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Past Event
Conference

Atomic Backfires: How Great Power Nuclear Policies Fail

Invitation Only Open to the Public

The Tenth Review Conference (RevCon) of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) will take place from 1 to 26 August 2022 at the United Nations' in New York.

On Thursday, August 11, from 10am-12 pm, the Project on Managing the Atom will host an in-person only conference side-event titled "Atomic Backfires: How Great Power Nuclear Policies Fail" in Conference Room B.

This panel discussion will launch a book by the same name. Moderated by Francesca Giovannini, the panel will include the following speakers: David M. Allison, Sarah Bidgood, Hyun-Binn Cho, Stephen Herzog, and Ariel F. W. Petrovics.

For questions regarding event attendance and logistics, please contact Project on Managing the Atom's Project Coordinator, Marina Lorenzini, at mlorenzini@hks.harvard.edu. We are unable to provide badges to members of the public to enter the conference.

Date: Time: -
UN HQ in New York

Speaker Bios

Moderated by Francesca Giovannini, Ph.D., Executive Director, Project on Managing the Atom

David M. Allison, Ph.D., Stanton Nuclear Security Postdoctoral Fellow, Project on Managing the Atom

Sarah Bidgood, Director, Eurasia Nonproliferation Program, James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies, Middlebury Institute of International Studies at Monterey; Ph.D. Candidate, King’s College London

Hyun-Binn Cho, Ph.D., Assistant Professor, The College of New Jersey

Stephen Herzog, Ph.D., Senior Researcher in Nuclear Arms Control, Center for Security Studies, ETH Zürich; Associate, Project on Managing the Atom

Ariel F. W. Petrovics, Ph.D., Assistant Research Professor, Center for International & Security Studies at Maryland, School of Public Policy, University of Maryland

About the Event

The States Parties meet to review the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) at a time when nuclear dangers loom particularly large. Indeed, the conflict in Ukraine and its nuclear dynamics have led many observers to fundamentally rethink deterrence and the idea that nuclear weapons can provide security to states. This turn of events highlights a need to scrutinize just how the nuclear-armed states have pursued their nuclear policy for decades.

Political efforts to halt nuclear proliferation, manage crises, promote arms control, and build alliances are often considered for mitigating the likelihood of nuclear catastrophe. Yet, no tool is guaranteed to succeed. Some may even have unanticipated, counterproductive consequences for global security.

At this side event, emerging nuclear scholars will provide insights based on research into the potentially damaging consequences of the policies nuclear decision-makers often take for granted. Their presentations represent selections from a forthcoming book intended for practitioners and students of nuclear politics alike. The panel will discuss unintended consequences of tools including: forceful counterproliferation, economic sanctions, crisis management strategies, arms control agreements, and nuclear alliances. Various approaches to combating nuclear risks will either succeed or fail. But identifying how the nuclear policies of great powers can and do backfire is ultimately critical for decreasing counterproductive consequences.