Applied History Project

The mission of Harvard’s Applied History Project is to revitalize applied history by promoting the production and use of historical reasoning to clarify public and private challenges and choices. Founded by Professors Graham Allison and Niall Ferguson in 2016, the Applied History Project builds upon the foundation laid by Professors Ernest May and Richard Neustadt in the 1980s, reflected in their book Thinking in Time: The Uses of History for Decision Makers. 

Advancing its mission, the Project sponsors the Applied History Working Group of faculty members across Harvard University to organize discussions with scholars and practitioners; supports historians and policymakers in producing Applied History; develops courses in Applied History; funds the Ernest May Fellowships in History and Policy for pre- and post-doctoral students; and holds Applied History Events open to the Harvard Community and the public. Harvard’s project is one of the leaders among a rapidly expanding network of universities and think tanks that are furthering the discipline of Applied History by clarifying predicaments and choices to inform better decisions.

The Project gratefully acknowledges the Stanton Foundation's generous support for its Applied History endeavors. 

Quote of the Week 

“In a word, we may gather out of history a policy no less wise than eternal; by the comparison and application of other men’s fore-passed miseries with our own like errors and ill deservings.” – Sir Walter Raleigh, “Preface,” The History of the World (1614) 

(More Quotes ») 

Article of the Week 

“Opportunistic Aggression in the Past and Lessons for Today: The Korean War” – Matthew R. Costlow, National Institute for Public Policy, July 7, 2025. 

“Although historical parallels are never perfect, U.S. leaders today also face the stark possibility of opportunistic aggression, or even coordinated aggression, under the nuclear shadow and thus will benefit from examining the hard-learned lessons of the past,” Costlow writes. He cites an illuminating quote from General Matthew Ridgeway, who said, “‘the nation’s top civilian and military leaders… [believed that] the kind of ‘victory’ sought by the Theater Commander, even if it were attained in Korea, would have incurred overbalancing elsewhere.’” The lesson for U.S. policymakers today? “Victory in a limited conflict may be ideal for deterring opportunistic or coordinated aggression, but the cost of victory may be deterrence failure in a second theater.”