There are different opinions on the causes of nuclear proliferation, however, it is clear that proliferation attempts have been mostly conducted covertly in form of secret nuclear weapon programs or under the disguise of peaceful nuclear projects. To detect such secret proliferation attempts and prevent the spread of nuclear weapon, the nonproliferation regime has been developed with the core being the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) and the safeguards system managed by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). However, the limited capability of the Agency in carrying out its safeguards functions became apparent after the end of the Cold War with the revelation of proliferation activities in North Korea, Libya, and Iraq. Besides, the history of the NPT has been marked by the tension between the non-nuclear-weapon states (NNWS) and the nuclear-weapon states (NWS), with the former repeatedly criticizing the latter for the lack of transparency in disarmament efforts and the unfair judgment of civil nuclear developments in NNWS. Trying to improve the effectiveness of the nonproliferation regime through trust building, since the 1990s the IAEA and its Member States have developed the concept of nuclear transparency in safeguards and nonproliferation.
In this seminar, the speaker will discuss how the nuclear transparency concept has evolved, how to frame it appropriately for better practice in the NNWS, fairer assessment by the NWS, more effective safeguards by the IAEA, and how to measure it, qualitatively and quantitatively with the help of a nuclear transparency dataset.
Please join us! Coffee and tea provided. Everyone is welcome, but admittance will be on a first come–first served basis.
