally important concern: adversarial alignment.
The nature, extent, and implications of this alignment—that is, relations among China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea—could scarcely be more consequential for the security and foreign policy of the United States and its allies. A Belfer Center panel, moderated by David Sanger, took on this issue with a lively and incisive conversation.
Why, exactly, have China, Iran, and North Korea lined up behind Russia in its war in Ukraine? (According to Fiona Hill, Vladimir Putin has sold his action as a proxy war against the United States.)
What has North Korea gained in sending its troops to fight alongside Russia? (Combat experience, said Dmytro Kuleba—a concern for all those who may be threatened by the nuclear-armed Pyongyang.)
Should China even be considered part of a grouping with Russia, Iran, and North Korea in the first place? (Not really, said Ian Bremmer, who emphasized the divergent geopolitical tactics and goals of Beijing and Moscow, their bonds notwithstanding.)
To be sure, the conversation did not lack of-the-moment themes. One topic was the prospect, sparked by the Trump administration’s moves, of a near-term peace deal in Ukraine. Kuleba’s view: the only person in a hurry is Donald Trump, and Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy will try to slow him down, knowing that a fast deal can only be done at Ukraine’s expense.
Meanwhile, Bremmer and Hill analyzed the threats facing Europe and the stirrings of greater investment in the continent’s security. (This latter topic, a major focus at Munich, is the subject of a Belfer Center task force report also released at the conference.)
From the sixth floor of Munich’s Bayerischer Hof hotel, the conversation offered a compelling picture of both the foreground of global events and the trends over the horizon. The view is hardly clear, making a sharp lens all the more important.