The overarching question imparting urgency to this exploration is: Can U.S.-Russian contention in cyberspace cause the two nuclear superpowers to stumble into war? In considering this question we were constantly reminded of recent comments by a prominent U.S. arms control expert: At least as dangerous as the risk of an actual cyberattack, he observed, is cyber operations’ “blurring of the line between peace and war.” Or, as Nye wrote, “in the cyber realm, the difference between a weapon and a non-weapon may come down to a single line of code, or simply the intent of a computer program’s user.”
The International Atomic Energy Agency’s (IAEA’s) workload has grown steadily over the past several decades while its budget has remained relatively stagnant, resulting in an increasingly resource-constrained inspectorate. As a result of this resource burden, the IAEA must employ more efficient inspection strategies to meet its detection goals. This seminar presents the development of a game theoretic computational tool that explores inspector and proliferator strategies at an enrichment facility and suggests optimally efficient strategies for both actors.