Paper
Comprehensive Agreement in Works
Iran and the P5+1 negotiators are convening this week in Vienna to iron out a comprehensive nuclear deal before the “deadline” – 20 July, 2014 – set in the November 2013 Joint Plan of Action (JPA).
It appears that the views of parties are still far apart when it comes to the establishment of “a mutually defined enrichment programme with practical limits and transparency measures to ensure the peaceful nature of the programme” of Iran. In fact, Iran has been raising the bar stating in recent times that it needs to have uranium enrichment capacity enough to fuel Bushehr reactor, which would entail about 130000 IR-1 centrifuges and substantial stockpiles of enriched uranium. An annual reload of a Bushehr-sized type reactor requires about 20 tons of uranium enriched up to 3.5 % U-235. In 2009, when the France, Russia, and the US negotiated with Iran the Tehran Research Reactor deal, the limit for maximum enriched uranium stocks in Iran was set to 1.2 tons UF6; quantity enough for one nuclear explosive, if further enriched.
With regard to the concerns on future plutonium production capabilities, Iran has indicated its willingness to reduce the plutonium production rate of the heavy water reactor under construction in Arak with modifications. However, suggestions made are not irreversible; the reactor can be reconfigured to produce plutonium annually for one nuclear device. In addition, there is no sign that Iran is giving up its heavy water stocks or production plant.
The full text of the paper can be found below:
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Belfer Communications Office
For Academic Citation:
Heinonen, Olli. “Comprehensive Agreement in Works.” Paper, June 30, 2014.
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Iran and the P5+1 negotiators are convening this week in Vienna to iron out a comprehensive nuclear deal before the “deadline” – 20 July, 2014 – set in the November 2013 Joint Plan of Action (JPA).
It appears that the views of parties are still far apart when it comes to the establishment of “a mutually defined enrichment programme with practical limits and transparency measures to ensure the peaceful nature of the programme” of Iran. In fact, Iran has been raising the bar stating in recent times that it needs to have uranium enrichment capacity enough to fuel Bushehr reactor, which would entail about 130000 IR-1 centrifuges and substantial stockpiles of enriched uranium. An annual reload of a Bushehr-sized type reactor requires about 20 tons of uranium enriched up to 3.5 % U-235. In 2009, when the France, Russia, and the US negotiated with Iran the Tehran Research Reactor deal, the limit for maximum enriched uranium stocks in Iran was set to 1.2 tons UF6; quantity enough for one nuclear explosive, if further enriched.
With regard to the concerns on future plutonium production capabilities, Iran has indicated its willingness to reduce the plutonium production rate of the heavy water reactor under construction in Arak with modifications. However, suggestions made are not irreversible; the reactor can be reconfigured to produce plutonium annually for one nuclear device. In addition, there is no sign that Iran is giving up its heavy water stocks or production plant.
The full text of the paper can be found below:
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