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Why do states send and seek conventional weapons? Logically, the balance of power motivates the arms trade, but many conventional arms transfers do not conform to balance of power logic. This article argues that arms transfers send signals about political alignments. It presents a typology of conventional weapons based on the weapons’ military utility and prestige. The case of arms sales to the Middle East before the 1967 Six-Day War shows the signaling function of arms transfers.
Jennifer Spindel, "Boom, Bling, Backbone, or Blip? The Signaling Inherent in Arms Transfers," International Security, Vol. 49, No. 3 (Winter 2024/25), pp. 164–204, https://doi.org/10.1162/isec_a_00505.
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