The overarching question imparting urgency to this exploration is: Can U.S.-Russian contention in cyberspace cause the two nuclear superpowers to stumble into war? In considering this question we were constantly reminded of recent comments by a prominent U.S. arms control expert: At least as dangerous as the risk of an actual cyberattack, he observed, is cyber operations’ “blurring of the line between peace and war.” Or, as Nye wrote, “in the cyber realm, the difference between a weapon and a non-weapon may come down to a single line of code, or simply the intent of a computer program’s user.”
Taiwan’s nuclear activities during the Cold War went through two stages—from 1972–1978, and from 1978–1988. During both periods, the United States expended considerable energy on a coercion and inducements campaign to persuade and eventually prevent Taiwan from progressing towards a nuclear weapon. In this talk, drawing on a series of interviews conducted in Taiwan with the support of the Belfer Center’s Managing the Atom Project, the International Security Program and the Stanton Foundation, Eugene Kogan will offer an update on an on-going research to deepen our understanding of this complicated nuclear negotiation.