To compete and thrive in the 21st century, democracies, and the United States in particular, must develop new national security and economic strategies that address the geopolitics of information. In the 20th century, market capitalist democracies geared infrastructure, energy, trade, and even social policy to protect and advance that era’s key source of power—manufacturing. In this century, democracies must better account for information geopolitics across all dimensions of domestic policy and national strategy.
Many government programs to aid democracy abroad today are not designed to foster short- or even medium-term changes in target countries' democracy levels. Instead, today's template of democracy assistance activities emphasizes technical programs that do not threaten the non-democratic regimes of the target countries. That template contrasts with the more confrontational aid projects to dissidents, political parties, and trade unions that dominated the early era of democracy assistance in the 1980s. What explains the taming of democracy assistance? Previous research suggests that donor countries' self-interests and target states' characteristics drive patterns of foreign aid. In contrast, this research project focuses on the incentives created by the funding structure of democracy assistance and how the field of professional democracy assistance organizations responds to those incentives over time. The argument is tested through a cross-national, time-series analysis of an original data set of democracy assistance projects funded by the U.S. government and a qualitative case study of the organization Freedom House, a non-governmental organization that promotes democracy abroad. The findings have important implications for the study of foreign influence, transnational delegation, and moral actors in world politics, as well as for the practice of democracy promotion.
Please join us! Coffee and tea provided. Everyone is welcome, but admittance will be on a first come–first served basis.