The information assembled here is for any campaign in any party. It was designed to give you simple, actionable information that will make your campaign’s information more secure from adversaries trying to attack your organization—and our democracy
Since 1998, both Pakistan and India have operationalized their nuclear capabilities and are in the process of completing their respective nuclear triads. Triggered by the dismemberment of the country in the 1971 war with India, Pakistan’s nuclear weapons program has been aimed at addressing an acute security threat, exacerbated by a growing imbalance in national power and military capabilities. Although Pakistan continues to invest in capabilities to ensure the credibility of its deterrent posture the growing imbalance in conventional and strategic military capabilities in South Asia is likely to contribute to crisis instability and could result in a failure of deterrence and the loss of escalation control during a future conflict with India. This seminar will examine the dynamics and trajectory of Pakistan’s emerging nuclear posture in terms of: the political and organizational sources of Pakistan’s strategic program; the perceived threat posed by India’s conventional and strategic force modernization coupled with a potential shift in its declaratory doctrine and development of counterforce capabilities; asymmetries in defense spending, and the growing gap in stockpiles of fissile material, the capacity to produce it, and the impact on Pakistan’s deficit on its force goals; the impact of India’s pursuit of ballistic missile defenses and space-based ISR capabilities, MIRVs, and nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines; and the prospects for bilateral CBMs and nuclear and conventional force reductions and arms control in the region.
Mansoor Ahmed writes and comments on various aspects of Pakistan's nuclear program, policy, and posture and strategic stability dynamics in South Asia. His current research examines the impact of bureaucratic-politics and myth making on nuclear decision-making in Pakistan.
Prior to joining the Belfer Center, he served as a Lecturer in the Department of Defense and Strategic Studies, Quaid-i-Azam University (QAU), Islamabad, and was a Visiting Research Scholar at the Sandia National Laboratories. He holds a Ph.D. in International Relations from QAU.