New Principles of Russia’s Nuclear Deterrence Liberalize Conditions for Use, Unsurprisingly

As widely expected, the Kremlin has unveiled the new edition of Russia’s official nuclear doctrine, “Basic Principles of State Policy of the Russian Federation on Nuclear Deterrence.” The document, which Russian President Vladimir Putin signed off on Nov. 18 as Ukraine tested his red line by striking the Bryansk region with U.S.-made longer-range missiles,¹ ushers in an expansion of conditions under which Russia reserves the right to use nuclear weapons, but contains few surprises for those who have followed the Russian leadership’s nuclear rhetoric since the re-invasion of Ukraine in 2022, including, most importantly, Putin’s Sept. 25 preview of changes that would be introduced into the 2020 edition of the document.

The content of the new edition’s opening section on “General Provisions” is largely, but not entirely, identical to the previous edition. There is one important change in this introductory section as noted by Kommersant's Elena Chernenko. The 2020 edition stated that “the Russian Federation considers nuclear weapons exclusively as a means of deterrence, their use being an extreme and compelled measure, and takes all necessary efforts to reduce nuclear threat and prevent aggravation of interstate relations, which could trigger military conflicts, including nuclear ones.” The word “exclusively” is absent from the 2024 edition.

The second section, on “Essence of Nuclear Deterrence,” contains more significant changes. The 2020 document’s second section starts by explaining the aim of nuclear deterrence, stating that “Nuclear deterrence aims to provide a potential adversary with comprehension of the inevitability of retaliation in the event of aggression against the Russian Federation and/or its allies.” In contrast, the 2024 document’s second section starts with an explanation of what actors Russia deters with nuclear weapons. It also includes one key innovation, which Putin proposed in his Sept. 25 preview with an aim of dissuading the West from helping Ukraine militarily: “Aggression against the Russian Federation and (or) its allies by any non-nuclear state with the participation or support of a nuclear state is considered as their joint attack.”² In addition, the second section in the 2020 document identifies six “main military risks that might evolve into military threats.” In the 2024 document, as many as 10 such risks are listed. The newly added risks include:

• The creation of new or the expansion of existing military coalitions (blocs, alliances), leading to the advancement of their military infrastructure to the borders of the Russian Federation.
• The actions of a potential adversary aimed at isolating part of the territory of the Russian Federation, including blocking access to vital transportation communications.
• The actions of a potential adversary aimed at defeating (destroying, eliminating) ecologically hazardous objects of the Russian Federation, which may lead to man-made, ecological or social disasters.
• The planning and conduct of large-scale military exercises by a potential adversary near the borders of the Russian Federation.

The third section, on “Conditions for the transition of the Russian Federation to the use of nuclear weapons,” has undergone even more significant changes. The opening paragraph of this section in the 2020 document states that “The Russian Federation reserves the right to use nuclear weapons in response to the use of nuclear and other types of weapons of mass destruction against it and/or its allies, as well as in the event of aggression against the Russian Federation with the use of conventional weapons when the very existence of the state is in jeopardy.” In contrast, this section in the 2024 document states that “The Russian Federation reserves the right to use nuclear weapons in response to the use of nuclear and other types of weapons of mass destruction against it and/or its allies, as well as in the event of aggression against the Russian Federation and (or) the Republic of Belarus as participants in the Union State with the use of conventional weapons, which creates a critical threat to their sovereignty and/or territorial integrity.” The introduction of this condition confirms my earlier hypothesis that repeated claims by Putin and his top officials that threats to Russia’s sovereignty and territorial integrity are already listed in Russian strategic documents as conditions for the use of nuclear weapons were meant to prepare the ground for eventually introducting these conditions into Russia's nuclear doctrine. (Putin and his top officials claimed that the threat to Russia’s territorial integrity and its sovereignty could lead to Russia’s use of nuclear weapons at least 11 times and 12 times, respectively, according to my tracking of nuclear rhetoric by Russian leaders since the re-invasion of Ukraine.)

The third section of the 2020 and 2024 editions also differ significantly in their descriptions of the actual “conditions for the transition of the Russian Federation to the use of nuclear weapons,” with the latest document, again, reflecting the innovations Putin called for on Sept. 25. The 2024 edition introduces new official conditions for Russia’s use of nuclear weapons such as: the use of nuclear weapons or other types of weapons of mass destruction by an adversary against military formations and (or) facilities of the Russian Federation located outside its territory; the identification of Belarus as an ally, aggression against which could prompt Russia to use nuclear weapons against the aggressor; and the addition of an all new condition, the receipt of reliable data on a massive launch (takeoff) of air and space attack weapons (strategic and tactical aircraft, cruise missiles, unmanned, hypersonic and other aerial vehicles) and their crossing of Russia’s state border (see Table 1).

Table 1:

While it is important to identify and analyze the declaratory policies of nuclear powers such as Russia, one should, however, keep in mind that they are, well, declaratory (and that, perhaps, could explain the absence of a doctrinal response by the U.S., whose own nuclear posture is considerably more vague than Russia’s). If Russian wargames are any clue, then the Russian military has been gaming out the use of nuclear weapons to respond to threats to Russia’s territorial integrity for years before this threat ended up explicitly identified as an official “condition for transition to use of nuclear weapons” in the 2024 edition of the basic principles of Russia’s nuclear deterrence policy. Moreover, Putin reportedly considered employing nuclear weapons to respond to the Ukrainian counteroffensive within Ukraine’s 1991 borders in the second half of 2022 (chances of use were put at 50% by the U.S. intelligence community), even though neither the 2020 principles nor Rusia’s 2014 military doctrine³ provided for using nuclear weapons in such a scenario. So, in absence of access to top secret operational plans, it is important to not only follow what a nuclear power declares in its strategic documents (and what its leader says), but also what it does in terms of deployments and wargames. 

Please find selected experts’ hot takes on the unveiling of the 2024 document below, compiled by Angelina Flood and Chris Conway:

• William Alberque, former director of Strategy, Technology and Arms Control at IISS: “In all, the new doctrine says that Russia will use nuclear weapons whenever the President decides to do so. It also contains a laundry list of things it doesn't like - to try to shape Western behavior. Interesting, but still a propaganda tool rather than actual doctrine.” (X, 11.19.24)
• Ivan Arreguín-Toft, editor of Russia Matters: “The idea that a conventional attack can trigger a nuclear response if that attack carries with it a likelihood of success, where ‘success’ is defined as creating a ‘critical threat’ to Russia’s ‘sovereignty and territorial integrity’ actually dates back to 1949. But what’s novel about Putin’s effort is that Russia's definition of what counts as Russia’s sovereignty and territorial integrity is completely up to Russia to define, as opposed to well-understood treaty and customary international law. In Russia’s view, its sovereignty and territorial integrity now include the Donbas and Crimea and, increasingly, Ukraine itself. The subtext of Putin’s dangerous attempt to re-write customary international law bracketing a legitimate resort to first use of nuclear weapons is that not achieving Russia’s political objectives in Ukraine equals a critical threat to Russia’s sovereignty and territorial integrity.” (RM, 11.19.24)
• Matthew Bunn, Harvard professor: “This is a signaling exercise, trying to scare audiences in Europe — and to a lesser extent, the United States — into falling off support for Ukraine. The actual short-term probability of Russian nuclear use hasn’t increased. The long-term probability of nuclear war has probably increased slightly — because U.S. willingness to support strikes deep into Russia is reinforcing Putin’s hatred and fear of the West, and will likely provoke Russian responses that will increase Western fear and hatred of Russia.” (NYT, 11.19.24)
• Lt. Gen. Yevgeny Buzhinsky, chairman of the PIR Center’s Council hopes that the West will “read the new doctrine carefully and will probably be upset, since the threshold for using nuclear weapons has been lowered doctrinally, and lowered quite significantly.” “But I think they won’t believe it. They won’t believe that Russia could actually resort to using nuclear weapons in response to actions that they themselves [the West] consider insignificant.” (Kommersant, 11.19.24)
• Alexander Graef, senior researcher at the Institute for Peace Research and Security Policy at the University of Hamburg: "The big picture is that Russia is lowering the threshold for a nuclear strike in response to a possible conventional attack." (Reuters, 11.19.24)
• Sam Greene, professor in Russian politics at King’s College London: “The fact that Russia published a revised nuclear doctrine on the same day that Ukraine first fired ATACMs across the border is the result of careful escalation management by both sides. We may eventually get to WWIII, but probably not tonight. None of this happened at a moment's notice. Ukraine had been asking for permission for long-range strikes for ages. Biden made it clear it was a matter of time. Putin will have decided that this--a relatively minor revision of a document--would be his response.” (X, 11.19.24)
• Col. Mikhail Khodarenok, Russian military expert: “Special attention should be paid to paragraph 11: ‘Aggression against the Russian Federation and (or) its allies by any non-nuclear state with the participation or support of a nuclear state is considered as their joint attack.’ This fully applies to the situation that arose when the United States (and its allies) decided to use long-range tactical ballistic and cruise missiles against targets deep in Russia.” (Gazeta.ru, 11.19.24)
• Daryl G. Kimball, Executive Director of the Arms Control Association: “We call on all responsible governments everywhere to clearly condemn all nuclear threats, explicit or implicit, and any use of such weapons, and speak out against changes to Russia’s nuclear doctrine, or any other state’s nuclear-use doctrine, that allows for the use of nuclear weapons in response to a non-nuclear attack. As the powerful Group of 20 (G-20) nations said in joint statements at their 2022 and 2023 summits, the use of nuclear weapons and threats of use are ‘inadmissible.’ (Arms Control Association statement, 11.19.24)
• Hans M. Kristensen, director of the Nuclear Information Project at the Federation of American Scientists: “Russia’s repeated nuclear warnings and latest verbal lowering of threshold for potential use of nukes demonstrate an almost desperate effort to be taken seriously. Whether it will be or actually changes likely of use nukes is another question. … The updated Russian doctrine document is an astounding read. It is so broad and detailed that one has to wonder what it means. Why not just publish a one-pager declaring: ‘The President can authorize the use of nuclear weapons in any scenario deemed necessary.’” (X, 11.19.24)
• Dmitry Medvedev, deputy chairman of the Russian Security Council: “The use of alliance missiles [NATO] in this way can now be qualified as an attack by the bloc countries on Russia. In this case, the right arises to launch a retaliatory strike with weapons of mass destruction on Kyiv and the main NATO facilities, wherever they are. And this is already WWIII.” (Kommersant, 11.19.24)
• Sergei Lavrov, Russian foreign minister: “I hope that they [in the West] will read this doctrine. And not in the way they read the U.N. Charter, seeing there only what they need, but the doctrine in all its fullness and interconnectedness.” (Kommersant, 11.19.24)
• Dmitry Peskov, Vladimir Putin’s press secretary: “What is the most striking example of modern reality? The authorities in the United States are deciding to use their weapons, American-made weapons, against the Russian Federation. This is a striking example of the new situation around our country, and this makes it necessary to update the concept.” (Kommersant, 11.19.24)
• Peskov also said: “This is a very important text…it should become a subject to very deep analysis.” (BBC News, 11.19.24)
• Pavel Podvig, Russian nuclear forces researcher: “There are a few things about the doctrine. While the changes have been in the works for some time, it does appear that the timing of the decree was chosen deliberately, to send a (strong) signal of disapproval of the decision to give the authorization. It's hard to say whether this signal will be followed by specific actions, of course. It's quite possible that Russia will take some escalatory steps outside Ukraine that would pose a serious challenge to the United States.” (X, 11.19.24) 
• Sergei Ryabkov, Russian deputy foreign minister: "Now the danger of a direct armed clash between nuclear powers cannot be underestimated, what is happening has no analogues in the past, we are moving through unexplored military and political territory." (Reuters, 11.19.24)
• Tatiana Stanovaya, Russian political analyst, noted that Peskov’s Nov. 19 comments marked the first time the Kremlin explicitly acknowledged “the potential use of nuclear weapons as a response to strikes on Russian territory using long-range missiles.” “Put simply, Peskov openly admits that the Kremlin is currently considering the possibility of a nuclear strike,” she said. Stanovaya also said “the current situation offers Putin a significant temptation to escalate” and marks “an extraordinarily dangerous juncture.” (AP, 11.19.24)
• Jack Watling, senior research fellow at RUSI, said the use of Western longer-range missiles “certainly will not” trigger Moscow’s nuclear response as some in the West feared. (AP, 11.19.24)

Footnotes:

1. Putin signed off on the new edition on the same day that Ukraine used U.S.-supplied ATACMS missiles against a target in Russia’s Bryansk region, ignoring the Russian leader’s recent warnings that such use would cross a Russian red line and make NATO a belligerent in the war. Asked Nov. 19 if a Ukrainian attack with longer-range U.S. missiles could potentially trigger a nuclear response, Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov answered affirmatively, pointing to the doctrine’s provision that holds the door open for a nuclear response after a conventional strike that poses a critical threat to the “sovereignty and territorial integrity” of Russia and its ally, Belarus, AP reported.The White House has played down the new document, saying in a statement issued by the National Security Council that it had observed “no changes to Russia’s nuclear posture,” NYT reported.
2. This repeats almost verbatim what Putin proposed on Sept. 25: “The updated version of the document is supposed to regard an aggression against Russia from any non-nuclear state but involving or supported by any nuclear state as their joint attack against the Russian Federation.”
3. BTW, the 2014 doctrine, which as Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Sergei Ryabkov has recently indicated, is superior in its legal status to the basic principles of deterrence, would now have to be updated or replaced to make sure it has up-to-date language on the use of nuclear weapons.