Nuclear Platform Diversification: A New Dataset

Name: Nuclear Platform Diversification: A New Dataset
Start: 2020-05-07T12:15:00-0400
End: 2020-05-07T14:00:00-0400

Open to the Public

Speakers: Giles David Arceneaux, Postdoctoral Fellow, International Security Program/Project on Managing the Atom

Kyungwon Suh, Ph.D. candidate, Department of Political Science, Syracuse University

The deterrent capacity of a state's nuclear forces is dependent upon the platforms and delivery systems that constitute the arsenal. The mere possession of nuclear weapons does not provide a robust deterrent and nuclear states cannot credibly deter potential adversaries with nuclear threats in the absence of adequate delivery capabilities. The project presents a new dataset that measures the possession of seven nuclear delivery platforms across all nuclear powers from 1945–2019, including: submarine-launched missiles, strategic land-mobile missiles, strategic solid-fuel missiles, nuclear cruise missiles, multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles, long-range ballistic missiles, and tactical nuclear weapons.

Everyone is welcome to join us online via Zoom! Please register in advance for this seminar: https://harvard.zoom.us/meeting/register/tJcsf-6uqTwoHdZZJ3qqoP1Ohy78rsXBc5en

Date: Thu, May 7, 2020 Time: 12:15pm - 02:00pm Location: Online

The USS Pennsylvania, a nuclear-armed Ohio-class ballistic missile submarine

Speakers: Giles David Arceneaux, Postdoctoral Fellow, International Security Program/Project on Managing the Atom

Kyungwon Suh, Ph.D. candidate, Department of Political Science, Syracuse University

The deterrent capacity of a state's nuclear forces is dependent upon the platforms and delivery systems that constitute the arsenal. The crisis between the United States and North Korea in 2017 illustrates this principle, as North Korea's successful demonstration of intercontinental ballistic missile technology forced the United States to account for North Korea's newfound ability to target the U.S. homeland. Despite the importance of specific platforms for nuclear deterrence and coercion, however, existing studies typically evaluate the deterrent power of nuclear weapons by measuring whether a state possesses nuclear weapons or the number of warheads within a state's nuclear arsenal.

This project argues that such measures of nuclear capabilities are inadequate for evaluating the consequences of nuclear proliferation for deterrence and coercion. The mere possession of nuclear weapons does not provide a robust deterrent and nuclear states cannot credibly deter potential adversaries with nuclear threats in the absence of adequate delivery capabilities. The project presents a new dataset that measures the possession of seven nuclear delivery platforms across all nuclear powers from 1945–2019, including: submarine-launched missiles, strategic land-mobile missiles, strategic solid-fuel missiles, nuclear cruise missiles, multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles, long-range ballistic missiles, and tactical nuclear weapons. These data provide an alternative conceptual framework that better captures the operational capacity of a state's nuclear arsenal. This project also provides a preliminary analysis of the effect of nuclear platform diversification on dispute initiation and escalation involving nuclear-armed states.

Everyone is welcome to join us online via Zoom! Please register in advance for this seminar: https://harvard.zoom.us/meeting/register/tJcsf-6uqTwoHdZZJ3qqoP1Ohy78rsXBc5en

For more information, email the International Security Program Assistant at susan_lynch@harvard.edu.