Paper
Laser and gas centrifuge enrichment
INTRODUCTION
Commercial uranium enrichment companies are currently operating in China (China National Nuclear Corporation, CNNC), France (AREVA). Germany (URENCO), the Netherlands (URENCO), the Russian Federation (ROSATOM), the United Kingdom (URENCO), and USA (USEC and URENCO). These enterprises have a total annual enrichment capacity of 65 million separative work units (SWU), which is well above the annual demand of about 45 million SWU. In addition, smaller enrichment facilities exist in Argentina, Brazil, India, the Islamic Republic of Iran, Japan and Pakistan.
There are several uranium enrichment methods, but only gas diffusion, gas centrifuges, and SILEX are of relevance on commercial scale. The world’s oldest operating enrichment plant - the Paducah gaseous diffusion plant in the United States ended its commercial operation in 2013. But new gas centrifuge enrichment plants will be built or current ones expanded. At the same time, the Global Laser Enrichment Facility (GLE) in Wilmington using laser enrichment technology is approaching its commercialization phase. With the onset of new gas centrifuge enrichment capacities, the World Nuclear Association expects that there will be in 2020 87 million SWU available to satisfy the estimated need of 60 million SWU. Most of the world’s enriched uranium will be produced by AREVA, CNNC, GLE, ROSATOM, and URENCO. In the light of these developments, there should be fairly little economical or security reasons for another country or commercial entity to embark on large enrichment projects elsewhere.
The full text of the paper can be found below.
For more information on this publication:
Belfer Communications Office
For Academic Citation:
Heinonen, Olli. “Laser and gas centrifuge enrichment.” Paper, June 2014.
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INTRODUCTION
Commercial uranium enrichment companies are currently operating in China (China National Nuclear Corporation, CNNC), France (AREVA). Germany (URENCO), the Netherlands (URENCO), the Russian Federation (ROSATOM), the United Kingdom (URENCO), and USA (USEC and URENCO). These enterprises have a total annual enrichment capacity of 65 million separative work units (SWU), which is well above the annual demand of about 45 million SWU. In addition, smaller enrichment facilities exist in Argentina, Brazil, India, the Islamic Republic of Iran, Japan and Pakistan.
There are several uranium enrichment methods, but only gas diffusion, gas centrifuges, and SILEX are of relevance on commercial scale. The world’s oldest operating enrichment plant - the Paducah gaseous diffusion plant in the United States ended its commercial operation in 2013. But new gas centrifuge enrichment plants will be built or current ones expanded. At the same time, the Global Laser Enrichment Facility (GLE) in Wilmington using laser enrichment technology is approaching its commercialization phase. With the onset of new gas centrifuge enrichment capacities, the World Nuclear Association expects that there will be in 2020 87 million SWU available to satisfy the estimated need of 60 million SWU. Most of the world’s enriched uranium will be produced by AREVA, CNNC, GLE, ROSATOM, and URENCO. In the light of these developments, there should be fairly little economical or security reasons for another country or commercial entity to embark on large enrichment projects elsewhere.
The full text of the paper can be found below.
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