How Much is Enough to Kill a Nation? Great Power Nuclear Deterrence in a New Era of Countervalue Vulnerability

A fundamental premise of the nuclear revolution theory (TNR) is the claim of assured destruction—the ability of a state to retaliate with a nuclear second strike that destroys the adversary’s economic and industrial infrastructure, denying it the ability to survive as a viable modern nation-state. However, as we enter an era of renewed strategic great power competition, emerging technological advances have reanimated questions about the continued relevance of TNR. Can a state employing emerging technologies significantly undermine its adversary’s assured destruction capabilities? Using insights from Self-Organized Criticality theory, I analytically reexamine and model the requirements for assured destruction. I demonstrate that the networked structure of critical infrastructures continues to make advanced industrial states extremely vulnerable to assured destruction—at a fraction of Cold War arsenal requirements. I estimate that 70 explosions using ~20 megatons will impose assured destruction on a modern nation-state. For comparison, during the Cold War, it required hundreds of explosions and 2000 megatons. I conclude the article by examining the dangers of pursuing damage-limitation efforts in this new era of countervalue vulnerability.