A Game Theoretic Approach to Safeguards Selection and Optimization

Open to the Public

This seminar presents the development of a game theoretic computational tool that explores inspector and proliferator strategies at an enrichment facility and suggests optimally efficient strategies for both actors.

Date: Wed, Dec 12, 2012 Time: 10:00am - 11:30am Location: Littauer Building - Belfer Center Library, Room 369

The International Atomic Energy Agency’s (IAEA’s) workload has grown steadily over the past several decades while its budget has remained relatively stagnant, resulting in an increasingly resource-constrained inspectorate. As a result of this resource burden, the IAEA must employ more efficient inspection strategies to meet its detection goals. This seminar presents the development of a game theoretic computational tool that explores inspector and proliferator strategies at an enrichment facility and suggests optimally efficient strategies for both actors.