Speaker: Nicholas Blanchette, Research Fellow, International Security Program
How do states reveal information about advanced military technologies to their security rivals in the context of peacetime security competition? The problem of technology revelation resembles one of the most important and underexplored decisions facing states in possession of advanced instruments of military power. Here, advanced military technologies carry the potential to alter the military balance between, change the relationship between offense and defense, and revolutionize warfare altogether. Consequently, the decision of whether and how to reveal technologies is fraught with tradeoffs. While states may preserve warfighting effectiveness or avoid preventive attack by hiding advanced military technologies, they would forego the peacetime political dividends of signaling military power. This project explores how states navigate this tension by variously hiding, exaggerating strengths or weaknesses, and transparently disclosing military technologies.
In this seminar, Nicholas Blanchette will introduce a novel typology of the various technology revelation strategies available to states and propose a theory that explains why decisionmakers opt for certain signaling strategies over others. In addition to discussing his theoretical framework and the broader policy implications of the project, Nicholas will discuss findings from a historical case study on German aerial rearmament during the interwar period, in which German political and military officials employed secrecy and deception in their signaling of aircraft for strategic advantage.
Admittance is on a first come–first served basis. Tea and Coffee Provided.
