Asymmetric Coercion and Rules of the Game: Theory and Evidence from the Israel-Hamas Conflict in the Gaza Strip

About

Speaker: Daniel Sobelman, Research Fellow, International Security Program

Despite the vast military disparity between them, the Hamas-run Gaza Strip has in recent years become a significant factor in Israel's strategic environment. Drawing on a conceptual framework of asymmetrical coercive bargaining, this seminar will discuss different stages in the evolution of the conflict between Israel and the Gaza Strip over the past two decades, but especially since Hamas's takeover in 2007.

Among other things, the speaker will discuss the tacit asymmetric "rules of the game" that have come into existence between Israel and Hamas, which have helped to regulate the conflict on the one hand, but limit Israel's latitude, on the other hand. He will further explain how shifts in Hamas's coercive leverage vis-à-vis Israel have translated into strategic impact on the Israel-Gaza sphere, on the Palestinian arena as a whole, and on the linkage between the Palestinian arena and the Iran-led "axis of resistance."

Everyone is welcome to join us online via Zoom! Please register in advance for this seminar:
https://harvard.zoom.us/meeting/register/tJIrd-mqqTMpH9dP2KfAGgAVLV3Ckzm9dLQv

Contact

For more information, email the International Security Program Assistant at susan_lynch@harvard.edu.