The overarching question imparting urgency to this exploration is: Can U.S.-Russian contention in cyberspace cause the two nuclear superpowers to stumble into war? In considering this question we were constantly reminded of recent comments by a prominent U.S. arms control expert: At least as dangerous as the risk of an actual cyberattack, he observed, is cyber operations’ “blurring of the line between peace and war.” Or, as Nye wrote, “in the cyber realm, the difference between a weapon and a non-weapon may come down to a single line of code, or simply the intent of a computer program’s user.”
Iran's failure to comply with its non-proliferation obligations is viewed as one of the most urgent threats to the nuclear non-proliferation regime and international peace and security. Given that diplomacy has thus far not been successful in changing that country's conduct, the only available options for dealing with the problem seem to be increasingly crippling sanctions and, possibly, military strikes against Iran's nuclear facilities. The seminar presentation challenges the above assumptions by drawing attention to the absence of serious diplomatic efforts and lack of understanding of what is at stake for Iran in the dispute. Drawing from the English School theory of International Relations, the speaker argues that the current "solidarist" approach to non-proliferation governance should be tempered by "pluralist" sensitivity to the political limits of both norm-enforcement and arms control.
Please join us! Coffee and tea provided. Everyone is welcome, but admittance will be on a first come–first served basis.