Past Event
Seminar

Dangerous Deterrents? Evaluating the Argument and Evidence that Nuclear Acquisition Emboldens Weak States

Open to the Public

Under what conditions does acquiring nuclear weapons embolden weak states to do things they otherwise would not have done against their stronger adversaries?

Please join us! Coffee and tea provided. Everyone is welcome, but admittance will be on a first come–first served basis.

A new 50,000 Rials banknote released by the Central Bank of Iran on Mar. 12, 2007. Iran issued a banknote emblazoned with a nuclear symbol, seen in center, in a move seen as an assertion of the national will in the face of international sanctions.

About

Under what conditions does acquiring nuclear weapons embolden weak states to do things they otherwise would not have done against their stronger adversaries? How frequently can we expect these conditions to obtain? And how severe will the results be when they do? This seminar will lay out the emerging conventional wisdom that acquisition has emboldened and will embolden states such as Iran; replace this flawed argument with a logically complete and less pessimistic competitor; and evaluate both in light of evidence from the crucial case of Pakistan.

Please join us! Coffee and tea provided. Everyone is welcome, but admittance will be on a first come–first served basis.