Resources

• Fiona Hill, “The Kremlin’s Strange Victory,” Foreign Affairs, November/December 2021.
  • Contrary to many Western expectations, Russia hasn’t become “more like us” since the end of the Cold War. Instead, the US has become more like Russia as populism, cronyism, and corruption have eroded the vitality of US democracy.
  • With Russian foreign policy driven primarily by Putin’s insecurities, the Cold War model of deterrence and limited engagement is no longer viable. Instead, our primary objective must be to make the US resilient against Russian opportunities to exploit our domestic divisions.
     
• Graham Allison, “Good News from the Russian Front,” National Interest, December 24, 2021.
  • Despite enormous risks of nuclear proliferation when the Soviet Union collapsed, not a single nuclear weapon has been discovered outside the control of Russian authorities. The cooperation and strategic imagination evident in this success—such as in the Nunn-Lugar legislation—offer a promising precedent for tackling modern issues in the US-Russia relationship.
     
• Mary Sarotte, “I’m a Cold War Historian. We’re in a Frightening New Era.” New York Times, March 1, 2022.
  • The Cold War inculcated habits of engagement, deterrence, and deconfliction between the US and the Soviet Union. In the thirty years since the USSR collapsed, those habits have atrophied, making the war in Ukraine a potentially dangerous flashpoint for Western and Russian policymakers who have forgotten the lessons of the past.

• Fiona Hill, “Putin Has the U.S. Right Where He Wants It,” New York Times, January 24, 2022.
  • Putin is a master at manufacturing crises that can only end in a “win” for him; his maneuvers around Ukraine have put the Biden administration on the defensive, and he hopes to force agreement on a new security deal which will “evict the United States from Europe.”
  • Putin’s timing is not coincidental. He is obsessed with history, and he “believes that the United States is currently in the same predicament as Russia was after the Soviet collapse: grievously weakened at home and in retreat abroad.”
     
• Sergey Radchenko, “Moscow Musings on Brinksmanship from Stalin to Putin,” War on the Rocks, February 22, 2022.
  • The behavior of Soviet leaders like Stalin and Khrushchev shows that seemingly irrational risks taken by Russia are not, after all, irrational. They are simply large, necessary risks in accordance with a distinctive understanding of Russia’s core interests.
  • The vastly diverging worldviews of the US and Russia mean that reason cannot bridge the gap between two sides—so the two players turn to force instead.
  • Injured pride plays a major role in Russian decisions today—including the impulse to give the Americans “a little of their own medicine,” prodding them at a time of national weakness to test their credibility and commitments.
  • As the US-China rivalry increasingly dominates global affairs, Putin is determined to claw back some of the influence in Eastern Europe that Soviet leaders took for granted.

• Mary Sarotte, “Russia, Ukraine and the 30-year quest for a post-Soviet order,” Financial Times, February 25, 2022.
  • The war in Ukraine marks the end of the “post-Cold War order,” but the seeds of this conflict were sown even as the USSR was crumbling. Muddled US policy on NATO expansion in the 1990s created new grievances among former Soviet states not admitted to the alliance—and in Russian leaders like Putin, who resented encroaching Western influence on their borders.
     
• Timothy Snyder, “Putin’s denial of Ukrainian statehood carries dark historical echoes,” Financial Times, February 23, 2022.
  • The Ukrainian identity has deep historical roots separate from Soviet or Russian influence; its growth was fostered over many years by people ethnically and linguistically Ukrainian.
  • Putin’s assault on Ukraine is based on a twisted understanding of Ukrainian history which argues that there is no Ukraine—but instead, only a part of Russia which is destined to be controlled by Russians.
     
• Chris Miller, “Why Is Putin at War Again? Because He Keeps Winning.” New York Times, February 25, 2022.
  • Russia’s military successes over the past fifteen years (in Georgia, Crimea, and Syria) demonstrate that the Russian military is a modern and threatening fighting force, capable of achieving political gains for Putin when he is willing to deploy limited force.
     
• Niall Ferguson, “Joe Biden Has Only Days to Avoid Becoming Jimmy Carter,” Bloomberg, February 27, 2022.
  • Russian leaders who lose wars rarely survive for much longer; Putin knows this, and will be willing to ramp up violence against Ukrainian civilians to save his own skin.

• Niall Ferguson, “Putin’s Ukrainian War Is About Making Vladimir Great Again,” Bloomberg, January 2, 2022.
  • Putin’s historical model in the Ukraine crisis is Tsar Peter the Great, who routed the powerful Charles XII of Sweden at Poltava in Ukraine. Putin is bent on recovering the rising glory reminiscent of Peter’s Russia—and will therefore invade Ukraine, regardless of what threats the West makes.
  • Even though Russia’s economy is relatively small, consider that the Axis Powers’ GDPs in 1939, added together, barely equaled US GDP; it is not necessary to be an economic “Goliath” to start a war.
     
• Natia Seskuria, “Russia Is Reenacting Its Georgia Playbook in Ukraine,” Foreign Policy, February 22, 2022.
  • Putin’s devious tactics in the 2008 invasion of Georgia—such as conducting military “exercises” nearby, falsely announcing a withdrawal of forces just before attacking, and pushing disinformation about “genocide” against ethnic Russians—demonstrate that his moves around Ukraine are pretext for a larger attack.

• Niall Ferguson, “Joe Biden Has Only Days to Avoid Becoming Jimmy Carter,” Bloomberg, February 27, 2022.
  • Kissinger’s tactics in the Yom Kippur War of 1973 offer a playbook for Biden on Ukraine: ensure the Ukrainians receive enough US arms to avert defeat, seize the diplomatic initiative to ensure that the US will be the broker of any negotiated peace, and be willing to use nuclear saber-rattling to intimidate Moscow.
     
• Niall Ferguson, “The Fates of Ukraine and Putin Turn on 7 Forces of History,” Bloomberg, March 9, 2022.
  • The elevation of US nuclear forces to Defcon 3 during the Yom Kippur War successfully deterred the Soviets from sending troops to aid their Arab allies against Israel; the Biden administration should not let modern Russian nuclear threats pass unanswered, lest it be seen as a sign of weakness.
     
• Edward Luce, “Biden should use cold war handbook to stop Putin’s Ukraine threat,” Financial Times, February 11, 2022.
  • The Carter administration successfully averted an invasion of Poland in 1980 as Soviet troops massed on the eastern Polish border. Although Putin is far stronger today than the Soviets in 1980—and although China was newly friendly to the US after normalizing relations in 1979—Biden can draw lessons from how the US government threatened dramatic economic consequences and convinced Brezhnev that an invasion of Poland would be too costly.
     
• Chris Miller, “Why Is Putin at War Again? Because He Keeps Winning.” New York Times, February 25, 2022.
  • The West must address its unforced error of allowing Russia to outpace it militarily in Eastern Europe, taking steps such as increasing military spending—rather than simply relying on soft power and economic influence.
     
• Mike Pietrucha and Mike Benitez, “The Dangerous Allure of the No-Fly Zone,” War on the Rocks, March 4, 2022.
  • The history of no-fly zones imposed in Iraq, Kosovo, and Bosnia demonstrates that this tool is not the surgical, low-risk option many have pushed for in Ukraine; advanced weapons technology makes no-fly zones exceedingly difficult and dangerous for the party fielding aircraft.
  • Russian airpower has not yet posed a major threat to Ukraine; for this reason (and because a no-fly zone may inadvertently escalate the conflict), a no-fly zone is an inappropriate tool for the West to deploy.
     
• “America returns to containment to deal with Russia and China,” Economist, March 14, 2022.
  • George Kennan’s theory of containment is experiencing a rapid revival in Western capitals, and the US refusal to militarily confront Russia in Ukraine reiterates that containment must often operate by indirect or non-violent means.
  • The dual threat of China and Russia requires a nuanced US strategy for the coming years; isolating and pressuring Russia may pay dividends by incentivizing China to distance itself from Putin.

• Nicholas Mulder, “How America Learn to Love (Ineffective) Sanctions,” Foreign Policy, January 30, 2022.
  • Truly effective sanctions are not “peaceful” tools: they are modeled on the economic blockade imposed against the Central Powers in World War I, which killed hundreds of thousands of civilians.
  • Sanctions are rarely effective tools on their own, especially against large, strong states capable of weathering their effects.
  • Economic pressure via sanctions can backfire by stoking nationalist resentment, causing such pain that the targeted populations succumb to chaos, or goading the targeted state into outright war.
     
• Paul Kennedy, “The Limits of Sanctions, From Abyssinia to Ukraine,” Wall Street Journal, January 27, 2022.
  • From the interwar history of sanctions as an alternative tool to war, it is clear that sanctions are far more effective against small, nearly powerless states—and rarely effective against large, powerful states with authoritarian leaders who can mobilize all national assets to counteract the effect of sanctions.
  • Sanctions will similarly be ineffective if they are mild and intended “to show disapproval rather than to punish”; if there are large financial or commercial loopholes in the sanctions; or if a great power steps in to supply or purchase from the targeted state.
  • Sanctions may backfire by encouraging authoritarian leaders to develop economic independence from an integrated global system.
     
• Niall Ferguson, “The Fates of Ukraine and Putin Turn on 7 Forces of History,” Bloomberg, March 9, 2022.
  • As in World War I, when the Allied nations imposed a blockade on Germany, sanctions will not be enough on their own to stop Putin—especially for a nation like Russia which, in the Soviet past, demonstrated its capacity for autarky.

• Sergey Radchenko, “Sergey Radchenko, an expert on Russia’s foreign relations, writes on its evolving friendship with China,” Economist, February 15, 2022.
  • During the Cold War, the USSR expected deference from China as the “junior partner” in the Sino-Soviet alliance, which ultimately proved fatal since Mao was unwilling to defer; Xi has learned this strategic lesson and treats his junior partner, Putin, virtually as an equal—meaning that their flexible, anti-Western alignment will likely endure for some time.
     
• Graham Allison, “Ukraine Crisis: Will China Have Putin’s Back?” National Interest, February 25, 2022.
  • If China chooses to align itself with Russia and the invasion of Ukraine, it faces the prospect of a Cold War-like alliance of Western and Asian powers aligned against it; the Chinese government will also be put in the uncomfortable position of defending a blatant violation of its own principles of “sovereignty and territorial integrity.”
  • Nevertheless, Xi’s carefully crafted partnership with Putin is operationally significant for both countries. When push comes to shove, China will have Putin’s back.

• Niall Ferguson, “Investors Are Often the First Casualties of War,” Bloomberg, February 20, 2022.
  • Major wars in the past have dramatically impacted financial markets, but we have forgotten this history based on the lesser impacts of smaller conflicts like the Gulf War, the wars in the Balkans, and the Russian annexation of Crimea, which have been overshadowed by monetary expansions that followed the 2008 financial crisis and the COVID-19 pandemic.
  • War in Ukraine would be far more impactful than even the Afghanistan or Iraq War, primarily because of the dramatic consequences of Western sanctions on Russia. Even more consequential, Russian success in conquering Ukraine could drive China to attack Taiwan—with dire financial consequences, should China win (and unseat the US dollar as a safe and strong investment) or should the US come to Taiwan’s aid (and begin a massive international war).
     
• Niall Ferguson, “The Fates of Ukraine and Putin Turn on 7 Forces of History,” Bloomberg, March 9, 2022.
  • Popular fervor in support of independence movements—whether Britons rallying in support of the Greeks in the 1820s or Americans cheering on Ukraine today—has little effect on the outcome of a war; its only effect is to pressure political leaders to take action.
  • History repeatedly demonstrates that war is the most common cause of spiking inflation—and the war in Ukraine comes atop extant inflation driven by excessive stimulus in 2021.
     
• Sarah Bidgood, “A New Nuclear Arms Race Is a Real Possibility,” Foreign Policy, March 15, 2022.
  • The Cuban Missile Crisis profoundly affected nuclear arms control for decades by instilling deep mistrust between Washington and Moscow, sparking progress on arms control ideas which had already been proposed, and inciting a rapid increase in both American and Soviet nuclear stockpiles. Given the paltry efforts at arms control between the US and Russia in recent years, the Ukraine crisis may further chill prospects for nuclear arms control.

This course offers two analytical perspectives based on the study of twelve diplomatic and military crises that are frequently seen as turning points in the modern era. To contextualize each crisis, we explore what the dominant strategic theories were at the time and how they were deployed in practice in the heat of the crisis. (Think of this as a vertical, historically oriented axis of understanding.) Then we examine the linkages between crises. Are there modes of behavior or thought that are of general utility in such moments? Can strategic thought ever truly claim to be universally applicable? Did decision-makers learn and apply lessons from previous crises, and with what success? (Think of this as a horizontal, thematic axis of understanding.) At its core, the course is an argument for bringing history back into the core of strategic thought. In short, it is an exercise in applied history.

Download Syllabus

• Strategy and Crisis Syllabus

What is history?  And can a better understanding of the past allow us to pursue wiser, more effective strategy and statecraft?

There are a variety of ways to study and try to understand foreign policy and international relations. Social scientists, such as economists and political scientists, attempt to isolate variables, measure and aggregate observations, identify causality, locate generalizable trends, and develop theories for what shapes and drives international relations over time and space.  Statesman and practitioners often rely on their personal experience and training in diplomacy to understand and manage the world around them.  Historians look to the past, uncover and assess new evidence, and examine both the long and short-term causes of important global events and phenomena, focusing on their context while weighing their significance and uniqueness and arguing over their meaning.  This course aims to explore all three practices, to see when and how they overlap and inform each other, and to see if the interaction can be more fruitful, with a particular emphasis on historical study.

The primary goal of this course is to familiarize advanced students of foreign policy and international relations with both historical methods and to develop what I call a historical sensibility. This can be challenging. The past provides few clear rules or lessons, it is often contested and controversial, and can easily be misused. History eschews forecasts, rarely isolates variables, and makes few general claims. Unlike many intellectual endeavors, there is no one shared “how to” guidebook to being a historian. Furthermore, the academic historical community has become, for reasons we will explore during the course, less explicit about their methods, assumptions, and research designs, and more ambivalent about engaging both strategy and statecraft.  For their part, policymakers and strategists often overlook the power (and perils) of historical insight to inform our understanding of the world we live in. At first glance, the busy decision-maker may find little of immediate value or promise by engaging history.  The relationship between these communities can be awkward, even strained.  This is, to my view, less than optimal. Historians, strategists, and statesman can and should do more to engage each other.  This course will explore how historical knowledge and historical skills can be used to better understand policy (with a focus on U.S. national and international security) and lead to more thoughtful discussion and debate about the pressing global challenges we face.  It will also suggest how historians can better sensitize themselves to the realities decision-makers face.

Download Syllabus

• History, Strategy, and Statecraft Syllabus

What are the major patterns in the history of American strategy and statecraft? How has the United States handled key diplomatic and military crises in the past? What challenges have the most important American statespeople faced, and what strategies did they develop to advance U.S. interests? What lessons do their experiences hold for leaders today and in the future?

This course is structured around an effort to answer these questions. This course is part 1 of 2 of the new Henry A. Kissinger Center curriculum in history, strategy, and statecraft; it provides students with an introduction to issues of strategy, war, and diplomacy, framed against the history of U.S. foreign policy. The course will begin with a discussion of the nature of strategy and statecraft, and of how history can help us understand these issues. The bulk of the course will explore American statecraft and strategy by looking at the policies and personalities of important American leaders, from Washington through Obama. We will examine the range of factors that went into their strategy and statecraft, including personal and political history, ideas, beliefs, and traditions in American foreign relations, and the pressing challenges of the day. Our hope is that this course will help students generate basic principles and guidelines that can be used to improve American approaches to strategy, war, and diplomacy in the years to come. The second part of this course (offered in the spring semester) will encourage students to apply these principles to the particular foreign policy challenges the United States confronts today.

Download Syllabus

• History, Strategy, and American Statecraft Syllabus

A study of the military history of the West since 1500, with particular emphasis upon the relationship between armies and navies on the one hand, and technology, economics and geography, and the rise of the modern nation-state on the other. The lectures covering the period after 1900 will also focus upon air power and sea power in their varied manifestations, as well as looking at recent developments in asymmetrical warfare. HIST 221/GLBL 281 provides a foundation lecture course for Yale Air Force/ROTC and Navy/ROTC students.

Download Syllabus

• Military History of the West Syllabus

This course offers students the opportunity to explore the lives and work of a number of fascinating men and women, who led organizations, countries, and movements during periods of widespread disruption. The course aims to understand the values these individuals lived by, the decisions they reached, —including the strategies they pursued, and the tradeoffs they faced as they created widespread power in companies, nations, and communities.  It also focuses on the impact that each of these individuals had and how this impact was related to their respective missions. Particular attention is paid to the lessons these leaders offer for men and women today who want to make a real, positive difference in the world.

The class also covers the life journeys of these people, including their evolution as human beings. Throughout the semester, students are encouraged to examine the choices the leaders made, the paths they traveled—including the mistakes and failures they experienced—the missions they nurtured, and the larger stage on which these people acted.  In looking closely at the agency of individuals who have exerted lasting influence, students are challenged to consider their own agency, along with their ambitions, deepest values, and ideas about leadership.

Download Syllabus

• Power and Glory Syllabus

History is central to IGA 217, “US Foreign Policy in a Global Age.” The course examines key points in American foreign policy over the past century, starting with intervention in World War I and ending with several class sessions on developments under Obama and now Trump. On day one I acknowledge that historical training confers no automatic insight in the sphere of public affairs, that history is as likely to be misused as to provide lessons, and that it sometimes resists efforts to become “applied.” I also insist, however, on the importance of cultivating a historical sensibility, and I tell the students that history can and should serve as a basis for effective, conscientious policymaking; in turn, effective, conscientious policymaking should be based on historical awareness and reflection. The course then proceeds from that basis. Emphasis is on discussion of assigned readings as well as group presentations. There is one simulation (I plan to add a second one next time), on LBJ’s decision to Americanize the war in Vietnam in 1965. Counterfactuals come into play at various points, and we give due consideration to the often-close connection between domestic politics and foreign policy in recent US history.

Download Syllabus

• U.S. Foreign Policy in A Global Age Syllabus

Today we often hear that American democracy is broken—but what does a healthy democracy look like? How has American democratic governance functioned in the past, and how has it changed over time? This course approaches American history with these questions in mind. Utilizing the case method, each class session revolves around a dedicated case study that introduces students to a critical episode in the history of American democracy, from the Constitutional Convention to Citizens United. Vigorous class discussions encourage students to challenge each other’s assumptions about democratic values and practices, and to draw their own conclusions about what “democracy” means in America.

Together, the cases explore the development of democratic ideas, institutions, and practices in the United States from the late eighteenth century to the present. The limited scope of the decision point featured in each case (such as how a special commission appointed by Theodore Roosevelt should respond to a major labor dispute in the anthracite coal industry in 1902) does not imply that the cases simply report on narrow historical episodes. Rather, each case frames a core decision within a broader historical context (such as the broader history of industrial-labor relations in the U.S.), which may span decades or even centuries. Being historical in nature, the cases address decisions that have already been made, but many of the themes they raise are ones that continue to resonate today. Indeed, in wrestling with these historical cases, students inevitably think in new ways about the challenges facing the nation’s democracy now, and what sorts of changes and reforms may be needed going forward.

Download Syllabus

• History of American Democracy Syllabus

The student body at the U.S. Naval War College is comprised of U.S. military officers from each of the services, U.S. government civilians, and international officers. The Strategy & Policy Department teaches two core courses -- the intermediate-level Strategy & War course, which is designed for mid-career officers holding the rank of O-4 (Lieutenant Commanders/Majors) who are preparing to hold positions of command; and the senior-level Strategy & Policy course, which is designed for officers at the rank of O-5 and O-6 (Commanders/Captains/Colonels) who have already held positions of senior leadership. Both courses use historical case studies ranging from Antiquity to the present to illustrate the relevance of several course themes including the interrelationship of policy, strategy, and operations. We supplement these case studies with readings from a variety of military theorists, including Thucydides, Carl von Clausewitz, Alfred Thayer Mahan, and Mao Zedong. The Strategy & War course has a thematic focus on military strategy in wartime, specifically the strategic effects of military operations, and evaluates the reasons why nations are either successful or unsuccessful at waging war. The Strategy & Policy course deals with grand strategy writ large and considers broader issues such as the nature of long-term competitions, the rise and fall of great powers, and the construction, preservation, and decline of world orders. Neither course is strictly speaking a history course. Rather, we follow Clausewitz's admonition to practice critical analysis, which includes gathering and evaluating historical facts, establishing the origins/root causes of key events, and most importantly asking whether alternative courses of action were available to military and civilian leaders. Ultimately, both courses aim to give students a nuanced appreciation of the utility of military force as an instrument of national power, while impressing upon them that tactical and operational skill offer no guarantee of enduring strategic success.

Download Syllabus

• Strategy and War Syllabus
• Strategy and Policy Syllabus

Nobody can understand the present without a keen understanding of the past. After all, history is all we have to go on in providing the resources for making sense of the world we live in. Successful policymakers often understand this and turn a view of the past to their advantage in interpreting the present. They understand how any good strategy is grounded in a sound view of history.

History and historical methodologies can give policymakers a keener appreciation of what is possible to do, but also of what must be avoided and what needs to be changed. History is mainly about change; relentless, often confusing processes, over which individuals, communities, and even states seemingly have little say. But by studying change at key points in human history, we can prepare ourselves better for taking charge of our future, and for promoting or steering change when needed.

This class looks at major shifts in history from European and Asian antiquity up to today. It looks at power in all its dimensions – material, demographic, technological, ideological, military, or religious – and shows how it has influenced and been influenced by major transformations in global history. Our aim is to better identify the key causes of power shifts, but also to get an impression of the fickleness of established orders in times of tectonic change.

We have prepared twelve new cases specifically for this class. They range from the Peloponnesian War and the origins of Islamic empires up to the invasion of Iraq and US-China relations today. Through these cases we want to discuss the different dimensions of power and how they shift over time. We also want to look comparatively at how leaders have initiated, steered, or responded to power shifts. The purpose of the cases is to illuminate how people in the past have reacted to major change and how their choices may help us understand the tools and options that are at our disposal when making critical decisions.

Download Syllabus

• Power Shifts Syllabus