Nuclear Issues

27 Items

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Testimony

The Implications of Sanctions Relief Under the Iran Agreement

| August 5, 2015

Nicholas Burns testified on August 5, 2015, before the Senate Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, on "The Implications of Sanctions Relief Under the Iran Agreement."


"Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Brown and members of the committee, thank you for this opportunity to testify on the international agreement to prevent Iran from becoming a nuclear weapons power and the implications for sanctions relief.

This is one of the most urgent and important challenges for our country, for our European allies as well as for Israel and our Arab partners in the Middle East.  The United States must thwart Iran’s nuclear weapons ambitions and its determination to become the dominant military power in the region."

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Testimony - Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard Kennedy School

The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) and the Military Balance in the Middle East

| August 4, 2015

Nicholas Burns testified before the Senate Committee on Armed Services on Aug. 4, 2015, on "The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) and the Military Balance in the Middle East."

"Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Reed and members of the committee, thank you for this opportunity to testify on the international agreement to prevent Iran from becoming a nuclear weapons power.

This is one of the most urgent and important challenges for our country, for our European allies as well as for Israel and our Arab partners in the Middle East. The United States must thwart Iran’s nuclear weapons ambitions and its determination to become the dominant military power in the region."

U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry delivers a statement on the Iran talks deal at the Vienna International Center in Vienna, Austria Tuesday July 14, 2015.

(AP Photo)

Policy Brief - Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard Kennedy School

Elements of the Iran Nuclear Deal

| July 15, 2015

The July 14, 2015 comprehensive nuclear deal between Iran and the P5+1 (known as the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action or JCPOA) consists of the agreement itself and five technical annexes: Annex I – Nuclear-related measures; Annex 2 – Sanctions-related commitments; Annex III- Civil Nuclear Cooperation; Annex IV – Joint Commission; and Annex V – Implementation Plan. The version issued by the EU is used here because pages and paragraphs are numbered in proper order.

This article describes the main elements of the JCPOA. In coming days, the Belfer Center plans to publish a more detailed description and assessment of the agreement.

Various images shown on screens at the General Satellite Control and Command Center show the launch of North Korea's Unha-3 rocket, Dec. 12, 2012, in Pyongyang, North Korea.

AP Photo

Policy Brief - National Bureau of Asian Research

The Leap in North Korea's Ballistic Missile Program: The Iran Factor

| December 2012

John S. Park, Stanton Nuclear Security Junior Faculty Fellow at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology and Project on Managing the Atom Associate, argues that cooperation between North Korea and Iran has been a critical—yet underexamined—enabler of North Korea's recent success. He concludes that the time has come for the United States to view the two previously independent missile programs as two sides of the same coin and recommends strategies for disrupting the procurement channels between Iran and North Korea.

In this Apr. 5, 2009 photo, U.S. President Barack Obama speaks at Hradcany square in Prague. "I state clearly and with conviction America's commitment to seek the peace and security of a world without nuclear weapons."

AP Photo

Policy Brief - Quarterly Journal: International Security

The Future of U.S. Nuclear Policy: The Case for No First Use

    Author:
  • Michael S. Gerson
| February 2011

"NFU would provide the United States with important political benefits in its efforts to lead the nonproliferation regime and encourage greater international support for nonproliferation initiatives. Many nonnuclear member states of the Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) often base their lack of support for U.S.-led multilateral nonproliferation initiatives on the grounds that the United States has not done enough to fulfill its obligation to Article 6 of the NPT, which commits the declared nuclear states to disarmament."

North Korean soldiers chant anti-U.S. slogans during a rally in Pyongyang, North Korea. Tens of thousands of North Koreans rallied in their capital to condemn the United States and South Korea on the 60th anniversary of the start of the Korean War.

AP Photo

Policy Brief - Quarterly Journal: International Security

Keeping Kim: How North Korea's Regime Stays in Power

| July 2010

"In contrast to the media, which persist in portraying Kim Jong-il as a madman or an incompetent playboy, this analysis shows him to be a shrewd, if reprehensible, leader. His meticulous use of the authoritarian toolbox reveals him to be a skilled strategic player. Kim shows every sign of being rational—and thus deterrable."

Australian customs service officers, wearing anti-chemical suit, get ready for an inspection drill as part of the Pacific Shield 07 exercises at Yokohama port, southwest of Tokyo, Oct. 15, 2007.

AP Photo

Policy Brief - Lowy Institute for International Policy

A Tighter Net: Strengthening the Proliferation Security Initiative

| August 2009

Australia and other countries should redouble their efforts to fix serious gaps in an international arrangement to stop maritime shipments of materials destined for weapons of mass destruction programs, according to the Brief. It argues that heightened concerns over North Korea provide an opportunity to bolster the Proliferation Security Initiative, a 95-country arrangement to promote interception of transfers of cargoes related to weapons of mass destruction.

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Policy Brief - Washington Institute for Near East Policy

Speaking about the Unspeakable: U.S.-Israeli Dialogue on Iran's Nuclear Program

| December 2007

Despite the longstanding and ever-evolving "special relationship" between the United States and Israel, the two allies do not appear to have engaged in substantive discussions on key facets of their most pressing mutual concern, the Iranian nuclear threat. Specifically, there has been little if any dialogue on the possibility of military action if the diplomatic route comes to a dead end, nor on the possible means of living with a nuclear Iran should both countries decide to refrain from military action.